

role as NATO's chief nuclear battlefield.

In fact, the same delusion possessed Kissinger in 1975—the delusion that the Soviets would accept a limited nuclear war in Europe and the U.S. would once more come through a major war without having to fight on its own soil. Will the Soviets have to preempt total war, starting with massive bombardment of U.S. cities, in order to prove Kissinger wrong?

Kissinger, Carrington, Rockefeller and NATO as a whole are miscalculating badly. But if the next stop in their global war games—militarizing the Western economies—succeeds, there will be little opportunity to stop them politically in the West. It will be up to the Soviets; but most of us will not be around to notice.

Current U.S. military policy lunacy

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Excerpts from an Aug. 16 statement by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.:

The Achilles-heel of the Anglo-American geopolitical encirclement of Moscow is the "China Card" and the Pakistan branch of the "China Card." Looking at Moscow's strategic problem through the eyes of the old Prussian General Staff's Schlieffen, this is key to the point at which Moscow can act to the greatest advantage with the least opposition and strategic risk.

Turn to the relevant map. Look at a very relevant little strip of Afghanistan abutting the Soviet Union, Peking China, and Pakistan. This little piece of real estate, unknown to most people today, could become the crucial pivot. This little strip of land—contested by Peking China—is the most singular element in the strategic geography of the world at this moment.

Now, look south from that strip, along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. If your map is politically accurate, it notes a section of this border area as Afghan, but claimed by Pakistan and under de facto Pakistan administration. . . . This contested area is integral to the staging of forces being launched by China and the United States under Pakistani surrogate cover, into Afghanistan.

Imagine that Gen. Douglas MacArthur were a Soviet general. How would he judge the significance of these elements of the real-estate offerings?

Now, turn your attention to a road leading from Peking China-occupied territory into Pakistan, the principal land-supply route from China into Pakistan, along

which a significant portion of Peking materiel flows into the Pakistan-based staging areas.

Any U.S. general officer of the old, "traditionalist" school of war-fighting, sitting in the Pentagon and imagining, as a modern Schlieffen might, what he would do were he in Moscow's shoes, comes to the very obvious conclusions. The relevant concluding point this general officer would include in his proposal is: "There's really not a damned thing we could do to counter this. It is potentially devastating for the entire geopolitical position in Asia."

Would Moscow pass up such a golden opportunity?

No Soviet military planner would wish to engage the Soviet forces in Pakistan as a whole. It is almost certain that no such superfluous undertaking would be considered by Moscow. It would be sufficient to massively discredit both Peking and Zia ul-Haq, by limited military action taken under the cover of the Afghan flag, neutralizing the rear bases of the forces deployed against Afghanistan, and cutting the land route into Pakistan from China.

During the recent weeks, since this writer first drew the conclusions just summarized here concerning the Pakistan option, it is clear that Moscow has reached analogous conclusions. *Any competent military analyst would reach exactly the same conclusions.*

An action neutralizing the geopolitical buildup of Pakistan and China has been repeatedly defined as current Soviet strategic policy in the Soviet press. The nature of the action has not been specified, but the fact of imminent action against precisely the Pakistan-Peking element of the geopolitical complex has been published as official policy of the highest bodies of the Soviet Union.

Some big-mouth idiots around Washington brush all this off, arguing in effect that the Soviets are publishing disinformation aimed at throwing us off track. On the contrary . . . it is the Soviet population which is being conditioned to acceptance of some action.

Add to this the fact that Soviet consumer-goods investment has been cut for increasing military expenditures, and that one in ten of the persons seen on the main streets of central Leningrad or Moscow are in military uniforms, and one has a picture of the state of mind emerging in the Soviet population generally today. It is estimated that Soviet military expenditures are rising rapidly toward 20 percent of the GNP, and are already at approximately 17 percent.

How can Moscow: 1) weaken Pakistan, 2) humiliate Peking to the degree of aggravating internal political instabilities there, 3) weaken the entire Asia buildup of the geopolitical combination, 4) reduce pressures on the Afghan involvement? What choices of action match the Moscow commitment to action?

If you were in Moscow, what would your choice be?