this was accomplished with SALT I. . . . The latter replacing SS9s with SS19s required the cheating Henry Kissinger, who had specifically been assured the SS11s would be replaced with a light missile. The payoff for swindling Mr. Kissinger was tremendous. [i.e., overwhelming superiority in the number of war-heads].

Problem Two was to prevent the U.S. from using its technology to protect its missile fields [the ABM treaty].

Problem Three . . . was the defense of the Soviet Union against a retaliatory strike. . . .

Problem Four was the most difficult: how to defend the Soviet Union against surviving U.S. land-based and seabased missiles. . . . [The Soviets] have built a huge ABM battle management radar . . . given the complexity of that radar, Moscow's decision to "break out" of the ABM Treaty was made before Reagan arrived. And, given the Soviet

investment here—some \$500 billion in offensive and defensive systems—and the gain to be realized—a nuclear warwinning capability—the Soviets are not going to dismantle because Ronald Reagan declares: "We caught you cheating!"

There is only one way to cancel the Soviet advantage. It is not with 100 MX missiles stuffed in silos targeted 10 years ago. It is for the U.S. to launch, with Manhattan Project urgency, a program for a land- and space-based defense of its strategic missile force, and of its homeland. The first question is whether Congress will permit Reagan to build it. The second is whether Moscow will allow the U.S. to build a defensive system that cancels out a generation's investment in strategic supremacy. Unless the Kremlin gets an historic case of cold feet, my guess is the answer is no. Thus, not too far ahead, probably lies the greatest confrontation of the Cold War, with Moscow holding the high cards.

## The need to build advanced ABM defenses

For the past year, Henry Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to Bonn Arthur Burns have been lying to America's Western European allies that President Reagan's March 23 speech did not represent a fundamental change in U.S. strategic policy away from the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Both Burns, privately, and Kissinger, in public and in private, have ridiculed the President's proposed strategic defense program as "pie in the sky."

Pro Pace, journal of the German Strategy Forum, has just published the speech which chief U.S. START negotiator Maurice Eisenstein gave at an elite military and foreign policy symposium sponsored by the Forum on Oct. 25-27, 1983, that shows those statements of Kissinger and Burns to be lies. Eisenstein's reported remarks at that time are as follows:

The question . . . which we must all ask ourselves . . . is whether deterrence, Mutually Assured Destruction, mutually assured retaliation with the horrifying perspective of holocaust, will be a viable and acceptable policy also for the next 40 years. I do not know what the President had in mind when he expressed his interest in what is known as the "Star War" in the United States. But it seems to me that he wanted to say that we should begin to think through what we can do in the future, when this concept of deterrence, Mutually Guaranteed Destruction, is no longer acceptable to the people of the West. The President referred to land- and space-based defense sys-

tems against ballistic missiles. For some of us, who have pondered over the problems of defense for many years, there is a good piece of wisdom in the President's proposal and in the research program which he initiated. . . .

We have begun to think out the defensive systems on a large scale, i.e.,

would attack our cities and our populations. The President spoke of Mutually Assured Survival [emphasis in original]. . . . If we succeed in building defense systems to destroy hundreds of attacking missiles, the problems for the aggressor would grow enormously. Were such systems possible, and deployed in the future, we would probably find that the interest in offensive weapons with a high destruction potential would recede. . . .

There may be some among you who believe that deployment of ABM systems would cause an arms race. I do not share this view. It is quite clear that the Soviet Union has implemented its own comprehensive ABM program over a period of years. Now it is high time that the United States caught up. . . .

Perhaps the most important point here is to recognize the fact that the strength of the West lies in its technological capacities, and that these technological capacities must be supported and promoted. It is probably these technological capacities of the U.S. and the West which the Soviet Union fears the most. We must nevertheless see to it that the most advanced technologies are available for military purposes if necessary, and that they will exist to deploy new weapons if this is necessary. . . . While our deterrence policy will remain in place for a number of years to come—and thus also the political fears which are the consequence of this policy will continue—we must energetically continue our search for the political and technological means to solve this dilemma.

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