

An Open Letter To 'Foreign Affairs'

LaRouche tells editor William Bundy what's really wrong with the CIA

An exchange of letters in the "Comments and Correspondence" column in the July, 1978 Foreign Affairs prompted U.S. Labor Party chairman Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. to respond with this open letter to the magazine's editor, William Bundy.

The exchange concerned an article titled "Ethics and Intelligence" that appeared in Foreign Affairs of last April. A letter by Arthur L. Jacobs, who described himself as enjoying "19 years' experience in the (CIA's) Operations Directorate sometimes called the *Clandestine Service*," challenged the contention of author E. Drexel Godfrey (with "13 years' experience in the CIA Intelligence Directorate") that the Agency's covert operations were both unethical and of dubious intelligence value, and so should be drastically curtailed. Jacob's lengthy defense of covert operations, called for "safeguards," but not further "restrictions": "We cannot maintain an effective (intelligence) service by multiple layers of watchdog offices within the executive, or by watchdog committees in our Congress which attempt to supervise in excessive detail." In reply, Godfrey restated his contention that "good men, allowed to operate without a sense of limits abroad, may find their capacity to distinguish appropriate and ethical limits in other contexts reduced. . . Too much damage has been done, too much credibility lost. The intelligence function must be radically redefined. . . and its traditional covert activities curtailed."

Here is LaRouche's answer to both sides of the the "covert operations" debate.

Subject: CIA Policy (Jacobs, July 1978)

June 17, 1978

Dear Mr. Bundy:

Whether or not Admiral Stansfield Turner and-or Zbigniew Brzezinski leave their posts during the weeks ahead, the present demolition of the U.S. intelligence and security capabilities must end, and a program of rebuilding introduced. We can not leave the nation without *preventive* capabilities against terrorism. We can no longer tolerate the recently aggravated situation in which the CIA has no qualified senior specialists in key regions of the world. We can not tolerate a situation in which the White House and Congress are strategically blind, and thus open to dangerous disinformation in many of the most vital areas of policy and executive decision. Nor can we rely on the assumption that our admittedly well-informed acquaintances of SIS, MI-5 and so forth be as accurate and forthcoming as we might wish them to be.

Apart from the useful function of being provocative insertions in *Foreign Affairs*, the combined efforts of Drexel Godfrey and Arthur L. Jacobs ("Comments and Correspondence," July 1978) confuse a problem already a tangle of muckrakers' mythologies and popular delusions. I desire that you employ this provocative letter of mine as a contribution to redirecting the agenda of inquiry and policy formulation. We require a new national intelligence policy, and very quickly.

In this letter I shall introduce elements of argument designed for the nonprofessional, to suggest thus the kinds of arguments professionals ought to be contributing to informing policy-designers and policymakers and the electorate generally. I shall also focus on points which directly address the professional. If the reader makes himself or herself conscious that I am consciously doing both things here, the reader will more efficiently understand the approach I am setting forth for use. Otherwise, it will be useful that the reader reminds himself or herself that I am not only factionally a Neoplatonic, but that I employ methods of judgment and communication which are specifically Neoplatonic, to the effect that what I write here can be read to slightly different effect on each of three levels of knowledge — *inductive hedonism*, *deductive understanding*, and *reason*.

To aid the reader on that point, I now proceed to an illustrative case, and thereafter indicate how that argument can be read on three levels. I shall emphasize that this matter of evaluation on the three classical Platonic-Neoplatonic levels of knowledge is the essence of competent political-intelligence evaluations and proper guidance of intelligence operations.

Covert Operations Against Terrorism

The following illustrative case, which I choose to term a hypothetical case, ought to indicate the kinds of evidence which expose the fallacy of the sort of moralizing into which Mr. Jacobs ensnared his typewriter. We do require "wet" operations capabilities in the domain of covert intelligence warfare. The moral issue is properly limited to policy considerations analogous to those appropriate for regular warfare.

A major industrial nation, a close ally of the United States, has been subjected — in this hypothetical case — to a hideous escalation of international-terrorist bloodbath, culminating in the brutal abducting and ensuing assassination of a former head of government. The actual and stated objective of this wave of terrorism is to destabilize not only an existing, duly constituted government, but to undermine the constitutional order of that nation. This government and responsible leaders of

the nation's two major parties have made repeated direct and indirect solicitations of U.S. intelligence assistance.

The intelligence service of this nation, plus the intelligence services of a nation closely allied to both it and the USA, have made clear determinations concerning the authorship of the terrorist operations. Included in these conclusive determinations are the names and roles of several persons nominally "above suspicion" who are a key part of the command of the terrorist infrastructure. Their arrest or demise would significantly damage the terrorist operations objectively, as well as producing a most desirable deterrent effect. These persons include figures associated with a certain faction of the old aristocratic families of Europe, part of the same network which groomed and sponsored Adolf Hitler in Bavaria. Some of these are out of reach of arrest because of diplomatic immunities.

In the aftermath of the assassination of the former head of government, two of these key terrorist controllers are hastened to their infernal spiritual rewards by accidents. These accidents, occurring in the context of an acceleration of effective counterterrorist activities by intelligence and security agencies, contribute to the containment of the terrorist problem. The popular view of the matter circulating among informed circles is that the Hand of God intervened to aid that beleaguered nation in a most timely and appropriate way.

I suggest that such realities ought to be contrasted to the hypocritical babblings of various "Deep Throats" and parodies of Titus Oates now titillating congressional committees and sections of our news media. It is also a contemptible fallacy of composition to condemn U.S. services without taking into account the practices of British SIS networks and elements of Israeli intelligence, two of the "wettest" forces running amok in the international spook world today.

Let us examine the political-intelligence side of the same general problem of international terrorism.

The question posed is whether the terrorists are policy instruments of the Warsaw Pact nations, Yugoslavia, Cuba, or Peking.

Apart from the case of "sheep-dipping" of proterrorist figures in pilgrimages to Havana and so forth, which does not delude qualified professionals, there is some past evidence leading to Prague and associated precincts. Upon examination, the connection of Feltrinelli and elements of the Socialist International's Red Brigades terrorist groups to Prague is firmly proven for the case of the Dubcek regime, a regime which also performed a wretched role in its effort to shape Cuban policy in the Americas. There have been and are elements in the Warsaw Pact nations which have aided or do wittingly or unwittingly aid terrorism in Western Europe and elsewhere.

These, however, are not the controllers of terrorism, and are among the factional opponents of the forces associated with Soviet President Brezhnev and Mr. Kirilenko. They are either "Bukharinites" associated with certain intelligence networks based in NATO

countries, or a twisted sort of "hard-liner" who desires strategic confrontation with the West and who therefore winks at practices which contribute to revival of Cold War atmospheres.

Peking does directly and actively support international terrorism and elements of the international drug traffic as a matter of state policy of the presently ruling combination in that nation. There is in the Philippines an Islamic guerrilla and terrorist force, headquartered in the City of London, which is patronized by Peking. Throughout the subcontinent, the Middle East and into Africa, there are important terrorist and related capabilities which Peking either directly controls or shares with certain intelligence networks based on NATO countries. Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and other nations are burdened with a major Peking-linked problem of this sort.

This Peking terrorist activity is overlapped with Peking's participating role in the international illegal opium traffic. Hong Kong and Singapore are the relevant financial centers for this drug traffic of the "Golden Triangle," with Chinese merchants key to the conducting of Peking's proportionately modest share in the revenue of this traffic, and this traffic significant in funding terrorist and related operations.

Sorting out basic facts concerning this aspect of international terrorism already requires sophisticated and extensive work by bodies of well-equipped professionals of our regular political-intelligence and drug intelligence agencies. The importance of this political intelligence is not merely a matter of sorting out facts from disinformation and misvaluations. One obvious result of good intelligence work is equipping our State Department with valuable options for obtaining cooperation of the Soviet and other nations' leaderships in joint operations against terrorism and illegal drug traffic.

These aspects of the problem can be mastered on the level of *deductive understanding*, as elements of intelligence forces in France, Italy, the United States, and other nations have already made correct determinations to the effect we have considered here. The deeper understanding of terrorism, and the development of most-sophisticated counterterror activities, requires a higher level of overview of the facts available, from the standpoint of *reason*.

For more than 2,000 years, Mediterranean-centered civilization has endured terrorist operations modeled on the ancient Phrygian cult of Dionysus. The most notable modern example is the Jacobin Terror directed by Danton and Marat, whose terrorist (sansculottes) instruments reflected the scholarly excess of "Phrygian caps." The connection between Phrygian terrorism and Luddite varieties of "environmentalism" is not peculiar to transatlantic international terrorism today, but is as old as the bucolic Hesiod. Terrorism and Luddite varieties of "environmentalism" go arm-in-arm as a battering-ram against the republican political forces dedicated to scientific and technological progress. There ought to be nothing surprising to the scholar in the discovery that the "ultra-ultra-leftist" terrorist of today turns out to be an instrument of, inclusively, the same

aristocratic circles which sponsored the rise of the Nazi Party in Bavaria, the circles of the "black nobility" who pursued the same antitechnology policies in their fights against the allies of Dante Alighieri, Petrarch, Cosimo de Medici, and Leonardo da Vinci.

If the authorship and guided development of the New Left and related projects is examined from the vantage-point of knowing the history of the evolution of the Phrygian cults over the recent thousands of years, there is nothing essentially original in the purpose or methods behind the coordinated, overlapping development of both international terrorism and Luddite forms of "environmentalism."

The currents behind such antics in both the capitalist and socialist sectors have common pedigrees which bridge the supposed distinctions between socialist and capitalist factions. Just as Jeremy Bentham and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the development of the anti-American forces of the Jacobin Terror were instruments of the same faction of the "black aristocracy" associated with terrorism today, so the influence of Bentham and Rousseau within the socialist movement combats the contrary socialist factions traceable (in Russia) inclusively to Leibniz, Benjamin Franklin's influence, Czar Alexander II, and Count Witte.

It is not accidental that the proper definition of the factional struggles within the Soviet Union is of a continuing battle between the heirs of Leibniz and the heirs of Bentham. Although, on the level of deductive understanding, the United States can seek effective detente with the Soviet Union in terms of specific measures of mutual or reciprocal self-interest, on the level of reason no truly durable detente can be established with the Soviet heirs of Bentham, but only with the heirs of Leibniz. U.S. policy ought to be that of strengthening the credibility and influence of the Soviet heirs of Leibniz, by rewarding those elements and impulses within Soviet foreign policy which correspond to the tradition of Leibniz.

That is the proper way in which to approach the political-intelligence tasks of antiterrorism. The methods and quality of required political intelligence for antiterrorist work are coherent with the methods and quality of political intelligence required for shaping U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Competent political intelligence is the basis for shaping operations intelligence policies, including determining which targets of covert intelligence warfare are morally and practically deserving of various forms of treatments. If the United States armed its Central Intelligence Agency with such a clear directive and mandate, that policy itself would cause the forces behind terrorism to tremble and be significantly deterred.

If we do not give the CIA such mandates and capabilities, and if we do not give similar support to the intelligence work of the FBI and state and local police agencies, the United States is laid open to a wave of terrorism analogous to what has been witnessed in Europe. Chasing identifiable individual terrorist perpetrators after the fact of the specific criminal act is necessary, but by itself it can do nothing to deter or contain the kind of terrorist deployments now being

prepared for the United States. Without an adequate intelligence capability, able to deploy surgically precise preventive actions, a mounting wave of terrorism provokes a besieged nation into police-state measures.

For example, the development of the sansculottes of terrorism, the Weathermen and their emulators and admirers, depends on a drugs and sodomy-flavored subculture. These tools are not in the appropriate condition for deployment unless they are maintained in a specific form of moral insanity. This is the essence of the Phrygian drug-and-sodomy-flavored terrorist cults and their lesbian-maenad-terrorist offshoots over thousands of years: the maintenance of a Phrygian subculture in the condition it must be to serve as a source of terrorists and their political auxiliaries in a variety of "life-style" associated with "communes" reeking of marijuana.

Although marijuana is a bad substance with psychotropic and physiological side-effects, the leading significance of marijuana usage today does not lie in its own specific effects, but in its role as the gateway to and context for a lifestyle of eerie sexual practices and usage of a wide spectrum of more dangerous psychotropics and addictives. This marijuana-centered life-style, especially as radiating from the retreats of the more wild-eyed "environmentalist" communes, is the infrastructure of terrorism and terrorist potentialities in the USA today. For this reason, the pattern of legislative "decriminalization" proposals and directed nonenforcement of existing antidrug statutes and ordinances is the single greatest contribution to fostering a terrorist potentiality within the United States today.

This quality of political-intelligence determination should not only be within the capability of CIA, FBI, and state and local police agencies, but this intelligence ought to guide government executives and legislators in treating the drug problem. If federal and state and local agencies are given mandate for arresting and securing convictions of drug abuses, this mandate arms them to neutralize at will the largest portion of the Phrygian side of the terrorist infrastructure.

A fairly recent successful police action in Mexico illustrates the point. The University of Mexico has been a hot-bed of terrorism. The police were frustrated in their efforts to deal with this problem, because of the campus immunities under which the terrorist nests on campus were shielded. Acting on advice received, the police intelligence placed a relevant section of the university faculty under extended surveillance, developing evidence which led to a major police action in which not only masses of drugs, but many caches of weapons, including machine-guns, were secured.

The fact that the terrorist-environmentalist hard-core infrastructure depends upon a certain drug-linked life-style makes antimarijuana laws with teeth one of the most crucial weapons in facilitating waves of mass arrests which neutralize terrorist capabilities in a locality. Although the "hit squads" used for assassinations and similar acts may be imported, and may not establish direct contact with the local terrorist-support and environmentalist groups, the psychological-warfare feature of terrorism usually demands preparatory and follow-up acts and diversions by

terrorist and environmentalist groups indigenous to the region. Breaking the back of that local infrastructure under conditions of impending or ongoing terrorist action is an efficient counterterror action.

One further example is relevant to the connection between political intelligence and combined overt and covert antiterrorist operations.

A terrorist action often involves the parallel deployment of two core groups. Let us consider the hypothetical case in which a terrorist-type action aimed politically against the Governor of New Hampshire is being deployed to the construction site of the Seabrook nuclear energy plant. One group is deployed as an antiviolence force, trained for this in "nonviolent civil disobedience" roles under the guidance of a well-known pacifist organization. The deployment of this group provides several essential kinds of flanking support for activities by a proviolence group of environmentalists. The object of such an operation would be to insert the violent groups into the same local theater as the "nonviolent civil disobedience" forces, and to force a situation in which the "civil disobedience" forces were involved in police action against the violence.

Efficient police cooperation for such a case would include marijuana busts of groups being deployed to New Hampshire in the cities and towns from which the forces were being dispatched to the action. This should be accompanied by the sort of measures police agencies in Europe used to prevent a bloodbath at one nuclear site in West Germany — a "seal-and-search" of vehicles bringing "counterculture types" into the target area. That action relieved the situation of masses of weapons and improvised weapons, as well as reducing the number of violence-oriented, hard-core forces moving toward the West Germany target from France, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Holland, and West Berlin. The projected replay of Creys-Malville fizzled. This successful action was the fruit of collaboration among political-intelligence as well as police agencies of the cooperating nations, and depended on covert intelligence as well as other activities.

I propose that the connection between political intelligence and intelligence covert operations provides a model for outlining the basic conceptions of covert operations policy generally. It also pushes to one side the sickly, empty moralizing on this subject which has much occupied the Congress and news media.

Improving Political Intelligence

Apart from Jacob's foolish sort of abstract moralizing, the most shocking feature of his commentary is the fact that Jacobs, as a presumably experienced professional, should express so pathetically amateurish a misconception

occupied with more important responsibilities, it would amuse me to head up a counterintelligence agency whose adversary intelligence force viewed intelligence as a matter of filching "secrets" from closely guarded files. *How our adversaries would dance to our tune!* There is no intelligence agency so foolish as one which bases itself on covertly secured "facts," especially facts representing "intent."

I am not arguing. I should inform the layman, that spies should not steal "secrets." This unavoidable standard activity in military-intelligence scrutiny of adversary technological capabilities and commitments. It is also necessary to have a capability for filching those "secrets" which have a crucial importance within the testing of a political-intelligence hypothesis. What I am stating is that intelligence estimates based chiefly on the arrangement of collections of filched "secret information" are intrinsically the work of incompetent amateurs.

The business of basing intelligence estimates on stolen information pertaining to an adversary's (or other's) "intent" is the most amateurish, most incompetent practice of all.

In a political deployment against an adversary, including the special case of military deployment, the deployment itself is designed to shape the adversary's perception of his intent by creating a degree of controlled environment around those targetted decision-makers. The vital sort of psycho-political intelligence is therefore the predetermination of what the intent of the adversary decision-makers will be under alternative controlled environment conditions which are within our foreseeable means to generate. What the fellow's conscious intent may be before such a development does not bear any necessary similarity to what his intent will become under generated controlled environment conditions.

Furthermore, since most politics involves a large array of deception, "hard evidence" of a prospective adversary's intent may fall into our hands either as deliberate deception by the adversary or may reflect other forms of deception or self-deception by the persons under study.

For example, were I running a counterintelligence agency, and were it reported to me that a certain adversary agent had been detected in place in sensitive parts of our establishment, I would not leap automatically to the amateurish decision of promptly arresting the fellow. I would more probably propose to evaluate the possibilities for turning the agent, to make him my witting tool, or to make him my unwitting agent, by a controlled amount of leakage of deception-information into areas from which he will attempt to steal. In the latter case, I would not have the information given to him, but present him with a difficult but feasible incentive for stealing. The greater, the cleverer the means by which an adversary intelligence force managed to steal a fraudulent document, the greater the value they would place upon it. *How they would dance!*

For example, to examine the problem on a higher level, consider the case of Soviet military posture. The Warsaw Pact does maintain and is generally enhancing a relative war-winning capability against NATO and allied forces. I know this because I know how leading Soviet circles think, because I have studied the history of the Soviet strategic outlook, and because I have confirmed crucial evidence that Warsaw Pact capabilities are developed in ways which have no other possible significance.

Now, consider the nonsensical interpretation of the fact of Soviet military strategic posture which

proliferates among many of leading USA circles. Schlesinger and his allies believe in the nonsense cabinet-warfare doctrine of "limited nuclear war." Hence, Schlesinger and kindred light-witted types imagine that the Soviets are preparing to take initiative for a "limited nuclear war." "Classical" Kissingerians, as distinct from Schlesinger-type derivatives of Kissinger, situate this perception within the geometry of "thermonuclear deterrence." Others merely insist that the Soviets are lying when they profess not to be developing a war-winning capability. It is all based on an isolated aspect of something close to the truth in point of fact, but the evaluations are all nonsensical.

It is also a fact that the Soviets are determined to avoid war, to avoid provoking war, and to seek a phased process of general disarmament. The war-winning potentiality exists and is being developed on the contingency that primary, *war-avoidance*, policy fails. Furthermore, the Soviet war-winning capability is not based on the sort of "Blitzkrieg" thinking associated with Schlesinger, Kissinger et al., but exists only for one condition of warfare, a general thermonuclear war which begins with a total intercontinental assault against the logistical centers (e.g., population centers) of the continental United States — along with other targets. Under those conditions, continuing warfare brings the in-depth, war-fighting capabilities of the USSR into play as the dominant feature of continuing warfare, following full-scale thermonuclear exchanges.

The notion that war begins with an armored-column assault in central Europe, and then probably escalates to nuclear exchanges, is the imbecility embedded in most of the misguided published estimations of Soviet and Warsaw Pact capability afoot in U.S. strategic policy circles. *For that sort of war*, the Soviets do not possess nor seek a well-defined war-winning capability. These Warsaw Pact tanks belong to the third phase of the assault — after thermonuclear and tactical ABC (atomic-biological-chemical) bombardment phases have "paved the way" for subsequent assault by mobile ground forces prepared to continue warfare in terrain which has massive ABC contamination. These armored forces move into the assault under conditions in which Western Europe and the United States have sustained ABC artillery bombardment and in which perhaps 30 percent of the Soviet population no longer exists. Soviet war-winning capability emerges only after that scale of initial destruction has defined surviving in-depth strategic capabilities of both sets of adversaries. In the equations of further mutual attrition after that point has been reached, Soviet strategy aims at ensuring that the ultimate, in-depth balance of assault capability lies with the Warsaw Pact forces.

Emerging advanced technologies will inevitably modify the quality of capabilities, but the basic equations of warfare will be ultimately determined by the same principles.

That defines one level of competent political intelligence in this connection. Competent intelligence does not stop there. Given the fact of the Janus-like mixture of Soviet primary commitment to war-avoidance and disarmament with complementary war-

winning strategic commitments concerning capabilities, why do the Soviets maintain the second feature of policy, the war-winning outlook? The amateur, the ignorant man in the street generally, insists that the NATO forces will do nothing to justify the Soviets' maintaining of a war-winning capability, and may therefore conclude that it is the Soviets who are darkly preparing to launch war or to blackmail us into submission with their emerging war-winning capability. This estimation by the amateur and credulous man in the street is factually absurd.

The danger of World War III flows directly out of the present policies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the "Brandt Commission." The economic-genocidal implications of IMF "fiscal austerity" policies for developing nations cannot be durably imposed without totalitarian regimes throughout the entire developing sector. If the Soviets aid nations resisting the IMF's policies, that is taken as a potential act of war by backers of the IMF policy. If the Soviets do not aid developing nations seeking their assistance, the IMF-dominated regimes throughout the developing nations represent an intolerable strategic combination to the Soviets. Therefore, we have the option of either dismantling IMF, World Bank, and "Brandt Commission" policies or ending up in World War III. Perhaps some angered person retorts, "Do you, then, propose that we must allow ourselves to be pressured into dropping IMF policy by fear of Soviet military reactions down the line?" That would be a nonsensical question. Is economic genocide and totalitarian dictatorship throughout the developing nations the vital interest of the United States? If so, we have defined United States interests in World War III. That is the Soviet leadership's general view of the strategic problem, a view they are developing with increasing precision.

For this circumstance, the duty of the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency is to inform the White House and Congress that the lunatic policy of supporting IMF policies is plunging the United States toward a general war which current U.S. strategic postures would cause the United States to lose. It is political intelligence operating at that level of quality and mandated authorities and duties which must be the controlling policy of the CIA and other national intelligence and security agencies.

What's Really Wrong With The CIA?

In form, the fundamental flaw in the CIA has been the same blunder which governed U.S. follies in Vietnam, the folly which is embedded as the central flaw in Clausewitz's *On War*. Under the influence of such Anglophiles as Charles Beard, and of Justice Holmes' "force doctrine" and similar subversions of American constitutional principles, U.S. institutions and policy-thinking during the 20th century have been degraded in quality and moral content by the substitution of abstract *state interest* for constitutional principles which define the United States as a humanist democratic republic dedicated to the promotion of a republican Grand Design-modeled order throughout the world.

In other words, instead of mandating our institutions to

serve a well-defined set of principles of national constitutional purpose, despite any change in Administrations, we have redirected those institutions to be servants for whatever radical changes in policy, including sheer White House caprice, represent the official definition of *state interest* for that specific Administration at that moment.

This is efficiently illustrated by a contrast of British military outlooks with American republican military outlooks against the backdrop of the effects of the prolonged Vietnam War on our military capabilities today.

Modern republican military doctrine is traced formally from the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli's problem was that the antirepublican, oligarchical (Black Guelph) faction prevailed over humanist (republican) forces because the general urban populations were not adequately developed as a suitably trained and suitable equipped military force in depth. Although the insight was not original to Machiavelli, his formal treatment of the problem is the point of departure for all competent modern military thought.

After Machiavelli, there were three outstanding cases of the successful application of his principles to warfare. The first was the unbeatable military force of Cromwell's Roundheads. The second was the development of the military capabilities of the American Revolution on the basis of the urban-centered volunteer militia. The third was the development of the same principles by forces associated with Lafayette and d'Estaing, principles consolidated in the creation of the French Army under the guidance of Lazare Carnot.

In each of these three cases, the armies involved not only what proved to be a superior conception of warfare. These republican principles of warfare — an adequately trained and equipped people in arms — defeated a contrary military policy, the "cabinet warfare" doctrine of the antirepublican, oligarchist faction, the military doctrines based on the notion of an "all-volunteer army." Despite the crushing defeat of the "cabinet warfare" doctrine by Napoleon's armies, a Britain-dominated Europe effected a significant return to "cabinet-warfare" doctrines during the 19th century. These doctrines were crushed by the U.S. Civil War, and by two World Wars of the present century. Still, the British and their political allies have attempted, once again, to institute "cabinet warfare" doctrines, and venture on the rim of World War III with Britain's immediate NATO allies committed to the same discredited folly. The antirepublican "cabinet warfare" doctrines are not the distillate of professional military experience. Exactly the opposite: they are policies which the totality of military history pronounces folly. They recur because they flow from the political character of the antirepublican, British monarchy-led faction which introduces them wherever its influence can be effective to that end.

In the U.S. operations in Vietnam, a republican military capability, our citizen-army, was deployed for a purpose flowing from oligarchical strategic doctrines. If President Eisenhower had directed a military operation in South Vietnam under the guidance of his Atoms-for-Peace policy, rather than the kind of operation launched under Kennedy, no disaster could have occurred. The

deployment of U.S. military forces to act as an armed city-builder force, guiding the development of modern industries, agriculture, and infrastructure in South Vietnam, would have rapidly won over the population of the nation, and would have been the axis for a successful U.S. policy throughout Southeast Asia, a policy on whose basis we could have effected agreement with North Vietnam. Instead, we pursued a cancerously enlarged form of "cabinet warfare," colonial warfare, for colonial-warfare objectives. The involvement of the citizen-army and the population in that sort of war provided the circumstances in which vital institutions of U.S. republican military capabilities were easily liquidated, the destruction centering around the introduction of the oligarchical principle of the "all-volunteer army."

In other words, the republican military principle is the sound principle of warfare, which ensures victory for the republican force in the case of well-matched adversaries. However, to use that capability for a purpose contrary to its nature corrupts and may destroy the institutions on which such a policy depends.

The same principle applies to our intelligence institutions. The vital issue is not whether the CIA operations forces engaged in "wet" operations. The issue is the policy governing those operations. Who were the victims? Should those persons have been victims of covert operations? Did they deserve such a fate; was such action necessary? Were the policy-objectives of the operation consistent with the constitutional objectives of the United States?

The problem is that defending the Shah of Iran against parasitical forces utterly opposed to the development of that nation and imposing a fascist dictatorship in Chile cannot be judged equally. One is necessary, the other an abomination. The principle of state interest says they are morally equal in respect of the oaths and mandates of the CIA and its personnel. That is the gut problem. Every other problem which is proven to be a moral problem is only a derivative of the gut problem.

When agencies of a government kill people, the same distinction between killing and murder applicable to conditions of warfare is to be made. Killing an adversary is not murder if the action is a necessary action. Killing a captured prisoner, rape of members of occupied populations, and so forth are crimes. The judgment of the matter involves two problems. One problem is the abuse of power by persons capriciously attempting to "play God." The more general, more significant problem is the policy guiding the action.

If the President of the United States orders the CIA to make intelligence and covert-operations assistance available to the government of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti or Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for combatting terrorism, and a clean job which does not injure innocents is performed, that is good. If a President orders the CIA to employ the same kinds of professional capabilities against persons Henry Kissinger dislikes, or to further the current policies of the IMF, World Bank, and "Brandt Commission," the successful completion of such an assignment is a crime against the United States' constitutional national purpose.

The problem with the CIA has been its faithful

performance of the kinds of policies it has been directed to serve, and the manner in which those same policies have shaped the judgment of CIA employees. Charles Beard, William James, Justice Holmes, Walter Lippmann, Jeremy Bentham, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson, and the likes and admirers of Bertrand Russell are the source of most that has been wrong with the CIA. The substitution of *state interest* and "force doctrine" for the Neoplatonic-humanist, constitutional republican principles of Benjamin Franklin and his collaborators is the crux of the matter.

The CIA must be reshaped as a complement to the State Department and Department of Justice in serving the U.S. Constitution as a reflection of a Neoplatonic-

humanist dedication to the fostering of a national and global order based on the principles of the Grand Design. The CIA and other institutions of government must be reshaped, remanded both to serve that national purpose, and to be efficiently capable of resisting directives to purposes contrary to that national purpose.

In other words, we must rid our institutions, including the CIA, of the contaminating influence of British oligarchical traditions and practices. The CIA must be a servant of the American Constitution, not the manipulations of the networks of the London Round Table and the IISS branch of British secret intelligence.

Sincerely,
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Advertisement

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June 30-July 1, 1978

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Uwe Parpart and Criton Zoakos

Panel II: Destruction of the Body of Knowledge — the Fight after Leibniz

Christopher White and Nancy B. Spannaus

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