

## Pravda Targets Brzezinski As Wrecker Of SALT

*The following are excerpts from Pravda's "International Week" commentary March 5 by Sergei Vishnevskii:*

Exactly five decades ago, speaking at Oxford, British General Swinton, the inventor of the tank, declared: "The world is rather more prepared for war than for peace, and therefore I do not think that England ought to agree to any disarmament." The Imperialists of the U.S. and England developed their military program unchecked, and also rearmed Germany. Japan, France and Italy did not lag behind. And everybody knows where the arms race ended up that time....

It would be a great stimulus to winding down the arms race, if the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were successfully concluded. A new agreement (SALT-II) would have been concluded long since, if it were not for those circles abroad who, in the words of Senator G. Hart, want to "suffocate the baby in the cradle," that is wreck the agreement....

Several days ago, a useful report was published by the U.S. Department of State, which refuted falsifications about Soviet "violation" of the 1972 agreement. But at

the same time, the alarming word "linkage" is heard from official Washington. Most often, it comes from the mouth of the President's assistant on national security affairs, Z. Brzezinski. Linkage of what with what? Of the SALT negotiations with questions completely unrelated to the problem of arms limitation, particularly the situation in the Horn of Africa (and in this, the peaceful goals of Soviet aid to the victim of Somali aggression, Ethiopia, are shamelessly distorted.) It is apparent that Brzezinski, sensing the untenability of the "linkage" tactic, is dancing a polonaise: today he is for "linkage", tomorrow against—but adding that it "might become inevitable."...

What is the point of all these dance steps? They might make some sense, if the U.S. had less of a stake in winding down the arms race than we do. It would be of some use to some people in Washington to reread the President's recent statement: "The absence of a new SALT agreement...certainly would lead to a worsening of the atmosphere, and to an ultimate catastrophe. If the arms race continues or intensifies, the chances will grow that those weapons will be used under certain conditions."

## ACDA Report Shows SALT II Could Work

Two separate reports released in Washington last week take most of the wind out of arguments by SALT opponents that negotiations so far have been no more than a *carte blanche* for Soviet violations and arms buildup.

The reports reveal that: (1) the compliance system which was set up for SALT I was very effective in checking possible violations of the SALT I treaty; and (2) the provisions of the SALT II treaty which have been worked out would be adequately verifiable under present circumstances.

Both reports were released under the auspices of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala), and were prepared by the State Department.

The SALT II report, developed by the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) with cooperation from the entire executive branch, including the Defense Department, reports a consensus that the treaty as agreed to so far would be "verifiable within adequate limits." In defining this term, ACDA Director Paul Warnke stated that the Soviets would either be caught in any violations early enough to correct them, or that the violation itself would not alter the strategic relationship. In addition, the report reveals for the first time, officially, the details of the provisions which have already been worked out in Geneva.

The SALT I report, which was prepared by the State Department's Standing Consultative Commission, a body created under the SALT provisions, reveals that while many possible treaty violations were filed with the Commission by both sides during the tenure of SALT I, no

claim proved to be in violation of the pact. The Soviets, however, reportedly "pushed the treaty to the limits." The report shows that the mechanism which was created to deal with irregularities worked very effectively and that a frank, give-and-take relationship between the U.S.-Soviet Commission took place on a regular basis. This is presumably the same type of apparatus that would be used to smooth over differences on the proposed SALT II treaty.

According to *Aviation Week*, the United States questioned apparent Soviet anomalies eight times, while the Soviet Union submitted five requests for clarification of unusual or ambiguous actions on the part of the U.S. The U.S. requests dealt with:

(1) Special purpose silos, which were later determined to be in use for launch control, although they were not stocked with missiles;

(2) A pattern of concealment from satellite photography, which apparently ended as soon as the request was submitted.

(3) Heavy missile deployment, which was not resolved because of ambiguities of definition in the SALT I accords. These ambiguities would be resolved in SALT II.

(4) The testing of an air defense system, the SA-5, which was later resolved not to be in an ABM (antiballistic missile) mode.

(5) Soviet dismantling of ABM launchers.

(6) ABM radar installations at the Kamchatka Peninsula, which are believed to be prototypes for full ABM installations. Discussions of this issue are continuing.

(7) Dismantling of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic

missiles) which could not be completed in time to comply with the ceiling on ICBMs. This was resolved by agreeing not to deploy SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) until the ICBMs in question were destroyed.

(8) Concealment at test ranges.

The Soviet complaints were:

(1) Concealment of U.S. Minuteman (ICBM) sites, which were shelters designed for upgrading silos. The U.S. cut down the size of the shelters.

(2) Atlas and Titan (ICBM) launchers throughout the country were protested until the U.S. gave assurance that they were deactivated and couldn't be used on any medium-term basis.

(3) A possible ABM radar installation on Shemya Island, which was determined to be for early warning and tracking.

(4) The privacy of the Standing Consultative Committee was protested, when U.S. newspapers reported Soviet violations as fact and not as requests for clarification. Some items were proved to have been leaked in such a fashion by "government circles."

(5) Dismantling of the ABM site at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

Other matters discussed by the Committee during its deliberations include: The blinding of U.S. monitoring satellites, which the U.S. supposedly resolved by showing the cause of the blinding to be natural gas explosions inside the USSR; the question of the mobile ABM system, a system which was determined not to exist; ABM missile tests; and testing of mobile ICBMs by the USSR, which is not prohibited by the treaty. (It was determined, however, that the missile in question did not have strategic but intermediate range.) The Committee also reviewed the denial of test information, in which the Soviets have encoded missile-test telemetry data.

*Here are excerpts from the ACDA's Feb. 23 report on "Verification of the Proposed SALT II Agreement."*

#### 1. Overall Assessment

The anticipated SALT II agreement is adequately

verifiable. This judgment is based on assessment of the verifiability of the individual provisions of the agreement and the agreement as a whole. Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs...

#### 5. Overall Verifiability of Agreement

...A consideration in determining whether the agreement as a whole is adequately verifiable has been whether the Soviets could exploit the monitoring uncertainties of several individual provisions, each of which is judged as adequately verifiable, in a way that would affect our national security interests. We have confidence that we can adequately verify compliance in such a context because the probability of detecting the fact of cheating increases markedly if the number of provisions being violated increases. Combined with the likelihood of detecting significant cheating on individual limitations, the ability to detect the fact of small cheating on a number of provisions enhances our monitoring confidence.

The Soviets cannot be sure of our overall capability to monitor a SALT II agreement. Thus, Soviet planners would be expected to make careful conservative assumptions regarding U.S. verification capabilities. For example, a slightly less than 50 percent chance of detection, which is considered "low confidence" in monitoring capability to the U.S. would probably appear as "high risk" to a Soviet planner contemplating cheating. Given U.S. Research and Development hedges and our greater industrial and technological base, the Soviets would not lightly undertake this risk and the attendant danger of U.S. abrogation.

In sum, although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs. However, any cheating on a scale large enough to affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. For these reasons, and others noted in this paper, we believe that the SALT II agreement, taken as a whole, is adequately verifiable.

## Young: British Solution Is No Solution

The Carter Administration soundly rejected the internal solution for Rhodesia which British Foreign Secretary David Owen had negotiated with Prime Minister Ian Smith. On March 9 Carter made a surprise announcement that Somali President Siad Barre has personally assured him that Somali troops would be withdrawn from Ethiopia. Carter also took an unexpected initiative by proposing a conference of all the interested national leaders which would include black leaders Josua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to work out a transition to majority rule.

Hours before Carter's press conference, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had mooted the possibility that Somalia may withdraw its troops from the Ogaden area saying this "is the necessary precondition for resolving

that conflict there." Vance further said that the Soviets and Cubans should respond in kind, and withdraw in favor of an Organization of African Unity peacekeeping force.

Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young had indicated in public statements last week that he considered the internal solution which included only domestic leaders Rev. Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa inadequate. In a guest editorial in the *Atlanta Constitution* March 1 Young correctly asserted "No Real Settlement in Rhodesia" in the headline. Young followed his editorial statement with strong public criticism of Britain's role in negotiating the internal solution, March 7 saying, "Are they (the British) going to run out on us in