

most relevant considerations are much broader and more profound.

At the outside, without some drastic shift in global political-financial arrangements, the Rockefeller financial empire might barely squeak through the June 10-June 30 crisis point but would not make it through to September 30 of this year. That is the maximum estimate; informed sources doubt the Rockefellers could stumble into the third quarter.

A second consideration is the rapid weakening of Rockefeller's influence in top Soviet circles.

Although top U.S. agents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have not yet — apparently — begun tossing hand grenades into their own agent's cell-meetings, the winds from the East make it clear that the days of Georgii Arbatov and his "systems analysis" cronies are being methodically counted. While the outcome of current Eastern European and Soviet political developments cannot be predicated with certainty, the Institute for Policy Studies' Richard Barnet and other key officials of Rockefeller's network into top Soviet circles must realistically consider the possibility that by about May 1 of this year, the neo-Fabian penetration of leading Warsaw Pact political command circles will have been mainly neutralized.

Moreover, if Carter indeed goes for war in southern Africa, his Administration would be faced with nationwide riots among U.S. blacks at the first sign of U.S. involvement with its racist breakaway allies of Rhodesia and South Africa. Such unrest would both create the conditions for and spur the implementation of the Justice Department's "Operation Garden Plot" police state guidelines, a course which would swiftly end Carter's "honeymoon" with the U.S. population.

In total, the Rockefeller interests are rapidly running out of time and alternative options — and since the SALT breakdown, their puppet president Carter's credibility has been plummeting inside and outside the United States.

The Danger

While the Rockefeller machine inevitably follows the pattern it first exhibited during the Kennedy Admin-

istration, it would be a grave error of intelligence evaluation to regard the present situation as simply a re-make of the old Kennedy script.

The Rockefeller machine is following the Kennedy-period script because that has been its committed strategic profile since approximately 1957-1958, and that profile has determined and thus delimited its pattern of strategic capabilities. That is the beast's built-in-behavior pattern, and therefore it follows that pattern.

During the Kennedy period, the Rockefellers took a major gamble — but then they had fall-back options to which they could retreat without facing financial and political collapse. This time, they are virtually out of alternative fall-back options and are inclined to "go for broke."

This time, the Rockefeller interests are governed by the logic of the "cornered beast." They are *subjectively* at approximately their most dangerous level of capability for the most desperate of gambles. While the present thermonuclear scenario countdown can be stopped, it will not be halted by ordinary methods of diplomacy. It can only be stopped by neutralizing one of its essential features of overall capability.

If the plug is pulled on this scenario, the Rockefeller group has only one remaining option: to throw itself on the mercy of this writer and his collaborators. Therefore, the writer commits himself publicly and requests his various active and prospective collaborators to join him in communicating to the Rockefellers our commitment to be charitable, if the Rockefeller and allied interests will back away from their mad course.

Despite all the evil that has been done in the world, we can be forgiving, if that is the price of getting the menace out of the way, and permitting us to proceed with building the new gold-reserve based international monetary system for global industrial development which can get the world out of its present depression and the related risks of general holocaust.

Meanwhile, the Brzezinski-Interpol wave of assassinations must stop, and the scenarios now under way toward confrontation must be aborted.

— Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr.

Naval 'Schlesinger Doctrine' Is Also All Wet

Zbigniew Brzezinski's use of France's President Giscard as the lever for putting NATO-Brussels into a "Cobra 77" invasion of Angola leads directly toward a scenario in which U.S. naval forces are pitted directly or implicitly against Soviet naval forces.

Given Atlanticist strategic doctrine, such an alignment sets into operation the so-called "Schlesinger doctrine." An actual or implied showdown between naval forces operates as a theater-limited nuclear confrontation in central Europe.

There are, no doubt, perceptions within the utopian strategy circles to the effect that the psychological warfare principles of the Schlesinger Doctrine would operate more effectively for an Angola-centered operation than

through a confrontation more geographically proximate to the Warsaw Pact nations. Given the psychological profile of the Atlanticists' utopian strategists, such an element in the situation can be adduced with virtual certainty.

It is extremely probable that the activation of such a variant on the "Schlesinger Doctrine" would trigger immediate full-scale general war. The following summary points show why that is the case. The order of their listing does not represent a scale of priorities respecting weight, but rather an analytical ordering.

1. *It neutralizes the "realist" factor.*

The David Rockefeller character of the Carter Ad-

ministration and the fact that the rail and mineral interests of the Zaire-Rhodesia centered region are Rockefeller interests, discredits those elements of the Soviet leadership which take the side of the Rockefeller's against the Soviet military-centered faction.

At their worst, Warsaw Pact strategists fail to reconcile their overall strategic outlook with the piecemeal policies and analysis of localized special situations. Make a threatened showdown with Cuba in Angola, and the Soviet piecemeal analysis of that region is thus sensuously connected — like a detonator to a charge — to the implications in overall *political* strategic posture. *Suddenly, the entire Soviet policy posture globally shifts.*

David Rockefeller, Richard Barnet, et al. become the principal adversaries of all Soviet leaders, and the Soviet circles most closely linked to Warnke, Barnet, and Rockefeller vanish from the scene.

With such a development, the crucial piece upon which all recent and current utopian doctrine has been premised vanishes — together with all connected strategic capabilities.

2. Naval forces are not a peripheral or supplementary feature of Soviet defense capability.

The Soviet naval forces are at the very core of the Soviet war-winning capabilities. To confront these forces would be the politically strategic equivalent to dropping bombs simultaneously on Leningrad, Moscow, and Novosibirsk. It would be folly to imagine that the Soviet command does not view the matter in this way.

3. Given the existing profile of the Middle East, Latin

America, and south of the Himalayas, a major operation in Africa would represent a strategically intolerable cumulative "outer world" configuration for the Warsaw Pact command.

The issue is not Angola itself, but what such an added development represents cumulatively.

4. Any naval encounter of theater-scale implications would oblige the Warsaw Pact command to go directly to full-scale general war posture.

The only exception to this is that the U.S.-NATO command might hypothetically accept a theater defeat by Soviet forces. That is the only condition under which vital Soviet strategic defense-capability interests do not prescribe general war *as the least penalty.*

One must assume that the Soviet military command is highly intelligent, and that under the sensuous conditions of crisis involving Rockefeller interests, the influence of known friends of David Rockefeller within the Soviet leadership would be less than zero.

In summation: On political intelligence, a majority of the Soviet leadership compares badly with the intelligence services of small Caribbean nations, even of island dimensions. On military intelligence and political evaluations from the standpoint of military strategic posture, the Soviet command is excellent. Once the latter is activated, that profile comes to the fore and psychological warfare based on the dominance of the former ceases to function. *On sea, as on land, Schlesinger is all wet.*

—Lyndon LaRouche