

### Venezuela and Brazil

Brzezinski heavily stressed the Cuba issue the following day in Caracas in his briefing to the U.S. press corps on the talks between Carter and Venezuela's President Carlos Andres Perez. Perez, under heavy pressure from Brzezinski-aligned forces internally, immediately showed the results of such arm-twisting by alluding to the "danger" of Cuba's Africa involvement, and by including a denunciation of "the presence of foreign forces in Africa" in the final joint communiqué.

In Brazil, Brzezinski was able to line up the Geisel government against Cuba by downplaying the touchy issues — human rights and nuclear technology transfers — that the Brazilians thought Carter would raise. Instead, Carter, under Brzezinski's instructions, flattered Brasilia's self-image as a nascent "big power" which has to be consulted by the U.S. on "global responsibilities" — such as Africa. This slightly refurbished resurrection of Henry Kissinger's "special relationship" with Brazil, first proposed in February 1976, so overwhelmed the flat-footed Brazilian officials that the lead headline of the *Correio Brasiliense* in Brasilia of March 30 read: "Jimmy Carter Arrived and Did Not Attack Us." As the *Christian Science Monitor* pointed out March 31, as soon as Carter sat down with Geisel for the first round of talks, the U.S. chief executive began "consulting" his counterpart on big-power global problems, which suddenly "changed the atmosphere." Carter went so far as to propose a "hot line" between Brasilia and the White House!

Whatever differences loomed prior to Carter's arrival were papered over. The human rights issue was quietly

filed away after Brzezinski reviewed Geisel's political reform program and deemed it "dynamic." As for the nuclear question, Carter simply explained that he was not opposed to Brazilian nuclear energy per se, only to the West German fuel cycle transfer. *O Estado de Sao Paulo* explained the following day that in light of Brazil's "new status as a great power," it must "share with the U.S....the grave responsibilities for the destiny of the West....(Therefore) collective interests temporarily take on the greatest weight." The hysterical anti-Cuban editorial in *O Globo* April 3 (see page 6) makes clear what these "interests" are.

Brzezinski's retread of Henry Kissinger's policy of a "special relationship" with Brazil simultaneously reactivates moves toward a modified South Atlantic Treaty Organization-type pact, which would be able to undertake anticommunist police actions in that arena, "independent" of the U.S. The present version, like Kissinger's original, necessarily envisages Brazil as the center. However, there have been problems as to whom the other Latin American and African participants could be. Nationalist factions in Brazil represented by Foreign Minister Azerado da Silveira refused to consider an alliance with South Africa, Kissinger's first choice on the African side. The long historical rivalry between Brazil and Argentina created difficulties for pulling Buenos Aires into this arrangement, as well. Hence, the importance of Venezuela and Nigeria. A "Brazilianist" New York commented April 5 that a SATO axis based around these three countries is indeed a Brzezinski option.

### The British View: 'Cuban Missile Crisis of 1978'

*The following remarks by Conservative Party speechwriter and British intelligence stringer Robert Moss appeared in the March 27 Daily Telegraph, in his article, "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1978":*

The Russians are building a pen for their nuclear submarines in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. This, according to senior Western military observers, is the evidence of recent American aerial surveillance.

There is a strong suspicion that Soviet strategic missiles have already been smuggled back to Cuba....

This time round, things are rather different. According to reliable sources in Washington, the Carter Administration has so far made no attempt to warn off the Russians.

Nor has it done anything about alerting the American public to what could easily develop into the Cuban missile crisis of 1978....

Similarly, the current Soviet leadership might have drawn the conclusion, after 15 months of confusion or inaction in American foreign policy, during which the Russians have been allowed to make notable strategic advances in Africa, that America's leader lacks the will to respond.

They are also well aware that they are in a much stronger strategic position than in 1962, and that Mr. Carter would need even stronger nerves than

President Kennedy to call their bluff.

Yet, American failure to resist such gross provocations as a new Soviet bid to install nuclear missiles just off the coast of Florida would amount to a damning admission of weakness...

It is in this context that President Carter's "cold war" speech in North Carolina on March 17 must be considered.

Mr. Carter's pledge that the United States will match Soviet military capabilities and will mobilize the forces to "counter any threats to our allies and vital interests" reassured many of America's friends who had been puzzled and disheartened by its failure to respond to Soviet aggression in Africa....

The Russians will not judge Mr. Carter by his words, but by his actions.

In the chancelleries of the world (and not least in Peking), assessments of what the Carter Administration really means will not be based on an occasional speech that may well be primarily directed at a section of domestic opinion but on how Mr. Carter and his advisers cope, or fail to cope, with the realities of power....

The Chinese will be watching the development of the Cuban missile crisis of 1978 as keenly as anyone in the West. As the Russians test Jimmy Carter, the questions get progressively tougher. Let us hope he can come up with the right answer to this one.