meddling in the internal affairs of Warsaw Pact nations is exemplary of the point to be made.

According to the enthusiasts of Brzezinski's adolescent pranks, the way in which to prevent the Soviet leadership from reacting decisively in event of say an Israeli strike against Syria is to make things as generally intolerable for the Soviets as possible. Brzezinski overlooks that the only conditions under which a power will go to total thermonuclear war is the circumstance in which the actions of the opposite power are becoming so unendurable that war is the only effective means for ending an increasingly intolerable pattern of developments.

Librium might aid Vice President Mondale to cultivate complacency in face of such risks. Mr. Carter may genuinely not comprehend such matters. Brzezinski is clearly not only incompetent in matters of strategy, but a certifiable lunatic — a Miniver Cheevy of a would-be Polish nobleman dreaming of romantic feudal military frolics in 16th-century Lavonia.

Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad. Certain gentlemen around Washington may deem it a matter of their privilege to "do their own thing," but their madness reflected into U.S. government policy might kill us all. Unless a drastic shift occurs soon, the ordinary citizen had better make up his mind whether to dip himself in batter or not; the time is approaching fast when he might fry.

- Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

1. The real story

From the available evidence, it is now apparent that the President of the United States and his Secretary of State were used as mere tools, set up to ratify a prearranged agreement that had been put together by General Dayan, Henry Kissinger, the British, and key leaders of the U.S. Zionist lobby weeks or months earlier. National security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Vice President Walter Mondale, representing those forces on the inside of the U.S. Administration, simply guided the Camp David talks to ensure that Carter and Vance did not deviate from the Israeli scenario.

Despite the theatrical hoopla from Carter about the mythical breakthrough reached at Camp David, there is now little doubt in anyone's mind that during the 12 days at the presidential retreat, Carter — guided by Brzezinski and Mondale — simply squeezed Egyptian President Sadat until he cracked. Precisely because the Camp David accord was reached with Sadat under duress, it is unworkable and is certain to be rejected by the entire Arab world.

Stripped of the vague and undefined formulations for the creation of a permanently Israeli-controlled

'It's just what Dayan wanted...It was worked out months ago'

Exclusive to the Executive intelligence review

Sources close to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Senator Jacob Javits, and Israel's Prime Minister Begin himself all made statements to interviewers this week claiming credit for having pulled off a tremendous diplomatic coup — having initiated, and then controlled, the Camp David summit and its immediate aftermath. Jimmy Carter simply walked into a carefully prearranged set-up.

The most blatant statement of this point of view was made by Israeli military strategist Shlomo Aronson, a scenario planner for Israeli nuclear weapons strategies and a cothinker of Dayan's, who has spent the last year at the Brookings Institute and the Rand Corporation. In an interview Sept. 19 he described how Dayan "masterminded" the negotiations and chortled that the accord specified fine-sounding specific timetables for completely ambiguous conditions "that don't oblige Israel to do anything." Here, portions of that interview:

Q: What is your evaluation of the Camp David accords?

A: Of course, I think they are wonderful. They are exactly what General Dayan wanted. Dayan masterminded the whole strategy at Camp David right from the

start. He's the mastermind of the Begin government, the chief strategist.

No matter how you cut the accords, they amount to a separate deal with Egypt. And that's exactly what General Dayan has been out to get. He's been at it ever since the Likud government came to power, even before Sadat went to Jerusalem. Remember all those secret meetings Dayan had in Morrocco and Europe? I know for a fact he was meeting with Tuhaimi of Egypt to lay the groundwork for a separate peace. And now, finally, it looks as though it's come to pass. Working closely with Dayan at Camp David was, of course, Begin, and also Israel's Attorney General Barach.

behind the Camp David accord

Palestinian bantustan on the West Bank — what Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman called a "fig leaf for Sadat" — the Egyptian president has done what he previously claimed he would never do: sign a separate peace with Israel.

The response: negative

Even as the ink of the Camp David framework was drying, the announced results of the marathon session had the following effects:

In the Arab world, every Arab state except Sudan, which is closely allied to Egypt, attacked the separate peace of Camp David, leading to a grave polarization and isolating President Sadat even from Saudi Arabia. The credibility of the United States suffered gravely throughout the entire Arab world as a result.

In Western Europe, America's key allies, France, West Germany and Italy, were shocked by the American refusal to put any pressure on Israel to extract concessions, and public statements from numerous European spokesmen indicated great unhappiness with what they considered to be a failure of American leadership.

In the field of U.S.-Soviet relations, the threat loomed of a serious deterioration in ties between Washington and Moscow because of the deliberately anti-Soviet character of the Camp David accord.

In the Middle East, the danger of a generalized Arab-Israeli war grew with reports that the crisis in Lebanon was on the verge of a serious turn for the worse. According to informed sources, the Camp David parties discussed the idea of partitioning Lebanon into three or more warring ministates; this is to be the wedge that provokes a series of tribal and sectarian disputes extending through Syria and Iraq into Iran and south Asia.

Contain the USSR

In short, the Camp David agreement — beginning with the separate peace between Egypt and Israel — is meant to be the cornerstone of a NATO-modeled regional defense and security treaty linking Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran under a NATO military umbrella. This strategy, called a "Middle East Treaty Organization," by Canadian-U.S. Zionist leader Edgar Bronfman, is firmly supported by NSC

Q: Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia have rejected the accords. . . .

A: Rejected? I wouldn't push it that far, but it is tending in that direction. It is a rather difficult decision for Jordan to make. Vance will try to get through to the King. He'll make it clear that this is Israel's last position, that we won't go any further in making concessions. If Jordan doesn't like it, then it means a separate Israel-Egypt peace. If they do decide to join in on the accords, then they can get involved almost immediately. That's fair enough, I would say.

Hussein is courageous personally, but not politically. Personally, he'd like to go along with the accords. Politically he can't. There is a growing reluctance in the Hashemite family to take over the West Bank.

Actually, it really doesn't matter if Jordan and Saudi Arabia don't play the game. In fact, Dayan is hoping that Jordan and Saudi Arabia don't play along, because if they don't, then that means it's only Egypt and Israel — separate peace!

So far, it looks as though Jordan and Saudi Arabia are being stupid enough to play along with that gameplan. Of course, if they do change their minds and endorse the accords, that doesn't mean that Israel is screwed. We have all kinds of leeway to prevent a West Bank settlement — we can keep dragging out the issues there for three, five years, even longer. Either way, then, we've managed to wiggle out of committing ourselves on the West bank!

The genius of the accord

The really innovative thing about the Camp David deal was the sophisticated use of the time element. This is the genius of the accord! Look at what you have: a string of ambiguous formulations that really don't oblige Israel to do much of anything, put into a timetable — three months, three years, five years — that creates the illusion of concreteness. Together, they create another illusion: an aura of momentum.

I'm pretty sure that this subtle approach was devised a long time ago. This deal, I would estimate, was not devised during the talks or drawn up overnight. It was worked out months and months ago. Though I don't know for sure, the U.S. went into the summit with a set strategy, the strategy being this

Director Brzezinski, who plans to link NATO and METO to the Chinese in a Cold War-style effort to "contain" the USSR!

Despite the immediate and firm opposition of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the Camp David framework, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance left on Sept. 19 for a five-day visit to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to apply the full and direct power of the American state in order to compel Jordan and the Saudis to reverse their position and back METO. The British — through British Petroleum, the British intelligence-run Bahai cult, the Aspen Institute, and other channels — are applying similar pressure on the Shah of Iran, another unwilling participant in the METO strategy.

Within hours of the announcement of the Camp David results, the Israelis and their allies were trumpeting a major victory and signaling their bellicose refusal to make any compromises whatsoever on the occupation of the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights. In addition, Begin reiterated his adamant 'No' to any serious negotiations with the PLO, the only credible spokesman for the residents of the West Bank.

The Israelis made the following points:

- (1) the Camp David accords allowed the permanent occupation of the West Bank by Israeli troops;
- (2) the Israeli settlements in the West bank could remain forever, and after a total freeze of three months, new settlements might be established;

- (3) the Israelis would retain a veto power over individuals and any groups that might emerge in the process of creating a local "autonomy" for the West Bank Palestinians:
- (4) the West Bank would never become a state or homeland for the Palestinians:
- (5) the success or failure of even this formula for the West Bank would bear no relation to the conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in three months.

It was over the latter point — shocking to some observers of the Arab political scene — that Egypt's Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kamel and a number of Egyptian ambassadors and diplomats have resigned.

It is thus clear that the Camp David framework is not anything more than an exact replica of the 1977 Dayan Plan for the West Bank, and of the 26-point Begin Plan, modeled on Dayan's that was rejected repeatedly by Sadat since his visit to Jerusalem last year.

Why did Sadat accept?

Then why did Sadat accept the plan?

First, there is overwhelming evidence that in the final 72 hours of the Camp David meeting, Sadat and the American delegation alike were operating against the background of dire warnings of war emanating from the Middle East. The crises in Iran and Lebanon had set off alarm bells in Washington, and there were reports that Israel had massed 60,000 troops on the Lebanese and Syrian borders. Sadat, hearing such

deal, and tried to sell it to Sadat, which they did.

The key to the Camp David agreements is that they do not preclude an Israeli presence on the West Bank for a long time to come. If Jordan doesn't join in, then you have a separate Israel-Egypt deal with no agreement on the West Bank. Peace Now (the Israeli peace movement — ed.) is not concerned about the West Bank — that's how sophisticated they are. If a separate peace

great, they say — and so do I. Very few actually care about the West Bank.

Javits takes credit for launching Camp David

A similar attitude was evidenced by Senator Jacob Javits, in an article in the Bronfman familyowned Canadian *Jewish News* Sept. 15. In this account, Javits took credit for having launched the Camp David process in the first place.

After being introduced at a testimonial fundraising dinner by Charles M. Bronfman, a Javits friend for many years who reminded the audience of Javits's fights in the early 1950s to secure economic aid for Israel from the U.S. government, Javits disclosed that the Camp David meeting was

originally brought on "in desperation" — induced by Javits and his colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

According to the Jewish News story, Javits gushed: "We met with President Carter at 9 o'clock (in the morning of the early-August day when Carter first announced the Camp David initiative), and at 11 o'clock the Camp David announcement was made. The President recognized that if the situation were allowed to drift, the consequences could be grave for the entire world. That is why he took the chance of calling the Camp David meeting — even without a set agenda."

reports and aware that Carter was far from prepared to put pressure on Prime Minister Begin to force concessions, decided to sign the accord that was presented to him rather than let the Camp David summit collapse in disarray, which — Sadat calculated — would lead to immediate general war.

Second, there is strong evidence that Deputy Prime Minister Tuhaimi of Egypt, who had been negotiating secretly with Dayan for almost one year, was a virtual Israeli-British agent in the Egyptian delegation, and that Dayan and Tuhaimi had previously worked out what finally did appear as the "Camp David framework."

Third, the success of Brzezinski's NSC in forcefully subordinating the U.S. government departments to NSC discipline gave Brzezinski near-total control over incoming intelligence to the White House, so that Carter was operating "blind" in respect to the world reactions to the agreements eventually announced.

Perhaps most important, Carter's own decisionmaking processes were clouded by the fear that the U.S. Zionist organizations might topple his presidency if he made a decision to break with Israel and deliver the necessary U.S. ultimatum to Begin.

The 'Text for a Framework': sins of omission and commission

What is noteworthy about the Camp David final "Text for a Framework for an Overall Peace" released by President Carter this week is less what it says than what it doesn't say.

A glance especially at the Framework sections dealing with the West Bank and Gaza reveals full non-recognition of any role for the Palestine Liberation Organization and a complete gloss over the two most vital questions: when and how will the West Bank revert to Arab sovereignty and what is to be the fate of Israel's illegal settlements in the West Bank area, an area that Prime Minister Begin, even after Camp David, persists in calling "Judea and Samaria."

More broadly, neither the preamble to the Framework, nor the Framework itself, nor its "associated principles" make the slightest mention of the disputed Golan Height territory between Israel and Syria, nor to the ultimate fate of the city of Jerusalem. On this last issue, which many veteran Middle East observers regard to be the stickiest problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Begin since Camp David has repeated several times that the failure of the

participants to mention Jerusalem signifies that that city will be "the eternal capital of the state of Israel."

The "West Bank and Gaza" portion of the Framework text is the place where several glaring errors — or outright provocations — have been committed.

Clause 1 begins "Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Who are the "representatives of the Palestinian people?" Clause 1b partially answers this: "The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed."

Does this give Israel veto power over the Palestinian representatives? And does the "from the West Bank and Gaza" phrase exclude the "Palestinian diaspora" headed by the PLO and centered in Beirut, which seeks to build a homeland in the West Bank and which is recognized as the Palestinian leadership by most West Bank residents?

Clause 1c provides a disturbing answer. Negotiations on the "final status" of the West Bank and Gaza "will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza" (emphasis added—ed.). This catch-phrase, "elected representatives of the inhabitants" is used in several followup clauses, and certainly adds up to PLO noninvolvement in the West Bank process.

As for the "final status" — what shape, in terms of time-frame and on-the-ground substance, does Camp David provide to ensure that the Framework does not add up to permanent Israeli military control over the area? None whatsoever.

In Clause 1b, we read, "A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations." Nothing about withdrawal of Israeli sovereign control over the area is included.

As for time: "When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin (emphasis added). As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors."

In other words, the central bluff: first, put the operation into effect in the West Bank, and only then does the countdown period toward final "discussions" on the West Bank's ultimate fate begin!