

U.S. Labor Party Statement

For A United States China Policy

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by Peter Rush

Since 1971, the United States has followed a policy toward China, designed by Henry Kissinger, which attempts to "use" China as a weapon against the Soviet Union and against the nations of the developing sector. This policy is directly contrary to the actual national interests of both China and the United States.

To their credit, Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and (so far) Jimmy Carter have refrained from complete implementation of this policy. Nonetheless it is still basic U.S. policy, and top Carter advisors led by National Security Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski currently seek to make it fully operational at the earliest opportunity.

The effort to ally the United States of America with the People's Republic of China in a military bloc against the Soviet Union — as recently advocated by Brzezinski and as favored by a vocal minority of politicians and academics — must be openly exposed for what it is: the adaptation of Britain's China policy, dating from the 1940s, of creating and manipulating an anti-Soviet "Asian communist" counter to the Soviet Union — and colaterally aimed at defeating proper U.S. policy objectives in East Asia.

Our nation must define the question of proper relations with China as a subsumed feature of U.S. foreign policy as a whole. U.S. foreign policy must further the United States's basic interests in the world.

The United States is an industrial power, and world industrialization should be the paramount concern of this nation. The application of an overall policy of industrialization involving massive transfers of capital and advanced technology from the industrially advanced to the underdeveloped regions and coupled with the atmosphere of international cooperation thus created, is the surest guarantee of lasting world peace and of prosperity for all the world's people.

Peking's Policy: Anathema to U.S.-Soviet Interests

At the present time, China's paramount foreign policy objective is to provoke conflict and war between its two perceived principal world enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union. It seeks to the full limits of its power — far from negligible, even if still quite circumscribed — to sabotage the primary objectives of both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: détente, arms limitation and reduction, East-West

world hotspots, such as the Middle East. China uses whatever limited influence it possesses in the Third World to foment instability and bring the U.S. and USSR into confrontation, as in Bangladesh, Pakistan, East

Africa, and southern Africa, to name only a few recent cases.

It tirelessly counsels Europe to break off positive contact with the Soviet Union and recently stepped up its anti-Soviet campaign — activities urgently requiring public condemnation by the international community. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping has now called for a world united front, against the Soviet Union. Such a call is a recognized *causus belli* under international law, such that had China the ability to bring about even a partial blockade of the type it seeks, the Soviets would be fully justified in declaring war.

Chinese diplomacy is not only fully committed to the above aims, but China, unique among the major powers, has no regard for the norms of international diplomacy or national sovereignty. It unabashedly interferes in the internal affairs of other nations by inviting Western politicians, in and out of power, to China for the purpose of convincing them to push China's policies in their own countries. Senator Henry Jackson was turned into the "Manchurian candidate" in the 1976 primaries in this fashion, and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger has been made virtually a foreign agent. It specializes in inviting out-of-power politicians from countries whose Soviet or China policies it opposes and using these visits to insult the governments involved. The major welcomes accorded Germany's Franz Josef Strauss, England's Margaret Thatcher and Edward Heath, and Richard Nixon (after the latter's removal from office) are telling examples. No other nation would consider making the snubs that China delights in — and gets away with. These visits are far from harmless and constitute active organizing *within* the United States for a foreign policy of provoking a war with the Soviet Union. Were the United States to follow China's, Schlesinger's and Jackson's policies of a close alliance with China, the Soviet Union would rightly interpret it as a provocation for war, and any advocacy of policy along those lines is a prowar policy.

China actively supports the destabilization of governments, such as that of Germany, whose Soviet policy it opposes, through the agency of Maoist-terrorist groups in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Public support for these groups is reportedly backed up by Chinese training, funds, and perhaps arms; *Izvestiya* recently charged China with training the Japanese Red Army. The full knowledge of our intelligence community on this matter should be made available to our policymakers for appropriate exposure and action. China's widely reported role in the international drug traffic should also be investigated.

In recent weeks, it has become clear that Peking is directly tied to British efforts to sabotage East-West détente, to destabilize the Indian subcontinent and to incorporate most of Southeast Asia into a Chinese-dominated bloc. Specifically, Peking is involved with British

networks in Yugoslavia to destabilize Eastern Europe; is using its influence in Bangladesh and Pakistan to exacerbate pressures and tensions within India; and is pressuring Burma and wooing Thailand to join with Peking and Cambodia in isolating the pro-Soviet states of Vietnam and Laos. Can there be any doubt of the menace that Peking's every policy holds for U.S. interests and the interests of a global peace?

What makes Peking's efforts at provoking war doubly dangerous is the *irrationality* of the thinking of Peking's leaders. China's foreign policy has one aim, and one aim only today: the most rapid possible assertion of Chinese hegemony first in Asia and then the world. The long-range goal is inconceivable, except over many centuries, unless the U.S. and the Soviet Union destroy each other, taking most of Western Europe with them. It is Peking's hardly veiled policy to provoke this Armageddon. There is every reason to believe that China's leaders are convinced that in the event of nuclear war, China alone of the great powers will survive to rule the world and that they look with equanimity on this prospect. The ruling regime recently reiterated Mao's infamous remarks delivered to the Soviets in Moscow in 1957, to the effect that while a world war would kill off over half of mankind, the other half would have a "bright future" (sic) free of capitalism (and be predominantly Chinese).

Before the death of Mao Tse-tung, China stood against everything that our nation stands for. It stood explicitly against industrialization, technology, and progress. It exalted the backwardness of its own economy and put forward labor-intensive, peasant-based rural economy as a model for the rest of the world. It became the example for Maoists around the world who attacked progress in their own countries, from terrorists in Europe and in the U.S. and their "environmentalist" compatriots to Robert McNamara of the World Bank and the bulk of U.S. and European "China scholars, who coo about the virtues of the "Chinese way." The peasant outlook has infested Chinese leaders, starting with Mao, who extended it to the realm of foreign policy, resurrecting a hideous form of the Great Han Chauvinism of imperial China dating from before the birth of Christ.

Within the past year, the post-Mao leadership has junked one aspect of this policy, the anti-technology, anti-science emphasis, and now overtly favors rapid industrialization of the country. But, so far, nothing else has changed. Taken by itself the new direction is laudable, but unrealizable within the broader framework of maintaining China as an isolated, "self-reliant" economy premised on the Han Chauvinist world outlook — in fact, a glorified "scheming peasant" ideology of paranoia and hatred for the outside world. Hence, we have seen an intensification rather than an abandonment of China's prowar foreign policy, proof that the post-Mao changes have not gone very deep.

The Danger of Playing China's Game

Even though China makes no secret of what it stands for in the world, policymakers and would-be policymakers in this country have chosen to ignore or even applaud the obnoxious features of China's foreign stance, in what is a grave error of shortsightedness. It is proposed, from such quarters as Henry Jackson, James

Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Kennedy, the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institution, the National Security Council, and numerous university chairs, that far from seeking a change in China's foreign policy, the United States should *encourage* it by *allying* with China in the interest of gaining some presumed leverage over the Soviet Union.

It is truly an amazing spectacle to find the United States, the greatest industrial power in the world and the greatest nation in world history, pandering to and propitiating a political remnant left over from the time of the Roman Empire in order to realize a putative foreign policy objective. But that is exactly the character of U.S. foreign policy toward China since 1971, a characteristic that the cited figures would have us intensify. If the Soviet Union were to adopt a foreign policy posture modeled on that of China — looking for world war and based on total irrationalism — it would be of the utmost concern to this nation to oppose and seek to change this policy. But from China, it is not only tolerated *without criticism or comment*, but applauded — provided it stays directed against the Soviet Union.

The thinking — usually unspoken — behind this approach runs as follows: we need China as important leverage against the Soviets, and we must prevent any kind of significant détente between those two powers at all costs. The more rabid will point out that China holds down many Soviet troops on its eastern border, and will be a valuable military "second front" against the Soviet Union, both as a threat now and in the event of war. In pursuit of this objective, the Great Han Chauvinists must be pampered and not aggravated unduly. If we can't give them Taiwan for the moment, we certainly mustn't annoy them by criticizing their foreign policy or commenting on their handling of human rights. Actual and proposed U.S. policy within this framework is premised on *manipulating* another major nation over which we have very little influence — a wretched, petty, and impotent game unworthy of a great power.

This obsessive cold war approach must be repudiated in favor of a policy based on an assessment of what China's foreign and domestic policies really are, and on how our nation can influence these policies to bring them into general consistency with our national interests throughout the world.

The psychological basis of Chinese policy making rests on the leadership's perception of the outside world as barbarians ultimately inferior to the Chinese race and culture. China thinks of itself as doing nothing more complicated than "manipulating the foreign barbarians." The beliefs of the credulous Schlesingers and Jacksons notwithstanding, China's "tilt" toward the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviets is not based on some sincerely felt common interest with the U.S. (of the sort exemplified by the Soviets' desire for détente), and it will last only as long as China no longer sees the Soviets as the biggest roadblock to their hegemonic pretensions. China's "U.S. policy" is, "Let's you and him fight," or, in Chinese, "sit on the hillside and watch the tigers fight." While it is the avowed aim of many Americans to "use" China as a pawn, it is China that will use America.

The irrationalism, peasant-outlook, and racial chauvinism that China has fostered for decades is the root problem to be addressed by U.S. China policy.

Item: China's lack of a legal system denies the population of the sensuous knowledge that human society is ruled by laws and *lawfulness* and inculcates irrationalism in every member of society, because the crypto-Confucian system of broad moral-political maxims and serendipity application of justice is itself irrational. The fact that in China, the accused not only has no right to counsel of any sort, but has no right even to assert his own innocence — is horrifying.

Item: the present regime, like its forebears (only much more completely) denies its population the right of privacy, the right even to private belief that might go against party prescription. It maintains the most articulated system in the world of popular spying on everyone, a resurrected "pao-chia" system. This reinforces irrationalism because the ability of the individual to develop a sense of his own personal judgment of right and wrong is sabotaged from birth; he is taught to mouth precisely dictated dogma, and his ability to do so perfectly replaces personal judgment of what is right or wrong. Morality is determined externally, not internally.

Item: China is by far the most closed major society in the world. This is extremely dangerous as it denies all but a handful of individuals any sensuous knowledge of the rest of the world, and it reinforces the peasant and racial chauvinism that progressive Chinese intellectuals have fought against since the time of Sun Yat-sen. The opportunities for Western notions of humanism and progress to penetrate the country are so circumscribed as to be almost negligible.

To these factors must be added the specific effect of the mass madness of the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958-61, the "Cultural Revolution" of 1966-68, and the arcane factional twists and turns since then in which black became white became black, etc., with great rapidity. We must ask ourselves the question of what is the psychology, the mental stability, and the judgmental quality of China's under-30 generations, who will one day rule this populous nation. What, indeed, is the outlook of the 50's generation that will shortly take over?

Commitment to Industrialization — Cornerstone of China Policy

This is the empirical background against which U.S. China policy must be formulated.

A comparison with U.S. Soviet policy is very much in order. In the Soviets, we have an adversary who nonetheless shares our basic belief in industrialization and progress and the need for peace. It is basically a Westernized country, which, for all its faults, has a functioning legal system, with substantial latitude for the individual. If international developments erased the Soviet Union's empirical need to maintain itself as a garrison state, and if it became fully integrated into a world cooperative effort for industrialization, we would see major positive changes in those aspects of Soviet society we do not like. Thus, our proper concern with respect to the Soviets, as indicated before this (Asian Affairs Subcommittee) committee by Marshall Shulman on Oct. 26, is to encourage the coming generation of Soviet leaders to move toward greater economic interaction with the West and thereby to encourage their every impulse toward Westernization.

A comparable policy is required toward China. This committee should ask pointedly: why has no one yet testified to this subcommittee on how U.S. China policy must be shaped in accordance with such considerations, that is, in influencing China to function as a viable member of the international community?

The United States must adopt a two-fold strategy: (1) strengthen détente with the Soviet Union and give no credence or support to Peking's prowar policies by trying to "play the China card" against Moscow or sell arms to China; and (2) make every effort to encourage China to industrialize and modernize, to import capital from the West, to accept foreign credit to accelerate this process, and to partake in the world development effort outlined below.

The centerpiece of this policy should be joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives for peace and development throughout the world. Such a development will let Peking's leaders know that their manipulation game is an utter failure and worse, simply irrelevant to world reality. What is needed are concrete policies from this country to realize global industrialization goals. This is not the location to spell these out in detail, as they have been elaborated in numerous briefs prepared for the Congress by the U.S. Labor Party, but they must center on the provisions of hundreds of billions of dollars in low-interest, long-term credits to the underdeveloped nations and to the Comecon nations, with which they will purchase capital equipment and technology from the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Domestically, some of the credits must go to modernization of our own economy, centering on nuclear energy development so as to prepare the way for the transition to controlled thermonuclear fusion power.

These policies will draw every nation involved, including the entirety of the Third World, into a mutually advantageous net of intercooperative relations that will augur a new era in international affairs. The mutual interest of this nation and the Soviet Union in industrialization, progress, and peace will grow proportionately as this plan is carried out and will profoundly influence the populations and societies of both countries. We have nothing to fear, and everything to gain, by the evolution of "détente" into this much closer relationship.

The possibility of realizing the above may seem remote to less informed members of this subcommittee, but it is not only immediately feasible, but essential if we are to get out of this deepening world "stagflation" crisis. It is also being actively considered in various forms by millions of American citizens, dozens of labor and business leaders, congressional and other political forces here, French industrial interests, leaders in Italy and Germany, and many Third World and East bloc governments. A modicum of leadership from the U.S. executive would suffice to bring the new order into being.

In such a situation, China would find itself odd man out by its own choice. It could decide to stew in its own juice, bypassed by a world intent on peace and development, or saner forces in China would begin to assert themselves and to effect a revision of China's odious policies. Since the aggregate and nation-by-nation rates of economic growth outside of China, especially those of its two principal enemies, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, would

exceed that for China in every case, the danger for China of an ever-widening economic gap between it and the rest of the world would ensure a near-term political reversal in the Peoples Republic of China. This would be hastened by the fact that China would have a standing and very tempting offer to take part in the new world economic order.

Prior to such a welcome development, the United States should under no circumstances contemplate selling arms to China. Secretary of State Vance's recent affirmation of U.S. opposition to such a course is to be applauded. Moreover, the U.S. should take the lead in discouraging such sales from Europe or Japan. To sell arms to China is to support directly and to encourage implicitly the very foreign policy we should seek to discourage. If necessary, we should consider carefully invoking the COCOM sanctions against the sale of anything of military value to communist nations if private negotiations with Europe fail to this effect. Very simply put, the West should not sell arms to any power that envisions and works for war. Resort to COCOM can probably be avoided because the new trade opportunities proposed will obviate Europe's need to export arms.

The second part of a proper China policy — contingent on the first — must be our attempt to speed the industrial transformation of China. The United States has a very great interest, as it does everywhere else in the world, in industrialization and the social implications thereof. The United States should propose, in the context of the world development patterns to be established, the quadripartite development of the North Pacific. The U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union, and China should cooperate for the crash development of Siberia, Manchuria, North China, and Korea, involving raw materials extraction, oil and energy production, and industrial development treating the whole region as one unified economic unit. This may not be accepted right away, certainly not by China until it makes major changes in its overall policy, and probably not by Moscow until a large measure of friendship and cooperation is reestablished with China. It should, however, be our long-range policy. China should also be offered the same easy credit for capital imports that the rest of the underdeveloped sector will be offered and every possible encouragement given for China to accept it.

This policy offers the best prospect for inducing sanity and rationality where it is now lacking in Chinese policy and for influencing the evolution of the Chinese ideology in positive directions without in any way infringing on China's national sovereignty. Nothing less is worthy of our nation. It is high time we affirmed that the responsibility of this country to the people of China is not to help maintain their backwardness, but to facilitate their fastest possible entry into the 20th century, economically and culturally.

Coming to Terms with Taiwan

Viewed in this light, the "Taiwan problem" is, in reality, quite different from the narrow "either-or" formulation we are familiar with. Once we are free of the illusion that we must curry *China's* favor for fear of some dire consequence, several new options open up that make

the Taiwan issue no longer a U.S. problem, but a Peoples Republic of China problem.

In short, we have the absolute obligation to base our approach on the *realities* of the situation, not on fictions maintained by any side. The realities are these: 1) the legal status of Taiwan is at least an open question; 2) the de facto status of Taiwan is that it is an entirely independent and sovereign entity; 3) U.S. policy contains both a stupid fiction and a hidden danger for Taiwan in referring to the effective government of Taiwan as the "Republic of China"; and 4) the "Shanghai Communiqué" is a clever, but shallow, diplomatic ploy that *prima facie* becomes invalid the moment Taiwan decides it is not part of China.

1) While Taiwan's population is ethnically Chinese, Taiwan's connection to the mainland has always been tenuous, at best. Ming imperial authorities did not protest when the Portuguese took over the island in 1590, and it only became an official part of China when conquered by the Manchus — with "barbarian," that is, Dutch, help — a hundred years later. It did not become a province of the mainland for another 200 years and was then ceded to Japan seven years later, in 1895. Only under a 1952 peace treaty did Japan hand the island over to the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) government, which had been set up on Taiwan. The latter cession is a legal anomaly because the Kuomintang controlled the mainland then no more than it does now, and therefore hardly had the right to make peace for the mainland. There is still no peace treaty between Japan and the Peoples Republic of China. In any event, such legal arguments can not be decisive but are relevant to discredit Peking's claim to undisputed sovereignty over the island of Taiwan.

2) Talk of peaceful or voluntary merger of Taiwan with the Peoples Republic of China by our "China hands" is wretched double-talk. Everyone knows that no formula for "autonomy" or any other possible merger arrangement will safeguard the current relative personal freedom, cultural life or standard of living of Taiwan's population. Merger is submersion, whether rapid or gradual. There is no reason to believe that the native Taiwanese want anything but independence from China as it is today.

The only impulse for merger comes from the Kuomintang (KMT) government, but this only on the condition that it reconquers the mainland. As everyone knows, even the KMT itself, hopes of reconquest are a fantasy. In fact, we are in no sense dealing with a "part of China," but with a sovereign, independent country in everything but name. The only thing lacking is official declaration to this effect and international recognition of the fact.

3) For this reason, U.S. policy should be designed to bring about this result *de jure*. First of all, despite the objections that will be raised to this by our allies on Taiwan, our obligation to protect the government and people on Taiwan — assuming they so wish it — from absorption by the Peoples Republic of China can only be discharged in the long run if a self-proclaimed "Republic of Taiwan" replaces the indefensible fiction of a "Republic of China" located on Taiwan.

Recognition of the Peking government by Washington is inevitable (and desirable) and could occur in the future. The moment that happens, Peking gains enor-

mous leverage with which to destabilize the Taiwan government, from fomenting internal subversion to exerting pressure on Taiwan trading partners. Taiwan's only long-run defense against this eventuality is to have the status of an independent nation.

The one stipulation the U.S. must make is that an independent Taiwan is not China. No "two-Chinas" policy, on either Korean or German models, is applicable here.

4) The Shanghai Communiqué — and almost all thinking on this question, — has assumed the U.S. can do what it wants with respect to Taiwan. Taiwan has been assumed a constant in the equation. But we ought to assume just the opposite: the moment the question of absorption by the Peoples Republic of China or independence is raised, the KMT will issue a unilateral declaration of independence on the spot and seek international recognition. Such an action would free the U.S. — by the very wording of the Shanghai Communiqué — from any obligation to recognize Peking's claim to Taiwan.

Defining a China Policy

The above is the reality of the situation. Our policy properly follows directly from this.

The U.S. should de-recognize the "Republic of China" and downgrade its embassy in Taipei to a consular office pending determination of the final status of the island. This de-recognition should be explained as just what it is, the ending of an unnecessary and counterproductive fiction which leaves Taiwan more vulnerable in the long run.

This should in no way be interpreted as affecting the U.S. understanding of the existence of Taiwan as an undeclared sovereign nation de facto, nor should it affect

any U.S. treaty or commercial ties to the island, including Export-Import Bank loans, arms sales, and foreign aid. Any alteration in the status of these commitments should be frozen pending the final determination of Taiwan's status.

We should also propose the establishment of normal relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and indicate our readiness to proceed immediately as soon as Peking is prepared to exchange ambassadors. We may anticipate that Peking will respond to this in rage and refuse to establish relations on this basis. If that is Peking's course, so be it. We shall have nothing further to say on the subject, except to support whatever course Taiwan eventually chooses. The U.S. under these circumstances cannot be accused of meddling in China's internal affairs for once the "Republic of China" label is dropped, relations between Taipei and Peking, as any honest observer must admit, will hardly be "internal" in any accepted meaning of that term.

If the KMT government declares its independence as, for instance, the "Republic of Taiwan," or if, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite on merger or independence yields the same result, the United States will have only one legal and moral choice: recognition and the advocacy that other countries take the same action.

The only obstacle to this is political: it will offend Peking. It is high time this nation began "offending China" in far more substantial ways by decisively repudiating any policy of allying with Great Han Chauvinist war provocations. It is likely that under the indicated U.S. policy, recognition of the Peoples Republic of China will foreshadow the same changes in Chinese leadership and policy necessary for China to rejoin the world community on a positive basis.