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EIR Special Report

Will the Soviets rule in the 1980s?

by Criton Zoakos, Editor-in-Chief

The most meaningful way to judge the significance of the recent 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party is to match the implications of its adopted policies against those of the policies contained in Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's defense budget and in the ill-conceived budget cuts of OMB Director David Stockman. A serious comparison between the economic-military policy of the Soviets and of the Reagan administration for the 1981-1985 period will demonstrate conclusively that if the intended policies of both nations are carried out, then the United States will be reduced to a third-rate power status by the time President Reagan completes his first term in office. By that time, there will be only one "superpower," the Soviet Union; "second-rate" power status will devolve on continental Western Europe under joint Franco-German leadership.

To justify this dramatic conclusion in the reader's mind, we shall first identify the most salient policy features of the 26th CPSU Congress; then we shall identify the underlying assumptions of the Weinberger defense budget plus the implications of the Volcker-Stockman economic policies for the future of U.S. defense and industrial capabilities.

The policy core of the Party Congress

To quote General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, the principal objective of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to order and organize the "regroupment of the scientific forces of the Soviet Union" for the purpose of carrying out the Eleventh Five Year Plan, a plan which by general admission represents a drastic departure from all hitherto observed Soviet economic planning practice.

In fact, Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov, in presenting the plan, characterized it as "the first stage" of a staggering 30-year energy development program, whose objective is to provide the Soviet Union with an "infinitely" extendable energy industry by the end of three decades. This will be accomplished by the systematic, interlinked development and installation of nuclear fission plants, fast breeder reactors, hybrid fission-

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Sygma

The opening of the 26th Party Congress: Leonid Brezhnev at the podium.

fusion reactors, and full-scale thermonuclear fusion reactors, as outlined by Anatolii Aleksandrov, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was further disclosed by Prime Minister Tikhonov that the entire energy development program is under the direct personal supervision of President Leonid Brezhnev.

Accompanying the launching of this ambitious energy program is the unprecedented emphasis on science and technology which permeated the entirety of the Congress's proceedings. Leonid Brezhnev's personal statement describing his science policy is an unusually powerfully formulated statement of purpose, and it occupied the centerpiece of his keynote address to the Congress:

> The circumstances in which the national economy is to develop in the eighties make the acceleration of scientific-technological progress even more pressing. No one needs convincing of the great significance of science. The Communist Party proceeds from the premise that the construction of a new society is simply unthinkable without science. The CPSU Central Committee advocates the continued raising of the role and responsibility of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and improvement of the organization of the whole system of scientific research. . . . There must also be a more attentive attitude to the needs of science, and a more attentive provision of scientific establishments with equipment and instruments, and expansion of experimental plants. The country greatly needs the efforts of the major sciences, together with the elaboration of theoretical problems, to be concentrated to a greater degree on the resolution of key national economic questions, on discoveries capable of making genuinely revolutionary changes in production. . . . The promotion of scientific discoveries and inventions is the most decisive and most critical field today. Research and development work should be linked more closely, economically and organizationally, with production. . . . It would be certainly worthwhile for the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology and ministries to carry out work in assessing the scientific and design base of various industries and to introduce proposals for the regroupment of scientific forces. Here we have every right to count also on help from industries having a particularly strong scientific base, including defense.
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> In short, comrades, close integration between science and production is an urgent requirement of the present day. The CPSU Central Committee is convinced that workers in science and technology, engineers, designers, and heads of industries and production plants will do everything possible to be equal to this requirement. The basis for scientific and technical progress is the development of science.

Science, in addition to being assigned the task of leading the way of Brezhnev's "infinite supply" 30-year energy program, is called upon to play the basic role in causing increases in labor productivity all across the

board, as Soviet Sector Editor Rachel Douglas discusses below. There is, furthermore, a more profound purpose in Brezhnev's guidelines: the Soviet Union, for the first time in its 63-year history, is mobilizing its resources for a preplanned succession of qualitative rather than quantitative transformations of its economic capabilities.

In short, during the next five years, the U.S.S.R. will be mobilized in pursuit of nonlinear, strategically important qualitative flanks in fundamental science and its applications in both production and defense. This tendency has existed in the Soviet Union for quite some time, and its strategic implications had been identified by the *Executive Intelligence Review*, especially by Lyndon LaRouche, since approximately 1975. What was a mere significant tendency over the past five years has now been transformed into the central rallying task of the Soviet state and party as a result of Leonid Brezhnev's extraordinary sucess in consolidating his powerful factional grip over his party.

In point of fact, Brezhnev's policy, his singular emphasis on a strategy of pursuing qualitative flanks in science, had been increasingly the subject of major public debates in the U.S.S.R. beginning in approximately 1976-77. During the summer of 1979, Soviet Academician E. P. Velikhov, a leader in the Soviet thermonuclear fusion program, informed Western journalists that the burden of military spending on the economy is such that "a simply linear expansion is now nearly impossible." Siberian development, energy development, improved transport—none of these tasks can be accomplished without a shift into qualitatively new modes of scientific development, he added.

A few months later, Brezhnev, in a Central Committee Plenum, indicated that the Soviet leadership was considering specific techniques of vectoring scientific development throughout their industrial base: "The structure of industrial productions is being improved by the accelerated development of those industries which, by their character, determine overall technological progress."

One year later, a spokesman for the Brezhnev faction, Professor V. Lebedev, wrote in *Pravda* that policy focus must be placed on the "fundamental achievements of science," and that what counts is those breakthroughs in science which create new, unpredictable, nonlinear geometries for the economy.

Finally, after the President of the Soviet Academy Aleksandrov was given his mandate by Brezhnev at the recent Party Congress, he went to the podium and addressed the five thousand-plus delegates principally on the unique importance of "fundamental research" and "fundamental breakthroughs which lead to new domains of human activity."

No doubts should be left about the policy content of the Brezhnev-dominated 26th Soviet Party Congress:

- Primary emphasis on in-depth development of their nuclear energy industry.
- Massive push in fundamental scientific research.
- Sustained increase in the growth rate of labor productivity.

The prospects for the United States

The combined effects on the United States economy of Paul Volcker's monetary policy, David Stockman's budget policy, and Caspar Weinberger's military program will now threaten to produce results so profound that they may be irreversible for at least 20 years. In sum, if the policies of these individuals are allowed to take effect, at the end of Reagan's administration, the United States will be decisively inferior to the Soviets in most essential economic and military capabilities. The single most important cause of such an eventuality will be the inability of these policy-makers to comprehend the specific significance that science policy has in determining both economic and military development.

First, on the matter of defense policy and Mr. Weinberger's budget: the objective of the Reagan administration's defense budget is to build a significant conventional combat force accompanied with an air and naval capability to deploy and fight in any number of locations in the Third World. Virtually the entirety of the budget increases for FY 1981 and 1982 is earmarked for acquisition and maintenance of conventional equipment, for improvement of the preparedness status of existing and planned conventional combat forces, for improvement of military salaries to cover the significant manpower shortages that now exist, and for the procurement of certain types of naval vessels and aircraft whose intrinsic combat mission is essentially conventional.

In terms of strategic nuclear weapons, the new budget faithfully sticks to McNamara's philosophy of "deterrence," i.e., maintaining a force *whose assigned mission is not to fight a war.* Thus, Secretary Weinberger has made the decision not to seek improvements in military R&D, to not seek the development of qualitative flanks precisely at the time when the Soviets are deploying the entirety of their efforts in the direction of obtaining qualitative breakthroughs which will tend to lead them into the next generation of weapons systems, generally associated with fundamental research in plasma physics, fusion energy research, and the effort to develop technologies capable of manipulating amounts of energies associated with thermonuclear fusion.

The strategic nuclear forces of the United States, under Secretary Weinberger's guidelines, are condemned to languish in the technological plateau of the late 1950s, a plateau that is not envisaged to be supreceded until the end of the century. The Trident II submarine, the MX missile and the Stealth bomber

basically represent refinements and linear extensions of existing technologies. Despite any possible future refinements in microcircuitry, precision targeting, new electronic countermeasures etc., the weapons planned for deployment into the 1990s cannot possibly embody any technological surprise to Soviet defense planners who are currently engaged in pursuits of "fundamental breakthroughs which lead to new domains of human activity."

If the present antiscience bias of our defense policy is not reversed with a drastic shift of emphasis in fundamental science by the year 1982, important national resources are going to be locked into commitments leading us further and further away from what must be done to meet the Soviet scientific challenge. It is possible that by the 1984 elections the science and R&D "gap" may become permanently unbridgeable. Current trends certainly point in that direction, as the following figures indicate.

At the present time the Soviet Union has 45 million "blue collar" workers employed in their nonagricultural goods-manufacturing sector; the United States has 25 million. Soviet labor productivity in the 1976-80 period increased by 17 percent; U.S. labor productivity in the same period registered zero increase (in 1980 it *declined* by 3 percent and in 1979 it *declined* by 0.8 percent). The Soviets now employ over 1 million scientists and engineers in basic science R&D; the United States 0.5 million. Each year, the Soviets graduate slightly over 300,000 new engineers; each year we graduate slightly less than 50,000. The Soviets, before their current Party Congress were outspending us in R&D by a ratio of two to one. After Brezhnev announced his science policy, this ratio is expected to increase significantly.

The above figures, viewed together with the policy decisions made at the Soviet Party Congress, represent the deeper, more resilient Soviet capabilities that the United States must face up to. The number of rubles the Soviets spend in their defense budget fades into insignificance compared to the above qualitative measures. Secretary Weinberger's defense budget fails to respond to this more profound Soviet challenge. Even if the secretary decides to spend more in absolute amounts than the Soviets, it will not improve American defense margins one iota. A bow-and-arrow army may outspend its rifle-equipped rival by three-to-one and more, without ever getting closer to match.

We shall be threatened with exactly this sort of situation if the Soviet Union brings to a successful conclusion its Eleventh Five Year Plan *and* if Paul Volcker, David Stockman and Caspar Weinberger succeed in carrying out their stated economic and defense objectives. The Volcker-Stockman economic policy, projected into 1984, provides for further drastic reduction in industrial and infrastructural capacities *below existing levels.* Chairman Volcker is projecting an increase of unemployment by an additional 1 million by the end of this year, together with a decline of our GNP by 1.5 percent. Given the interest rates since October 1979, there is a net disinvestment going on during the latter half of 1980 and into 1981. Science programs are being systematically cut, including the fusion energy program and NASA. One particularly vicious twist in Stockman's budget cutting was the elimination of that component of the NASA budget which had once been allocated for the purpose of facilitating the transfer into private industry of those new technologies developed within NASA programs.

Over a year ago, Lyndon LaRouche, this publication's chairman and founder, wrote a book with the title *Will The Soviets Rule In the 1980s?*

If one views the Volcker-Stockman-Weinberger policy against the background of the just-concluded Soviet Party Congress, one wonders if that question has already been answered in the affirmative. It may have and it may have not. One thing is for sure: if the Volcker-Stockman-Weinberger policies are implemented during 1981-82, they will burden the United States with just such qualitative disadvantages, whose character may be irreversible for a long time to come.

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