

SPECIAL REPORTS

European Bloc at NATO Assembly Meeting Votes No to War, Yes to Detente

Nov. 20 (NSIPS) — This week at the NATO Assembly Meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, Jimmy Carter's war strategists were put on notice — by a broad cross-section of delegates from European nations including Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Scandinavia — that their policies have brought NATO to the verge of economic and political disintegration.

For the first time in the history of NATO, a sizable faction stepped forward to denounce the Schlesinger doctrine of "limited nuclear war" and the more recent push by the Carter camp for "forward defense," codewords for a thermonuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the meeting's debate, the West German Chairman of the Bundestag's Defense Committee, Herr Buchstaller, summed up its progress with his announcement that there were irreconcilable differences within NATO between those forces who were pushing for a showdown with the Soviets and the forces of détente. "It is easy for you in the U.S. and Canada to think of winning a war," he stated before the assembled parliamentary delegates, "But we see it differently. For us it is a question of war and peace. These are two entirely different points of view. We must discuss détente."

The Europeans were reacting to the ongoing "Carter transition," power grab in the U.S. — the anti-Soviet threats and hysterics issuing from Carter's war ministry in the wings, the Committee on the Present Danger; Carter's related economic threats against the Europeans and Arabs; and the "show of force" bludgeoning by Carter insiders in the Ford Administration, Kissinger and Rockefeller. European delegates carried out open floorfights against the proposals of Kissinger-Rockefeller, both of whom addressed the meeting, and the delegates representing the U.S. nuclear offensive strategists.

The Carter gang's demands and threats were laid on the Assembly table in heavy-handed fashion early in the week by Henry Kissinger. After first assuring the delegates that his policies were those of Carter, Kissinger demanded that NATO move for a strong nuclear buildup and enunciate a policy of nuclear offensive to combat the growing strength of the Soviet Union. Kissinger warned against the tendency of European nations to develop their own military strategy counter to the "general interests" of Wall Street. He implied that there would be "economic repercussions" if Europe attempted to go it alone.

In effect, what Kissinger demanded was total supranational control over NATO member countries by the U.S. and its puppets; that Europe and Third World members commit themselves to "limited sovereignty" and give up the right to determine their own military and economic policies.

The Europeans correctly viewed Kissinger's proposals as part of the Carter push for nuclear showdown. In consequence, the NATO Assembly Meeting completely broke with its previous

history of quietly rubberstamping whatever the U.S. set before it and directed a well-calculated blow against Carter's war and genocide policies.

What catalyzed the debate was a report submitted early in the week by Pieter Dankert, a delegate from the ruling Labor Party of the Netherlands. In his report, Dankert blasted the Schlesinger doctrine of "limited nuclear war," stating that it was based on a commitment to war with the Soviets and was being implemented through retailing of "pathological suspicions and emotional rhetoric" rather than a realistic assessment of Soviet nuclear strength and the financial abilities of NATO member countries. Dankert charged that the "limited war" doctrine had led to the impossible situation of unlimited expansion of nuclear armaments and a simultaneous demand for "unlimited military credits" from member governments. In the second part of his report, Dankert laid out the "inevitable reality" which NATO would have to face regarding communist influence in both the Third World and Europe. He stated that the West had been in difficulty in Angola since the beginning because it was associated with the colonial role of Portugal while the Soviet Union was identified with the popular voices of liberation.

Hitting the Schlesinger-Kissinger strategy of "local wars," Dankert warned that the West would continue to suffer setbacks in the Third World if it strove for settlements, as in southern Africa, that were not based on "national aspirations and realities, but on superpower notions of stability and self interest." Labeling the problem of communist entry into European governments, such as Italy, a pseudo-problem created by the Atlanticists, Dankert announced that "the NATO Alliance will simply have to move away from the static and rigidly defined zones of Cold War." Underlying Dankert's remarks throughout was the necessity of détente and joint Third World-advanced sector development.

Dankert's colleague from the Netherlands, DeVries, the head of the NATO Assembly Subcommittee on Détente, then issued a sharp warning to the delegates to face up to the reality of Soviet nuclear superiority: "We must remember that the USSR is a superpower everywhere and not just in Eastern Europe and that therefore we must be very careful to confine all conflicts within very tight bounds." "This," he firmly concluded, "includes all conflicts in both the ideological and physical spheres."

Although the political committee of NATO, which is more tightly controlled by the U.S. than the Assembly, failed to endorse Dankert's report, a Canadian paper, *The Montreal Gazette*, reported that "in rejecting it the members of the political committee freely acknowledge that it represented the views of more than just the one man who happens to be somewhat to the left of most — that it represented a viewpoint

that comes close to being acceptable to a considerable number of the elected representatives of the countries making up the NATO Alliance." Dankert's report, they state, was not rejected easily; and not without considerable debate. And as one Canadian delegate told the reporter for this paper, "It caused quite a stir. One helluva lot of fire broke out on this one."

What provided the spark which may have touched off the fire was a lead editorial in the Nov. 17 *Washington Post* quoting Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who had just been sent to the Continent to evaluate NATO's forces. Nunn and Bartlett brought back the report that Europe was not prepared to fight a conventional war and should therefore prepare for a short, intense war. The Post states that since "The alliance has been slow to react to the disturbing and unwarranted buildup of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe... It should modernize its forces and plan to counter the kind of brief and intense attack the Soviets are now in a position to make on short notice." NATO should also attempt to delude the Soviets with promises of reducing the conventional forces even more while achieving the goal of conventional parity with "force modernization."

Another article appearing in the Post on the same day by Evans and Novak predicted that "the Warsaw Pact is now at the threshold of a military capability to make a lightning-like attack against Western Europe patterned after the World War II German blitzkrieg." The solution, they say, to the pressure on Europe to reduce its NATO commitments because of the financial crisis, "lies in only one place — the Oval Office of President Jimmy Carter after January 20."

Nunn and Bartlett's report was an undisguised statement of the line now coming out of CPD member and Carter advisor Eugene Rostow and Carter's Brookings' advisor Henry Owen: that the Soviets are preparing a "surprise attack" which NATO cannot withstand and therefore NATO must be prepared to attack first. The team also demanded an "eastward repositioning" of NATO nuclear forces, something the Soviets have warned of as being almost equivalent to a NATO declaration of war. The Nunn-Bartlett report was used as the vehicle by the U.S. controlled press to start a "great debate" on U.S. foreign policy. Evans and Novak stress that the Nunn-Bartlett report shows "détente has now been found dangerously wanting" and that Carter must "substitute reality for his previous pledges to cut defense spending" and force both the U.S. and Europe to increase arms production no matter how much austerity is involved.

Responding to these statements as tripwires to nuclear war, the European bloc fought back by centering discussion precise-

ly on economic questions as the priority, refusing to be trapped by the nuclear scare threats and what a delegate from Britain's Labour Party called "fear of Trojan horses from the Soviet Union. The real Trojan horse in Europe is economic and social erosion. The problems are not addressed now... We must match the Soviets militarily but first worry about our internal condition."

Another victory for the Europeans was the successful defeat of the U.S. proposal to put a floor price under raw materials and oil. The floorfight was carried out by Herr Lange, a member of the SPD and the West German "Senate" whose argument against it was essentially that it was a kind of indexation scheme which would prohibit individual oil-for-development trade agreements between European countries and the Third World and Arabs and would lead to international hyperinflation. In a special interview with NSIPS, Lange was asked what Britain was going to propose regarding the dollar debts which are crushing her economy. Lange replied, "We must freeze the debts to the dollar for 10 or 20 years." When asked if this was the policy of his government, Lange replied, "Yes. When push comes to shove, yes."

One of the initiating battles at the Assembly meeting took place over the U.S. centerpiece proposal to give NATO's Atlantic fleet commander, Admiral Isaac Kidd of Britain, authority to coordinate the merchant fleet operations of all NATO countries. This had long been a major item put forward by Kissinger as part of the supranational control package and in this instance the European bloc fought against it not only because it limited their own sovereignty but because the measure could be used to bolster the government of South Africa against the desires of many member NATO nations.

In order to emphasize to the Europeans that they could expect no leniency from the U.S., the final plenary session was addressed by biggest nuclear warrior of them all, Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller demanded that the meeting make a firm commitment to a united policy of nuclear offensive. He made no mention of détente, no mention of trade or development with the Third World, no statement on the economic crisis, and proposed a single solution, that the Trilateral group of U.S., Western Europe and Japan be strengthened and that an all-out drive to maintain nuclear parity be initiated.

But the Carter forces have already been given a taste of what they can expect from the military community within Europe. They will not tolerate a further escalation of the arms buildup, will not submit to the scare tactics, "Trojan horses," and anti-Sovietism, will not allow Carter's war cabinet to provoke another crisis in the Mideast to force up the price of oil, and will no longer follow the U.S. dictates on their relations to the Soviet Union and the Third World and Arab nations.

West Europeans Begin Bolt From NATO's Suicidal War Policies

Other voices than those of the West Europeans at Williamsburg have responded to this madness by publicly documenting the overall strategic superiority which the Soviet Union now wields. On the same day as Buchstaller's keynote speech for peace, representatives of the Boeing Company of Seattle testified before the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the U.S. Congress on a detailed report they had prepared on the unmatched Soviet capacities to withstand even the maximum nuclear response the U.S. could mount to a Soviet first strike. Entitled "Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear

Attack," the report makes the following crucial points: "It seems logical to conclude, then, that these (Soviet) defensive preparations, combined with the increasing power of Soviet strategic offensive forces, have in fact destabilized the strategic relationship between the two nations. . . . The most probable outcome, then, is not nuclear war; it is more likely to involve increasingly costly concessions by the U.S. in order to avoid nuclear war."

The basis for the fully documented conclusions of the Boeing report are essentially simple. The Soviets have in place tested