

### Can a peace treaty mean war?

## Why the CFR wants SALT II

If your principal concern is to maintain the power of the British oligarchy in world affairs, as it is for the New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), then "you have a better chance of doing it with SALT II than without it," according to Lloyd N. Cutler. Cutler is counsel to President Jimmy Carter, and is one of the top legal minds for the New York CFR. He argued "The Case for SALT II" in a Washington Post op-ed column this week.

In the excerpts of that column appearing below, Cutler advances various arguments for SALT II's passage, each appropriately camouflaged, but not inaccessible to the trained analyst. Basically, there are three reasons that the British oligarchy—and the CFR circles—want to have the SALT II treaty passed by the U.S. Senate during this administration.

First, SALT II will provide their faction with the leverage wanted for a general economic agreement with the Soviet leadership, permitting them to subordinate the national sovereignty of "neutral" states to the International Monetary Fund and other supranational agencies (see ECONOMICS). Admittedly, SALT II as a peace treaty will be ineffective unless it is coupled with a broad economic agreement, uniting East and West to industrialize the Third World. However, for the CFR, SALT II is an instrument for a different sort of "economic agreement," by which the USSR allows, in effect, the restoration of the British empire over the Third World.

Secondly, the aim of this faction is to use SALT III negotiations as the framework for negotiating "deeper cuts" in advanced scientific and technological research—something they seek to impose on the West, but which caused the Soviet leaders to kick over the table when Cyrus Vance first took the "zero growth" proposal to Moscow in 1977. But there will be no "deeper cuts" through SALT III, if SALT II isn't passed. And finally, the British-CFR element fears that their policy of preparing for a "limited nuclear war" in the European theater against Soviet-led forces will fall through if the Soviet Union launches a major "strategic" arms buildup. The

Anglo-American side would then have to match the Soviets on the strategic plane leaving them penniless for the "tactical" or "theater" nuclear weapons buildup they now plan. Such a Soviet strategic buildup would almost certainly occur if SALT II is not passed by the Senate.

The following is Lloyd N. Cutler's way of stating those points.

"...It will be more difficult to maintain strategic equivalence without SALT II than with it. Without it, the Soviets can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage they may achieve in the early 1980s and conceal from us what they are doing. All this will lengthen the time and increase both the cost to us and the uncertainty of maintaining parity. ...

"Failure to ratify would also have an adverse impact on NATO's actions to deploy in Europe modernized and longer-range U.S. nuclear weapons systems so as to offset the threat of the Soviet SS20. For the NATO governments in Europe, a decision to deploy under American control nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union is a political decision of great internal and external consequences. For them the decision to deploy the new weapons is justifiable on two parallel grounds: military needs, and as the first step in a plan to negotiate theater nuclear weapon limitations. These limitations would be in the context of SALT III, alongside the further intercontinental limitations that will also be part of SALT III. But such a plan depends on the existence of SALT II.

"SALT II does not cut the existing strategic arsenals very deeply. But it does ban completely many systems now on the drawing boards and it places substantial limits on MIRVing, new types and other avenues of breakout and proliferation. ...

"Above all it lays the basic groundwork for further cuts in SALT III. I would liken the SALT II treaty to a Wall Street bond indenture. It contains all the critical definitions, all the warranties and covenants, all the events of default, all the procedures for notice and consultation. Once this basic indenture is in place—whether for a \$100 million bond issue or for launcher ceilings and subceilings of 2,400, 1,320, and 1,200—it is a relatively simple matter to negotiate an increase in the size of the bond issue or a decrease in the launcher ceiling.

"But if we have no SALT II, no basic bond indenture, then the future negotiation of agreements on lower ceilings will be incomparably more difficult. As in SALT II, agreement on any one point will depend on agreement on all other points. All the definitions, all the counting and non-concealment rules will have to be traded out again. Without SALT II in place, an agreement on deeper cuts would probably take many more years to achieve."