

to intimidate Yugoslavia with regard to Soviet-Yugoslav friendship while spreading throughout Western and Eastern Europe alike the notion that without Tito Yugoslavia cannot possibly exist.

The claims of the Yugoslavs to the contrary, there is hard evidence that the campaign has wrought significant damage:

— The difficulty which each of the pre-Congress conferences of national subsectors has experienced with nationalists has been severe, even to the point of reshufflings and purges in the two key sectors, Serbia and Croatia. The renewed vigorous activity of the Croatian Party in Exile (a Frankfurt-based operation with possible ties to the Ustashi — the Croatian Fascist organization), openly calling for Soviet intervention to help set up a separate Croatian state, received wide publicity in West Germany, and a special Ettore Petta dispatch in *Corriere della Sera* on April 14 — just as the Croatian LCC conference was being held and as Executive Committee Chairman Josip Vrhovec's opening speech strongly attacked foreign pressures on the LCC.

— The Yugoslavs responded to U.S. import restrictions against Yugoslavia with the pathetic comment that there must be some mistake — the regulations were supposed to be aimed at *Communist* countries!

— In a major speech on April 15 in Sarajevo Tito asserted emphatically that the Yugoslavs do not fear the Soviets. The strong implication was that the psywar campaign had had discernible consequences, and had produced a significant popular attitude of fear of the Soviets which Tito was forced to address.

Transatlantic Strategy

While the European continent was being fed Red Army takeover stories and territorial/nationality-violation bulletins, Americans were assaulted on *their* point of vulnerability: the anti-Soviet bogey of "thought control," repression of intellectuals, and violation of individualism. The "evidence" came in the form of Yugoslavia's persecution of the eight Belgrade philosophy professors (the "Praxis" group) under attack by Tito as "anarcho-liberalists." February 22-25 the *New York Times* raked these coals. A committee of American scholars was formed to rally to the defense of the Belgrade 8; among its luminaries were State Department socialists Daniel Bell, Stanley Hoffman, Noam Chomsky, Robert S. Cohen, Charles Frankel, and Herbert Marcuse, as *New York Times* writer Raymond Anderson announced as early as January 31.

Eric Pace reported February 23 the special persecution of Professor M. Markovic, who was denied a passport to come to the American Association for Advanced Sciences California symposium on "Problems of Forbidden and Discouraged Knowledge." Markovic is identified as the intellectual who was first persecuted in 1965 for an article on Soviet prison camps claiming that the Russians, not the Nazis, invented concentration camps. PEN-American Center President Jerzy Kosinski linked the Yugoslav campaign to the Solzhenitsyn deportation; while Pennsylvania University Professor of Philosophy Richard C. Jeffrey noted in a letter that Markovic was a faculty member of the University of Pennsylvania last year and had had an essay published in the *New York Times*, and that Z. Pesic-Golubovic, also of the Belgrade 8, was denied a passport to visit the University of Pennsylvania this year.

Significantly, it is out of the University of Pennsylvania that Tavistock co-thinker Eric Trist operates his criminal Wharton School network of menticide and slave labor against ghetto youth, as extensively documented in *New Solidarity*.

At the very outset of coverage of the persecution campaign, Raymond Anderson reported in the *New York Times* that the Belgrade 8 had been offered non-

teaching positions at full salary by the Yugoslav authorities, but that "they favor leaves of absence for a few years to take teaching posts in the West."

The U.S. press overlooked Major Sejna's revelations, which so scandalized Europe. When the Yugoslav-Italian border dispute became official in early March, the *Times* occupied itself with recounting how housewives in Yugoslavia would not be able to participate directly in the national political process (*New York Times*, March 9); how two Britons accused of spying on Soviet airlifts during the October Mideast war were appealing for freedom in Belgrade (*New York Times*, March 16); and how Yugoslavia was planning a national celebration of the founding of its State Security Police, who were quoted as needing modernized equipment (*New York Times*, March 17). Only on March 22 did the Zone B dispute receive mention, and no editorial comment appeared until March 31. The dispute was then treated as a clumsy and even pathetic propaganda ploy on the part of the two nations involved to build up respective internal unity.

The significance of the anti-Yugoslavia campaign can be measured in its capacity to wreck what the Rockefeller interests had analyzed as Soviet expectations for the New Year (as drawn up by Hedrick Smith, the *New York Times* slick man in Moscow, in an article entitled "Soviet Exults in the West's Problems"). According to Smith, Soviet expectations for 1974 were: (1) increased Soviet stature and credibility in the Mideast; (2) an advantageous world trading position; (3) Warsaw Pact solidarity and European detente; (4) East-West troop reductions; (5) Yugoslavia and Rumania "lured" closer to the Soviet orbit; (6) political unmooring of and economic competition with Western powers. These expectations were rendered virtually inoperative by late April through the Rockefeller/CIA offensive on numerous fronts: from the heating up of the cold war by Rockefeller's brinkmanship operative U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger; to Rockefeller's created explosions in the Mideast, accomplished through the offices of Dr. Henry Kissinger; to the rupture in East bloc relations achieved by the psychological-warfare operation under examination in this case study of Rockefeller's use of major sections of the bourgeois press.

CHINESE TO INCREASE TRADE WITH ROCKEFELLER/CIA GENERALS

May 17 (IPS)— The Brazilian Export Association mission is back from China, and China is due to return the visit this year. At that time, official economic relations will be re-established. In 1973, China bought \$100 million worth of commodities from Brazil, of which \$58 million was direct purchases and the rest mediated through third parties [*Diario Las Americas*].