

ongoing research. This is the reason why the presently foreseen applications concern either systems operating in the atmosphere, i.e., with a very short range, or systems operating in a vacuum, i.e., with a much greater range, but not allowing for any impurity between the target and the particle accelerator. It is thus not so simple!

When President Reagan announced last spring, in a futuristic declaration which buried nuclear deterrence, that these systems could be mounted on satellites, and be used in flight to destroy either ballistic missiles or their warheads, I devoted new attention, as you did Mr. Deputy, to everything which was written on the subject. President Reagan based himself on very sophisticated studies and research, which I examined with curiosity. However the Americans expect to test only some components of these systems and not the entirety, as President Reagan's declaration seemed to imply.

You are thus quite premature, Mr. Deputy, when you already point to the eventual deployment of these energy-directed weapons. In fact, the best American specialists don't foresee this occurring before the year 2000. Without betraying a secret, I can indicate that we have, however, some contacts with the Americans on this issue.

Don't let us take the risk—in this I join with Mr. Debré [Gaullist leader Michel Debré—ed.]—of relinquishing the benefit of nuclear deterrence for the sake of a speculative system whose installation is as yet uncertain.

It is normal that this subject be debated and you are perfectly right. However these debates are more suitable at colloquia, university or scientific meetings. I agree to organize, one day, a colloquium on directed-energy weapons, but it is not yet time to plan for a legislative debate.

Concerning the Soviet Union, our information is less complete. Nevertheless it seems that this country is presently making quite a substantial effort in this domain, if one can judge from its statistics on studies and research. I am sorry not to be able to give you more information on what is going on in the Soviet Union.

As far as the French effort is concerned, it bears on the acquisition of the technology of power lasers and the study of their effects.

Without wanting to reveal too much about it, I can nevertheless tell you that we occupy a more than honorable rank in this field, and that military credits play a preponderant role in the development of this new technology. A weekly magazine, *Les Nouvelles*, dedicated a remarkable technical study to this subject 15 days ago, and was pleased to point out that the development of this new technology was only possible in France because of research credits granted by the defense ministry. It is obvious that the defense ministry must now think of defining passive means of protecting our missiles against the effects of the laser, in spite of the admittedly hypothetical nature of the threat. However, we must think about it not in such a way that energy-directed weapons replace deterrence, but so that the latter is not threatened by the former.

WEST GERMANY

Genscher tries to halt ABM debate

by George Gregory

A few weeks ago the West German Bundestag held the first in a series of internal discussion seminars on the subject of "alternatives to present NATO strategy." The bulk of the parliamentary discussion was reportedly devoted to variations on the theme sung by former U.S. secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara, during his tour of the Federal Republic in October: that the present NATO doctrine of "flexible response" is no longer credible, and therefore the chief weight of European efforts must be to develop conventional armaments capabilities for the purpose of direct defense against the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

In the middle of the debate, one Christian Democratic deputy suggested that beam-weapon antimissile defense systems should also be included in such a discussion of "alternatives," particularly in light of the U.S. commitment to develop and deploy such systems, and the offer of President Reagan to develop beam weapon defenses directly for defense of Western Europe.

The suggestion of the deputy was quashed by none other than Gen. Wolfgang Altenburg, general inspector of the West German Armed Forces, who insisted that even a closed-door debate of parliamentarians was not the proper place to discuss beam weapons, nor the alternative strategic regime of "Mutually Assured Survival."

That incident is typical of the rear-guard effort of the Bonn government to cork the momentum of debate and deliberation occurring in professional military and military policy circles on direct Western European work on developing beam-weapon anti-missile defenses. There has, nevertheless, been widespread media coverage here of the recommendations of the Fletcher Commission to the President on beam weapons, reports of Pentagon estimates that the Soviet Union is engaged in a beam-weapon development program equivalent to \$30-\$50 billion annually (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Oct. 25), coming in the wake of the *EIR* seminar "Beam Weapons: The Strategic Implications for Western Europe," in Bonn on Oct. 5. These developments have assured that many inside

and outside of the government are insisting on a positive initiative for beam weapon development on the part of Bonn, both as strategically necessary and to break the grip of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher over the security policy of the country.

Despite official kowtowing to "flexible response" doctrine, the doctrine itself has been buried, leaving two chief tendencies in a raging debate over what strategic doctrine will be developed. The first is represented by would-be NATO General Secretary Lord Peter Carrington, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had also been Schmidt's foreign minister. This grouping also represents the majority position of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, its de facto German branch, the German Association for Foreign Policy, and the Royal Institute for International Affairs. The central feature of their proposed revision of NATO strategic doctrine is, as noted, the exclusion of nuclear weapons of all categories in favor of reliance solely upon conventional armaments of European NATO to "deter" Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Western nuclear force potentials would be restricted to a supposed "second-strike" capability.

Since nothing in this proposed revision of NATO's present strategic doctrine infringes on Soviet nuclear potentials, the package is supposed to be anchored in a treaty agreement on "non-first use" of nuclear weapons. This is Genscher's line of march. Our sources report that Genscher, who is also national chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), has launched a personal initiative to introduce the "no-first-use" gambit into the party's platform at the next FDP congress.

On the other hand, *EIR*'s Oct. 5 seminar in Bonn has contributed to bringing a good deal of the background support for beam weapon anti-missile defenses as a joint NATO project into the public fray. In a carefully phrased statement in Rome Nov. 9, at the *EIR* seminar on beam weapons, Col. (ret.) Hans Seuberlich stated that "the severely perforated nuclear umbrella of the United States, which Col. Geneste outlined in Bonn on Oct. 5 [see *EIR*, Nov. 8], and under which NATO countries have basked for so long, will only be able to exert its protective function once again, if the U.S.A. is successful in stopping Soviet armaments extremism by means of developing and deploying the new beam weapon defense systems. . . . It is my conviction that, to this end, the best minds of NATO should, as soon as possible, design a joint working plan of implementation." Colonel Seuberlich, formerly a field officer in many command posts, stationed at the Bonn Defense Ministry for several years, and a Christian Democrat and vice-president of the European Association of Military Associations, then delivered a recommendation to his government: "The government of the Federal Republic is still hesitating to draw effective conclusions leading out of the present situation. One of these paths is to turn toward the U.S. project for beam weapons defense against missiles, and to approach the potentials of beam weapon

development with a scientific and open mind. In my opinion, the Federal Republic should become involved in these developments *in time*, and thus be in a position to deliberate with our alliance partners at an early stage so that the peculiarities of the geostrategic situation of the Federal Republic can be appropriately embedded in the overall project. . . . Continued hesitation or official ignoring of these developments could lead to a strategic 'decoupling' from the U.S.A. like that which we experienced at the beginning of the 1960s."

Genscher draws political fire

Guiding Bonn's moves toward this "strategic decoupling" is Foreign Minister Genscher, who is taking advantage of widespread fear of the Soviet Union inside and outside the German government to push through a policy contrary to the United States' along the entire spectrum of foreign and military affairs.

"Genscher," said one source close to the government, "is in the grip of a dangerous fantasy. He is trying to establish Germany as a broker between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and he has invested so much prestige-capital in his relations with the U.S.S.R. that the Russians are playing him, manipulating him, and blackmailing him." Genscher's "broker" role has gone so far that he has played messenger-boy from Moscow to U.S. officials, with the message that Washington should back off beam weapons because the Soviets don't like them. "The Russians are telling the Germans what the U.S. must and must not do, and the beam-weapon ABM issue is part of that. That is why Genscher keeps praising Soviet arms negotiations offers, even though he knows the Soviet offers are meant to be unacceptable to the U.S. He is consistently feeding the mood here that America is the source of all problems."

An intelligence adviser to the Bonn government remarks that Genscher's near-total grip on Bonn policy means that "he will denounce any U.S. strategic answer to the Soviets as brinksmanship, but everything the Soviets do he reads in terms of Soviet 'self interest,' all the way from Afghanistan to the Mideast, Asia, or the Caribbean. . . . Genscher agrees with Carrington, [French Foreign Minister Claude] Cheysson, and Henry Kissinger in not liking any U.S. insistence on 'global responsibilities.'"

Genscher's increasingly blatant moves have not gone unopposed, however. The foreign ministry's denunciation of President Reagan's military move in Grenada ("had we been asked, we would have counseled against it") provoked Christian Social Union powerbroker Franz-Josef Strauss to fire a well-aimed salvo across Genscher's nose, in his address in Munich at an international strategy symposium of the Christian Social Union's Hans Seidel Foundation. Strauss warned that the Soviets would make a last-ditch "offer" at the START talks in Geneva to reduce Soviet SS-20 missile launchers to 54 with 162 warheads (equivalent to the number of British and French warheads currently deployed), and that "there are tendencies in Bonn that are psychologically and politically

prepared to fall for such a Soviet offer." Strauss charged that those who attack President Reagan's action in Grenada "are also acting irresponsibly, because they are playing into the hands of Soviet propaganda, which has only one goal, to claim that it is the United States which has a reckless policy, from which Europe ought to disassociate itself as fast and as far as possible."

Genscher has moved hard to consolidate his control and preempt such opposition. He has installed a new ambassador to Moscow, Jörg Kastl, who was trained by Henry Kissinger at Harvard, and was head of the Department for Eastern Affairs in the Bonn foreign ministry during Willy Brandt's chancellorship. Following 12 hours of meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva Oct. 15-16, Genscher dispatched the chief of his Planning Department, Konrad Seitz, also Kissinger-trained, to Moscow for in-depth deliberations with Moscow foreign ministry staff.

Genscher has also moved to dominate the defense ministry, a chief locus of potential support for the U.S. beam weapon policy. Defense ministry sources report that the issue of beam weapons has been declared too hot for them to handle right now, "because we are up to our necks with this 'no-first-use' issue"—Genscher's ploy to keep on good terms with the Soviets. Since Genscher wants neither his military nor military-policy professionals, nor the general public, to even discuss matters which might send waves back to his stern interlocutors in Moscow, he has tried to put the lid on more public debate and expression of support for beam weapons.

His leverage to muzzle the defense ministry goes back to a blackmail battle he won during the Schmidt chancellorship, when Social Democrat Hans Apel was defense minister. Genscher succeeded in having all matters of military policy which have anything to do with foreign policy transferred to the foreign ministry, so that, in the words of one official, "since then we have been reduced to tinkering away at the guidelines Genscher sets for us." It is not known whether he has explicitly used that blackmail leverage against CDU Defense Minister Manfred Wörner. But when we hear from military officials that the reason for the lid on beam weapons discussion and debate is that it "would provoke the peace movement and pull 2 million onto the streets to demonstrate against the government," it is only appropriate to ask just who did that public opinion poll—no one in the Defense Ministry professes to have done any such poll themselves.

Genscher dispatches his own people, even when they are Christian Democrats like his deputy, Foreign Ministry State Secretary Alois Mertes, to debate Social Democrats like Egon Bahr on military policy issues, only to have his deputies soundly trounced. With slogans like "There is no danger of war," or "The Soviets would never really use their nuclear weapons," or "I firmly believe in the rationality of the Soviet Union's leadership, particularly after the KAL 7 shooting" (Alois Mertes, SIPRI Strategy Conference, Stockholm), it is no wonder that the government's credibility is on the wane.

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scale use over decade. The study major constraint on economy can expand and create wholly new industries is the speed with which new baseload electric-generating capacity can come on line.

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