den; and Soviet General Milshtein.

One month later, the Swedish publication Göteborgs Handels och Sjofartstidning embarrassed all by identifying General Milshtein as a KGB officer. Palme's office did not deny the report, but from that point, the commission described Milshtein as a "scientific adviser to the commission," rather than a secretariat member.

Also in early October, Palme headed a Swedish Social Democratic delegation to Moscow at the special invitation of the Soviet Central Committee, and met with Central Committee member Ponomarev, discussed energy with Dzhermen Gvishiani, and discussed the Palme Commission with Georgii Arbatov, who is now a commission participant.

The next important gathering of the commission took place in Washington, D.C. in the interstices of the "Eurosocialist" conference there on Dec. 5-7. Attending that conference were Palme and former Dutch prime minister Joop den Uyl, and a prominent zero-growth advocate. Arbatov was in Washington at the same time, meeting with Palme, Vance, Henry Kissinger, and Leslie Gelb. Their discussions contained particular emphasis on the Reagan administration and the potential for building an international "peace movement" against it (see EIR Dec. 23, 1980).

The commission held a private meeting in Vienna later that week including all members. Milshtein and Arbatov relayed their view of how to deal with the Reagan administration, and the Socialist International members relayed the view that Reagan would launch a huge cold-war military buildup, a line intended to bolster the Ponomarev faction at the Soviet Party Congress in February. Gelb, for his part, indicated to all present, including the KGB faction's representatives, that they and the commission would be able to work with Alexander Haig, if discreetly.

The December meeting planned 6 to 12 working sessions during the course of 1981. The first took place on Feb. 9-11, presenting a document prepared by Vance, Gelb, and Milshtein on the effects of the collapse of the SALT process. The session also provided a podium for the U.S.-based Physicians for Nuclear Disarmament, an affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a convergence point of U.S.-Soviet networks associated with the late Lord Russell, whose program is principally aimed against all peaceful uses of nuclear power.

In a Feb. 5 Pravda article, General Milshtein delivered the KGB's sanction to the Socialist International's "peace and disarmament" movement. The KGB officer praised Lord Bertrand Russell—the man who twice advocated pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. In light of his participation in the Palme Commission, that is only appropriate.

Interview

How the Ayatollah was put in power

The following is Part I of an April 28 interview with Hossein Rastegar of the Iran Liberation Army (ILA). The ILA is a political and military organization that believes in armed struggle for the liberation of Iran, and whose 25-man leadership—comprised of both civilian and military figures—includes Mr. Rastegar. In April, Mr. Rastegar was a featured speaker at the Second Conference of the International Caucus of Labor Committees in Mainz, West Germany. The interview was conducted by EIR Wiesbaden bureau chiefs Thierry LeMarc and Mary Brannan.

EIR: Can you describe the aims of your organization, and how you hope to achieve them?

Rastegar: The Shah was the head of the leadership of the army in Iran, and when he left, the army found itself in confusion and chaos. In this context, General Huyser's visit to Iran should not be overlooked. [In February 1979, NATO Gen. Robert Huyser, then a subordinate of Haig's, told the Iranian army not to defend the Bakhtiar government—ed.] Huyser had the task of implementing the decisions taken by Carter and his Western supporters at the Guadeloupe meeting. Huyser tried with all his means to destroy the army, of course using all the agents he had working for him in Iran. Bakhtiar tried to keep the army together, but it was unfortunately too late.

The government was overthrown and Khomeini took power. As he is an enemy of the Iranian nation, and he had to do what was laid down in the Carter doctrine, his first target was the army. He tried to completely eliminate the army, and he succeeded. Every day officers were executed, without any legal trial. Not only officers, but also many civilians, politicians, economists, and intellectuals were executed. Every section of the Iranian population was hit by Khomeini's murderous policies.

In this context, the Iran Liberation Army was founded by young Iranian officers after about a year of Kho-

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meini's rule. Its aim was to bring together young officers and noncommissioned officers who were still alive, and who wanted to fight for the liberation of Iran. It also tried to bring together young intellectuals and other nationalist Iranians. When the ILA leadership realized that its headquarters in Iran were in danger, the ILA was transferred abroad, and has continued work there, among young officers and refugee Iranians.

Since then, the organization has had its headquarters in Paris. We have branches in all major Western cities, with military and political offices. The highest committee is made up of 25 young Iranian officers and intellectuals. They are all nationalist, democratic, and they all consider that Iran is a part of the world and of humanity as a whole. They think that Iran must be freed one day, and they consider that the new Iran should work for good relations with all countries, especially with Western countries and with its neighbors.

Our aim is first of all to make clear to Iranians what actually happened in Iran, what we have lost and what we have got in its place. We have lost in every respect, and disease and destruction have entered the country. We have another main aim abroad: to make clear to Western nations that they should not play with nations as Iran was played with. What happened in Iran was not what the Iranians wanted at all, but was a fully planned operation.

When Carter came to power in America, he officially declared: "In my foreign policy I will have nothing to do with two people: the Shah of Iran and Somoza of Nicaragua." He did not realize that the Shah of Iran could not be compared with Somoza, and even if there had been enmity between Carter and the Shah, plans should not have been made to destroy Iran, plans which bring Western security into danger as well.

This is what we have tried to explain to our people and to Western nations in the past year and a half. What happened in Iran was not what the Iranians wanted, but was deliberately planned and implemented by Carter and his Western supporters at the Guadeloupe meeting.

We are planning to destroy the Khomeini regime, with every means possible, military and paramilitary. After the restoration of security, order, and freedom, we will hand over power to a democratic, civilian regime.

EIR: What do you consider to be the role of [the son of the late Shah] Reza Shah?

Rastegar: We accept the young Reza Shah as our Shah, as the symbol of the unity of the Iranian nation, and as the symbol of the liberation of Iran. He has a very important task in the future, namely to distinguish between good Iranians, that is, those who think and work genuinely in the interests of Iran, and those who simply call themselves Iranians and who only think about their

own profit. Naturally, this second group has the right to live and work in Iran, but we think that power in Iran and important positions should only be in the hands of those who are genuinely working for the Iranian nation. That is the task of the young Shah. He should bring such people together and put them to work in the economy, politics, and in the army of Iran.

EIR: What do you think about the theory that the Shah tried to import too much modern technology and industry into Iran, and that what happened was simply a spontaneous reaction against that?

Rastegar: That is an important question. Up until 30 years ago, even though the Shah's father had achieved some progress, we were very far behind in terms of modern technology.

The Shah tried to make modern science and technology the foundations of Iran, with the support of his people. He tried to bring something new into Iran, with the money earned from oil. For example, up until 30 years ago, we had only one university, the University of Teheran. When the Shah left the country, we had 16 big universities, and almost 40 higher education institutions; that is, engineering schools, technical schools, and so on. Thirty years ago, the number of students and schoolchildren was very low. When the Shah left the country, we had more than 100,000 students studying abroad, while in Iran itself, the number of students at every level was more than 8 million!

When you consider that out of Iran's 35 million population, 8 million students and schoolchildren were dealing with modern studies and technology, that represented great hopes for us. Naturally, these students would also have higher wishes and demands, especially concerning modern science and technology. The Shah's govenment tried to fulfill the wishes of the future generation of intellectuals in Iran, to modernize the country as rapidly as possible. He built many industries for us, many highways, railways, and airfields, both civilian and military. The Khomeini regime says today that agriculture was at zero, but in fact the Shah made tremendous progress possible in agroindustry. Several major agroindustries were set up in different areas of Iran.

The aim was to make Iran independent of Western agricultural help by the end of the 1980s. In industry, too, we thought that one day oil would run out, that the country could not count on its lasting for hundreds of years. So we tried, using the oil revenues we obtained, to invest in science and technology for the future of Iran. That was the Shah's aim, and I must say that he implemented this plan step by step. If this catastrophe had not happened, we would have been a strong scientific, economic, and political power in the Middle East by the end of the 1980s.

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