

What Cannot Be Kept Confidential

This statement was issued by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., U.S. Labor Party Chairman, May 14, 1978:

The FBI's five months of experience with pathological liar Greg Rose, documented in FBI files labeled "Kwarterbak" released under the Freedom of Information Act procedures, illustrates an important principle concerning the limits of efficient confidentiality.

Rose, an agent of certain British-linked private intelli-

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gence networks, was planted upon the FBI on or about May 1975, conveying a wild cock-and-bull story, purporting to have evidence of, among other things, a successful penetration by the National Caucus of Labor Committees of high levels of NATO military security. After five months of transatlantic activities by several agents on this account, in October 1975 the FBI concluded that Rose's wild tales had been "a melange of wishful thinking, creative day-dreaming, and unfounded chest-thumping." The FBI dispensed with Rose's services, at which point Rose passed into the hands of the *New Republic's* British intelligence nest and circles within the United Autoworkers bureaucracy.

The central feature of Rose's fabricated allegations, which prompted FBI officials to five months of extraordinary activities, was the allegation that the NCLC had penetrated to possession of secret documents concerning NATO's Hilex-75 operations and NATO MC14-4 doctrine. Since Rose's falsified tale had a certain verisimilitude to New Solidarity International Press Service's published coverage of the Hilex and MC14-4 matters, the FBI, operating ostensibly on the misguided assumption that the NCLC could not think through facts in the public domain, allowed itself to be led astray by the working assumption that the NCLC's knowledge could only have been derived from possession of secret documents.

According to the FBI documents now available, the FBI closed the case after it had exhaustively shown Rose to be a liar, and apparently did not evaluate those blunders in FBI thinking that had allowed the Bureau to be lured off into a five months-long wild goose chase. It is that latter oversight by FBI officials that ought to be publicly examined, as a matter of refining U.S. national security and counterintelligence policies and practices.

The Case Itself

A summary of the NCLC's interest and work in the Hilex and MC14-4 cases provides the appropriate background to stating the principled points to be made in this connection.

The scenario for Hilex-75, a 1975 NATO simulation, was published in the West German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* during the preceding summer. As the simulation proceeded, our offices in Wiesbaden, West Germany, and New York noted that a number of the significant items in

the reported scenario were in fact *operational* at the time the operation was in progress. As a matter of check, we completed a computer cross-tabulation of the published scenario with breaking developments that cross-gridded with those elements, and made this report available to relevant persons in the U.S. Department of Defense and responsible congressional bodies, among other such locations.

In this we proceeded on the assumption that the operational status of the key elements of a NATO war game represented a war danger either because of conspiratorial intent to that effect by certain agencies, or because of the reading of possible such intent in the Warsaw Pact command.

For the second variant, it was necessary to consider the fact that such effect on the Warsaw Pact command would be seen in advance, and would be an intentional feature of the deployment — a feature consistent with British-Kissinger psychological-warfare policy.

The imperative, whichever of these variants might be the most correct one, was to forestall any such caper and, at the same time, to uproot an organized "Strange-love"-scenario capability in or around the NATO command.

It was our view that alerting relevant officials to the significance of the factually established pattern of operational elements of the simulation would destabilize any foul bits of conspiracy afoot, and might also, one rightly hoped, alert responsible U.S. officials to the deadly risk of keeping creatures such as Kissinger, Haig, and Schlesinger in positions of influence.

All of this information concerning NCLC sources and deductions was in the public domain.

As we stated in print and in various oral communications to Defense Department and congressional officials at that time, we never had a copy of the classified MC14-4 document in our possession or before our eyes. We did, however, have a copy of the nonclassified version of the doctrine, as issued routinely by an appropriate public information office. What we had was a broad press campaign by personalities linked to the London International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), pushing what we perceived to be an insane revision of NATO doctrine. This shift we associated with the name of the policy being publicly pushed, MC14-4, and alerted figures in the Defense Department and in congressional circuits to our view of the implications of this policy shift.

The cases of Hilex and MC14-4 ought to have illustrated once again to the FBI that no policy can be kept secret once public refractions of its attempted implementation occur. Once a policy is pushed, any competent group of persons can reconstruct rather quickly the contents of the secret policy documents used to set such a policy thrust into motion. Although the name of the author of a document might be kept secret even under such conditions, the names of the factional forces authoring the document can be inferred quickly, accurately, and conclusively.

However, if relevant counterintelligence officials of

the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and the FBI — for example — are not adequately trained on certain relevant points of political intelligence, those officials are unable to judge such matters, and are therefore susceptible to being lured off into various sorts of wild goose chases, even in far more important matters than the disinformation supplied by some would-be Titus Oates.

The Policy Problem

The gut of this continuing disability in the USA's counterintelligence community is the effect of the myth of the Anglo-American partnership in strategic interests. By accepting the myth that Great Britain is a close ally of the United States, one closes out of one's mind all of those conceptions and knowledge indispensable to competent U.S. counterintelligence professionalism.

For example, in the FBI's Greg Rose case, the FBI was victimized by a knee-jerk reaction to the mythology of "left versus right"; by profiling the NCLC as a "left group," the FBI was trapped into formulation, "We have information that a left group is penetrating NATO secrets." With that credulous equation drawn, the wild goose hunt was on, continuing for a wasteful five months of top-level exertions.

If the FBI officials had been competently educated, they would have known that for the thousands of years of development of Mediterranean-centered civilizations, the fundamental and continuing factional division has been between humanists (city-builders) and oligarchists (zero-growthers). If they had been competently educated

to that effect, they would have known — as they obviously did not — why the United States fought repeatedly against Great Britain, beginning with the American Revolution. They would have understood that the fundamental issues in the world today continue to be between the American Revolution's philosophy, a city-builder commitment, and the oligarchical (Malthusian) policies of the British monarchy. They would have recognized that Henry Kissinger was the epitome of the United States' number one security risk — then and now.

With that background, the FBI officials would have been able to evaluate the significance of the issues involving Hilex-75 and MC14-4, as a matter of a continuing battle within the Atlantic Alliance between vital U.S. strategic interests and the policies of the British monarchy. Once they had competently judged the nature of the issue, they would have easily seen through the lying of Greg Rose.

Because the FBI officials — and, ostensibly, those with whom they consulted—did not understand the nature of the issue, they could not competently judge the kind of knowledge used by the NCLC to evaluate the evidence in the public domain. This ignorance by the FBI officials and others contributed to their delusion that the NCLC could not possibly have done what it obviously did: adduce a judgment from facts in the public domain. So, they spent five months on a wild goose chase. They finally dropped the case because they proved Greg Rose a liar — not because they finally understood the character of their own blunder in judgment.