Brzezinski Anti-Sovietism Cornered

Vance steers African policy toward detente

A sweeping drive to silence National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and reorient American foreign policy, beginning with U.S. African policy and U.S. Soviet relations, is underway. The emphatic reversal of U.S. African policy away from confrontationist involve-

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ment and the "Cuban-Soviet bogeymen" outlook, and towards cooling down the African situation, as per Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's testimony before the House International Relations Committee and his Atlantic city African policy speech, are among the clear signals that a large scale and — bitterly fought over — across-the-board foreign policy reorientation is occurring.

Brzezinski's recent policy statements have set into motion two broad types of political forces to put a cap on his insistence on global confrontation policies directed against the Soviet Union. Generically speaking, these two political forces are 1) U.S.-centered power groupings enraged over the threat to U.S. national security posed by Brzezinski hegemony over Administration foreign policy, and 2) British-allied spokesmen who are convinced that Brzezinski overplayed the "China card" as a means to threaten the Soviets.

These latter view Brzezinski as totally incompetent to act on behalf of London's two overriding strategic concerns. These are: first, the necessity of successfully sabotaging joint West European and Arab organizing for implementation of the historic May 6 Bonn-Moscow accords; and second, London's wish to maneuver any confrontation with the Soviet Union away from Europe and into the Pacific theater.

The White House decision to designate Vance as the upfront spokesman for Administration African policy — at Brzezinski's obvious expense — is the other leading indicator of Administration response to the very heavy pressure to "exile" Brzezinski.

Government officials (particularly in the State Department), members of Congress, and industrial and political leaders around the country have all exerted tremendous pressure on the White House, especially as the Brzezinski and CIA head Stansfield Turner "Cubans in Zaire" invasion stories became totally discredited.

Referring to the National Security Advisor's anti-Soviet ravings while visiting China, and Carter's own echoes of this stance in his recent Annapolis speech, one Capitol Hill source explained that "Carter has the vast majority outside the White House horrified by this. Now he understands that the Administration's words have an impact, that they can't be said lightly."

Congressional pressure on the Administration is exemplified by the fact that Vance's presence at the House International Relations Committee was requested in a letter sent out by 14 members of the Committee to Carter expressing their concern at the direction of U.S.-Soviet relations. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind) queried the Secretary about *Pravda's* attack (see excerpts, "International Report") on Administration Cold War postures and asked if recent events indicated a shift of U.S. policy into a tougher approach, which Vance denied. The Indiana Congressman persisted that his constituents have been pressing him about this change in policy and that he needed a straight answer.

What Vance Has Said

The summary of Vance's two speeches, outlining the new U.S. African policy are as follows: 1) the primary U.S. orientation toward Africa consists of "economic development, trade and aid"; 2) peaceful solution to area conflicts; 3) no U.S. military involvement, and a pledge not to use Africa as an arena for East-West confrontation; 4) a near-total omission of the recent hysterical rhetoric of the so-called Cuban-Soviet involvement in the Shaba invasion, a distinct downplaying of "concern" over the "Cuban-Soviet role" in Africa; and 5) most indicative of how far this shift has gone, the opening extended to Angola for relations with the United States.

However, Vance has left more questions — the most important ones — open than were answered by these policy addresses. His remarks, taken at face value, straddle the fence between the twin-pressure currents bombarding the Carter Administration. Vance's speeches identify a negation of a previous policy — in this case, Brzezinski's. They do not establish a new policy, but merely an opening towards a new policy, a policy that can either reflect the London pressures, or, an African policy of progress and detente more in line with the "Grand Design" inclinations of powerful U.S.centered interests. The foremost litmus test will be for the Secretary of State, and indeed the Administration to define concretely what "economic development, trade and aid" mean. Until now, no answers have been provided.

Below is arrayed the crucial evidence pertinent to the above analysis. We begin with excerpts taken from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's opening statement before the House Committee on International Relations, and his Atlantic City speech before the Junior Chamber of Commerce Convention on African policy. These are followed by our exclusive publication of comments



from a high Administration source. This official expresses his endorsement of the Vance speeches as they now stand. Excerpts then follow providing a sampling of known London-affiliated conduits, all speaking out against any confrontation over Africa.

-Konstantin George

Vance Reflects Administration Fight

New York Times, "Vance Urges Effort by U.S. And Russians to Reduce Tensions," June 20:

On specific issues, Mr. Vance said the controversial question of Cuban involvement in the recent fighting in southern Zaire had been "blown out of all proportion." He also seemed to take issue with the bitter comments of Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Carter about Soviet behavior by warning that although there would always be strains in relations, "one should be careful in terms of rhetoric one uses because I think it is very easy to slip into rhetoric that may be excessive and may lead to what people call the cold war."...

Mr. Vance has been worried, according to his aides, that Soviet-American relations were being worsened unnecessarily by what he regarded as gratuitous attacks on both sides. Although he personally supported the substantive points in Mr. Carter's speech at Annapolis June 7 on Soviet-American relations, he had no hand in preparing the language that offered Moscow the choice of either "confrontation or cooperation."....

Following are excerpts of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's opening statement to the June 19 House International Relations Committee:

The recent introduction of large quantities of Soviet arms and thousands of Cuban troops in certain parts of Africa raises serious concerns. The size and duration of their military presence jeopardizes the independence of African states. It creates concern on the part of African nations that outside weapons and troops will be used to determine the outcome of any dispute on the continent. And it renders more difficult the efforts of Africans to resolve these disputes through peaceful means.

As I plan to indicate tomorrow in a speech on our African policies, our strategy is based upon an affirmative and constructive approach to African issues — helping African nations meet their pressing human and economic needs, strengthening their ability to defend themselves, building closer ties throughout Africa and assisting African nations to resolve their conflicts peacefully....

This strategy represents a sound and positive approach to African realities. Let me emphasize the essential point that the basis for our position in Africa—a position which is strong and growing stronger—is the African perception that we see them, and their problems

in their own terms, and not as an arena for East-West differences.

Following are excerpts from the June 20 speech by Secretary Vance at the Atlantic City Jaycees convention — provided by New Solidarity International Press Service, Washington, D.C.

...Last July...I said that we can be neither right nor effective if we treat Africa simply as an arena for East-West competition. Our Africa policy has not changed. Its objectives remain forward looking and positive....

What are the ingredients of a positive African policy? Simply stated they are:

- A strong U.S. commitment to social justice and economic development in Africa;
 - Efforts to help resolve African disputes peacefully;
 - Respect for African nationalism;
 - Support for legitimate African defense needs;
- And finally, helping to foster respect for human rights....

In this connection, we believe it could be helpful to increase our consultations with the Angolan government and begin working with it in more normal ways in order to improve the prospects for reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, as well as for achieving a peaceful settlement in Namibia....

...We do not ignore that there is a residue of suspicion among some Africans who have fought against colonialism that our policy is simply a tactic and not a reflection of a genuine commitment to African needs. Only time and our continued demonstration that we mean what we say will meet this problem.

We are convinced that an affirmative approach to African aspirations and problems is also the most effective response to Soviet and Cuban activities there. Any other strategy would weaken Africa by dividing it. And it would weaken us by letting others set our policies for us....

New York Post, "For Vance, the test is crucial," by Joseph Kraft, June 19:

Unfortunately the president, instead of stating the general case, made a specific allegation based on secret intelligence. "We," he said at a news conference in Chicago on May 25, "know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping" the forces which attacked Zaire.

In fact the evidence is far from clear. Castro has denied the charge and given American congressmen a story to the effect that Cuba actually tried to block the invasion from Angola....

But it is a fair test given the rivalry between the secretary and the president's chief White House adviser on foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Those who doubt Mr. Brzezinski's judgment have been urging the president to give primacy to Mr. Vance. The president seems to be moving in that direction....

This exclusive coverage of a press briefing by a highlevel Administration official was provided by New Solidarity International Press Service, Washington, D.C.

Q: You say "work with Angola in more normal ways" — what's afoot?

A: In the Shaba crisis and Namibia, it is clear that Angola can have a key role in the solution of both. Other nations have realized that greater communication between Zaire and Angola are necessary to resolve the border problem. We are prepared to engage in more normal working relations with them. This does not mean diplomatic relations in the first instance....we have exchanged, in the Shaba crisis and, less directly, in the Namibia situation, communication with them.

Q: How much do you intend to increase development aid? A: We are up to a FY '79 request of \$467 million. We would look for a further increase in '80.

Q: Any encouragement from the Angolans in our attempt to get cooperation?

A: On Namibia, Angolans as part of the front-line group have taken a supportive attitude towards front-line proposals and are supportive of the contact group. The front-line states are very supportive, especially the Angolans. We have seen a constructive attitude on their part — a willingness to be supportive of efforts the contact group have made.

On the Angola-Zaire situation, we do have indications from Angola of responsiveness to our and African concerns about the border. We are encouraged to believe that the government has a positive attitude about the need to stabilize the border.

Q: What is the Administration policy on establishing diplomatic relations with Angola?

A: We would like, as a matter of principle, to have normal relations with all states....If there is a reduction of Cuban presence, the question of normal relations could again come up. But there are problems....

New York Times, "An Ominous Silence," by James Reston. June 21:

...If I understand what is going on here, Mr. Carter is making a major reappraisal of his priorities. After concentrating on "human rights," Castro, Cuba, Angola and Zaire, he is now returning to the major questions of relations with the NATO allies, of arms control with the Soviet Union, and of U.S. relations with Japan, China, India and Southeast Asia. He is concerned about organizing what he calls a "world structure of peace," which means working with the NATO allies and Japan to control the trade and monetary chaos in the world; to encourage the European allies to use their influence to avoid racial and tribal violence in Africa; to urge the Chinese to come out of isolation....

New York Times, "Earning African Friends," by Jonathan Power. June 21:

...What should the West do if it is to stop giving points away to the Russians and Cubans in Africa?

First, it should stop behaving as if it believed the Cubans had some master plan for the takeover of Africa

Finally, it must not let up its pressure on South Africa to strike a deal with S.W.A.P.O. in Namibia, and must persuade Ian D. Smith and his black acolytes in Rhodesia that they have no alternative but to subscribe to the Anglo-American proposals for a settlement.

If the West did this, within two years it would find it had a strong belt of Western sympathizers right across Africa with whom it wouldn't be ashamed to be friends.

U.S. Steel Unionists: We Need Capital Investment Like Japan's

As the following interview, reprinted from the monthly newspaper of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), Steel Labor Today, reveals, the basis for forging an active political labor and industry alliance around policies of economic growth, nuclear energy

LABOR

development, and high technology investment exists as an immediate potential.

Entitled "Japan's Steel Industry: An Ultramodern Complex," the interview reflects a profound

commitment by steelworkers and key sections of the union leadership to what in actuality are "American System" policies of industrial development and technological progress. Interviewed are Robert J. Petris, Director of USWA District 38, and Al Marnati, President of USWA local 2869, Kaiser Steel, Fontana, Calif.

The Japanese, the two labor leaders assert, have taken what used to be American investment practice and technological know-how and applied it to the effect of building a powerful industrial nation, whose output in some cases, as in steel, exceeds even the U.S. in quality and tonnage. While not specifically locating Japanese practice in terms of the American System strategies laid