

tion in equivalent NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In Bonn last May, Soviet President Brezhnev acknowledged that the parity principle in troop reductions is negotiable, keeping alive options for a comprehensive approach to resolving the critical differences which still remain in the talks.

Also of significance are recent West German statements that they do not desire to have upgraded U.S. IRBM missiles stationed on West German soil. It was these so-called forward based systems, which the NATO command under lameduck commander Alexander Haig did not want to discuss or negotiate at all, that in fact pushed the Soviets to develop the SS-20 ICBMs — most of which are aimed at China. The German posture represents another potential opening for further negotiations toward a general disarmament conference. However, as long as the U.S. continues to undermine the basis for a SALT II agreement, there appears little that West Germany can do in this direction.

Provocative NATO maneuvers on West Germany soil — some designed to simulate a NATO nuclear first strike against Warsaw Pact forces — have come under severe attack by Defense Minister Apel. At a Wehrkunde conference in Munich last month, Apel produced a major NATO study which argued that there was no need for such maneuvers, not only because the damage they cause to the West German countryside is not only irreparable, but because, fundamentally, they do not reflect the security needs of West Germany. Two weeks ago, Apel canceled NATO's Reforger '79 exercise.

DeGaulle and Adenauer — an independent Europe

The general strategic thinking of Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing reflects the attempt of their predecessors Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer to place Europe out from under Anglo-American control. Though de Gaulle pulled French forces out of NATO in 1966 as a result of the dangers of thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, provoked by the Alliance, his and Adenauer's quest for a truly sovereign and independent Europe fell short of the mark after Adenauer was forced from office in 1963 by a series of contrived political scandals initiated by the British dominated West German press.

The world is now at the point again where either war avoidance policies or war confrontation policies predominate. The same realities that de Gaulle and Adenauer confronted have been brought to the fore for Giscard and Schmidt. If the world is going to realize a new age of industrial and scientific prosperity, then Europe must become in the short term ahead a true independent superpower for peace — and this requires drastic surgery for NATO.

— Paul Goldstein

The interchange in the Bundestag

In a parliamentary debate punctuated by noisy interruptions from the opposition, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt emphasized the Federal Republic's role to bring economic stability and peace to Europe. His remarks, which constituted one side of the debate, were augmented by similar comments from West German Defense Minister Hans Apel and Social Democratic Party parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner in the Bundestag discussion March 9-10.

The opposite view that Germany must participate in a NATO-directed arms buildup to preserve its sovereignty from aggression was voiced by Christian Democratic Union opposition parliamentarians Helmut Kohl, Alfred Dregger, and Manfred Woerner. Here are excerpts of the debate, including the interruptions as they occurred. Chancellor Schmidt speaks first; other speakers are indicated by name.

... They (the Christian Democratic Union opposition—ed.) have also spoken, and several of their speakers have also acted as if security in Europe had decreased in the last few years. The opposite is the case: Europe today is the very continent which is the most secure, in spite of the accumulation of the greatest military potential, if I am permitted to disregard Australia....

And the fact that this is so was by no means self-evident, when one remembers the Berlin crisis at the end of the 1950s, and at the beginning of the past decade, in the year 1961, when one remembers the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and when one remembers the Czechoslovakian crisis and all of the events in the course of the past decade. But it was also precisely during this past decade that the first feelers were put out in the detente process between both of the major nuclear powers at that time.

And at the end of the 1960s, the Federal Republic of Germany participated in this process—with good success—and this process is the reason for the relatively greater security which all the people of Europe are enjoying today to some extent in comparison to the previous decade, at the beginning of the past decade, and at the end of the past decade. This has also led to a new consciousness about responsibility for peace in Europe, to a new understanding of security, and to the recognition that existing tensions must be mutually checked or reduced....

... The general feeling of security in Europe, or, to begin with ourselves, in Berlin, in Germany, and in Europe, has increased overall—and it has correctly in-

creased, and Europe is actually conscious of (and it is a justified consciousness) a strongly increased, generally mutual security. This development of both of the last decades, the 1960s and 1970s, has shown that there is no security if the other person too doesn't feel himself secure, or, to paraphrase a well-known phrase: Security is always the security of the other person too.

If I am allowed to add a word or two here ... then I would like to say with equal emphasis that this is no one-time thing that people do once and then can keep, but a constant, increasing task, because, sometimes, even economic and social influences effect changes and instabilities that can bring about new dangers. Even the military balance of power is not a one-time task, but a constant one. It is not necessary that there be a total arithmetic or mathematical identity among all the different kinds of armed forces or weapons—the military balance of power must be *generally* maintained.

... I will say it again: a policy of balance is by no means strictly limited to the military sector, if it is to bring success in securing the peace along with it.

This fear on both sides, which played such a great role here yesterday on the German side—while the other side wants to use arms limitation in order to get political advantage for itself—this fear on both sides can only be overcome by long term processes and developments in building confidence, and these processes must be continued.

Naturally, even in an era of detente, acute conflicts, unforeseen conflicts can occur—and what is necessary here is a command of crises, and the capability to end the crisis. One of the preconditions for this is that the parties potentially in conflict remain in contact with each other. It is important that the statesmen in the world speak with each other *before* a crisis occurs, so that they know what they can expect of each other, in case it does occur. I would also like to say that we, here, have contributed significantly towards the ability and the will, we have contributed a great deal so that leading persons in positions of responsibility get to know each other.

Here I want to refer—without appearing arrogant—to the continuous contacts that the Chancellor of this state has entered into with all the leading statesmen from both sides, and which have been supported even by Eastern Europe—not only in the West—and I must tell you that I hope very much that it will finally come to a meeting, to personal acquaintance between Mr. Carter and Mr. Brezhnev. I consider it to be a mistake that both of these two persons do not know each other. (ap-
plause)

Overcoming crises requires the political will to shun provocations from the other side; it requires the will and the capacity to make one's own options, one's own negotiating possibilities unmistakably clear to the other,

and it requires the will to take the cutting edge out of dangerous situations by one's own readiness to compromise. It demands the will to make it possible so that the participants can save face.

The greater the calculability of the political—and also the military—conduct of a participant, all the more less is the danger of an acute crisis. And a precondition for calculability is the transparency of one's politics, the plausibility of what one is striving for. For example, we are striving for more transparency in the instruments of military power, and even in the instruments of economic power that go into armaments, because only this will make possible progress in the formation of mutual confidence. This goes for SALT, this goes for MBFR.

Transparency, and the predictability of one's own policies ... I would be thankful if we could recognize the policies of all the other partners in Europe as being characterized by the desire for transparency, by the transparency of those governments...

(After several attacks on West German government policy by opposition politicians Helmut Kohl, Alfred Dregger, and Manfred Woerner):

Defectors scandal, Luns's

Attacks on NATO policies from leading West Germans are not the only problems that the Alliance and its West German friends are confronted with. Within the last two weeks, four secretaries in NATO headquarters in Brussels, and in the Bonn headquarters of the West German Christian Democracy, defected to East Germany. Although this is a severe problem by itself, the damage has been compounded by documentation from one former secretary, Ursel Lorenzen, that NATO is using its on-going WINTEX and CIMEX command staff exercises to prepare the authoritarian civilian and military control needed to carry out a first nuclear strike against the Warsaw Pact.

Unfortunately for NATO, Ursel Lorenzen knows what she has been talking about on her East German radio broadcasts. For 10 years she was the secretary for British NATO diplomat Terence Morgan, Director of NATO Council Operations, who was in charge of organizing NATO's semi-annual command staff exercises.

Her broadcasts have also covered such topics as NATO's stake in political destabilizations of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's intention to use China as a NATO surrogate against the Soviet Union, and

I worked on putting this alliance together, its deterrence and its (defense) policy. That was 20 years ago, and I do not think you remember how it was then, when that attempt at detente failed, when the Paris summit meeting between East and West failed.... I understand that some of you do not know, but some of you do, Messrs. Mertes, Marx, and maybe Woerner, just how badly a German government in the 1960s burned its fingers, not only with the East but also with the West, on the issue of the Multinational Nuclear Force in NATO ... The American government let that drop faster than the Germans knew what was happening. I would enjoy seeing you get your hands burned in that way. (*Dregger then shouts that Schmidt should make unpopular decisions against the left wing in his own Social Democratic Party.*)

You know, I do just that, and not only in military strategic questions, but in many areas I weigh the facts and both sides of the argument and I decide according to my oath of office and my conscience. But I would like to let you know a secret of my political experience. When one decides according to his conscience, even

against the prevalent stream of popularity, then in fact it turns out that you win popularity.

Helmut Kohl: Schmidt, you don't get your policy through because you are a coward, you are too much of a coward to confront Herbert Wehner.

Schmidt: Mr. Kohl, you are very sensitive when it comes to political criticism. I am not. I have a very thick skin. But, I also have the power to hit back. You had better think over whether you have the right or the legitimacy to accuse me of being a coward in this parliament. And your information on my alleged position on the neutron bomb is wrong. Unless, of course, you have confidential documents from meetings you did not attend, and those documents are forged.

Hans Apel: Security is of course, one precondition for the well-being of a country. *But war is not the father of all things, peace is,* and that means the social and economic well-being of a country is a decisive contribution to its defense efforts. Defense expenditures, yes, but

past bedevil NATO's friends

NATO General Secretary Joseph Luns's strategy for dealing with the revelation of his Dutch Nazi past (see below.)

The three East Germans who worked for the Christian Democracy in Bonn, Christel Broszey, Inge Goliath, and Ursula Höfs, have been silent about their activities, but this has not calmed down the CDU. Both Broszey and Goliath fled to East Germany, while Höfs was arrested by West German authorities. As in the Lorenzen case, key CDU offices were targeted, with Broszey being the secretary to CDU General Secretary Kurt Biedenkopf, while Goliath worked under Werner Marx, CDU spokesman on East European affairs.

It is well known in CDU circles that both Broszey and Goliath typed confidential internal party memoranda, and both knew of the CDU's support for the China card, in addition to the inner party faction fight between Biedenkopf and CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl.

The fact that both Biedenkopf and Marx are vociferous anti-communists who constantly attack the ruling West German Social Democratic Party for being "soft on Communist infiltrators" has increased the shock in CDU headquarters.

Luns

The Lorenzen spy case could not have occurred at a worse time for NATO. Several weeks before Lorenzen defected, NATO General Secretary Luns was already under attack for his membership in the Dutch Nazi NSB party from 1933 to 1936, after the Dutch War History Institute confirmed that his name had been on the NSB membership lists for the years stated.

Luns's explanation for this damaging fact was that his brother, an admitted Dutch Nazi, had signed him up in the NSB, and kept his name on the rolls for three years, after which Luns's name was taken off the lists, all without Luns's knowledge.

Lorenzen shot down this already shaky excuse by stating it was well known in NATO headquarters that the only person who signed Luns up for Nazi membership was Luns himself. The fact that E. N. van Kleffens, a former Dutch Foreign Minister under whom Luns served, stated that if Luns's Nazi past had been known in 1937, he would never have been allowed to serve in the Foreign Ministry, has only reinforced Lorenzen's charges.

—James Cleary

there is a close relationship between external and social peace. Our country is defensible only as long as the social and domestic peace is maintained.

Defense goes with detente, and neither can be ignored. Military imbalance produces insecurity, and defense is a precondition of detente, but whoever says that detente is either ended or dead, I have to ask him just where he wants to let us be driven. Foreign Minister Genscher has spoken of this. I am very sorry that Genscher is not here, so that he himself could say that no difference exists within the government on the evaluation of military security. We want him back in a good state of health because we cannot do without him.

Genscher had said that "Our treaties related to detente will be fulfilled." This policy is not an episode, but is laid out for the long term. Both East and West have an interest in continuing detente.

Manfred Woerner: There is only alleged unity here. How do you explain Herbert Wehner's interview to the "Radio In The American Sector" where he attacks the idea of an axis (between Bonn and Washington—ed.)?

Apel: We have published the government's answers. I am not going to allow myself to be distracted by this sort of question. Formulations sometimes used may be irritating, but I must say that when it comes to irritating formulations, you of the opposition are masters of it.

Herbert Wehner: I do not attack anyone among you for wanting war. But I warn you not to endanger the relatively political detente we have achieved thus far. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has not been fully exploited yet. The Brezhnev proposals ... indicate that Moscow, too, thinks that the CSCE can be further developed

How the Germans

"I know the Soviet leadership. They are responsible men and do not intend to start a war." With these words to the West German Bundestag (parliament) on Feb. 15, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt rejected the entire basis of British and American NATO policy and its pretext, "Soviet expansionism."

Ten days earlier, Schmidt's party whip in parliament, Herbert Wehner, told a Dutch reporter that blaming the Soviets for lack of progress at Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna was simply a "fraud." "The Soviets do not have their tanks" in Central Europe "in order to conduct an aggressive war ... The Soviets have made proposals ... the Western side people have not reacted ...

"I find it improper to put the Soviets alone in the defendant's dock about this question of armament and disarmament," Wehner went on. "Do not overlook the American radio stations, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, who beam their broadcasts into the East bloc ... When it comes to riots in Poland because of the tight economic situation ... then Radio Free Europe acts as though it is based on Polish territory and gives advice to the rioters ... It is a frightful thing.... Taken with critical developments in Iran — I am brave enough to admit that one really must shudder ... a crisis could develop once again in Europe that could conjure up a confrontation between both superpowers."

Such statements now form the cornerstone of West German political-military thinking. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces pose no offensive military threat, unless provoked intolerably. The problem is NATO and its policy of provocation. NATO policy must change.

That view formed the cornerstone of the views expressed by government spokesmen in the March 9 and 10 Bundestag debate; but that debate was prepared over approximately a two-month period by a series of statements — primarily issued by parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner — which defined the terms of the debate. *Executive Intelligence Review's* West German bureau followed the situation closely. Based on their reporting, the following reviews the past months' developments.

West German dissatisfaction with NATO policy has been growing since 1975, with the secret introduction of the MC14-4 "limited nuclear war" or "counterforce" doctrine into NATO policy planning. That dissatisfaction crystalized more recently with the announcement from Washington that "counterforce" is official U.S. military doctrine for deployment in Europe. That announcement coincided with British and American playing of the "China card" — "counterforce" in Asia