
Documentation

New Soviet signals on military policy

by Rachel Douglas

It is understandable that the London *Economist* should have advised in its Aug. 8-14 issue, "Those mutterings from Moscow should be ignored." Take seriously the latest words of the Soviet chief of staff, the foreign minister, the party press, and even that intimate of Western geopoliticians, Georgii Arbatov of Moscow's U.S.A.-Canada Institute, and little will remain of the foundation on which Lord Carrington's strategies rest.

For Carrington, the British foreign minister, has counted on the Soviets to play a prerigged game of global crisis management. Moscow would trade real estate in far-flung corners of the globe, would even shoot some small nuclear missiles under certain circumstances—never on a scale that could not be circumscribed by negotiations, and would offer no objections to the post-industrial austerity intended for the advanced sector and starvation for the Third World.

In our Aug. 4 Special Report, *EIR* documented the Soviet decision to allocate economic and scientific resources to the military, in preparation for what one general called "the possible war which the imperialists are preparing against the countries of socialism." This war, wrote Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov in July, would involve all continents and jeopardize "the whole of mankind."

According to intelligence on Soviet strategic thinking, the Soviet leadership sees two potential crises as trigger points for war. The first is the probability of a monetary collapse by this September-October, as projected by the Basel Bank for International Settlements. The chaos ensuing from such a collapse, accompanied by the imposition of the International Monetary Fund's ferocious conditionalities policy toward the underdeveloped sector, would tend to turn any destabilization in the Third World into a point of superpower confrontation.

The second crisis point, as the Soviets see it, if the West averted monetary collapse, would emerge with the stationing by NATO of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe beginning in 1983. The Soviets view the stationing of the Pershings, which could strike Soviet soil within five minutes, as a Cuban Missile Crisis—this time in reverse.

Spokesmen like Arbatov and *Pravda's* senior commentator Yuri Zhukov have elaborated Ogarkov's warning. In addition, *Pravda* carried two major articles, one

by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and one over the authoritative pseudonym "A. Petrov," analyzing the geopolitical ventures of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Lord Carrington, respectively.

On a late July British Broadcasting Corporation show, Arbatov asserted that, "for the Americans, Europe begins to be more and more a sort of forward-based bridgehead, where if necessary they can even . . . fight it out with the Soviets, including to fight it out with nuclear wars, and then have a chance to settle things somehow without suicide." Arbatov said, "In my point of view, *it is an absolute illusion*. If they have a nuclear war, we have a nuclear war, which is called limited in Europe but it will become an all-out world nuclear war."

Therefore Europe would never be the same after installation of the Pershings, wrote *Pravda* Aug. 12; there could be no subsequent return to the *status quo ante*. Since the weapons would be in American hands, the paper added, West Germany would be unable to veto their use and hence could not prevent a violation of the Soviet-West German Moscow Treaty of 1970, meant to ensure war never again began from German soil.

In *Pravda* of July 28, Zhukov compared Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to John Foster Dulles, but his article was no simple rehash of Cold War rhetoric. Dulles, according to Zhukov, was a much safer person to deal with than Haig and Weinberger, because his assumption of coming through a nuclear war was founded on genuine military competence and muscle, not bluff: "For all his zoological hatred of communism, Dulles and his co-thinkers still understood that dancing on the brink of war was permissible only while the United States preserved a monopoly on atomic weapons."

The Gromyko and Petrov articles dealt with major segments of the strategic encirclement mapped by the Soviet command. Petrov's rebuff to Carrington, referring to the British-drafted plan for an international conference on Afghanistan, transcended that issue to constitute a repudiation of Carrington's geopolitical method.

Petrov on Carrington

"The statement by Reagan in the second month of his presidency about the intention to give military aid to Afghan counterrevolutionaries had a sinister connotation. . . . This aggression being carried out against Afghanistan is only a part of a vast plan for the destabilization of the situation throughout the region from South Asia to the Persian Gulf.

"What is offered in the 'initiative' of the European Community's Council, approved in Ottawa, and based on Britain's proposals? The proposals basically amount to holding an international conference in two stages. At the first it is proposed to discuss questions of 'ending outside interference,' and at the second 'to guarantee

the future of Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state.' . . . The underlying process of the 'European proposals' is obvious. Their authors want to lead the process of settlement away from the discussion and elimination of the basic, main reasons for the tension over Afghanistan. . . . The Western capitals and Peking are keeping completely silent about the objective motives by which the Soviet Union was guided. . . ."

In his BBC talk, Arbatov frankly explained the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as due not so much to destabilization in that country, but to NATO's acceptance on Dec. 12 of the Carter administration proposal to place Pershing missiles on European soil and to build up U.S. naval forces in the Persian

Gromyko on Haig

The Soviet foreign minister wrote for *Pravda* Aug. 8, the tenth anniversary of the Soviet friendship treaty

with India. He used the opportunity to elaborate the geopolitical threat perceived by Moscow to the South.

"The results of the negotiations of Haig with the Chinese leaders cannot be evaluated otherwise than as an escalation of a reckless policy. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent, above all, to the plans of granting China modern American arms. The American-Chinese rapprochement on a basis which is hostile with respect to the U.S.S.R. will be considered by us in an appropriate manner, in the context of our relations to the U.S. and China.

"The Soviet Union will take all measures which the development of the situation may dictate. Nobody should have doubts about the fact that the Soviet state will be capable of defending itself and its allies and friends. . . . Pakistan is more and more notably entering a path in its policy which provokes the justified concern of its neighbors."

LaRouche Statement

'Imminent Soviet moves against Pakistan'

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., *EIR* founder and chairman of the advisory committee of the National Democratic Policy Committee, warned on Aug. 7 that Soviet military "hot-pursuit" operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan are to be expected within the next 30 days. Although such Soviet preemptive actions to destroy Afghan rebel bases in the border areas of Pakistan will be given justification on the grounds of the defense of Afghanistan, the anticipated Soviet actions cannot be seen merely as part of a widening conflict on the subcontinent.

LaRouche, who is currently touring West Germany, stressed that such Soviet preemptive action would represent a strategic response by the Soviet leadership to a rapidly deteriorating international situation. Abundant public as well as private evidence on the present strategic posture of the Soviet military leadership indicates this type of characteristic response. The prominence of articles in the Soviet media authored by the highest military leadership is but one of many indicators of the increasing visibility of the Soviet military command in the decision-making process. For all practical purposes the political and military leaderships of the Soviet Union are presently merged.

LaRouche noted that just as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was part of a predictable strategic re-

sponse to the evolving China Card and Euromissiles policy of the Carter administration, an active "hot pursuit" military policy toward Pakistan is being dictated by the overall strategic military situation. The latter is defined in Soviet eyes by the simultaneous crises represented by the new Begin government's preparations to invade Lebanon, the ongoing Polish crisis, and of course, the United States' commitment to ring the Soviet Union with middle-range missiles. The Soviet leadership, seeing itself subject to an encirclement strategy, will "choose the path of least action" to make a demonstrative military action or series of actions, in LaRouche's words. Those analysts who would try to define the subcontinent situation in local terms would thus completely fail to understand the overriding motivation of Soviet policy at this time.

With both the Soviet Union and the United States on a military buildup and confrontation course, any major Soviet move of the type indicated above would signal the Soviet perception of a) the failure and uselessness of the so-called Carrington Plan, and b) the increasing imminence of much broader strategic conflict.

The launching of military operations against Pakistan would thus represent the first of a series of military actions in a deteriorating world strategic environment.

While the Soviets tend to see the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe as the outer parameter of the ongoing crisis, LaRouche stressed that the economic and financial crisis anticipated for the last quarter of 1981 in the West could detonate a series of major conflicts long before 1983.