

Inside the Pentagon by Tecumseh

Shultz's 'speculative hope'

The murdered Major Arthur Nicholson forewarned us of the consequences of the secretary's outlook on the Russians.

It has been said that the ultimate test of an intelligence evaluation comes when the intelligence officer must stake his life or the lives of others on the validity of his analysis. To those who see national intelligence estimates as issues of life and death for the republic, and not as academic career pursuits, these excerpts from the master's thesis written by U.S. Army Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr. in 1980 stand in testimony to an officer who died in service to his country:

"Are the interests of the Soviet Union sufficiently convergent with those of the United States as to constitute a foundation upon which greater stability can be built? . . .

"Soviet military doctrine calls for a superiority of forces, both tactical and strategic, as a precondition to victory. In this regard, it is helpful to recall that Soviet doctrine posits superiority of forces, especially nuclear, as the first law of warfare. . . . The Soviet Union does not share the Western view that strategic superiority is an undesirable, unattainable, or destabilizing condition. . . . Capitalizing on key principles of surprise, early seizure of the strategic initiative and decisive use of nuclear weapons, it provides a viable means of securing Soviet objectives in the event of war. It can also support the avoidance of war by providing an ability to wage it, and possibly win.

"Soviet doctrine embodies a phil-

osophical rejection of mutual deterrence through assured destruction. . . . This militaristic approach to the problem of strategic warfare frequently alarms the Western observer. In defense, he tends to dismiss the doctrine as a bluff, or to refute it on grounds that it is irrational or primitive. Such thinking is perilous. Soviet doctrine should be accepted for what it says. When facing an opponent over an issue as vital as survival, is it not more prudent to take him at his word given credible evidence as to his sincerity, than to chance the future to some speculative hope that his statements lack commitment?

". . . The United States should re-examine its strategic doctrine with the objective of further reducing emphasis on the concept of 'mutual deterrence' as the key doctrinal principle. The United States would be wise to take heed of the Soviet observation that the prospect of nuclear war has two dimensions: the necessity of its prevention, and the possibility of its being waged."

The pathetic response by the White House to the murder of Major Nicholson has not measured up to Caspar Weinberger's identification of the act as exemplary of Soviet policy. To attack the problem at its roots, we contrast to Nicholson's analysis a recent piece by George Schultz in *Foreign Affairs*:

In the past four years, "the under-

lying conditions that affect U.S.-Soviet relations have changed dramatically." As the Soviets moved boldly in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, he continues, "they had reason for confidence that what they call the global 'correlation of forces' was shifting in their favor. . . . We [now] have reason to be confident that the 'correlation of forces' is shifting back in our favor."

Therefore, when confronted with displays of Soviet brutality, "our objective should be to act in a way that could help discipline Soviet behavior. . . . At the same time, *our posture should not leave our own strategy vulnerable to periodic disruption by such shocks* [emphasis added]."

To Shultz, the mobilization of Soviet forces for war in Europe, and the murder of an intelligence officer responsible for reporting such threats, is merely a "disruption" we should ignore.

And why not, for an administration conditioned to ignore even the most shocking evidence of vital weaknesses in its economic capacity to mobilize for national defense? For Shultz, Regan, and the President's other "handlers," the myth of "economic recovery" takes precedence over the facts demonstrating that the next Soviet "disruption" will find us economically incapable of response.

Gorbachov, for his part, has demonstrated the contempt he holds for the "mythologists" controlling U.S. policy: The early April "offer" to stop deployment of SS-20s was issued in open mockery of Shultz's piece, and is further evidence that the Ogarkov plan for confrontation in Europe is entering its final phase. The "moratorium" starts with a number of missiles deployed which greatly exceeds the amounts agreed to in the recent INF talks in Geneva!