

KGB delegation coaches the MX vote in Congress

by Richard Cohen in Washington, D.C.

On the night of May 16, the U.S. House of Representatives directed a devastating blow at President Ronald Reagan's strategic rearmament program. Under the Aspin amendment, the number of MX missiles to be funded in FY85 will be reduced to 15. The Reagan administration had asked for 60, in accordance with the Scowcroft Commission compromise. Earlier this year, the House Armed Services Committee had reduced the approved number to 30.

The funding for these 15 will be withheld for six months as an "inducement" to get Moscow back to the strategic arms talks. Then, in this incredible strategy for unilateral disarmament, the amendment stipulates that if the Soviets do re-enter the talks, MX production will be postponed for at least an additional six months.

The MX is indispensable, because it is far less vulnerable to "pin-down" by enemy attack than the currently deployed Minuteman, and it is more accurate, enabling it to better target hardened Soviet targets.

After the defeat, Washington intelligence sources point to a probable assault on other big-ticket strategic weapons systems, including the B-1 bomber and the Trident II submarine. They fear that the momentum generated by the May 16 House vote will evolve into a serious challenge to the beam-weapons Strategic Defense Initiative and the White House's anti-satellite plan.

Finally, the House action, according to intelligence sources, is sure to have a profound impact on the struggle in the Netherlands parliament surrounding the proposed stationing of 48 cruise missiles in that country. Elements in the Dutch legislature will now use the House attack on Reagan's strategic policy to justify a retrenchment on the installation of so-called Euromissiles. That could lead to a major effort in West Germany to halt the stationing of Euromissiles there.

In a last-minute attempt to save funding for the meager

30 MX missiles, on May 14 President Reagan, at an impromptu White House press conference, declared: "What have we done to the Soviets that can compare with any of the things that they are presently doing, except tell them that we are not going to let them get so powerful that they can impose nuclear blackmail on us. . . ." But, by the evening of May 15, White House political advisers were forced to conclude that the administration no longer had the votes to sustain even the 30 MX missiles.

Under threat of the total elimination of MX funding—a proposal sponsored by House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.) and the entirety of the House Democratic leadership—the Reagan administration capitulated and accepted a "compromise" proposal offered by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.). Since the spring of 1983, when he and Reps. Norman Dicks of Washington and Albert Gore of Tennessee supplied the margin for the passage of the "Scowcroft Commission" recommendations, Aspin has acted as an agent of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's business partner and longtime political aide Brent Scowcroft's and Scowcroft's penetration operation within the Reagan administration. Aspin is a liberal with ties to Averell Harriman and a faction of the CIA associated with former director William Colby.

Indeed, the MX defeat of a crucial element of the President's strategic rearmament program is a direct result of Henry Kissinger's coup in the administration. Shortly after the President's March 23, 1983 speech, Reagan was informed that the liberals on the Hill would kill his MX production program unless he accepted the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. A tacit proviso was that the President pull back on promoting his new Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan stuck to his part of the bargain, but Democratic support on the Hill for the MX was pulled out from under him. When *EIR* asked White House press spokesman

Larry Speakes at his daily briefing on May 16 how the President reacted to being doublecrossed by the Scowcroft Commission, he replied, "Er, I don't know that he really thought he had a deal. . . ."

The only way the President could have pressed through the MX vote would have been to appeal to the nation, to tell Americans the truth about the scope and imminence of the Soviet threat. That is ruled out by Reagan's re-election strategy. If the May 16 humiliation does not shock the President into a radical reversal of the appeasement theme introduced into that re-election strategy by White House Chief of Staff James Baker III and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, what remains of U.S. strategic rearmament, the SDI, and the U.S. commitment to Europe embodied in the Euromissiles will be placed at unnecessary and extreme risk.

While the inside job done on the President by Baker, Deaver, and the early-1983 Commission on Strategic Forces chaired by Scowcroft has steered the White House down the road to capitulation, two recent developments played a role in the grave defeat suffered by the White House on May 16. Interest-rate increases panicked Congress into a spending-cut craze. And the Soviet leadership made a strong and effective intervention directly into the U.S. Congress a week before the MX vote. Under the direction of two senior Soviet operatives, Georgii Arbatov, the head of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute, and Academician E. P. Velikhov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (and the most outspoken critic of the U.S. SDI), Moscow managed to mobilize all its assets in Washington behind an assault on U.S. defense capabilities.

Soviets mobilize Washington

According to Capitol Hill sources, the Soviet mobilization of the U.S. Congress began approximately 10 days before the MX vote. Beginning on May 4, Arbatov, accompanied to Washington by Velikhov, Primakov, and R. Sagdeev (head of the Moscow Space Research Institute), launched a series of high-level secret meetings lasting for approximately six days with important figures in the Eastern Establishment-dominated arms-control community, which exerts a directorship over most Capitol Hill Democrats and many Kissinger-linked Hill Republicans.

On the weekend of May 4, Velikhov and his team met at the Aspen Institute's Wye Plantation in Virginia with the Federation of American Scientists, a group directed by arch-environmentalist and disarmament Jeremy Stone. Also reported in attendance at this private confab were former Carter administration Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) director Paul Warnke; Carter State Department Soviet Desk chief Jerry Hough; Paul Stairs, the anti-SDI resident fellow at the Brookings Institution; and other Democratic Party-linked think-tankers.

On May 6, Velikhov's team was joined by Arbatov and Primakov at a semi-annual meeting of Soviet and American

"academics" sponsored by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Significantly, this program was orchestrated by Carter ACDA Deputy Director Spurgeon Keeny, now head of the NAS arms-control effort.

Also present for these four days of closed meetings were leading anti-SDI demagogue Richard Garwin, Brookings Institution foreign policy head John Steinbruner, arms controller Wolfgang Panofsky—all representing the Democratic Party "shadow government"—and the heads of MIT, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Universities.

Sources confirmed that "'Star Wars' [the beam-weapons policy] was a major focus of these discussions." These sources also reported that Arbatov, Velikhov, and other Soviets repeatedly expressed extreme hostility to the Reagan administration's SDI, anti-satellite program and strategic rearmament policy.

Indeed, following these six days of meetings, Velikhov was publicly quoted comparing the Reagan administration's initiatives in these areas to Nazi Germany's build-up prior to Operation Barbarossa. Yet, our sources reported, the U.S. representatives at these meetings were impressed and excited by the Soviets' willingness to at least talk about arms issues.

The Arbatov and Velikhov entourage were inundated by requests from Capitol Hill for meetings. A source who confirmed that the Soviets had numerous meetings with congressmen and senators, primarily at dinners and receptions hosted by American legislators in their honor, stated: "It was all really at the initiative of the Hill people, who were pursuing the Soviets. They really wanted to meet with them. The Soviets agreed, but refused to meet with any officials of the U.S. administration."

Of special significance was a reception thrown for the Soviets on the Hill by Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), which was attended by the entirety of the Soviet delegation and representatives of the Hill and their staffs. Pell, a member of the Soviet-co-initiated Club of Rome, was the last U.S. legislator to visit Yuri Andropov, at a meeting in Moscow last year reportedly arranged by Carol Rosen, head of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in Outer Space, which has been in intimate contact with the Soviet embassy in Washington and the Soviet government in Moscow. According to intelligence sources, it was Rosen who crafted the proposal on "peaceful uses of outer space" which Andropov handed to Pell at that meeting. Pell was later joined by Sen. Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii) and Rep. Mel Levine (D-Calif.) in sponsoring legislation that would block U.S. development of ABM defense systems and anti-satellite weapons. now also an adviser to Levine.

The festivities in honor of the Soviets included a dinner at the Brookings Institution set up by Matsunaga and others who "especially wanted to meet Arbatov and Primakov." To appease their Soviet guests, Brookings went to the extreme of revoking invitations to the dinner sent to Reagan administration officials.

Following their consolidation of key groups on Capitol

Hill against the President's rearmament program, Arbatov and Primakov moved up the ladder for direct consultations with the elite Eastern Establishment stringpullers of the liberal wing of Congress, first spending three days at the Harvard University Kennedy School unit on International Negotiations, under Trilateral Commission honcho Graham Allison—one in a series of meetings these senior Soviet officials have held with this Harvard group; they are trying to set up a government-sponsored "Crisis Control Center" to be permanently staffed by Soviets and Americans who can "talk it over" (rather than respond) when crises erupt.

After these private deliberations in Cambridge, the Soviets moved on to Dartmouth University for meetings of the "Dartmouth Conference"—the latterday high-powered version of the Pugwash Conferences, sponsored by Kissinger intimate David Rockefeller, the Harrimans, and other leading New York-based banking interests.

On May 22-24, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Business Council holds a New York City meeting with a fresh delegation of Russians. The U.S. side will send senior administration representatives, and leaders of the Soviet group will also meet with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam.

Interest-rate blackmail

While Arbatov and Velikhov consolidated the Soviet peace-movement position on Capitol Hill, their allies in the U.S. and British money-center banks, in league with Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul A. Volcker, engineered a drastic jump in the prime interest rate, sending shock waves through Washington. Sources on Capitol Hill report that the Democratic leadership in both Houses of Congress, as well as the Kissinger-linked Senate Republican leadership, attributed the interest-rate rise to the President's refusal to cut the U.S. defense budget further and, secondarily, his refusal to raise taxes. These legislators created panic around the MX vote, predicting even larger rises in the prime rate if the defense budget were not cut.

According to Democratic-linked sources at the Brookings Institution, this initial rise in rates is just the beginning. They expect rates to rise throughout the course of this year, as long as President Reagan refuses to slash the U.S. defense budget and raise taxes.

These sentiments were echoed by Kissinger-linked Senate Finance Committee chairman Robert Dole (R-Kans.), who warned that rates will rise 3-4% between now and the November elections. Dole calculated that for every half percent rise in the prime rate, the Republicans will lose one Senate seat. He reported that the only way to bring rates down would be through a serious curtailment of the budget deficit—which would require major cuts in U.S. defense.

According to nationally syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, a secret meeting of staffers of the Federal Reserve Board and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee occurred a few weeks before the sudden

jump in the prime. Leading Democrats—particularly in the Senate—led by campaign committee chairman Sen. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) actually offered the Fed political support if it went ahead with a rate rise. Thus the Democratic Party leadership has shown itself willing to jeopardize the nation's fundamental security in the interests of partisan electoral gains and appeasement of Moscow.

The Scowcroft victory

Then, in the midst of direct Soviet intervention on Capitol Hill and the blackmail threat of higher interest rates, Tip O'Neill and the rest of the House Democratic leadership launched a full-scale effort in support of an amendment to the FY 85 budget sponsored by Reps. Charles Bennett (D-Fla.) and Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.) to completely eliminate any funding for the MX missile.

On May 14, following a full week of heavy-handed campaigning by the House Democratic leadership, O'Neill predicted that the House would cancel the production of 30 MX missiles and give the administration only \$1.7 billion for further MX research. Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale announced that he would launch a telephone drive to convince wavering congressmen to support the Bennett-Mavroules amendment.

The following day, as a White House which had spent virtually all its energies the week before convincing a resistant House to continue aid to El Salvador began a blitz to save the MX, O'Neill and the Democratic leadership announced that they had secured at least 220 votes—enough to pass the Bennett-Mavroules death-blow.

In the fall of 1982, the White House sat on the verge of a similar savaging of the MX in the House; then-Deputy National Security Adviser Bud MacFarlane seized the opportunity and recommended the creation of a "bipartisan commission" to save the MX on the Hill. The idea was strongly endorsed by James Baker. Congress funded 21 of the 100 missiles approved, after Reagan abandoned his original request for 200.

Early in 1983, the commission was founded under the direction of Kissinger asset Brent Scowcroft. Then in April—after the March publication in *Time* magazine of a Kissinger piece urging the sacking of the 10-warhead MX and any other weapons systems that could fit into a potential nuclear war-fighting strategy and their replacement by a single-warhead mobile missile (the "Midgetman") which would assure the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction—Scowcroft issued his report.

Just before its issuance, he had an extended meeting with Georgii Arbatov. Beyond forcing a commitment to the development of the Midgetman as a price for allowing the MX to proceed to the procurement stage, the Scowcroft recommendations demanded an administration commitment, subject to congressional review, to a "serious" arms-control policy. This established the notion that the MX is merely a "bargaining chip," not a weapon essential to U.S. security.