## Interview: Gen. Iníguez de Moral

## Integration into NATO will be slow

General Iníguez del Moral is the Division Chief for Coordination and Planning for the Spanish military's chiefs of staff. He spoke to EIR in Madrid in late September.

**EIR:** What do you think about the question of a Fourth NATO Command for Spain?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: Given the complexity of our peninsula, one should think in terms of a single command for the entire Iberian peninsula.

**EIR:** The press reported that the NATO delegation in Madrid this summer refused even to discuss the question of the Fourth Command.

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: I was not part of the delegation, so I cannot tell you why. Personally, I think that Spain's integration to NATO, should this take place, will take a long time. Furthermore, NATO commands are organized in a very old structure indeed. As soon as Spain is in NATO, a change is called for, which I think will not be immediate.

**EIR:** So you mean the Fourth Mandate will be part of the discussion again?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: I do think so; I would not rule it out.

**EIR:** That seems positive. Turning to the Gibraltar issue, Spain did not bring this up in the last U. N. session. Do you think the negotiations to take place with NATO will be the occasion for this question to be raised?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: Gibraltar is an idea shared by every Spaniard, namely that it must be given back [by Great Britain—ed.], and the procedures to recover it occupy the thoughts of every Spaniard. If, through NATO, this can be done in a reasonable, civilized fashion, it will be brought up. That is my own personal opinion. We will do the maximum.

**EIR:** England seems intransigent at the moment.

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: That is true, notably due to their success in the Malvinas. But I do think that we are civilized peoples, and it should be possible to arrive at a solution. The U.N. has recognized that the Rock should be given back to Spain. I stress that this preoccupation is common to everyone in this country. Everyone shares this opinion. Through dialogue, through reason, there may be paths to understanding and a solution.

**EIR:** This year's Bonn defense ministers' meeting raised in the final communiqué the eventuality of NATO out-of-area deployments. What do you think about this?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: First, for the moment we are not yet fully integrated into NATO. The whole idea calls for better knowledge of what NATO acting outside the NATO area would mean. Spain is a country which has broken with a policy of aggression, and now maintains a purely defensive posture. Within the area of responsibility of NATO, we should have to intervene, whatever the case. Outside the NATO area of responsibility, to what extent we, or NATO, could move—well, I consider that a complex and difficult question since it would entail acting in the position of an aggressor.

**EIR:** Anglo-Saxon military circles have spilt a good deal of ink over the Malvinas, calling it the first step in gaining free rein to intervene in the Third World.

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: Yes, that is obviously the case. There is no doubt that the meaning of the thing was and is, from a strategic military standpoint, a trial run for interventions into other countries. A masterly, professional trial run.

EIR: Violent criticism was voiced during the Malvinas crisis against British economic planning. Milton Friedman's policies have been blamed for the sinking of some ships in the Malvinas, due to cheap materials. Milton Friedman is today in Madrid. What consequences do you draw for the economic planning of the Spanish armed forces?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: There is no doubt that everything that touches economics and finance greatly affects the army, since it can act only so long as there is both financial and economic strength. In every country, requirements normally outstrip availabilities.

**EIR:** The technological level of the Atlantic Alliance has greatly fallen behind, especially from the standpoint of space warfare, advanced technology, and so on. Could this not create a deep crisis within the Alliance?

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: It is quite clear that if the U.S. government today does not remain on the path of high technology and research, on a better level than in the U.S.S.R., this will lead to defeat, as will an incapacity to modify America's own criteria, which is extremely dangerous. I say this to you as my own opinion, and I do not disagree with you. What surprises me, is that this is not taken into account, and that is a mistake.

**EIR:** The PSOE plans heavy cutbacks in the nuclear program, and investments more oriented toward light than heavy industry. Will this affect the armed forces negatively?

**Gen. Iníguez del Moral:** Anything which leads to a loss of industrial capacity has a negative effect on the armed forces. In the U.S.S.R., they devote themselves to high technology, advanced research and so on, to ensure more powerful armed

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forces. On the other hand, with what now appears to be zero growth in the United Kingdom and U.S.A, their power is slipping away. Similarly, a bottleneck in energy growth will necessarily affect the armed forces negatively.

EIR: Well-known figures in the Atlantic Alliance like General Maxwell Taylor and François de Rose of the European Security Community have for the last few years talked of the risks of "overpopulation." Maxwell Taylor has even said "NATO thinks demographically." The U.S. State Department Global 2000 Report speaks of the need to cut population by 20 percent before the year 2000. Could the Spanish armed forces accept such an idea from a moral standpoint?

**Gen. Iníguez del Moral:** Personally, I think this would be immorality. To correct demography by force is to me immoral. I am sure that my companions in arms would agree with me on that. To do away with populations by warlike means strikes me as totally immoral.

**EIR:** Henry A. Kissinger has repeatedly stressed the need for a limited nuclear war to get around the problem of Soviet superiority. Can one take such an idea seriously?

**Gen. Iníguez del Moral:** The idea that one might be able to limit a nuclear war seems to me precisely one of the biggest problems facing humanity. Who is going to limit the use of nuclear arms? Who will then say, here I stop? . . . May such a problem never arise! But should it arise, it will be terrifying.

**EIR:** Ideologues at think tanks such as the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies have spoken of the need for coercive governments to solve the impending economic crisis, one worse than the 1930s.

Gen. Iníguez del Moral: I believe in a system of liberty.

## Interview: Octavio Aguar

## The drug financiers must be unmasked

Dr. Octavio Aguar, who holds the United Nations position of Scientific Collaborator, spoke to EIR on the drug problem in late September.

**EIR:** Dr. Xavier Aizpiri, head of the Viscaya province's anti-addiction unit in the Basque country, recently told the press that drugs in the Basque are controlled by a well-structured international network.

**Dr. Aguar:** In point of fact, drug traffic in the Basque is very likely more tightly organized than in the rest of the country. It is hard to know through exactly which channels; the frontier with France is where most of the heroin comes

over. We thereby assume that the thing is carefully channeled, using advanced methods. There are virtually no small dealers, as opposed to the situation in southern Spain.

**EIR:** What is the stand of the PSOE and the PCE on the legalization of drug consumption?

**Dr. Aguar:** There is no doubt that both these parties' youth movements embrace legalization of marijuana, especially the PCE, which actually held a public meeting on the subject demanding total legalization, i.e., making cannabis freely available. The PSOE shifted recently to a more diplomatic attitude due to public opinion. . . . In the Madrid municipal council, a big fight broke out concerning cannabis legalization. Some Socialist Party members wanted legalization, and their declarations were published in the Spanish press.

**EIR:** Since 1979, heroin traffic has shifted to Sicily as a base, via Lebanon. Courageous men like General Dalla Chiesa of Italy investigated drug-money laundering into real estate and other boondoggles. What role does this Sicilian connection play in Spain?

**Dr. Aguar:** Before 1979, most heroin came from the Far East, but from late 1978 on, the raw material started coming in from not only Lebanon, but the Mideast generally. The refined heroin now reaches such a high degree of purity at times, that we assume that individuals linked previously to the Marseilles operations are refining it. These individuals are very obviously on a European level of technical competence. We suspect that they are working out of certain Mediterranean islands, including some within Spanish waters. All indications point to General Dalla Chiesa having been murdered for his investigations into this field.

It follows logically that the huge sums of money earned in this fashion are not buried underground, but through various financial channels create a whole new series of outlets. For example, it may well be that the opening of certain new ports, the creation of new sites for yachts and launches, and new buildings along the seaside could be part of the whole operation.

**EIR:** In the Caribbean, the tourist industry, casinos and so on function to launder drug and other dirty money. What about Ibiza and Marbella in Spain?

**Dr. Aguar:** Ibiza and Marbella have two casinos. These two sites also have points of entry for certain drugs, so that logically the money which flourishes in such an environment tends to be related to drugs. Individuals functioning as connection points there easily acquire drug monies, and can be also involved in gambling as well. Via the tremendous money throughput of casinos, money can easily be transferred to other sites. I would like to see the money gained by such means attacked at its very root; I would like to see the individuals who benefit from this money—no matter how high their social standing, no matter how utterly respectable or enviable their lifestyle—unmasked once and for all.

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