
ASIA



Photo: UPI

Japanese security, Korea and one Richard Sneider

by Daniel Sneider

Over the past few weeks, the long-simmering battle for the military and political future of East Asia has broken out into the open. The collapse of the Ohira government in Japan, the chaos reigning in South Korea, the launching of an ICBM test missile by China, all relate directly to whether East Asia will be reshaped—in some cases forcibly—into a military bloc aligned against the Soviet Union, led by the Brzezinski forces in the Carter administration.

In this special report on Asia, EIR Editor-in-Chief Daniel Sneider brings some unusual insights to the current political turmoil in both Japan and Korea, making clear the strategic policy underlying the recent developments in both countries. In an accompanying piece, the prospects for the upcoming Japanese elections are discussed, especially the prospect that the current drift in Japan toward virtual integration into NATO will be reversed.

The key to unlocking the secret behind the current political upheavals in South Korea lies neither in Seoul, nor Moscow, nor Peking, nor even Washington, D.C.'s Foggy Bottom. Oddly enough, it is to be found instead in the hands of both "retired" State Department careerist Richard Sneider and Kiichi Saeki, president of the Japanese Nomura Research Institute—the major organizers of an unofficial State Department conference to be held in Tokyo in mid-June.

The conference is entitled "Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific," which has the ironically appropriate acronym—SCAP—of the Allied postwar command over Japan. Its aim, according to Sneider, is to explore the global defense problems arising from the "instability in U.S. Middle East oil supplies," and the "vacuum" in Asia which will be caused due to U.S. military deployment into the Persian Gulf. The "obvious point," Sneider tells interviewers, is that the Japanese are going to have to move in militarily to fill the vacuum.

In direct language, this means that the Japanese will become the cornerstone of the Eastern NATO alliance of the U.S., Great Britain, China and the two Koreas—and sitting ducks for Soviet missiles anytime the U.S. decides to set up an anti-Soviet provocation in that part of the world.

But Sneider, who was ambassador to South Korea from 1974 to 1978, and who prides himself on his reputation as "Japan's best friend in the U.S.," wants to keep all talk about the "obvious" to a minimum. He loudly chastised George Ball in a *Wall Street Journal* opinion column two months ago because Ball insisted on "pushing" the Japanese to take a "regional defense role." "We simply want to point out the situation and leave it to the Japanese to draw the conclusions," Sneider said recently.

The set-up

The set-up to get Japan to join this Eastern NATO strategy has ranged from the Lockheed scandals, to economic warfare, to oil blackmail, to Korea. It is in the Korea operation where "the Ambassador"—as Sneider's friends call him, possibly in consolation for the post to Japan which he never got—played his first key role.

Sneider's modus operandi closely parallels that of Henry Kissinger in the Iran crisis. Loudly professing his disdain for the "radicals" and "human rights advocates" such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sneider maintained a close friendship with former Korean President Park Chung Hee, just as Kissinger does with the Shah. From the "inside" Sneider was then able to coordinate with the "outside" destabilization effort against the Korean leadership. He told this writer personally that it was directly as a result of his own quiet personal diplomacy that key opposition leader Kim Dae Jung was released from prison after Park's death.

And why, like the Henry Kissinger who bugged his

subordinate's phones, including Sneider's, would Sneider work to undermine his own and the U.S.'s staunch allies in Korea? Because those staunch allies—including the current Korean strongman Lt. General Chun Doo Hwan—adamantly oppose NATO strategy of allying with the Chinese lunatics for a suicidal war against the Soviet Union!

The oppositionists, on the contrary, like Kim Dae Jung in Korea and the “anti-Soviet Islamic fundamentalists” in Iran are prepared to join that insane policy. The *Baltimore Sun* quoted a Korean opposition leader universally identified as Kim Dae Jung in an article two months ago to that effect. The U.S. should put me in power, he said. I can make the deal with the North Koreans which would be beneficial to the U.S. strategy of an alliance with China.

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The Korean destabilization has worked to put more pressure on Japan to join the U.S. and China. Korea's once thriving economy has been brought nearly to its knees by the oil crisis and constant political instability—thus threatening its Japanese backers. And its political volatility raises the bogus, but useful flag of “Soviet threat”—softening the Japanese up for China's open arms.

At the moment, the Korean operation has taken on a life of its own, threatening a succession of coup against countercoup that can only play into the U.S. NATO plan. The focus for the squeeze has turned to Japan.

Sneider is again playing the “inside” man, the man the Japanese can trust. Besides his jobs as a member of the international advisory boards of the Marine Midland Bank and Gulf Oil Co., Sneider serves as a paid consultant to both the State Department and the Defense Department on Japan. It was in this capacity that he met with Ohira last fall to discuss—ever so discreetly—what Japan should do on the defense issue.

Sneider's bosses' success so far can be measured by the trend of statements from Kissinger-favorite Ohira and independent nationalist Nakasone toward increas-

ing Japan's military production over the traditional 1 percent limit, including in providing supplies to China. Leaks from Ohira's recent meetings with Carter in Washington say that the Japanese prime minister also agreed with Carter that the power of Korean strongman Chun “had to be curbed.”

While the vote of no confidence which greeted Ohira on his return home could derail this scheme, it is currently being used for a Trilateral Commission drive to break up the industry-connected ruling party (LDP), and soften up the country for a “liberal” government more amenable to Ohira's pro-China aims.

Sneider's co-organizer of the SCAP conference epitomizes the forces within Japan who are in cahoots with the NATO crowd.

Saeki is a leader of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies which supervised the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations scheme for establishing NATO as the global policeman of the 1980s. The deadly enemy of the IISS plan, as the CFR reveals in its Project 80s series, is the “mercantilist” industrial growth perspective of Japan and the Western European nations. The natural tendency of this mercantilist faction, which includes economies based on the ideas of first American Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and his influential German follower Friedrich List, the CFR hastily notes, is to ally with the “Marxist” economies in a perspective of international industrial growth.

Saeki's Nomura Research Institute operates effectively to the IISS end of destroying Japanese industrial growth. It is the close collaborator with the Stanford Research Institute in America in that evil institution's plans to conform human behavior to the zero growth mold which the Anglo-American financial oligarchy has decreed necessary. Simultaneously, Saeki has pushed the NATO link for Japan directly.

Conclusions

The Japanese, and whatever allies they have left in the CIA-wracked country of South Korea, should take a close look at the goals of their “friends” like Richard Sneider. Sneider himself ranted and raved about French President Giscard d'Estaing's recent peace efforts in the Persian Gulf—just as the U.S. State Department did about the sane strategies Japanese industry had for Mexico. For the Anglo-American plan for a global NATO is based on oil austerity, constant political upheaval, and a commitment to “sacrifice” frontline nations like West Germany up against the Soviet Union in a “war of attrition” and “disintegration” in the wishful delusion of “wearing them down.”

How would Japan fare in this geopolitical game? Draw your own conclusions.