

Part IV: Bare CIA Watergate Role

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by Lyn Marcus

NEW YORK, May 6 — Despite hysterical efforts to ignore the fact by leading press agencies, the two major "Watergate" documents publicized this past week have begun to bring the role of the CIA in the affair plainly out into the open.

During the same week that the White House published its 1,308-page "Watergate" tape document, former President's counsel Charles "Chuck" Colson issued a brief largely blaming the CIA for the affair. The connection between the two documents is obvious. Few informed students of the 1,308-page release will believe that either the connection or timing of the two items is coincidental.

To the extent that an investigating body treats the White House tapes as hard evidence, the tapes clearly exonerate Nixon of all charges but one. That single opening for further investigation is a matter of the \$120,000 "blackmail" payment to "former" CIA operative E. Howard Hunt. Despite the President's claim that the tapes clear him in this particular matter, the famous March 21, 1973 sections do leave room for reasonable doubt.

The tapes are not truly conclusive, either for or against Nixon. All of the participants in those exchanges knew that the tapes were being recorded, which would have influenced what they would have said and not said. (At some point in 1973 the speakers must have anticipated the possibility of the tapes being subpoenaed. However, even long before that time, when it would have been believed that there would be no outside access to the tapes, the speaker would have guarded his statements out of regard for what might have been held against him in intra-White House bureaucratic wranglings. No tape-recorded conferences within an experienced bureaucracy can be treated as infallibly candid.)

However, to the extent that the tapes are given weight as evidence, they narrow the work of the House Judiciary Committee and Jaworski to only one line of investigation: **What did Hunt have that enabled him to blackmail the White House?** The calculated effect of the taped transcript is to provide such investigators with no alternative but either to pursue the Hunt angle or drop further impeachment efforts.

The investigators are now forced to ask themselves: **Is this a trap?** The transcript is filled with strong hints that Hunt is bait for a trap.

"(5) that Dean had personally destroyed documents from Hunt's safe: or (6) that Dean had ordered Hunt out of the country, and then retracted the order." (p. 11)

"They confirmed to the President, as Dean had, that no one at the White House had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. Erlichman said, 'There just isn't a scintilla of a hint that Dean knew about this.' The Pres-

ident asked about the possibility of Colson having prior knowledge and Erlichman said, 'His response was one of total surprise...He was totally non-plussed, as the rest of us.' Erlichman then reviewed with the President the earlier concern that they had for national security leaks and the steps taken to find out how they occurred.'(p.27)

Nixon: "...You can't keep it out if Hunt talks. You see the point is irrelevant. It has gotten to this point."

Dean: "You might put it on a national security grounds basis."

Haldeman: "(unintelligible) - CIA - "

Dean: "Ah -"

Haldeman: "Seriously."

Nixon: "National security? We had to get information for national security grounds."

Dean: "Then the question is, why didn't the CIA do it or why didn't the FBI do it?"

Nixon: "Because we had to do it on a confidential basis."

Haldeman: "Because we were checking them."

Nixon: "Neither could be trusted."

...

Nixon: "On that one I think we should simply say this was a national security investigation that was conducted.

And on that basis, I think the same in the drug field with Krogh..." (March 21, 1973)

...

Nixon: "...Anything on the (unintelligible) thing, the plumbing thing was national security, the ITT thing."

...

Nixon: "It's a national security - national security area - and that's a national security problem." (April 17, 1973)

...

Wilson: [on the papers from Hunt's safe, part of which were deep-sixed by John Dean] "I don't think it was as much political as it was — didn't he have something to do with national security?"

Nixon: "Yes." (April 19, 1973)

...

Nixon: [to Peterson] "You remember my call from Camp David. I said, Don't go into the national security stuff..." (April 27, 1973)

Those citations are exemplary of a repeated theme throughout the transcript. In effect, Nixon, Haldeman, and Erlichman state that the plumbers operation was chiefly directed to checking important breaches of national security by the National Security Council, the CIA and the FBI, and that Hunt's potential disclosures and blackmail go into that area.

The FBI Trap

The most conspicuous feature of the transcript's editing is the extent to which it includes matters not integral to the Watergate affair. The readers have been deliberately given some particularly enticing tidbits apparently extraneous to the narrow purview of the House Judiciary and Jaworski investigations.

While the finger of doubt pointed at the National Security Council and CIA does not fall into that category of gratuitous disclosures, the discussion of Senator Edward Kennedy's Chappaquidick problems and of the FBI involves segments of discussion whose inclusion in the published transcript is not so directly justified.

Pages 111 - 156 of the transcript bear marginally on the Watergate matters themselves, thus providing an excellent pretext for publishing discussions extremely offensive to Senator Kennedy and to the FBI.

Referring to former FBI official Sullivan's disclosures, the following discussion ensues:

Nixon: "Let's look at the future. How bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly damaged?"

Dean: "Do you mind if I take this back and kick it around with Dick Moore? These other questions. I think it would be damaging to the FBI, but maybe it is time to shake the FBI and rebuild it. I am not so sure the FBI is everything it is cracked up to be. I am convinced the FBI isn't everything the public thinks it is."

Nixon: "No."

Dean: "I know quite well it isn't." (March 13, 1973)

Dean, during that same session, picks up on Nixon's strong hint at one point, in the following way:

Nixon: "... There is not a Watergate around in this town, not so much our opponents, even the media, but the basic thing is the establishment. The establishment is dying, and so they've got to show that despite the successes we have had in foreign policy and in the election, they've got to show that it is just wrong because of this. They are trying to use this as the whole thing."

Dean: "Well, that is why I keep coming back to this fellow Sullivan. It could change the picture."

Nixon: "How could it change it though? Saying here is another."

Dean: "Saying here is another and it happens to be Democrats. You know I just--"

Nixon: "If he would get Kennedy into it, too, I would be a little more pleased."

Immediately, Dean outlines the result if investigators check Donald Segretti's link to Kalmbach, and then Kalmbach's records back through the July 1969 - June 1971 period: "...there comes Chappaquidick with a vengeance. This guy is a 20 year detective on the New York City Police Department," referring to the person hired by Kalmbach to spend a year investigating the Chappaquidick incident as an employee under Jack Caulfield. The conversation continues:

Nixon: "In other words we--"

Dean: "He is ready to disprove and show that--"

Nixon: "If they get to us that is going to come out and this whole thing can turn around on that. If Kennedy knew the bear trap he was walking into--"

Nixon: "How do we know why don't we get it out anyway?"

Dean: "Well, we have sort of saved it."

The interview concludes with another reference to the potential of Sullivan's various disclosures:

Dean: "...if I have one liability in Sullivan here, it is knowledge of the earlier (unintelligible) that occurred here."

Nixon: "That we did?"

Dean: "That we did."

Nixon: "Well, why don't you tell him - he could say, 'I did no political work at all. My work in the Nixon Administration was solely in the national security.' And that is thoroughly true."

The Colson Angle

The thrust of Colson's newly publicized defense concerning his own Watergate legal problems is that it is impossible for him to enjoy an unprejudiced trial because of massive publicity generated by such agencies as a CIA-front public relations firm which formerly employed the ubiquitous E. Howard Hunt. Few informed observers will believe that the timing of Colson's move is coincidental. They will regard it as probably part of the same tactic as the White House publication of the tapes transcript.

For example, the representative exchanges between John Dean and Nixon Feb. 28, 1973:

Dean: "Chuck is going to be of aid when he is out there not connected with the White House, coming through with bits of tidbits..."

Nixon: "Sure! Sure!...Colson can be more valuable out than in...outside he can start this and say I am a private citizen and I can say what I (expletive omitted) please."

Although subsequent exchanges indicate that Colson was disliked by Dean and considered a bit too much of a maverick by Nixon, April 16, 1973, we note the following indicative observation by John Erlichman:

"Colson called and says you've got an ass [transcriber's error: he certainly said 'asp'] at your bosom over there, and so, today he checked again, apparently with Howard, and discovered that Dean was still here, and he called and said, 'I've got to see you.' He came in and he says, 'You guys are just out of your minds,' and said he wanted to see the President."

The following day, Nixon noted, "Colson's recommendation is to get him out by firing him," which is the way Nixon subsequently did deal with the matter.

The editing of the tapes transcript strongly suggests to the House Judiciary Committee and Jaworski that the

only point on which impeachment can be pushed is the point if E. Howard Hunt. However, if such a push is made, it is strongly implied that "All the trees in the forest might fall."

The reach of the deeper investigations includes not only the CIA, NSC, FBI, Senator Kennedy, but also Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. The Gray and Sullivan features lead into a devastating exposure of the FBI. The general investigation of Hunt and the plumbers unit leads into the ITT affair, the RAND Corporation, the NSC leaks and the Ellsberg hoax. The exchange of March 17, 1973 demands a full investigation of the CIA angle. Donald Segretti's involvement leads to Chappaquidick and some alleged unknown horrors. Then, the following tidbit: **Dean:** "On the '68 thing, I haven't probed Sullivan to the depths on this thing because I want to treat him at arm's length until he is safe, because he has a world of information that may be available."

Nixon: "But he says what happened on the bugging thing. Who told what to whom again?"

Dean: "He said that Hoover had told Patrick Coyne about the fact that this was done. Coyne had told Rockefeller. Now Rockefeller had told Kissinger..."

[According to one-time CIA publicity director Kirkpatrick, in his book *The Real CIA*, Patrick Coyne is Nelson Rockefeller's key liaison man to the CIA. Following President Kennedy's dismissal of Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA in 1962, Kirkpatrick claims that Nelson Rockefeller handpicked his friend John McCone as Dulles' successor and then sent his close confidantes Patrick Coyne and General Schuyler in to reorganize the CIA per Rockefeller directive. — Ed.]

Nixon: "Why did Coyne tell it to Nelson Rockefeller?..."

Dean: "...this is Sullivan's story...I don't have any reason to doubt that it is true."

Nixon: "Hoover told me, and he also told Mitchell personally that this had happened...So Hoover told Coyne, who told Rockefeller, that newsmen were being bugged."

Dean: "That tickles you. That is right."

Nixon: "Why do you suppose they did it?"

If Chuck Colson's tactics indicate the direction of Nixon's thinking, as the internal evidence of the transcripts strongly suggest, then John Doan and Leon Jaworski are in trouble.

Is Nixon a CIA Man?

The irony of it all is that Nixon has been a part of the larger CIA establishment for most of his life in national politics. The strongest single suggestion of this occurs within the transcripts during the March 13, 1973 discussion of Sullivan's information.

Nixon: "Why is Sullivan willing to do this?"

Dean: "I think the quid pro quo with Sullivan is that he wants someday back in the Bureau very badly."

Nixon: "That's easy."

Dean: "That's right."

Nixon: "Do you think after he did this, the Bureau would want him back? Would they want him back?"

Dean: "I think not. What Bill Sullivan's desire in life is, is to set up a domestic national security intelligence system, a White House program. He says we are deficient. He says we never have been efficient, because Hoover lost his guts several years ago. If you recall he and Tom Huston worked on it. Tom Huston had your instructions to go out and do it and the whole thing just crumbled."

Nixon: (inaudible)

Dean: "That's all Sullivan really wants. Even if we put him out studying it for a couple of years, if you could put him out in the CIA or someplace where he felt — put him there..."

Nixon: "We will do it."

Sullivan's reported proposal is essentially that identified by Lt. Col. Prouty as original to the Jackson-Dulles-Correa proposal for the CIA. This is complementary to Nixon's counting the "Omnibus Crime" bill a virtual domestic U.S. hunting license with no bag-limit for the CIA — as one of his administration's "law and order" achievements. How does such evidence square with Nixon's current victimization by Rockefeller's establishment? The CIA is the principal conduit and coordinating agency for a Rockefeller-headed Anglo-American fascist machine created in collaboration with Winston Churchill. The means of establishment of the Rockefellers' control over all major issues of U.S. policy, domestic and foreign, was Churchill's declaration of "Cold war" which represented a controlled political environment, to which everyone adapted who got ahead in national politics. Nixon, like numerous others not on the inside of the Tavistock-centered Anglo-American establishment machine, progressed by his ruthless adaption to the climate created by the Rockefellers, and was successfully (if sometimes reluctantly) used by the Rockefellers.

As we foresaw and wrote in the spring of 1971, in our feature article, "Nixon for Sale Cheap," Rockefeller would (and has) moved to dump Nixon as a scapegoat as soon as the U.S. labor movement had been broken by Nixon-instituted austerity programs.

The difficulty facing the Communist Party and most liberals on this point is the fact that they naively explain fascism as an outgrowth of conservative moods and tendencies. In historical fact, contrary to such liberal and CP myths, fascism has always emerged as a "radical" movement of lumpen-proletarians, "counterculture freaks," and declassed ex-servicemen, all guided and funded by such major financial establishments as the Thyssens, Krupps, and Rockefeller's I.G. Farben allies, Lawfully, as with the financier-funded anarchist Mussolini, or the German National Socialist Workers

Party, Rockefeller has moved to a Democratic Party-linked "constituency" of fascist "local community control," typified by John Doar's base in New York City, and the CIA's "local community control of police" LEAA.

The conservatives — Nixon's immediate base — are being pushed aside to make way for fascism

The conservatives, like Nixon and Goldwater, are no less oriented to anti-Communism than the CIA, but they are oriented to the objective of preserving established

constitutional forms at the point that the Rockefellers are moving to destroy all those old constitutional forms throughout North America and Western Europe.

Therefore, the concurrence and violent disagreements between the Nixon Republican and Rockefeller Democratic factions. Now "Watergate" has reached the point that Nixon must either expose and wreck Rockefeller or be destroyed himself. He has run out of all other options.