

was not easy to fulfill all the legal requirements, but I had a friend in London, the father of Lord Carrington, you know, who just became head of NATO, and he helped out with visas. Weizman was also important in mediating with the British. Then we developed links to the diamond industry in Johannesburg, the Oppenheimers, and so on.

EIR: What other fields are you active in?

Ben Ami: Mainly journalism.

EIR: That's interesting. One thing that strikes the visitor to Israel is the unusually high proportion of the population which reads newspapers and periodicals. For a population of only 4 million people to have 25 daily newspapers in 12 languages is extraordinary. And I am told that the leading papers have a circulation of about 150,000 to 250,000 daily.

Ben Ami: Yes, people read a good deal. When I was working with Ben-Yehuda's son, I started writing for the first Hebrew language newspaper in Israel, which was the *Daily Mail* in Jerusalem. The paper was forced to close in 1933 for lack of advertising. At the time, I was very busy with Netanya, but later I met with a man who had emigrated from Leipzig, named Karlbach, who proposed that I publish an evening paper. I accepted his conditions, which stipulated that the editor and publisher together would hold 51 percent, while the workers held shares too, and on February 15, 1948 the first issue of *Ma'ariv* appeared. Now we have a circulation of about 180,000, with 220,000 on weekends, and are planning to move to a new, expanded office in Tel Aviv, with all the latest technology typesetting equipment. You have to keep up with the times, you know.

An adequate defense strategy for Israel

by Meir Pa'il

Meir Pa'il is a leading figure in Israeli military, political, and academic circles. He served in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) until his honorary discharge in 1971, having been a brigade commander, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces Military Academy, and chief of the Department of Tactics and Operational Doctrine of the Armed Forces Supreme General Staff. Dr. Pa'il was a member of Israel's Knesset from 1973 to 1980 and was a professor of military history at Tel Aviv University and at Hebrew University.

The following are excerpts from a reprint of an article by Pa'il, originally published in Can the Palestinian Problem be Solved?, A. Hareven, editor, The Van Leer Foundation, Jerusalem, 1983.

... Given the offensive and mobile character of the IDF's operations in the Six-Day War and in the second, strategic stage of the Yom Kippur War, it becomes a relatively simple matter to defend Israel even without applying Israeli political and military sovereignty in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This could be achieved by Israel's adopting an offensive strategy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where the perception of certain shifts in the military or political status quo would prompt the IDF to move forward at once and re-occupy the territories. This strategy is graphically illustrated in [the accompanying map], which indicates how the ostensible potential threat of an enemy attack ... could be neutralized from the outset.

While it is self-evident that in this conception the IDF would act swiftly and vigorously should the need arise, the doctrine's chief objective is to deter the enemy and to obviate any intention by the neighboring states to violate the political and military arrangements concluded in a peace treaty.

The military clauses of a peace treaty

To execute this strategy, which views the West Bank and Gaza Strip as strategic depth for forward movement in time of war, the following eight military clauses should be incorporated into any peace treaty relating to these territories:

1) Israel will evacuate the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in agreed stages, and not at one stroke.

2) In the course of the Israeli withdrawal, the future Arab governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will establish a Palestinian police force outfitted with modern mechanized means (including armored vehicles, helicopters, and light aircraft) whose numbers and quality will be agreed on mutually by Israel and the Arab government to be formed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3) The West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized of saliently offensive military forces, both Israeli and Arab. No armored formations, no artillery units of any kind (barrel or rocket-based)—including field, anti-tank, or anti-aircraft artillery—will be permitted to deploy there.

4) No large new airfields will be constructed beyond the one at Kalandia. The Arab government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will not establish an offensive military air force.

5) No fortifications will be erected in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, be they permanent, field fortifications, or minefields.

6) Mixed Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian supervisory units and observation points will operate in the Jordan Valley, along the Gaza Strip coast, on the Gaza-Egypt border, and at the Kalandia airport. These units and points will be equipped with state-of-the-art electronic technology for detection, control and communications, and with suitable means for land, sea, and air transport.

7) In addition, a joint Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian border police force will be set up to supervise the borders, chiefly against terrorist activity. This force

will have the right to operate on both sides of the border.

8) Jerusalem will remain unified municipally, although part of East Jerusalem may be transferred to Palestinian or Palestinian-Jordanian sovereignty. It is quite possible that in order to preserve ongoing security in Jerusalem, a joint Israeli-Arab police force will need to be established, which could be incorporated into the joint border police. . . .

Once it has been illustrated that not every solution entailing territorial concessions constitutes a security risk to Israel's survival, it becomes possible to discuss the Palestinian problem on its more important—political and ideological—planes.

Like any self-respecting national liberation movement, Zionism excelled in attracting to its ranks Jews holding divergent worldviews who nonetheless envisaged the realization of one shared goal: the ingathering of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, the building of a resurgent Jewish nation based on Jewish creative labor, and the establishment of Jewish political independence in the Holy Land. From the earliest days of the movement, all Zionists believed that the Jewish people had full historical rights to the Land of Israel. At the same time, however, most Zionists recognized that the Palestinian Arabs were endowed with identical prerogatives by virtue of the natural rights that accrue to any person or to any group of people and the land where they live and the soil they are cultivating. This moral and political concept regards it as a principle to respect and esteem neighboring national movements—and their right to self-determination—even if they continue to evince enmity, zealotry and intolerance toward the Zionist movement. For after all, the Arab enemy, too, is a human being, formed in the divine image and endowed with full natural rights—and the way must be found to coexistence. Nor is this to be achieved through self-effacement, but rather through a readiness for political bargaining and a military struggle, while stressing our insistence that both the Arab national movement as a whole and its Palestinian branch must give recognition to the Jewish people's right to self-determination in Palestine, just as the Palestinians have the same right. . . .

Let us launch a political initiative for a solution of the Palestinian problem, based *ab initio* on the principle of the two peoples' natural and historical rights. Such an initiative might proceed along the following lines:

An Israeli peace plan recognizing the Palestinians' right to self-determination


The Government of Israel views with favor the establishment of a national home for the Palestinian Arab people alongside the State of Israel, with peaceful relations and mutual recognition being maintained between the two nations. This, on the basis of the following principles:

The Political Principle: The State of Israel recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including their right to establish an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, provided the Palestinian state recog-

nizes Israel's right of existence on a reciprocal basis.

The Geographical Principle: In order that the political principle may be realized, Israel hereby declares its readiness in principle to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in order to allow the Palestinian people to exercise in these territories their right to self-determination, whether through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, or by the establishment of a Palestinian autonomous republic in a federative relationship with Jordan, or through the establishment of a Palestinian autonomous republic in a federative or confederative relationship with Jordan and with Israel alike.

A plan for the defense of Israel



- ★ Control posts
- ➔ Possible preemptive-preventive attack directions
- ➡ Probable preemptive-preventive attack directions

Israel could be defended without exercising sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, provided those areas were maintained as a forward strategic space for a preemptive-preventive Israeli offensive in case of a threatened enemy attack.

Source: A. Hareven, ed., *Can the Palestinian Problem Be Solved?* Jerusalem, 1983.