

But more importantly, there is a possibility that Singlaub's assessment is right and Carter's is wrong. There is no question that, next to the Middle East, the most dangerous place in the world today — in terms of potential conflict that could rapidly involve the major powers — is the Korean peninsula, with Tokyo, Peking, and Vladivostok less than one hour away by jet, Korea is obviously a strategic piece of real estate...

It would be unfortunate if the removal of Singlaub is taken as a signal that the debate and discussion over Carter's decision to pull out of Korea is now over.

Chicago Tribune, May 27, "Mr. Carter Flunks on Korea," editorial:

... General Singlaub told Congress that (Mr. Carter's) "explanation" didn't do the job. "We have not heard any rationale, any reason given," he said. "It is making our job extremely difficult."

He said requests by the American military in Korea to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the reasons behind the policy had gone unanswered. The impression is left that the "explanation" the President referred to was in the nature of "this is what you're going to do, so shut up and get going." ... For all we know, his discussions with the military were as one-sided as his "explanation" to the people in Korea. And if we did learn of the opposition of

men like General Singlaub, this President who promised an open administration, didn't see fit to mention it to the American people...

There is now talk in Congress of summoning the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give their version of what happened when they were "consulted" about Korea. This should help to show whether Mr. Carter actually had any military support at all for his policy or whether he is simply carrying out an ill-informed promise he made as a candidate for the presidency. We need to know the truth.

Detroit News, May 27, "Withdrawal Decision Seen as New Threat to Peace," editorial:

... (Retired Army General and editor of the American Enterprise Institute's Defense Review, Richard G. Stillwell, said:...) "U.S. forces in Korea are... essential assets... in strengthening the partnership with Japan... improving relations with the People's Republic of China, sustaining the region's economic equilibrium... and preventing nuclear proliferation..."

... The withdrawal decision, it is now confirmed, did not reflect the opinion of the U.S. Army officers on the ground, and was in effect, a campaign pledge that became policy with Mr. Carter's election.

Isn't that sufficient reason to be worried?

## Vance Foiled Again In Geneva

U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was squashed for the second time in as many months following his May 18 Geneva summit with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to discuss strategic arms limitations (SALT). President Carter's latest try at convincing the Soviets to accept a "deep cuts" proposal in their national security occurred at the same time as his Mideast scenario backfired (see Mideast report) bringing the Likud electoral victory in Israel and lowering the threshold for nuclear war.

These events, according to highly placed, informed sources, prompted the Soviet representative at Geneva to point out to a shocked Vance that the Likud sweep had been interpreted by the Soviet leadership to signify the Carter Administration's final resolve to provoke a world war confrontation.

At the conclusion of the two-day Geneva meeting, the Western press blared "breakthroughs" and "gains" despite the fact that nothing of the kind was achieved. At his May 20 press conference upon departure from Geneva, Gromyko said unequivocally that while "certain progress" had been made, an agreement was still very much lacking and the U.S. side has not in any way renounced its intention to seek one-sided advantages to the detriment of Soviet security. "We have repeated this on more than one occasion and we will repeat again — we cannot accept such an agreement."

On May 23 a senior Tass commentator strongly reiterated Gromyko's attacks against U.S. attempts to

"diminish the security of the Soviet Union" and secure "an advantage to the American side."

Gromyko's statements embody exactly the same rejection of Carter's "deep cuts" proposal made by the Soviets at last month's Moscow SALT talks. The unacceptable "deep cuts" would mean a slashing of Soviet heavy missiles, while a full crop of NATO tactical nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union from Western Europe would be maintained. The proposal also seeks to destroy Soviet Research and Development in nuclear technology — which currently forms the Soviet's marginal superiority in defense over the U.S.

The joint Geneva communique printed in *Pravda* May 22 confirmed the death of the "deep cuts." "They (Soviet Union and United States) studied in detail the matter of preparing a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms on the basis of the Vladivostok Accord...." This 1974 agreement provided a simple ceiling on strategic missiles and launchers which were acceptable to both sides.

Another proposal touted in the press as "Vladivostok plus," supposedly would force the U.S. to accept limits on their "cruise missile" and the Soviets to accept a concession on their Backfire bomber. This supposed lone "concession" which the press claimed was made by the Soviets, is actually a concession by Washington. According to the *Baltimore Sun*, the Soviets agreed to position their Backfire bomber in such a way that they could not reach U.S. territory; the Backfire will not in

any way be included in the total limits for strategic bombers. But, as the Soviet side has always emphasized, the Backfire is now incapable of reaching the U.S. — which is why the Soviets have insisted it cannot be classed as a strategic bomber!

*“One Little Paper”*

Against this background, Vance arrived at Geneva surrounded by “stacks” of already rejected proposals, imaginatively packaged by the press as something new. On the other hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko pointedly remarked: “I’ve brought one little paper” — which no doubt read “stop your foolish and dangerous ideas about concessions from us.”

As it became clear that there was no “breakthrough”

story, the U.S. press dramatically switched its reportage to the “results-are-in-the-eyes-of-the-beholder” method. According to the *Washington Post*, “Each side’s Assessment Fits Its Own Needs.” The Geneva meeting, wrote Moscow Bureau chief Peter Osnos, is how you see it: “is the glass half full or half empty?” By Sunday, regardless of the contents of Osnos’ glass, even the *New York Times* had to admit that “major snags” remained.

At a press conference on his departure, the U.S. Secretary of State tried to keep up some semblance of an agreement. Vance danced around a description of a “three-tiered” proposal, while the press corps scratched their heads and asked for more than just “scanty” details.

## Proxmire: USSR Will Strike If Forced

*What follows are excerpts from the April 1977 report of the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production, chaired by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc). The Committee examines three scenarios of Soviet nuclear attack against the U.S., and concludes, similarly to the U.S. Labor Party, that the military leadership of the USSR will initiate such an attack only if forced by strategic encroachments from the West:*

**Case I: Calculated Risk**

...the committee could find no credible or realistic scenario in which the Soviet Union would initiate a nuclear war or threaten to initiate a nuclear war as a means of achieving some Soviet objective, since there are no credible or realistic circumstances in which the Soviet leaders could believe that the risks and costs of such an option would be less than the gains...

**Case II: Irrational Leadership**

...In the absence of other, strong justifications for them, massive expenditures for civil and industrial defense against the low probability of an irrational adversary alone do not seem justifiable.

**Case III: Last Resort**

...As Secretary of Defense Brown has noted in the remarks quoted earlier, the ordinary forms of deterrence will not discourage a desperate leader or leadership from nuclear attack.

For example, an effort by the West to “roll back” the Iron Curtain and to “liberate” the Soviet republics or client states in East Europe might be so threatening to the Soviet regime, to Soviet communism, or to the Russian people that the initiation of an nuclear war to forestall this roll back would

appear to be the lesser of two evils. Likewise, an overt or implied threat by the United States and/or its allies to launch a direct nuclear attack on the Soviet Union might be perceived as sufficient cause to warrant the desperate step of trying to implement a pre-emptive strike on the United States, no matter how costly the retaliation would be. Any strong threat to the core values of a nation, therefore, is enough to upset normal calculations of deterrence and to run the risk of igniting a nuclear war no one wants by making it an option of last resort.

In reviewing various estimates of the willingness of the Soviet Union to initiate nuclear attack or war, the committee could find no authority who believed that the Soviet Union cared to launch a nuclear attack except under conditions of extreme provocation. Most sources, in fact, considered that the Soviet Union wishes to avoid war...

When viewed in this light many of the questions about Soviet offensive forces and the purposes of passive defense measures take on a different meaning...Population protection becomes, not a malevolent effort to achieve the impossible “war-winning” capability, but rather a prudent effort to make the devastation of thermonuclear war slightly less awesome in its consequences...

Nor could the committee find any basis for the claim that Soviet civil defense programs had any aim other than responding to a nuclear war that might be thrust upon the Soviet Union. This, in the committee’s judgment, is a very different objective from attempting to promote world-wide communism by attaining nuclear superiority through uncertain, untried and partially effective civil defense programs...