

## Pentagon documents Soviet war plans

The Pentagon's annual review of the U.S.S.R.'s military capabilities, *Soviet Military Power*, was released April 2 in Washington. It reveals how the Soviets plan to fight and win a global military conflict, and underlines the dominant political role played by the military in the Soviet Union today.

The report highlights the following aspects of Soviet war planning:

- **Space:** The Soviets are in the last phases of preparation for the launching of a large-scale manned space platform, a capability which has been developed in tandem with extensive military preparations for carrying out "space wars."

- **Ballistic-missile defense (BMD):** The Soviets have deployed an extensive battle-management radar system capable of controlling a full point defense of the Moscow command and control structures, and have coupled this with an operating anti-satellite ground-based laser capability now in testing/deployment phase at Sary Shagan. They also have been working since the 1970s on the deployment of space-based particle-beam weapons, one of which will be tested in an anti-satellite mode in the early 1990s.

Although the timetable for the deployment of these systems in a full ABM mode is relegated by the Pentagon to the 1990s, this is the first time that these weapons systems have been presented as an integral part of the Soviet strategic arsenal in official Pentagon publications of this type.

- **Spetsnaz forces:** The report contains a full review of the background and nature of the spetsnaz special commando forces, and their role in prewar sabotage/assassination operations. In addition, the review includes an analysis of the KGB border guard units and their strength concentrations in its assessment of Soviet troop strength. Both of these are a radical departure from past Pentagon analyses. The report states:

The U.S.S.R. maintains a complement of special purpose forces, known by the Soviet acronym spetsnaz. These special purpose forces are controlled by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff and are trained to conduct a variety of sensitive missions, including covert action abroad. This latter mission was illustrated by their covert role, under KGB direction, in the December 1979 assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin. . . .

During peacetime, the GRU carefully coordinates

reconnaissance programs that are geared to meet the intelligence requirements for Soviet forces in war. In wartime, spetsnaz forces would operate far behind enemy lines for extended periods of time. They would conduct sabotage, reconnaissance and attacks on a wide variety of military and political targets. . . .

- **Civil defense:** The report points out that the Soviets have over 10 million tons of hardware stored in invulnerable bunkers and enough military equipment to carry out a 30-day war following a full nuclear exchange. The *Washington Times* has reported that the Soviets are also completing construction of underground sea-level caverns for repair and storage of Typhoon class ballistic-missile-carrying submarines.

### The military in the Soviet state

The Pentagon review describes in some detail the far-reaching role of the military in the Soviet state, confirming *EIR's* extensive reports on this subject. Thus:

In Soviet society, military forces exist not as a separate institution, but rather as an inherent part of the Soviet system. One is just as likely to find a uniformed soldier in the offices of a research institute as in the barracks of a field unit. . . .

The Soviet obsession with security has played a central role in influencing the Party's approach to the development of the Soviet State and the evolution of its Armed Forces. From the time the Communists first seized power, they have cultivated a special relationship with the Armed Forces. M. V. Frunze, the Bolshevik military leader who replaced Leon Trotsky in 1925 as head of the Red Army, argued that the next war could be won only through the "militarization of the entire population."

The Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets call World War II, bore out Frunze's predictions. The Soviets mobilized the entire country behind the war effort. That undertaking left a mark on Soviet society that is evident to this day. The Party and the government use this to remind Soviet citizens of the sacrifices made and to emphasize the importance of military preparedness.

The report also documents the nature of the Soviet war-winning strategy:

The Soviets perceive that any conflict between themselves and the West could easily escalate to the nuclear level. They also believe that territory can be held only with troops and that even on a nuclear battlefield final victory could only be won by ground armies reaching and controlling their ultimate objectives. Hence, Soviet doctrine calls for continuing conventional arms offensives during and after any nuclear phase of a general war.