

refrain to respond officially to President Carter's announcements, leaving this task to Soviet journalists, and that it will consider Carter as virtually "finished" as President of the United States, with a "bare minimum of credibility" left to him domestically and internationally.

The entirety of the Soviet posture is meant to convey that the Soviet leadership regards Brzezinski's policy of encircling the U.S.S.R. with a rearmed Europe, a rearmed China, and a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated "Islamic fundamentalism" as a war provocation—and is prepared to fight any war that Brzezinski provokes.

The Afghanistan move called Brzezinski's bluff and it is very likely to shortly call Peking's bluff as well. In the military geography of the Near and Middle East, the United States had no conventional, limited military counter-response available.

The British government, led by Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, has announced that it will act as the "pacemaker" for Brzezinski's policy internationally, accelerate the shipment of weapons to China, move up the nuclear weapons modernization in Western Europe, and build up a new Islamic Pact centered around a rearmed Iran and Pakistan.

The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and also certain relatively less insane circles in London are presently realizing that the Thatcher-Brzezinski response is simply to intensify the very policy which triggered the Soviet signal-move—without supplying any credible hint that they are able to take on the Soviets on the military terms that they define. As every European and Japanese official who can read maps must have already deduced, the Red Army's High Command will hardly consider a possible boycott of the Moscow Olympics as a staggering defeat to their motorized divisions.

As every European and Japanese official knows, if the Soviets are compelled by the Brzezinski-Thatcher strategy, to repeat their Afghan move in Pakistan or Iran, the only possible Anglo-American response will be either acquiescence or a nuclear strike. Those able to read Moscow's Afghan signal have no doubt that the Soviets have completely and unequivocally once again rejected the doctrine of "theater nuclear war." Any American nuclear response to an induced Soviet move into Pakistan (or Iran) will instantaneously lead to general thermonuclear war. Any failure to respond to such an induced Soviet move will rapidly lead to a realignment of continental Europe in the direction of the Soviet side, and similar shifts in Asia and the Middle East.

The alternative to these nightmare scenarios is a course of action principally focused on putting aside the Thatcher-Brzezinski policy of inducing the Soviets to such further moves, the so-called "controlled disintegration" policy of the IMF, and replacing it with a broad program of industrial expansion and prosperity.

I. Why the Soviets

Overall policy

After many warnings.... a display of force

With the dispatch of many thousand soldiers into Afghanistan, the leadership of the Soviet Union shifted from a "war-avoidance" to a "war-winning" mode of conducting foreign policy. How the decision was reached, and what it would take for Moscow to return to war-avoidance, can be understood from an examination of Soviet strategic thinking.

The invasion of Afghanistan was not a tactical move. By taking Afghanistan, Moscow answered an array of British and American steps which added up, on the walls of the Kremlin's maprooms, to a picture of probable thermonuclear attack. The Soviets see three processes afoot on the globe leading towards that result: 1. an American attempt to encircle the U.S.S.R., involving destabilization of the Middle East, playing the China card, and building a mobile strike force to fight wars on the Soviet periphery; 2. an increased United States and NATO commitment to the strategy of "limited nuclear war," applied not only to Third world theaters of crisis, but to Europe, where the countries Moscow views as more reliable detente partners are being harnessed to American plans; and 3. an economic crisis so severe in the West that the Soviets are easily convinced that the "final collapse of capitalism" has arrived and is motivating overseas adventures by the United States.

The Soviets expect nothing but lunacy from Washington at this moment. The Soviet news agency Tass, in a Jan. 6 release authorized at the highest levels in Moscow, responded to President Carter's imposition of sanctions against the U.S.S.R. with an assessment of the president's judgment as follows:

The President's statement creates the impression that it lacks both political balance and a realistic assessment of the international situation, that it overestimates the potentialities of the United

invaded Afghanistan

States, while underestimating the potentialities of those states against which the United States intends to take steps of one kind or another.

In addition to viewing Carter and his cabinet as volatile and capable of drastic surprise actions, the Soviets' confidence in Western Europe's ability to hold to a course of preventing war was shaken by West German acquiescence to a Dec.

sion. What remained for the U.S.S.R. to do, thought the Soviet military and political command, was make a show of force to serve as a final warning to Washington, London and Peking.

Here we will detail, issue by issue, the escalation that took Moscow around the corner toward an active war-fighting posture, citing the public statements which should have signaled what was coming. Then, we turn to the factional situation in Moscow: how it affected the Afghanistan decision and will affect future policy options.

The Dec. 12 NATO decision

Meeting in Brussels Dec. 12, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO nations okayed a plan to produce and station on Western European soil 572 medium-range nuclear weapons—"Tomahawk" cruise missiles and Pershing-II rockets.

Anticipating this decision for months, Moscow has used every option, from warnings to negotiation offers, in order to avert it. In October, Soviet President Brezhnev proposed to hold talks on this class of missile, including the Soviet SS-20's stationed in the Western portion of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets particularly sought for West Germany to oppose the Anglo-American missile plan, banking on Bonn's commitment to preserving detente and appreciation of the plan's military implications: Western Europe would be scorched in a nuclear exchange; the United States—contrary to the "limited" exchange presumed by the NATO strategists—would also be hit immediately.

Following talks with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn Nov. 23, however, Soviet Foreign

Minister Gromyko already had the impression that Bonn would not totally buck the plan, but would seek to have it coupled with NATO's own negotiations proposals. Gromyko stated at a Bonn press conference:

If it should come to such a decision, if our proposal for immediate negotiations should be rejected, then the basis for negotiations would be destroyed.

The NATO session came and went, the missile plan was approved, and NATO made a counteroffer for talks on medium-range weapons. The Soviet Union has flatly refused to entertain that proposal, unless Pershing and Tomahawk production is stopped.

The impact of NATO's decision on Moscow was not measurable in tons of hardware now slated for production, but strictly in terms of the strategic nature. Every Soviet newspaper carried unambiguous explanations of the missile deployment as a preparation for carrying out the "limited nuclear war" strategy in Europe, with the included option of a NATO first-strike against the U.S.S.R. They emphasized that such a conflict would, in fact, be all-out nuclear war.

Major-General R. Simonyan, strategic analyst for the military daily *Red Star*, wrote one day before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

(These plans) would qualitatively change the strategic situation in Europe and destabilize the situation in the whole world. It is entirely natural that the Soviet Union and its allies could not remain indifferent to this fact and would be forced to take measures in response. . . .

The assumptions by the supporters of a "Euro-strategic war" that it could be kept limited to within borders delineated in advance are without substance. An aggressor attacks because he wants to destroy the victim of the aggression. . . . Therefore he is ready to launch every means at his disposal. Under these circumstances, the victim of the aggression will not sit idly by. He will use all means in order to defend himself and his allies and give a most resolute rebuff to the aggressor. The journal *Stern* warns, "... a limited military conflict in Eu-

rope ... would quickly and automatically be transformed into a world nuclear confrontation.”

Red Star's Colonel M. Ponomarev, in a Dec. 16 article, elaborated:

(The NATO decision) cannot be evaluated otherwise than as a statement of intent on the part of the United States to create an arsenal of nuclear missiles here for a first strike aimed against the Soviet Union and its allies. . . . The material base is being prepared to implement the doctrine of “preventive selective nuclear strikes” first developed in the United States several years ago. . . . Having imposed this decision upon its North Atlantic bloc partners, the U.S. has essentially turned the people of the Western part of the continent into hostages. In the event of a military conflict in Europe, it is these people who will be the first to pay for Washington's aggressive adventures.”

The Soviets' belief that NATO was locked into a disastrous policy grew stronger when President Carter announced, also on Dec. 12, that the U.S. defense budget would be raised to \$157 billion for 1980. The sum was explained by NSC chief Brzezinski, who bragged that NATO, with the missile plan, had an option to fight less-than-total war with the U.S.S.R. in Europe and proclaimed a “post-Vietnam era” heralded by Iran's taking of U.S. hostages, in which the U.S. would create and deploy into Third World crises areas an overseas military strike force of over 100,000 men.

Encirclement and the China card

The “rapid response force,” about which Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown have spoken frequently, was an object of Soviet concern throughout 1979. Analyzing the tour of the Persian gulf and East Africa by American Defense and State Department officials in late December, Tass commentator Igor Orlov wrote:

The U.S. press is rather outspoken, if not cynical, in discussing the specific plans to expand military beach-heads in these areas of the world. The Defense Department, according to the *New York Times*, has embarked on a search for a place to deploy a U.S. military base in the Middle East. This base will be used by the “quick reaction corps” as well as by the U.S. Air Force and Navy deployed in the area.

This concern became a good deal more specific when American hostages were taken by the Ayatollah Khomeini's gangs in Teheran and Washington began to consider the use of military force in Iran. It was compounded by escalation of Islamic fundamentalist agita-

tion in Afghanistan, where the rebel groups opposing three successive Marxist governments in Kabul are equipped via Pakistan and China.

The Soviets concluded that the architects of the “arc of crisis” were going to launch an Islamic domino-chain to ring the U.S.S.R. in.

With these expectations, the Soviets even renewed attacks on the special role of the Muslim Brotherhood in subverting Afghanistan. The Brotherhood is the British-controlled cross-national network which Moscow had avoided mentioning during several months of softlining the Brotherhood-linked Ayatollah Khomeini.

The picture of a Soviet Union encircled became complete when, on the Eastern front, Moscow picked up a reactivation of the Carter administration's “China tilt.” Harold Brown's fishing expedition to Peking was announced for the second week of January. On Dec. 25, B. Gorbachev wrote in *Red Star*:

Striving to play the “China card,” that is, to use Peking's anti-Sovietism for pressure against the Soviet Union, some Western countries intend to supply China with specific types of modern weapons and military technology. Such a short-sighted policy encourages the aggressive intentions of the Maoists and is fraught with dire consequences, not the least for those who are conducting it.

The Soviets also reacted to attempts to forge a stronger military link between China and Japan. On Dec. 28, the day after the Soviet Army moved into Afghanistan, Vsevolod Ovchinnikov wrote in *Pravda*, under the headline “Japan and the ‘Pacific Polygon’ ”:

In an interview with *Dialogue* magazine, Defense Secretary Brown said that Japanese military potential is disproportionately small, especially in view of the “unreliability of oil supplies.” Brown said that the Trilateral Commission member countries [U.S., Japan, Western Europe—RD] should “supplement one another more effectively.” According to the *Japan Times*, Brown stressed the importance of joint efforts by the U.S., the European NATO members and Japan in the military field. Such an alliance on an anti-Soviet basis is, as is known, the dream of Peking.

Finally, Moscow received and reported increasingly frequent indications that Peking was preparing to invade Vietnam a second time, repeating the steps which took the world to the brink of war in February 1979.

On Dec. 23, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet navy, arrived in Hanoi for a visit of several days duration. He met with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong as well as military leaders, in order both to show Soviet backing for the Vietnamese against China's

threats, and to review concrete military actions for the event of a new outbreak of war in Southeast Asia.

One of the most dangerous developments of the last months of 1979 was the idea that took increasing hold in Moscow, that the economic collapse of the West was irreversible.

Writing a year-end review called "The Wind of History" in *Red Star* Dec. 30, Colonel M. Ponomarev said that "detente came to a standstill" because of "the deepening economic crisis in the capitalist countries" and the "breakdown of American dominance" of the Western world. "This breakdown is final and irreversible," he asserted.

Pravda's senior columnist Yuri Zhukov, referring to the recoil effect on the U.S. of Carter's sanctions against Russia, wrote Jan. 6:

The Washington administration is not bothered by the fact that this kind of policy can only create further difficulties for the economic development of the United States and its allies, already weakened by a series of grave crises. The American dollar is plummeting, the burdens of the working man grow, and the edifice of the capitalist economy cracks like a dilapidated barn in the wind.

A belief on the Soviets' part that the crisis is irreversible is dangerous on two counts. First, it cements their impression that particularly the U.S. leadership, deprived of any domestic security, will be prone to crisis-mongering in every other area of the world.

Second, it further undermines Soviet confidence in a Europe-centered collaborative war-avoidance effort. Even though Moscow consistently withheld open endorsement of the European Monetary System, the Soviets—especially the "Bonn hands" in President Brezhnev's detente faction—knew very well that a connection existed between West Germany's hopes for the EMS to succeed and its simultaneous efforts for East-West economic deals and military detente. Back in the spring of 1978, the EMS's creation followed by a matter of weeks Chancellor Schmidt's sealing of a 25-year cooperation treaty with Brezhnev.

The factions in Moscow

During the 1970s, and particularly after the Schmidt-Brezhnev agreement of May 1978, Soviet foreign policy—in the war avoidance mode—was defined by the detente commitment associated with Brezhnev.

There exist two countervailing tendencies to Brezhnev's detente in the Soviet Union, making the picture more complex than the myth of "Brezhnev vs. his hard-line opponents" would have it.

The first countertendency is associated with a factional grouping best characterized as the "British" or "Jacobin" faction.

The second is the judgment that no pro-stability Western leaders are both reliable and strong enough to make detente work. This is not the view of a fixed group, but one which a whole array of Soviet leaders, both in the military and in the party, have come to. Some reached that conclusion sooner than others, and disagreements remain as to whether it is a reversible state of affairs. Under crisis circumstances such as today's—or those of spring 1968—Leonid Brezhnev also shares this outlook.

In the current case of Afghanistan, it was the second counter-detente tendency that determined the Soviet actions on the strategic plane. The internal features of the coup in Kabul, however, bear the fingerprints of the "British" faction in Moscow. The pedigree of Babrak Karmal, the communist installed by the Soviets to replace the nationalist leader Hafizullah Amin, links him to this Soviet grouping.

The "British faction" consists of British agents-of-influence within Soviet ruling institutions: think tanks, the security organizations, and the party Central Committee. Their characteristic profile, of promoting a military foreign policy posture featuring "class struggle" and destabilization for areas deemed under imperialist domination and a relatively slow-growth, quasi-environmentalist domestic economic policy for the U.S.S.R., was last represented at the Politburo level by Nikolai Podgorny. Brezhnev defeated Podgorny factionally in the late 1960s en route to consolidating power and launching detente, but Podgorny lingered on in the ceremonial post of President until 1977 and was sighted at a Moscow reception as recently as November 1979.

The British faction features prominently Kim Philby and Donald Maclean, the British intelligence officers who staged defections to the U.S.S.R. in 1963 and 1951 respectively. Both work in significant advisory positions: Maclean heads the British desk and oversees European work at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), while Philby has reportedly been promoted to the rank of General in the KGB (Soviet intelligence), where he specializes in Middle East affairs.

Their influence was apparent in shaping Soviet support for Khomeini, on the grounds that what was bad for the United States must be good for the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1979, the British faction stepped up activities on two other crucial issues: science and economics. A series of articles appeared in the party journal *Kommunist*, written by Soviet scientists and journalists who not only are involved in joint economics "systems analysis" modeling projects with the anti-growth Club of Rome, but are seeking Soviet acquiescence to the Council on Foreign Relations' global strategy of "controlled disintegration" to be bolstered by the institution of a limited-growth policy in the U.S.S.R. itself.

B. Miroshnichenko, a *Kommunist* author who wrote "Ecology—A Sphere of International Cooperation" in November, endorsed several Club of Rome-shaped United Nations programs on the environment and called for a "mass education program" to instill what he called "environmental thinking" in the Soviet population.

Still another contributor to the journal, Academician N. Dollezhal, drew a direct public attack from Dr. A. P. Aleksandrov, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, for his proposal that nuclear power plants be confined to sparsely populated Siberia. Aleksandrov's blast, telling a press conference that Dollezhal's argument was incompetent, reflected the intensity to which this factional battle had risen by Dec. 18.

A clash on foreign economic policy, nearly as heated, occurred at an autumn conference in Budapest devoted to East-West relations in the monetary field. When I. Bogomolov, the director of the Soviet think tank studying economic processes within the East bloc, endorsed a gold-based monetary system in terms which brought him very close to approving the European Monetary System's principles, economist E. Matyukhin from Maclean's IM-EMO stood up for a division of the world into regional currency blocs—the scenario of the Council on Foreign Relations and leading London banks.

What next?

The Soviets' radical shift into a war-fighting posture, where the Generals and Marshals make the decisions, is not something which can be reversed at a moment's notice. Although the "British faction" did not order the action, it occurred in the context of a "British" factional offensive and there are clearly numerous officials and officers who think Brezhnev waited too long to make the show of force and counted too much on the potentialities of European-centered detente.

This line of thought is visible in East Germany, for example, where attacks on Helmut Schmidt appeared sooner and were harsher than those issued by the Soviets after the NATO missiles' decision. East German Defense Minister Hoffman, who was absent during ceremonies to mark the unilateral withdrawal of a contingent of Soviet troops from East Germany mandated by Brezhnev, has made it known that, from his standpoint, further such gestures are out of the question.

The composite picture of where Soviet factions stand today leads to the conclusion that to restore even a modicum of detente, much less open the door to economic cooperation which could bring long-term stability, will require not only strenuous efforts from Western Europe, but a decisive change in the foreign policy of the United States away from those actions which encourage the U.S.S.R. to expect nuclear war in the very near future.

—Rachel Douglas

Military strategy

How World War III may start in Afghanistan

That the world should go to war over Afghanistan would seem preposterous—but in 1914 Sarajevo was hardly a more imposing strategic objective. Now, as then, the principal war danger lies in strategic miscalculation, the wishful assumption that the enemy could not be engaged in or persevere in the type of action which is nonetheless indicated by all the available evidence. In the case of Afghanistan wishful thinking characterizes the Soviet operation there as essentially a local police operation; there is even talk of a potential Soviet Vietnam etc. In fact the entirety of the Carter administration's already adopted or openly contemplated counteractions only make sense in a strategic context which clearly no longer matches or even significantly intersects the guiding geometry of the Soviet undertaking.

If one does not deliberately blind oneself to the unambiguous public Soviet policy profile subsequent to the NATO Pershing II decision and to certain equally obvious military and geographic features of the Afghanistan seizure, there can be no doubt that Afghanistan as such and the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired rebellion against the Kabul government are only second-



ary, subsumed objectives of the Soviet move. Soviet troops now and in the immediate future will be deployed to uproot the rebels from their positions in Bamian province and in the western provinces bordering on Pakistan principally to secure the country as a whole as rapidly as possible as a reliable basis for further strategic operations. Take a look at the map. Not those blow-up maps of Afghanistan which have appeared in every newspaper during the last week which focus your attention on every irrelevant geographical detail there, but a map which at least spans the area from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal. While a team of U.S. Defense Department specialists were touring the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions to scout out favorable locations for future U.S. military bases, the Soviet military within 48 hours seized a set of new bases which those scouts must regard with the greatest of envy if they are endowed with any strategic judgment. Soviet troops now stand within a hundred miles of Islamabad, thus making a mockery of Harold Brown's combined China/Pakistan card; they stand within a few hundred miles striking distance from the Baluchi port city of Gwadar guarding the entrance to the Persian Gulf; they have opened a broad new front facing Iran, and finally the Soviet Air Force has secured several major new air bases ideally sited to project large scale air power into the Indian Ocean and Gulf theaters.


Nor should there be any doubt about the intended strategic use of Soviet forces in Afghanistan indicated by geographic realities. The structure of the Soviet forces still being moved into the country provides the strongest and most telling evidence. While the lightning assault on Kabul itself was carried out by an airborne division being lifted in in smooth and extremely rapid fashion, sizeable

troop concentrations had been in waiting at the Soviet-Afghan borders and are now being moved in methodically, probably to reach a total size of close to 100,000 by the end of this week. These troops are fully equipped with a wide variety of armoured vehicles, including the most modern Soviet T72 tanks, heavy artillery, sophisticated anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles etc. Against ill-equipped mountain guerrillas who do not dispose of air power such Soviet equipment and massing of forces, of course, would represent quite unnecessary overkill actually embodying the danger of militarily denuding other vital Soviet positions. The only explanation is provided by interpreting this Soviet deployment as a long-term strategic commitment of forces, to be used, if need be, precisely against those strategic targets indicated by the geographical potentialities.

What clinches this argument is the fact that the Afghanistan operation was not based on short-term last minute decisions, yanking Soviet troops out of the other assignments and commitments, but actually involved significant overall Warsaw Pact redeployments, picked-up, but generally misread by Western intelligence services. Thus as certain Soviet units were airlifted from East Germany and from Hungary, the major Soviet staging area for airborne operations into southern Europe and the Near East, to the Transcaucasus military districts, they were replaced principally by East German units moving by rail into Hungary as well as Bulgaria. The entire operation is directed by General Ivan Pavlovsky who had personally inspected the Afghan situation and launched the incursion immediately after his return into the Soviet Union. Pavlovsky is no mere regional commander, but the overall commander of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces.

It should thus be clear and any competent intelligence officer and military analyst should be capable of the reading that in Afghanistan the Soviet Union has not made simply a local, possibly self-defeating commitment. Afghanistan is the signal that the entire Soviet policy command has shifted its strategic posture from war avoidance to war winning and the last warning signal has now been run up the mast. The potential element of Soviet miscalculation in this situation involves their probable disbelief that a United States government could risk the existence of the nation suicidally in pursuit of further controlled disintegration and limited strategic confrontation follies. With Carter, Brzezinski, and Brown in command there are few guarantees that the Soviet signal will be read correctly and no chance that the United States will deliver the kind of firm and self-confident peace policy proposal which demonstrates to the Soviet Union that its security needs are not better served by military adventures.

—Uwe Parpart



Like 1968

No "Prague Spring" in Southwest Asia

During the night of Aug. 20-21, 1968, approximately 175,000 Soviet-led troops rolled into Czechoslovakia and swiftly took over airports, radio stations, the parliament, and other government buildings. The occupation was carried out flawlessly, and was virtually a complete surprise. The "Prague Spring" experiment was over.

Comparison of the current Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with that earlier invasion—the last time that Soviet combat forces were engaged outside the borders of the U.S.S.R.—goes far deeper than the facile "extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside the East bloc" analyses currently bandied about in the leading U.S. press. The unfolding of the 1968 Czechoslovakia crisis demonstrates why, as *EIR* has warned, the NATO vote at its Dec. 12 meeting in Brussels to deploy new medium-range missiles in Western Europe—in full understanding that this would be a concession to the "Schlesinger doctrine" of limited nuclear war—threatens to bring a hardline, antidetente policy into predominance in Moscow, greatly increasing the danger of thermonuclear war.

Whether the Soviet Union has completely ruled out a continuing prodetente war-avoidance policy is not yet fully apparent. What is clear is that if West Germany and France in particular do not take vigorous measures to convince Moscow of their own opposition to "limited nuclear war" chicken games, and of their readiness to fight for a detente policy even over U.S. opposition, then a Soviet policy shift will become irreversible.

In 1968, the Soviet military move was a response to the destabilization of a strategically vital region—but that was not the primary consideration. Then as now, the Soviet Union saw a crucial West European capitulation to the Rand Corporation and Council on Foreign Relations military policies, and saw no choice but a show of military strength. Today the situation is doubly aggravated by the growth of China as a major component of the Washington-London anti-Soviet axis.

'Flexible response'

In December 1967, after nearly six years of intense political battles on both sides of the Atlantic, which included France's withdrawal from the NATO military

organization, NATO formally adopted "flexible response" as its operative military doctrine. "Flexible response," and the "counterforce" targeting strategy that went along with it, were first announced by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara in a famous speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan soon before the Cuban missile crisis. The connection between those two events was not lost on Soviet military thinkers.

"Flexible response," the granddaddy of today's "limited nuclear war" lunacy, meant that war in Europe might not necessarily escalate to full-scale thermonuclear war, and therefore NATO should prepare for conventional warfare or warfare limited to tactical nuclear weapons. McNamara advocated the "counterforce" strategy of hitting only military targets, not population and industrial centers—a strategy which, Soviet commentators pointed out, makes sense only if one intends to strike first, since otherwise the enemy's military bases, missile silos, and so on, would already be empty by the time one's own bombs arrived.

The West German government under Konrad Adenauer and many West German military men opposed this doctrine. As one Defense Ministry spokesman said in 1963, nuclear weapons would inevitably be used in a war in Europe, and would be used against the "maximum" urban targets. The "idea of a conventional war in Europe was military alchemy," he said. Another ranking military man described his encounters with the McNamara crew: "They were so 'expert' you could hardly understand them. I told them they should just once stop proclaiming their figures and assumptions and listen to those who had actually fought the Russians."

But this West German resistance eventually buckled, as the Adenauer government was driven out of power and the pro-Atlanticist Erhard and Kiesinger regimes came in. Many West German politicians consoled themselves that, given U.S. insistence on this new doctrine, conforming to U.S. desires was the only way the Federal Republic of Germany could ensure its defense at all, especially as the reliability of the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella came more and more in question.

NATO's 1967 session coupled the adoption of "flexible response" with a call for troop reduction in Europe, according to the so-called Harmel Plan, which was characterized as a "detente" package. After all, McNamara argued, was not a military doctrine that stops short of full-scale nuclear war and does not target civilian populations more "humane" and "peace-loving" than the old "massive retaliation"?

Reject 'limited war'

The Soviets were not impressed. The Harmel Plan has recently been cited by numerous West German officials and commentators as a precedent for the 1979

NATO meeting's "parallel" adoption of an arms buildup coupled with an offer for arms reduction negotiations. This formulation was denounced in the strongest terms by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Bonn last month.

The Soviets have always rejected outright any notion of limited nuclear war in Europe. They perceived the June

for the "flexible response" doctrine, a doctrine that would eventually be applied closer to the Soviet Union's borders. In September 1967, just before NATO's official adoption of the new doctrine, a commentator in the Soviet journal *International Affairs* denounced what he called the United States' "salami policy" of seeking thin slices of "local wars." If successful, "the local wars will merge and gradually approach the borders of U.S. imperialism's main enemy. ... For a long time now, the imperialists have regarded the Middle East as a base for an attack against the Soviet Union from the south, and hence the anti-imperialist movement of the peoples of the Arab East is considered in the U.S.A. not only a danger to the interests of the oil monopolies but also a threat to U.S. total strategic plans against the Soviet Union," he wrote.

From this standpoint, the Soviets saw the destabilization of Czechoslovakia as a "slice of the salami" that cut very close to home.

The CFR's strategy

The way the Council on Foreign Relations and its British allies saw the Czech situation, they would win no matter what happened. Either the Soviets would back down and allow Czechoslovakia to break out of the Warsaw Pact and join the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Or the Soviets would blow the whistle and invade, which would put an end to the pan-European cooperation for economic development which the Soviets and French President Charles de Gaulle were rudely threatening to unleash.

Just as the December 1979 NATO decision delivered a major setback to the European Monetary System's potential to become an effective war-avoidance instrument that would pull in the Soviet Union as well as the United States for high-technology Third World development, a similar process was operative in 1967. De Gaulle had proclaimed as his goal European-wide economic progress "from the Atlantic to the Urals," and visited Moscow in 1966—after his break with NATO—to discuss how this could best be implemented. The Soviet-led economic community, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, announced the same year a "very elastic approach" in offering its unit of account, the gold-backed transferable ruble, for use by non-member-countries—hinting at a global shift away from the Bret-

ton Woods-International Monetary Fund monetary system. Through 1966 and 1967 the Soviets launched an unprecedented diplomatic offensive through Europe, calling for a European-wide conference on security and cooperation.

The tanks rolling in to Prague, combined with the weakening of General de Gaulle after the May 1968 student demonstrations in Paris, brought all this to a sudden halt.

The Prague "thaw" was by no means the spontaneous search for human freedom that it is portrayed in the West. It was a masterful dirty-tricks operation run by the combined forces of British intelligence, the Jesuit Order, American operatives allied with Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the West German networks of Willy Brandt and Franz Josef Strauss.

British Ambassador Barker, a "former" intelligence officer, was a key on-the-scenes coordinator in Prague. During World War II, he had worked with many people in the exiled Czech staff in London, many of whom returned to Czechoslovakia after the war. The U.S. embassy in Prague worked closely with Barker, and in 1968 when the Soviet invasion began, the embassy incinerator was stuffed with so much "confidential material" concerning U.S. operations in the country that a fire broke out in the embassy and raged out of control.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a professor at Columbia University's Russian Institute, was, with his Jesuit trainers, one of the architects of the "convergence theory" that was to provide the framework for the Czech operation. "The basic assumption of the new approach," he wrote in 1965, "was that mere verbal hostility would not overthrow the communist regimes. ... Instead of waiting for the communist regimes to collapse, the United States would henceforth bank on promoting evolutionary changes within the movement and within the bloc as a whole." Brzezinski traveled to Prague at the height of the ferment in that country, stating at a lecture there in June 1968: "I reiterate that we in New York welcome these events...the old values are actually being realized in a new form."

"One world" theorists from the Jesuit order, and its cothinkers like Roger Garaudy (then a member of the French Communist Party and an adherent of Jesuit theorist Teilhard de Chardin), flocked to Prague to preach the "Christian-Marxist dialogue" and to push for a revival of novelist Franz Kafka, the 1920s writer of surrealistic tales about the "alienation of man." This provided the intellectual climate for the "Prague Spring" explosion of Jacobinism.

Retrenchment

After initial efforts to ignore what was going on in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership finally saw no

1967 Arab-Is

choice but to move in. As Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev told the Czechoslovak leadership in March 1968: "the blood of 20 million Soviet people was not shed in World War II so that the imperialist camp could move to the very threshold of the Soviet Union."

The Soviet invasion produced a Cold-War hardening in both halves of Europe. Denunciations of "Soviet imperialism" rang out in the parliaments of the West, with most of the Communist parties joining in to one degree or another. While some hard-core Anglo-American "kooks" pushed for the U.S. to apply its new "flexible response" doctrine with a show of military strength against Moscow, this grouping did not control the White House.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had been making overtures toward the U.S.S.R. for improving relations and getting strategic arms limitation talks going, reportedly issued orders to U.S. officials not to comment publicly on the crisis. Johnson's restraint led Sir Fitzroy Maclean, a top British intelligence controller, to issue this call to arms in July 1968: "Today Czechoslovakia is once more threatened with armed aggression. It seems scarcely conceivable that, in such a situation, no word of warning should be uttered by any Western statesman...."

Western Europe's press began playing scare stories of U.S. "abandonment" of Europe, of a new division of the world into "spheres of influence." This paved the way for a significant reconsolidation of NATO, which was still smarting from France's withdrawal.

At NATO's first ministerial-level meeting after the Soviet invasion, in November 1968, the European member countries for the first time pledged a larger financial contribution than the United States. Even France showed signs of moving back into closer military collaboration with NATO; France agreed to cooperate with the new NATO Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean command in monitoring Soviet naval operations. The November meeting resolved that NATO's "continued existence is more than ever necessary," and warned that any further Soviet intervention by force in Europe or the Mediterranean would "provoke an international crisis of grave consequences."

On the Soviet side, a parallel retrenchment occurred. The military press began to stress the need for "the least possible dependence on the capitalist countries," and East Germany's hard-line leader Walter Ulbricht proclaimed the necessity "to solve each and every important scientific-technological, military, economic, or other problem through [the socialist community's] own strength and with its own resources."

British agents-of-influence in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic steered the Soviet reaction in the direction of blaming West German "revanchism" for the whole affair, putting out the line that

West Germany had intended to invade Czechoslovakia. In September 1968, authoritative commentaries in Pravda asserted the U.S.S.R.'s treaty rights under the World War II Potsdam Accord and the U.N. Charter to intervene militarily in West Germany if necessary to suppress "a rebirth of German militarism and Nazism" and to prevent "a renewal of aggressive policy" by that former enemy state!

This turn toward Cold War reversed itself only gradually, as Soviet President Brezhnev consolidated his own personal power and support within the Kremlin leadership for a renewed detente initiative toward the United States and Western Europe. The winding down of the Vietnam war and the openness to a detente policy of the new Nixon administration created the potential for such a shift.

By March of 1969, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee overcame resistance from Ulbricht and the other hardliners, issuing a new call for a European-wide conference on security and economic cooperation. Said the statement, "a firm system of European security creates the objective possibility and the necessity of carrying out large-scale projects through joint efforts in fields directly related to the well-being of the entire continent's population: power engineering, transport, the condition of the air and water, and public health. It is this area of common concern that can and must become the foundation of European cooperation."

The decisive turn toward detente with the United States occurred during early 1971, when Brezhnev for the first time took full personal charge of relations with West Germany and the U.S., and of the Soviet position in the SALT negotiations. A channel of personal, confidential communications was opened between the Soviet leader and President Nixon, which resulted in the May 1971 agreement breaking the impasse on the SALT talks. The Soviet Communist Party's 24th Congress in March of that year revealed that Brezhnev's position was now firm and that the Soviet Union was on the track of "normalization" of relations with the United States.

In 1980, in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, it will not be possible to wait three years for the world to get back onto that track. The fuse to World War III is much shorter than it was in 1968. The U.S. administration is under the complete control of the Council on Foreign Relations war policy. China threatens a new invasion of Vietnam which the Soviet Union will not ignore. Soviet President Brezhnev is aging and ill and not able to mount the kind of vigorous factional battles he did during the aftermath of "Prague Spring," and the question of Brezhnev's successor remains unsettled. Responsible governments will have to act now to ensure that the profiled Cold War response of 1968 does not occur now.

—Susan Welsh