

United States Labor Party Memorandum

Warsaw Pact Combat Group Modifications

The following memorandum was released on July 21, 1977 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, National Chairman and Presidential Candidate of the U.S. Labor Party.

The gross mis-situating of Warsaw Pact combat group modifications circulated into NATO circles in Europe ought to be promptly corrected. I refer to the evaluator's situating the question of such modifications of Warsaw Pact combat groups within the context of a Warsaw Pact "conventional warfare" mode of assault in the European theater.

In general, the evaluator not only fails to situate the question of Soviet ground forces' deployment within the corresponding strategic situation, but aggravates that by attempting to reason from tactics to strategy. The pernicious influence of line-by-line cost-benefit pseudo-thinking upon the evaluations community appears to be prominently reflected in the subject case.

If the Warsaw Pact discussion of combat group organization and capabilities is situated where it belongs, in what I shall term Phase III, or the End Game of general war fighting, then and only then does this matter show up in its true importance within overall Warsaw Pact strategic thinking.

Although the outline of indicated Warsaw Pact general warfighting has been repeatedly outlined elsewhere, it should be summarized again here. This is done to facilitate systematic criticism of the overall analysis employed, specifically to assist critics of my estimate in focusing on possible loopholes.

The case of the Warsaw Pact combat group deployment on which I wish to focus by this means is as follows. In the End-Game phase of general war (Phase III for this purpose) Warsaw Pact forces are confronted hypothetically by an attempt of NATO forces to regroup in the vicinity of the Ruhr, industrialized Alsace-Lorraine, the Lille area, or an analogous location. In this End-Game phase, Warsaw Pact policy is to minimize destruction of populations and productive facilities. For obvious political reasons, this setting for the discussion of combat group capabilities would not appear in Warsaw Pact publications. However, it is the situation in which the discussion in question most emphatically arises as a problem within Warsaw Pact strategy.

In this setting, we should place the Warsaw Pact discussion of combat group capabilities and related problems vis-a-vis corresponding adjustments of U.S. combat-group policies, with included emphasis on the problems associated with improved targetting of ABC tactical and support artillery weapons of various sorts. In principle, this problem has a hereditary connection to the effects of aimed fire by skirmishers and others against eighteenth-century Prussian, British, etc. infantry and similar problems arising during the U.S. Civil War.

The work of von Steuben in developing American capabilities used in the Battle of Princeton illustrates a second hereditary problem posed in modern ABC contexts of combat group deployment.

The Warsaw Pact's included attention to the problems of combat intelligence, which I am informed is relatively a weak-point in earlier Soviet development, is also extremely relevant to defining what sort of problem Soviet thinkers have in mind.

From an historical standpoint, the problems of combat group capabilities in End-Game phases of general war appear as essentially another case of the way in which modes of warfare have undergone successive evolution to date. I have included the historical references as a way of exemplifying the kind of mind-set with which the subject ought to be approached.

The need to situate the study of Warsaw Pact combat group capabilities within its proper strategic setting reemphasizes the importance of finally defining what general war means, without the Rand Corporation and other Orwellian nonsense spewn out in the effort to confuse the issue.

Strategy in General

Overall Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy can be termed Clausewitzian in the most specific sense in that it divides strategy into war-avoidance and war-winning. However, it is not Clausewitzian in certain crucial respects, as East German studies of the cases of Baron von Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz indicate in a special way.

From 1806 through 1815, the German republicans grouped around von Stein and Scharnhorst committed a fundamental political blunder in placing themselves at the mercy of England and Prussia (and Metternich), and thus losing the freedom to place their capabilities (Landwehr etc.) in the balance between France and England. Politically, the strategic thinking of these German republicans around von Stein was qualitatively inferior to that of Franklin's collaborators in the United States and France. They did not, consequently, maneuver and maintain political freedom of maneuver to situate the application of their resources to whichever side of the balance coincided with their fundamental self-interests. Hence, at the Treaty of Vienna, they and their interest were dispensed with politically to the United States' acute strategic disadvantage.

Ironically, we now confront a reflection of this matter of political-strategic maneuver in the case of the forces grouped around Giscard d'Estaing.

Giscard's forces are currently following their version of a Gaullist policy. They are operating within the Atlantic configuration according to a three-level perception. We should distinguish between a Carter-Brzezinski configuration, a Mondale-London con-

figuration (with Andreotti so far delimited vis-a-vis Mondale-contained Carter by London connections), and an inner core built along lines of the DeGaulle-Adenauer pattern of strategic alliances. Within these three levels, including a parody of DeGaulle's Soviet policy, Giscard's forces are exploiting France's screw-up potentialities to the end of exacting items which are beginning to shape up as a shopping-list of special advantages. This shows Giscard et al. as riding various horses almost simultaneously, but with a consistent objective — based on perspective of a dollar collapse — as a continuous, dominant threat throughout.

This is a parody of the policy of Condorcet et al., and a kind of parody of the policy von Stein et al. should have followed during the Napoleonic period.

The Soviets are manifestly on top of the essentials of this European situation, a perception which is obviously aided by their sources of information, but is also aided by the fact that Soviet strategic thinking runs along those lines of judgment.

The ramifications of this should be reviewed, since those considerations most directly affect the actual war in which strategic patterns will tend to evolve up to the threshold of any general war situation in the immediate future.

The immediate key to the situation is London's momentary "inside track" with OPEC and the Arab Monetary Fund under conditions of developing dollar collapse. The gist of thinking reflected by the London-Humphrey-Mondale axis is that in the case of a monetary blow-out a strong position of London banks in the EEC and an inside track, through Hambros et al. with the Soviets, means that their combination comes out on top at the expense of those other financier interests combinations with poorer connections to an OPEC reserves generation in the order of \$40 billions annually. The gist of the immediately opposing crew (e.g., Senators Javits and Church) is thus to smash OPEC. However, neither of these two factions is thinking in terms of a new monetary system, but only a reform of the existing monetary system in which each has a relatively-enhanced position at the expense of the other. The Giscard combination includes forces which have a strong thrust in the direction of a new gold-reserve-based monetary system. Their estimation, as I read it so far, is essentially a viable one.

In a dollar blow-out, London's inside track with OPEC vanishes because of OPEC self-interest in securing their assets by placing them in the orbit of a stable monetary arrangement centered around gold-pegged hard-commodity credit.

These three factional tendencies of the moment are complicated by efforts to maintain flexibility and to consolidate strengthened positions both within various nations and globally. Political back-stabbing among allies and special positions with opponents are in part deceptions, pragmatic concessions, but also lawful implementations of the underlying policy-tendencies which essentially characterize each factional tendency.

Like an old English sheep-dog, underneath all the proliferation of hairiness, there is something with definite shape.

This is somewhat complicated by the factional situation in the Eastbloc, especially the Soviet leadership. Each of the factional tendencies within the Atlantic orbit is also playing games with the process of adjustments within the Eastbloc. Not only is each combination probing for its own set of options with the East, but this activity is associated with efforts to affect the evolution of the internal process within the Soviet leadership.

This hairy Eastbloc beast also has a definite shape underneath. No matter what short-term adjustments to the contrary occur at any moment, the military and hard-liners will now prevail — and it is to the advantage of the United States that they should prevail.

They will prevail for the following reasons.

The hard-line factions, catalyzed into a strengthened position by the Vance-Warnke Mutt and Jeff act in Moscow earlier this year, are operating on a war-avoiding policy modelled upon the U.S. Labor Party's International Development Bank peace alternative. At the same time, they are developing their war-winning preparations. Any aversive development, which includes aversive pressures against the peace strategy of hard-commodity-credit approaches to a new world monetary system, will trigger an enhancement of the war-winning posture for "Clausewitzian" reasons.

The enhancement of a war-winning posture would most probably lead to a Soviet show of force in some area such as Ethiopia or the Middle East. This show of force is made a probable variant for such circumstances by the airing of versions of the Schlesinger doctrine themes by leading press and official spokesmen in the Atlantic countries. A show of force would be designed to avoid probable general war, although taking that risk, but to demonstrate Soviet "unbluffability." Under such conditions, the Soviets would give little consideration to the penalty of offending the Saudis and so forth. Ethiopia is a probable case for such a show of force.

To the extent that Soviet strategic posture is generally accurately represented by leading press and official spokesmen of the Atlantic nations, the probability of a show of force is diminished.

Among the aversive factors, in Soviet perception, is any and all pressure to impose Friedmanite and World Bank policies upon indebted developing nations, and also the introduction of Schachtian-Friedmanite programs of "labor-intensive" austerity within Atlantic nations, including the United States. The Soviets will increasingly read the Carter-Mondale "energy" and other austerity policies as replications of the Hitler regime for purposes of assessing the direction and tempo of U.S. and other foreign policies. They will correctly read intensive austerity programs as generating the political structures and moods committing the United States to an early confrontationist posture, regardless of any short-term impulse to the contrary.

Because these perceptions have become operative at the top levels of the Soviet command, it will be impossible to put the Soviets back into the pattern associated with the Henry Kissinger period. The possibilities for influencing internal Soviet perceptions characteristic of the Kissinger period no longer exist.

However, short-term impulses in the direction of a return toward internal Soviet configurations of the Kissinger period are a distinct possibility. We have seen some indications of that during the most recent weeks. The catalysis for such short-lived impulses will be provided chiefly by London and will be reflected from London through Italy, even for those cases in which the momentary shift appears to be in response to an initiative from the USA. Such responses to U.S. efforts to strengthen the soft-line position within the Soviet leadership will tend to occur only on the basis of the influence of London and Rome readings of the Mondale option. Those will be short-lived wherever they occur, as we have seen an example of this most recently.

Such developments will increase the danger of general war, since the resumption of the hard-line posture will tend to occur as a jolt, and be accompanied by a momentary enraged reaction.

What we require is continuous stability of a rational, cold-blooded outlook from the Soviet leadership. This will afford us the essential precondition for developing agreements on the basis of rational options.

The special strategic problem of the moment arises from the loss of control represented by competing groups of interest among the Atlantic nations. As the momentary crisis intensifies, the impulse to force adjustments in the position of one group vis-a-vis the others, and the accompanying deterioration of U.S. and other intelligence overview of the essential elements of the situation represent a growing element of instability in the overall strategic configuration. One of Giscard's bargaining-maneuvers could go out of control. The conflict of interests among Atlantic factions in the Middle East and Africa, dangerous games being played with the China-Korea situation, and a potential for breakdown of checks-and-balances within Atlantic and other governments might readily trigger a sequence of events leading into general war under conditions in which the world is so close to the threshold for configuration.

The best variants within the configuration outlined are: (1) That the USA promptly changes course in the directions I and my associates have proposed as urgent, or, alternatively, (2) that the Giscard option wins out over New York and London under conditions of monetary collapse. In the latter case, such a development would enhance a USA potentiality for shift to the first option. That latter contingency I have thought through and could handle to USA advantage.

In the case that the Carter-Brzezinski (and Javits-Church) thrust prevails, general war is imminent *now*. In the case that the current Mondale-London approach prevails, general war is imminent *soon*.

Excluding the obvious war-danger itself, the worst problem potentially confronting the United States is the victory of the Mondale option apparently without a well-defined immediate war-danger. Under this circumstance the U.S. would find itself at a profound economic-strategic disadvantage in the world. Eurasia, Africa and major parts of Latin America would orient toward a Eurasian-Mediterranean focus of world economic development, leaving the United States significantly frozen out. The Soviets, under a Mondale option, would tend to reenforce such a course, for strategic reasons.

First, the "energy" and austerity policies associated with the Mondale option mean a fascist war-tending dynamic within the United States like that of Nazi Germany under Schacht during the 1933-1936 period. That will be Soviet perception of the implications of the Mondale option — and they will be correct.

Second, the Carter-Mondale "energy" and austerity packages mean a rapidly-deteriorating economic potential in the United States, and an evaporating base for militarily-relevant high-technology development. Soviet strategy for this case, given the preceding political evaluation on their part, would be to exploit this internal weakening of USA military-technological potential.

It is rightly argued that Western Europe would not wish to participate in the process of a decisive Soviet strategic advantage along these lines. However, the alternative is early strategic confrontation, which means early general war. This will also be a rapidly developing perception in the USA, which means virtual certainty of early general war under a Mondale option.

The only alternative is that which coincides with USA capability for maintaining economic-industrial hegemony and corresponding strategic capabilities. That requires that Carter and the Mondale option both go in favor of the remedial measures my associates and I have proposed.

Warsaw Pact War-Fighting Strategy

The overriding risk in war is losing the war. Once the threshold has been reached at which war is to be made, war must be fought, and gentlemen's agreements to moderate the penalties of war are honored only by such fools as are determined to lose war. War must be seen as a maximum deployment of capabilities at the most rapid rate possible to destroy the adversary's capabilities for continuing war beyond his initial exertions, and for breaking his political will to continue fighting.

Once those objectives have been predetermined as strategically secured, then, and only then, does strategy prescribe the minimization of damage through continued war. In this phase of war, the End-Game phase, the populations and productive capacities are the resources available to the victor, which he must properly wish to secure with the least further damage.

Generally proposed NATO doctrine is intrinsically incompetent because it has these equations of war-fighting policies backwards: it proposes to advance its combat personnel ahead of supporting artillery fire.

Moderation in the conduct of war is properly applied only to captured populations and territories or to those populations and territories one is assured of capturing.

Warsaw Pact doctrine has these equations in the proper order. On this count Warsaw Pact doctrine is to be believed because: (1) It is generally a properly articulated and rationally evolved perception of reality, and has been evolved by painstaking exclusion of other options as unacceptable; (2) the totality of developed war-fighting capabilities of the Warsaw Pact corresponds to its doctrine; (3) the doctrine corresponds to the experience of the nature and penalties of war by Soviet forces in World War II.

My cumulative perception of Warsaw Pact war-fighting is as follows. I define each element now listed in the following way. In the general description of each element I state only that feature of which I am certain. I include under that heading the recommendation of further evaluation of some elements which are important, but concerning which I am sensible of the limitations of my knowledge.

PHASE ONE: The Opening Artillery Barrage

The opening artillery barrage of the Warsaw Pact forces must include the aim of destroying the following targets:

- (a) The in-depth war-fighting capabilities of the North American Atlantic nations.
- (b) All NATO and allied bases and concentrations of forces throughout the world, including especially ABC-armed naval forces.
- (c) Selected features of in-depth war-fighting capabilities of Atlantic nations outside the Eurasian continent. (e.g., Great Britain).
- (d) Defense measures against Atlantic forces' ABC artillery capabilities (including aircraft).

Discussion

(a) Means primarily population and logistical centers of the United States and Canada. This is certain.

If USA commanders were to behave rationally under conditions of Soviet strategic missile lift-off, all strategic weapons would be immediately launched.

The Warsaw Pact must assume high probability that all Atlantic silos hit by Soviet warheads would be empty silos. However, Warsaw Pact commanders must allow for irrationality in a NATO command conditioned to a two-strike policy, and must act to exploit such a blunder.

(b) Although it must be certain that destruction of naval ABC-armed vessels would have the highest degree of priority, I have only some indications of crucial features of this process.

Otherwise, all assured military targets and key logistical targets must be expected to be hit in the same phase.

In general, this initial barrage would be regarded as determining the preconditions for Warsaw Pact war-winning capability based on the balance of in-depth capabilities for continued war-fighting. This, we must assume with aid of elaborated Warsaw Pact discussion to this effect, that they have prediscouted their penalty for total deployment of NATO strategic capabilities. The figure of thirty million losses during World War II would be the prominent point of reference in their thinking.

PHASE TWO: The Assault

The occupation of Western Europe by ground forces becomes the immediate objective following the opening barrage of war. This would include:

- (a) Paving the way for ground assault with ABC sanitization of areas of opposing troop concentrations.

(b) Probably a dispersed assault in combat-group strengths on all usable borders. (As distinct from the earlier concentrated Fulda gap and northern-sweep probabilities).

PHASE THREE: End-Game

If Atlantic forces elect to play out the End Game, a consideration which must tend to correlate with the extent of surviving NATO strategic (naval, aerial) capabilities, the questions of reforming the Warsaw Pact combat group most prominently arise. Naturally, the qualities of the combat group best suited to that circumstance are the basis for the type of group best suited to the initial assault.

It is unthinkable, under the existing NATO commitments, that the Warsaw Pact would launch the assault without preparatory and covering ABC bombardment. At the phase of war, the countermeasures — ABC bombardment — to be applied by NATO are obvious. It is only under the End Game condition that it becomes urgent from a Warsaw Pact postwar perspective to find means for avoiding a continuation of the ABC "paving" measures in populated industrial and analogous areas.

Since the world is already dangerously proximate to the thresholds for general war, the effort to misinterpret the Warsaw Pact discussion of combat-group problems to suggest a conventional war-fighting opening phase (under present configurations) is itself a step toward increasing the probability of outbreak of war, in the same general sense as deploying neutron bombs and cruise missiles in Europe.

The effect of such misinterpretations upon West Germans is obvious in fact and in its implications. Numerous West German professionals are assured that NATO MC 14-4 doctrine is insane. Yet, the imposed psychology of defeat in two world wars, the "Soviet tank" paranoia, and so forth reinforces their belief that they must adhere to even an insanely incompetent NATO doctrine as a condition for enjoying continued protection of the U.S. thermonuclear umbrella. In such circumstances, spreading disinformation of the sort indicated, whether intentionally or not, is in itself a kind of Mutt-and-Jeff form of psychological conditioning, Zuckerbrot and Peitsche in a single package. "Ah, maybe we won't be as badly destroyed as we feared." Some Germans will tend to seize upon such disinformation with grim obsessiveness. If they then act on that basis of such a delusion, another essential control on the strategic situation is jeopardized.

In general, at this juncture, the propagation of disinformation concerning the implications of general war is, like building worthless — but trusted — fallout shelters in target cities, a lowering of the threshold for general war.

War does not commit itself to states; states, wittingly or not, commit themselves to war. War must be fought on the terms that war prescribes. Whoever refuses to master the implications of that has lost all wars against well-matched adversaries before the war begins. Any "treaty" or "convention" made in advance of war by potential adversaries will be honored only in those details where no potential strategic advantage is gained by violating it.