

The two military faces of Yuri Andropov

by Rachel Douglas

On Aug. 10, one of Yuri Andropov's advisers threatened in print that if the United States implements the defensive strategic doctrine spelled out by President Reagan last March 23, it will be a *casus belli*—the U.S.S.R. will launch nuclear war. A week later, in meetings with two different delegations from the United States, Andropov put on a theatrical display of negotiating offers and unilateral "commitments" which serve only to wreck the Reagan initiative for anti-missile beam weapons and thus to keep the United States and U.S.S.R. locked on a course towards a missile crisis.

The public threat by Fyodor Burlatskii, which we excerpt on the following pages, reveals Andropov's calculation that now is the time to force Reagan to back down from the beam weapons policy, since Henry Kissinger can be counted on to work against it from the inside. Spokesmen for Kissinger intimate George Shultz's State Department hastened both to belittle Burlatskii's "*casus belli*" article and to promise "careful study" of Andropov's latest disingenuous proposals to ban space weapons.

Burlatskii's article is also under evaluation as a personal threat to Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.—the first American politician to have proposed a shift from the Kissinger-created Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine to Mutually Assured Survival based on beam weapons—who called for this policy back in February 1982. LaRouche's organizations have been under a barrage of attacks from the Soviet intelligence outlet *Literaturnaya Gazeta* for several months. The same *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, while roundly denouncing Reagan's March 23 speech, refused to publish that speech or

report that Defense Secretary Weinberger has discussed parallel, agreed-upon development of the systems by both sides, to end the era of MAD.

In Europe, supporters of LaRouche's policy circulated a release on the Burlatskii article, which said, "This monstrous military threat escalates the political pressure and is meant to shut up politicians in the West who favor the development of beam weapons. In the front line of these politicians are Lyndon H. LaRouche and his German wife Helga Zepp-LaRouche, the leader of the European Labor Party. . . . If Lyndon LaRouche or his wife Helga Zepp-LaRouche or members of the International Caucus of Labor Committees or the European Labor Parties get harmed in any way, then the KGB or Henry Kissinger or both are responsible."

Missile crisis blueprint

The day before informing a group of U.S. senators led by Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) of the Soviet desire to negotiate a ban on space-based weapons, Andropov once again painted a picture of dire Soviet "countermeasures" if the United States deploys medium-range Pershing II missiles in Europe. In a meeting with William Winpisinger, International Association of Machinists head and Socialist International leader, Andropov claimed the Soviets were sticking to a "constructive and flexible line" at the Geneva talks on those missiles and the Soviet medium-range SS-20s, but warned that when the missiles are deployed, the U.S.S.R. will "concentrate on defensive countermeasures to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies." Europe, where the Pershings would

be deployed, is "the nerve center of international relations . . . a source of a rapid and dramatic growth of the threat of a new world war," Andropov said.

Other Soviet spokesmen have recently specified the military technologies on the verge of application, giving rapid delivery time for Soviet nuclear bombs to U.S. targets. Col. Gen. Vasilii Reshetnikov of the Soviet Air Force said in a TASS interview put out Aug. 18, that the U.S.S.R. has an air-borne nuclear capability that could "hit enemy targets without entering the air space in which they may be reached by enemy air defense."

Fyodor Burlatskii's *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, besides threatening to launch war as a response to Reagan's space-based strategic defense program, also confirmed that the Soviet navy is preparing to base nuclear weapons off U.S. shores—in the style of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As *EIR* showed in articles earlier this year, the rash of Soviet submarine incidents off the coast of Sweden was a demonstration of such shoreline capabilities. Burlatskii in his article put in the mouth of an unnamed American a summary of how the Soviet navy could arm anything coastline, from freighters to fishing trawlers, with cruise missiles.

Way out of showdown

There is a scientific way out of such a showdown at the brink of nuclear war, but that is precisely the alternative Andropov is doing everything he can to wreck.

Burlatskii's article is part of that effort. Particularly noteworthy in the piece, is its warped characterization of the policy the author calls a "*casus belli*." Burlatskii advises that anybody can find out all about Reagan's March 23 policy by reading the Heritage Foundation-published proposals of Gen. Daniel Graham, which actually concentrate on putting existing technologies into orbit rather than going for the across-the-board technological breakthroughs, including a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile capability using beam weapons based on physical principles not previously utilized, called for in the LaRouche proposal and by the President. Ironically, Burlatskii enumerates some of these systems, such as x-ray lasers, but attributes them to Graham's package.

The bids Andropov delivered to the Pell delegation had two purposes: to give ammunition to the "peace" forces who are mobilized with every capability against Reagan in Europe, up to and including terrorism, and to make a ban on all space-based defenses a main item on U.S.-Soviet arms negotiating agendas so that the two sides are locked firmly into MAD.

Andropov told Pell that Moscow wants "the complete prohibition of the testing and deployment of any space-based weapons for hitting targets on Earth, in the air or in outer space." He then vowed a "unilateral moratorium" on deployment specifically of anti-satellite technologies, an area in which the Soviet Union is documented to have done dramatically more than the United States.

The diversionary purpose of this proposal was self-evident, but the State Department's Alan Romberg said on Aug. 18 that the administration intended to "study carefully any serious Soviet proposal on space arms control."

When it came to Burlatskii's spectre of a Soviet first strike, however, officials of the same State Department were not so anxious to do any studying or respond to queries about its implications. Despite Burlatskii's background, one State analyst said, "Burlatskii has already been denounced . . . on the 'cocktail circuit' in Moscow. Soviet officials of at least the same rank as he denounced his *casus belli* statement." Another commented, "Burlatskii's relations with Andropov are not that clear. . . . He may not be so close to Andropov any more."

Not just a journalist

Fyodor Burlatskii, author of Moscow's threat to launch war sooner than permit an era of Mutually Assured Survival to begin, was in the United States in May of this year. He was the gray eminence of the Soviet delegation to a Minneapolis conference, co-sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies and Moscow's U.S.A./Canada Institute, where three dozen Soviets teamed with luminaries of the American "peace movement" to chart steps against President Reagan's defensive strategic doctrine.

In Minnesota, Fyodor Burlatskii was wearing the hat of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* commentator, but his journalist's garb should not disguise who he is—a member of Yuri Andropov's kitchen cabinet for more than two decades. In the late 1950s, Burlatskii became the first head of an advisory group on international policy, attached to the Communist Party Central Committee. The group answered first to Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish former executive of the Communist International who became a Soviet Politburo member, and then to Andropov in his capacity as Central Committee (CC) Secretary. Georgii Arbatov, now head of the U.S.A./Canada Institute, later headed the same CC intelligence group. In 1967, Burlatskii was the first Soviet journalist to write in favor of negotiations on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which had been proposed by President Lyndon Johnson and his Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara in December 1966. His article in *Pravda* was a signal that the creation of the ABM Treaty, to be completed by Henry Kissinger, had begun.

'Space weapons are absolutely a *casus belli* for nuclear war'

The following are excerpts from an article entitled "War Games" by Fyodor Burlatskii, political observer for Literaturnaya Gazeta, which appeared in that magazine on Aug. 10, 1983.

It would seem to be axiomatic that neither the West nor the East can set itself the goal of winning in a thermonuclear conflict. Is this not really a common threat; is that really not reason enough for joining efforts in the name of preventing catastrophe?

Today this is not only our opinion. I have heard analogous judgments at many conferences on limiting the arms race—in Moscow, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, in conversations with scholars at political research centers in Washington, New York, and London, with public figures who participate in the antinuclear movements in the U.S. and Western Europe. . . .

The most rational of all the irrational arguments I have heard in favor of continuing the arms race is that the modernization of nuclear and other types of weapons and their delivery systems is inevitable and irreversible. At the IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] in London, I talked with two officers, a tall, tanned, haughty English colonel and a small, lively, wiry, brisk person in civilian clothes, who later turned out to be an American general. I posed them a naive question, worthy of Sancho Panza: "What can the ceiling be on the accumulation of nuclear weapons? How many warheads does the West need for 'detering' the Soviet Union? Thirty thousand? Forty? A hundred thousand?"

My collocutors, it seemed to me, were shocked by the question. The colonel told me that nobody can know how many nuclear warheads it is necessary to have, since the process of weapons modernization, like scientific-technical progress in general, cannot be stopped. "One thing is clear: we should have no fewer than the Soviet Union," remarked the Englishman. "It would be good even to have a few more and of better quality," said the American with a cheerful chuckle. But for what is this necessary? And who needs it?

It is not difficult to prove that continuous weapons modernization corresponds to the interests of various social groups in the West. . . . But how does the activity of these groups influence U.S. national security? I wager that all these furies of private interests have done nothing in the last 40 years

except destroy the security of their own country. Their colossal expenditures, their mystical notions, their unprecedented zeal have a negative vector. . . .

Upholding deterrence

President Eisenhower was the man in the U.S. political leadership who tried to extract a rational gloss from the hopeless equation of the nuclear race, which had been launched at his country's initiative. It was under him that the doctrine of deterrence was recognized. It consists in the necessity of having as much nuclear weaponry as is necessary, in the event of an enemy first strike, to preserve the capability of inflicting on him irreparable (catastrophic) damage with a retaliatory strike. The rational side of the deterrence doctrine, if you understand it correctly, is that the nuclear arms race has limits: when the sides have reached a certain level and are capable of delivering a retaliatory strike, there is no need to continue the accumulation of nuclear arms.

President Kennedy was the first U.S. leader to comprehend the truth that a time may come when human life disappears on our planet. After him President Nixon and, at the beginning of his presidency, President Carter began to understand the necessity of agreeing with the U.S.S.R. on the limitation of nuclear arms. The strategic parity of nuclear forces, which took shape during the 1970s, stimulated several important agreements: on cessation of testing nuclear weapons in three media, on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the SALT I treaty, and, finally, the SALT II treaty, which was not ratified, because of the United States. . . .

The current American administration is striving to cancel out this experience. It is seeking a new conception, which would replace the formula of mutual deterrence. Such a formula is the strategic doctrine of so-called nuclear survival, which knows no limits in the arms race.

Here is what the present U.S. Vice-President Bush said not so long ago: "It is necessary to guarantee the possibility for survival of the supreme command, the possibility of saving the industrial capability, and also to guarantee the defense of a certain percentage of the citizenry and to possess such a force of arms, as would ensure bigger damage to the adversary side than what it could inflict on ourselves—this is the path, along which the winner in nuclear war goes. . . ."

But could the new military programs charted by the U.S. possibly introduce something new and effective into the security system of this country and its allies? It is easy to be convinced that this is not so.

I assert—and let Western experts try to refute this—that the military programs already realized in the U.S. and those planned mark three steps down to the precipice of destabilization and further destruction of U.S. security, not to mention that of its allies in Europe.

The first step is the deployment of “Pershing II” and cruise missiles in the countries of Western Europe; the second is the building of “MX” and “Trident-2” missiles; the third step is the maturing plans of deploying nuclear weapons in space. . . .

Soviet coastal attack capability

Here is a question being widely discussed among American experts: to what extent will the cruise missiles strengthen the security of the U.S. itself? It turns out that this is a double-edged weapon. One very authoritative American specialist told me, “I do not understand what our strategists are thinking about. The cruise missile is small and mobile. When it becomes part of the arsenal of the U.S.S.R.—and this is inevitable—an inevitable threat for my country will arise. Any merchant ship, any fishing trawler will be able to be armed with such rockets. Cruising off U.S. shores, they will be able in a matter of minutes to comb over our entire territory—from West to East and East to West.” A curious admission, no?

And what about the MX—is it really dangerous only for the U.S.S.R.? The military advantage of this missile is that it is capable of carrying ten nuclear bombs and has a more accurate, flexible and effective guidance system. But in the opinion of American experts, this missile is extremely vulnerable. It is sufficient for the adversary to use just 100 bombs, to destroy 1000 warheads.

Furthermore, and American experts know this very well, the U.S.S.R. is capable, if it deems this necessary, to produce a missile of corresponding power. This means that by setting up 100 MX missiles against the U.S.S.R., President Reagan simultaneously stimulates the emplacement of 100 analogous MX’s against his own country. What does the U.S. gain?

But the most fantastic program concerns the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. On March 23 of this year, President Reagan delivered a speech on space war which, without question, represents the most risky and dangerous of all military intrigues of the current administration.

One can read about the technical details of this plan in an outwardly very proper-looking document of 175 pages, published last year by the right-wing organization Heritage Foundation. This report was prepared by the former director of intelligence in the defense department, Lt.-Gen. Daniel Graham. It defends a shift from the now accepted doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” to the doctrine of “assured survival.”

How does the general conceive of this way of survival? He recommends creating a system of 400 satellites, which would constantly be in orbit and which would be armed with a whole array of lethal beam weapon systems, capable of destroying Soviet missiles in the first five minutes after their launch. Among such beam weapon systems would be systems using light beams from hydrogen fluoride lasers, those using bursts of nuclear particles, x-ray beams produced by a nuclear explosion and focused by means of a lasers, microwaves and also the electromagnetic pulses which are created by a nuclear explosion. Beyond that, Graham proposes to the Pentagon to put into orbit combat satellites, capable of blinding and destroying Soviet satellites in open space, and also to deploy groundbased so-called “energy cannons” capable of knocking down enemy missiles before they reach the United States.

‘Provocative systems’

If you allow for a minute that the Americans could be the first to create a somewhat effective space defense system and reduce the effectiveness of the retaliatory nuclear strike, then this would create a practically irresistible temptation for the American military men and politicians: to inflict a first strike and forever get rid of the adversary. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its allies would be faced with a totally new military and political dilemma. In other words, space weapons are provocative weapons; they are, absolutely, a *casus belli* for nuclear war.

A space defense system . . . would create a practically irresistible temptation for the American military men and politicians: to inflict a first strike. . . . On the other hand, the Soviet Union would be faced with a totally new military and political dilemma.

Human reason would not be capable of controlling a space system. Decisions would have to be taken within seconds, taking into account thousands of components. These decisions will have to be entrusted to computers. Robots will acquire absolute power over the fate of the human race. A machine brain will decide whether there is to be or not to be humanity on the planet Earth.

So there is it, finally, the ultimate goal of nuclear competition has been discovered: let everything be decided by “beings” of a more perfect and higher breed—robots.

Don’t the pictures of wars of the world, depicted by Herbert Wells, pale before this fantasy? Just as the image of