

writes, must “end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially *Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World* [emphasis added].” Kissinger is demanding a free rein to use military force to back up International Monetary Fund debt collection policies in countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

Kissinger and the ‘flexible response’ doctrine

Kissinger’s *Time* magazine piece is the logical extension of a 30-year career as a Soviet agent of influence. His aim is the destruction of the nation states of Europe—and the United States. In his memoirs he boasts of his “conviction of the obsolescence of the nation state.” (*White House Years*: all quotes below are from that source unless otherwise indicated.)

NATO’s first serious crisis came with the U.S. backdown in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Russia forced President Kennedy to withdraw all American intermediate range missiles—those capable of reaching Soviet territory—from Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and most strategic bombers from Europe and Asia as well. The first hole in the U.S. commitment to defend Europe came with the formal enunciation of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in December 1962 by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara. MAD stated that if the United States replied to a Soviet invasion of Europe with a nuclear attack on Russia, only the destruction of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could result. (At the same time, McNamara killed the U.S. ABM program.) The Kennedy administration proposed to set aside the Eisenhower policy of “massive retaliation” in response to a Soviet attack on Europe and replace it with a policy of “flexible response,” that the United States would not necessarily respond to an attack with total retaliation against Russia, but that a “limited nuclear war” was also possible.

Kissinger was a National Security Council (NSC) consultant working directly under NSC director McGeorge Bundy. Kissinger is widely credited with formulating the policies of MAD and “flexible response” in his 1957 study *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, written under Bundy’s direction for the Council on Foreign Relations. “Limited nuclear war,” Kissinger wrote, “represents our most effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of substituting manpower for technology.”


Adoption of the policy pulled the rug out from under pro-American leaders in Europe, such as West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose government fell shortly thereafter. Adenauer later warned that the new U.S. nuclear policies would “hand Europe over to the Russians.” France’s President Charles DeGaulle responded by withdrawing from NATO’s integrated military command and building an independent French nuclear missile force.

Kissinger and ‘Ostpolitik’

The end result of this shift in U.S. policy was to bring Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats to power in West

Germany. “The opposition [Social Democrats] . . . had urged a neutralist [and unified] Germany equiposed between East and West,” wrote Kissinger later in his memoirs. Kissinger was President Nixon’s National Security adviser when Brandt came to power in the fall of 1969. Previous West German governments had refused to recognize the puppet Soviet regime of East Germany whose very political existence was dependent on Soviet military power. It had been anathema to conceive of a settlement in Europe with Germany divided and dismembered.

As soon as Brandt put together a ruling coalition and even before his government was installed, he requested that Kis-



Why Europe needs a nuclear defense

The great fraud of Kissinger’s “Plan to Reshape NATO” is the notion that Europe can be defended without nuclear weapons. “By 1990,” he states, “Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union.”

The map shows the real story: NATO Western Europe—shown to the left and below the dark line—lacks the geographical basis for a defense in depth. The arrows show potential Soviet attack routes. A Soviet armored column can reach the French border on the Rhine within hours of crossing into West Germany. The closest reinforcements for the European line are thousands of miles away in the United States. Furthermore, Soviet military spokesmen insist that they will precede the land invasion of Western Europe with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons bombardment.