

Europeans Move To Cool Horn Crisis

Speaking on Western German television on Feb. 8 after his talks with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that he and Giscard had agreed that "no foreign power should intervene in the situation," thus completely discrediting press reports asserting that France and West Germany were supplying arms directly to Somalia. (For a fuller report on the Giscard-Schmidt summit, see EUROPE.)

In addition, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held a meeting with all the African ambassadors to Bonn to discuss a resolution of the conflict on the Horn.

Military circles in Western Europe are fully aware that the question of full-scale warfare in the horn of Africa is but one front of confrontation between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger's British-allied circles within the U.S. Administration, and other U.S. government officials working more or less honestly in the American national interest. Adalbert Weinstein, military correspondent of the conservative West

German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, gives this internal U.S. battle as the explanation for America's refusal so far to provide military aid to Somalia's conflict with Ethiopian forces. His editorial says in part:

"America's self-restraint has become so explicit that no one can dare to count on any American engagement in the horn of Africa. People in Washington are even secretly congratulating themselves on the policy being pursued at this point. In this war, they say, the Somalis are the real attackers; one ought not give encouragement to the aggressor. Aid for the Ethiopian rebels is also impossible, because Africa — which has elevated the inviolability of nations' borders to the status of a taboo — would turn against any nation giving support to the rebels. And why is America practicing such abstinence? This country's policies continue to be determined by what the Americans call 'the lesson of Vietnam.' Ethiopia and Somalia are a problem of American domestic policy, rather than one of foreign policy or even a strategic one..."

increases mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR, the Soviets will be disposed to make substantial concessions on a variety of other issues. However, if the United States closes the door to the latter course, the Soviets will correspondingly shift at an accelerating rate toward a hard line, making virtually no concessions.

Up to the beginning of the recent Sadat-Begin peace effort, the British government was working to push the Soviets away from joining the United States in creating a favorable climate for progress of those negotiations. While London, with aid of British agents-of-influence Mondale, Brzezinski, and Kissinger, have virtually wrecked the Sadat-Begin negotiations, largely by making Begin a captive of Moshe Dayan, London dropped its mask and surfaced with a virulent Cold War profile, demanding that with the Soviet Union and Cuba over the Horn of Africa.

This is accompanied by the City of London's monetary demand to Moscow that Moscow and other Council for Mutual Economic Assistance nations subordinate their foreign debt and credit to the City of London markets in connection with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. It is accompanied by London's efforts, with Kissinger's active support, to launch a "Chile scenario" in Italy, to destabilize the governments of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and to break Japan to London's will.

Moscow will never accept the total package of concessions London is demanding that the U.S. government demand. The Soviets will go to total war before making such extensive submission of their sectoral economic integrity and global strategic capability.

Hence, although Moscow does not have the depth of commitment to Ethiopia it had to Cuba in 1962, when the confrontation in the Horn is situated, as it is now, as part of a total, globally interlinked strategic package, that matter has vital strategic implications which could not

be identified by the "geopolitical" features of the region itself.

Any qualified military commander in the U.S. ought to have the competence to see this clearly for himself.

The one thing which must be avoided is a direct confrontation between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Indirect or "surrogate" confrontations are risky enough in this period. A direct confrontation means that either one of the powers must back down, or that the following order of warfare is activated:

(1) Total, intercontinental thermonuclear (and other atomic-biological-chemical — ABC) barrage, targeting strategic military and logistical targets out of the near-term reach of the Warsaw Pact ground forces.

(2) An accompanying short-range and intermediate-range ABC barrage, hitting rear-echelon military and logistical targets in the projected theatres of ground combat, and also "paving" the NATO front in-depth, preparatory to ground forces advance.

(3) A broad assault by mechanized forces, in combat group formation, through an ABC-contaminated line-of-march, and a de-escalation of warfare from "maximum deterrent" towards "conventional" warfare with some ABC augmentation.

Estimate of War Risk

The degree of risk of general thermonuclear war in a Horn of Africa direct confrontation between major powers is not to be compared with the situation of the Kennedy Administration Berlin Crisis, the 1962 Cuba Missiles Crisis, or Kissinger's wild gamble with war in 1973. Although there are some "built-in checks" in the "system" still, the Mondale, Brzezinski, and Kissinger-dominated Carter Administration does not have a relatively strong president such as Kennedy or Nixon in place to ensure that situations are more or less competently judged and that firm war-avoidance courses of