

## MILITARY STRATEGY

# NATO:

## The debate Washington is trying

Last week what may be the most crucial debates determining the future of postwar Germany and the advanced sector Western nations were held in the Federal Republic's Bundestag in the course of a debate on West Germany's defense policy and role in NATO.

The strategic implications of the debates for U.S. policy received no significant coverage in the U.S. news media, even though they placed a spotlight on two diametrically opposed strategies for NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization founded in the late 1940s on the initiation of Great Britain to combat what the British contended was the military threat to Europe posed by the Soviet Union.

London, supported by the Carter Administration in Washington, wants to expand NATO drastically. Current proposals center on (1) expansion of NATO forces in Europe. This would include arms standardization proposals and increased defense spending by member nations, and featuring stationing of modernized nuclear-armed missiles in West Germany; and (2) extension of NATO into the Middle East. This proposal includes possible incorporation of Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Gulf emirates into NATO, stationing of U.S. and NATO forces in the Middle East, and establishment of a NATO "Fifth and one-half Fleet" in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and based at Diego Garcia.

For London, what is at stake is some 200 years of global financial hegemony which is threatened by establishment of the European Monetary System. As the British provoked war in 1914 and 1939 to protect their economic preeminence, so today they regard a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as necessary to force a realignment of the world political geometry away from EMS-centered detente.

British strategists have stated in published documents their goal is to beef up NATO to be capable of successfully initiating a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact by no later than the mid-1980's. They have

elaborated a strategy, termed the "arc of crisis," for progressive weakening of the Soviet global strategic posture to make such a confrontation possible. Both METO and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, they have made clear, are elements of this strategy, as is the destabilization of Iran.

At the same time, the extension of NATO is designed to make possible the imposition of wartime austerity regimes both in western Europe and in the Third World.

In the West German view, this policy-thrust is a prescription for a strategic disaster, which is almost certain to lead in the short term to World War III with the Soviet Union if pursued to its logical conclusion. Contrasting the British view of NATO as an essentially offensive alliance whose mission is to steadily encroach upon the Soviet sphere of influence, the West Germans stress that national security is mutual — both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations have the right to enjoy it. Particularly alarming to the Germans has been the persistent Anglo-American effort, officially enacted by a Washington ukase early this year, to base NATO war-fighting strategy on a "limited" nuclear counterforce first-strike against the Soviets. This strategy, the West Germans emphasize, is premised on a false assumption that the Soviets will make a "limited" response to a "limited" NATO nuclear first strike. On the contrary, the West Germans say, the Soviets will respond to such an attack with a total thermonuclear bombardment. NATO is not prepared to withstand such a Soviet response — premised on all-out atomic-biological-chemical warfare — and vulnerable West Germany will be one of the Soviet's primary targets.

### **The West German solution**

The West Germans' solution to the NATO policy question places them in the forefront of the voices calling for reason in response to the London-Washington war drive. The key to the West German policy lies in the 25-year economic development package negotiated last May by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with Soviet Presi-

# to suppress

dent Leonid Brezhnev. The signing of the package demonstrated to the world that West Germany and the Soviet Union see their strategic interests as best served by peace — no confrontation. Moreover, these accords established the strategic foundations for the European Monetary System. The latter institution, the centerpiece of the alliance between Schmidt and French President Giscard d'Estaing, is in the process of realizing what Schmidt calls "a European superpower for peace."

Yet when Schmidt negotiated his historic accords with Brezhnev last year, he almost certainly did not envision the vehemence with which his nation would be publicly attacking NATO policies within less than a year. Last week's debate was a response to a series of provocative Washington and British actions against the EMS and the growing detente with the Soviets: the London-engineered Iran Crisis, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, efforts to beef up NATO nuclear forces in West Germany, and the Carter-London fueling of the Middle East crisis. All these are seen in Bonn, and elsewhere in Europe, as a grave threat to world peace which must be answered with measures that might have seemed unthinkable a year ago. Within the past several months, West Germany, the leading power in NATO, behind the United States has taken the unprecedented steps of canceling NATO maneuvers scheduled to occur on West German soil and of publicly attacking NATO policies as articulated by Washington, London, and Brussels, culminating in last week's carefully prepared blasts at the Atlantic Alliance in the Bundestag.

At this point, West German objections to U.S. policies center not on any particular blunder, the "China card" e.g., but on recognition that U.S. policy under the Carter Administration is fundamentally insane. The diplomatic formulation coming out of Bonn is that "U.S. policy is full of surprises," but it is evident to all of Europe that West Germany, in conjunction with France (which pulled its troops out of NATO more than a decade ago), is moving away from the postwar system

## How Britain dominates NATO

Although the NATO Supreme Commander is always an American, the cases of recent commander holders of that post illustrate some of the methods by which British are able to dominate the Alliance.

Lame duck Commander, General Alexander Haig, a protégé of London-trained Henry Kissinger, is a notorious and outspoken follower of British strategic doctrine and policies.

His successor, General Bernard W. Rogers, promises to be no different. NATO's new commander comes well qualified for British tastes. Graduated from West Point in 1943, Barnard Rogers received a 1947 degree from Oxford under a Rhodes scholarship. Following his first command in Korea, Rogers served under his patron, Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Executive Assistance Officer. A follower of Taylor's war-losing doctrine in Vietnam during his command post from 1967-1969, Rogers was then appointed to the Pentagon as Army Chief of Staff during the Ford Administration.

It is his stint as a Rhodes scholar that is key to Roger's Anglophilism, observers say. The scholarships were established by Cecil Rhodes explicitly to foster the reannexation of the United States into the British Empire, and to expand the Empire's influence globally. Scholars even today typically return from the banks of Oxford's river Isis flushed with the spell of oligarchic Britain.

Other notable Rhodes scholars illustrate the point. They include:

Harvard professor William Yandell Elliot, patron of Henry Kissinger; Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-chief of *Time* magazine; foreign policy hawk W.W. Rostow; and Schachtian economist Robert Roosa, partner, Brown Brothers Harriman and director, American Express. Roger's year, 1947, produced a notable crop: Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, former U.S. Attorney General, and General Counsel for IBM; Thomas L. Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment; and Stansfield Turner, director, CIA. Another member of the U.S. policy team in Europe, Richard Gardner, currently Ambassador to Italy — who is under attack for his intrusions into Italian domestic affairs — was a Rhodes scholar in 1951.

of "geopolitical" alliances built by Great Britain and successive manipulated U.S. administrations. Indicative of this shift are West German and French efforts to sponsor membership of Spain, Greece and Turkey in the European Economic Community, and eventually the European Monetary System, without Spain's officially entering NATO — a condition which Britain has placed on the table to block Spain's integration. This policy is consonant with Germany's overall policy of maintaining NATO's defensive character and present membership, so as to ensure the mutual security of NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.

But is that policy enough? In fact, the logic of present NATO strategy as defined in London, Washington, and Brussels is forcing West Germany to confront the question that French President de Gaulle confronted when he pulled French forces out of NATO in 1966. One indication of that turn: while NATO headquarters denounced Soviet President Brezhnev's recent proposal of a nonaggression pact among the signers of the Helsinki Treaty as "propaganda," the Bonn government treated the proposal as a serious one. If adopted, Brezhnev's plan would mean a fundamental reorientation of NATO outlook.

#### **What is NATO?**

To understand West Germany's attitude toward the Atlantic Alliance, some fundamental facts about its history must be recalled.

Originally, the NATO alliance was a purely "geopolitical" entity created by Great Britain for the purpose of preventing the postwar continuation of the World War II alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the United States' entry into the alliance was nearly blocked — on constitutional grounds that were only glossed over in the final Senate ratification of the treaty — and the U.S. made no significant contribution to NATO until 1950-1951, when the carefully managed Korean conflict erupted, forcing the significant U.S. opposition to the alliance into silence. The NATO structure allowed the British colonial military apparatus to virtually dissolve itself into the alliance and bring under its control the resources of the other NATO member nations. Under the Truman administration, for instance, practically all the parameters for determining U.S. policy were defined by Britain, including military secrets, espionage and general defense policy. Though President Eisenhower was able to make limited initiatives for peace and detente with the Soviet Union, the machinations of an Anglophilic U.S. foreign policy and intelligence apparatus under the domination of the Dulles brothers placed the United States on a head-on confrontation course with the Soviet Union time and again under the Eisenhower administration.

NATO's mission was not solely directed against a potential U.S.-Soviet entente; since 1902, British "geopolitical" doctrine has been dedicated to the breaking

up of potential and/or actual industrial development-based alliances between Russia and Germany (the "heartland"), the United States, and Japan. It is this strategy which has defined British military-strategic doctrine through two world wars, and which guides NATO today.

It is this fact, that NATO policy is as much directed against its own "members" as it is against the USSR, that accounts for the strange role of the British Army of the Rhine in the Federal Republic today.

A puny force of about 36,000 British and Canadian soldiers combined, the Army of the Rhine represents no military capability of significance against the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed against it. Its "mission" is as an occupation force used to blackmail successive West German governments. It is well-documented that many incidents of terrorism — of both left-wing and right-wing varieties — have stemmed from British military headquarters in West Germany. In fact, the notorious British Special Air Services units are rotated between Northern Ireland and West Germany.

#### **The crucial issues for Germany and NATO**

Under its presently defined goal of blocking the possibility of long-term economic collaboration between the nations of western Europe and North America and the nations of central and eastern Europe, NATO can only be a destabilizing force in world affairs, one which obstructs the possibility of lasting peace.

What is required in place of British-defined geopolitical adversary relations is a "community of principle" among nations that fosters trust through economic and political cooperation for technological progress and industrial development, especially in the underdeveloped sector. Without such a series of economic arrangements, which provides the foundations for systematically placing political collaboration in its proper setting, the possibilities for preventing war are reduced to virtually nil.

There are several issues facing West Germany in the effort to continue the war avoidance policies which Schmidt and Giscard have set into motion.

First, can it break through such blackmail methods as those represented by the activities of the British military, the threat of an oil boycott, and various other destabilization operations? In following reports, we review the evidence that Schmidt is in a better position than any previous postwar leader to chart an independent course for the Federal Republic.

Then there are crucial, specifically military issues. Foremost among these are the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, which Schmidt recently revived and which are now proceeding in Vienna. Schmidt has agreed that NATO's demand for removing a crack, 30,000-man Warsaw Pact tank force stationed near Dresden is no longer a vital strategic issue. Schmidt declared he would settle for a general 30,000-man reduc-

tion in equivalent NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In Bonn last May, Soviet President Brezhnev acknowledged that the parity principle in troop reductions is negotiable, keeping alive options for a comprehensive approach to resolving the critical differences which still remain in the talks.

Also of significance are recent West German statements that they do not desire to have upgraded U.S. IRBM missiles stationed on West German soil. It was these so-called forward based systems, which the NATO command under lameduck commander Alexander Haig did not want to discuss or negotiate at all, that in fact pushed the Soviets to develop the SS-20 ICBMs — most of which are aimed at China. The German posture represents another potential opening for further negotiations toward a general disarmament conference. However, as long as the U.S. continues to undermine the basis for a SALT II agreement, there appears little that West Germany can do in this direction.

Provocative NATO maneuvers on West Germany soil — some designed to simulate a NATO nuclear first strike against Warsaw Pact forces — have come under severe attack by Defense Minister Apel. At a Wehrkunde conference in Munich last month, Apel produced a major NATO study which argued that there was no need for such maneuvers, not only because the damage they cause to the West German countryside is not only irreparable, but because, fundamentally, they do not reflect the security needs of West Germany. Two weeks ago, Apel canceled NATO's Reforger '79 exercise.

#### **DeGaulle and Adenauer — an independent Europe**

The general strategic thinking of Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing reflects the attempt of their predecessors Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer to place Europe out from under Anglo-American control. Though de Gaulle pulled French forces out of NATO in 1966 as a result of the dangers of thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, provoked by the Alliance, his and Adenauer's quest for a truly sovereign and independent Europe fell short of the mark after Adenauer was forced from office in 1963 by a series of contrived political scandals initiated by the British dominated West German press.

The world is now at the point again where either war avoidance policies or war confrontation policies predominate. The same realities that de Gaulle and Adenauer confronted have been brought to the fore for Giscard and Schmidt. If the world is going to realize a new age of industrial and scientific prosperity, then Europe must become in the short term ahead a true independent superpower for peace — and this requires drastic surgery for NATO.

— Paul Goldstein

## The interchange in the Bundestag

*In a parliamentary debate punctuated by noisy interruptions from the opposition, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt emphasized the Federal Republic's role to bring economic stability and peace to Europe. His remarks, which constituted one side of the debate, were augmented by similar comments from West German Defense Minister Hans Apel and Social Democratic Party parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner in the Bundestag discussion March 9-10.*

*The opposite view that Germany must participate in a NATO-directed arms buildup to preserve its sovereignty from aggression was voiced by Christian Democratic Union opposition parliamentarians Helmut Kohl, Alfred Dregger, and Manfred Woerner. Here are excerpts of the debate, including the interruptions as they occurred. Chancellor Schmidt speaks first; other speakers are indicated by name.*

... They (the Christian Democratic Union opposition—ed.) have also spoken, and several of their speakers have also acted as if security in Europe had decreased in the last few years. The opposite is the case: Europe today is the very continent which is the most secure, in spite of the accumulation of the greatest military potential, if I am permitted to disregard Australia....

And the fact that this is so was by no means self-evident, when one remembers the Berlin crisis at the end of the 1950s, and at the beginning of the past decade, in the year 1961, when one remembers the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and when one remembers the Czechoslovakian crisis and all of the events in the course of the past decade. But it was also precisely during this past decade that the first feelers were put out in the detente process between both of the major nuclear powers at that time.

And at the end of the 1960s, the Federal Republic of Germany participated in this process—with good success—and this process is the reason for the relatively greater security which all the people of Europe are enjoying today to some extent in comparison to the previous decade, at the beginning of the past decade, and at the end of the past decade. This has also led to a new consciousness about responsibility for peace in Europe, to a new understanding of security, and to the recognition that existing tensions must be mutually checked or reduced....

... The general feeling of security in Europe, or, to begin with ourselves, in Berlin, in Germany, and in Europe, has increased overall—and it has correctly in-