

had been persuaded by the Americans to keep his troops off the streets as the Marcos-Aquino confrontation escalated." State Department officials also reported on Feb. 24 that they had a total profile of every field commander.

Labor Minister Blas Ople, who had come to Washington to sound out possibilities for a coalition government, informed President Marcos by phone that Reagan believed Marcos should step down. Ople, in an interview with the *Washington Post*, reported Marcos as saying: "My life and the lives of my family are threatened right here. They have bombed the palace. They have forcibly taken over the radio station." Ople said that Marcos "said it was a very curious situation, in which he is being told not to defend himself . . . by the United States."

Political environment manipulated

Between August, when the coup plot first surfaced, and the final hours of Feb. 25, the U.S. State Department, along with the media, and members of Congress led by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), worked to create the political environment that would cover for the U.S. coup. The primary objective was not to bring in an Aquino government, but to break the Reagan commitment to Marcos. The first phase of the operation was a media campaign to convince the White House that the Philippines, if left to Marcos, would be lost to the communists. Bosworth's embassy supplied the "reports" to back up the media claims.

The tactical objective was to force Marcos to prove his mandate by calling elections. The biggest fraud perpetrated in the elections was the created perception that the Namfrel—heralded from Manila as "our eyes and ears now" and which proclaimed Aquino the early "victor"—was ever an independent "citizen's watchdog committee." A creation of the CIA in the 1950s, Namfrel received funds from the CIA throughout the election period. On Feb. 26, Namfrel chairman Jose Concepcion, a member of the board of directors of the Benigno Aquino Foundation, was named minister of trade and industry in the new Aquino government.

If democracy had ever been an issue for the United States in the Philippines, Reagan's initial Feb. 11 response of neutrality on the election results would have stuck. Mrs. Aquino would have been congratulated for a "close race." Instead, by Feb. 24, the State Department was actively studying the option of freezing all Filipino assets in the United States—as if President Marcos were a state enemy! From the State Department's point of view, President Marcos's crime was that he was a nationalist leader who threatened to block the International Monetary Fund ravaging of the Filipino economy, and challenge the authority of the Fund internationally. But President Marcos's more fundamental crime was that *by virtue of his proven loyalty to the United States*—he was an obstacle to the New Yalta treason by which the State Department has agreed with Moscow to destroy the vital security of the United States.

Chronology of the Philippines coup

by EIR's Asia Bureau

Phase one: the drive for elections

"This is not something the United States has done. This is something the Filipino people have done."

—Secretary of State George Shultz, Feb. 25

Aug. 1. A public clamor began in the media in the United States for Marcos's ouster over his failure to carry out State Department-dictated "reforms." On Aug. 1, the *Boston Globe* editorial stated: "U.S. policymakers should call Marcos's bluff. This is a case in which the hostages are expendable. A conspicuous order to the Pentagon to update its plans for relocating the Philippines bases would send a signal to both Marcos and his critics that the U.S. has learned from its mistakes. . . . Clark Field and Subic Bay are undeniably important . . . but not irreplaceable. Certainly the Philippines bases are not worth a U.S. war to sustain a discredited regime."

Aug. 2. Dimas Pundato, leader of the separatist Moro Liberation Front who is in exile in Libya, met in Washington with officials of the U.S. State Department. Pundato emerged from the meeting to announce in Washington that if President Marcos did not meet MLF demands for greater autonomy, the Moros would take up arms against the government with the New People's Army. Sources reported that another result of the meeting was State Department funding of the Moros. The State Department justified the meeting with Pundato by saying: "We have an open door policy. We talk to anyone with a responsible point of view."

Aug. 7. *New York Times* editorial called for the administration to begin "an energetic search for alternate sites" for the U.S. bases on the Philippines. "As long as Mr. Marcos believes the Americans will swallow anything to keep those bases, he can disregard America's worried attempts to press for constitutional change."

Aug. 16. *Executive Intelligence Review* released story charging that U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, along with former Ambassador William Sullivan, were plotting a military coup against President Marcos with then Acting Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. "The timing for the final



Government of the Philippines

President Ferdinand Marcos. His loyalty to the United States made him an obstacle to the State Department's treasonous design.

move against Marcos is projected in eight to nine months, or will be timed with Marcos's promised reinstatement of Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian Ver. . . . Bosworth now meets up to two hours every day with Acting Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Fidel Ramos. . . . Ramos would come to power with a young officers' reform movement, called We Belong as his power base in the military." The story was based on information from reliable sources in both Manila and Washington, D.C. The coup plot reflected what sources said was an across-the-board consensus that the Marcos government must be overthrown.

Sept. 1. The pro-opposition Bishops and Businessmen's Conference released result of one-month-long poll showing that 52% of Filipinos polled would vote for President Marcos in a general election.

Sept. 4. Cord Meyer, speaking for the bankers' wing of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote a signal piece for the overthrow of Marcos in the *New York Post*. Meyer stated that the Reagan administration must "face the real possibility that before its second term is over a Marxist regime may have taken over in the Philippines and given the Soviets access to the strategic air and naval bases now occupied by the U.S. . . . A search is already on for alternative basing arrangements."

Sept. 16. Lt.-Gen. Fidel Ramos appeared on Philippines national television to claim that the *EIR* charges of a coup plot with the U.S. embassy were "highly speculative and grossly inaccurate." He said: "My association with Bosworth

is limited to occasional courtesy calls, social functions, and meetings that have always been in relation with my official responsibility to promote unity of the armed forces and the integrated national police."

Sept. 18. U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth told the Manila Foreign Correspondents' Association that the *EIR* coup story is "absolutely false." The *EIR*, he said, has a "history of satisfying people's more conspiratorial and paranoid suspicions." Contrary to Ramos's statements, Bosworth said he only met with Ramos "several months ago on a golf course." He then stated: "Our concern is with the effective leadership of the armed forces and the program to restore its confidence, discipline, and effectiveness."

Sept. 22. The International Monetary Fund suspended the Philippines' use of its third tranche for a \$620 million stand-by loan, stating that President Marcos has "fallen out of compliance" with IMF conditionalities.

Oct. 16-17. Richard Kupperman led a televised crisis simulation scenario at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled "The Fall of the Philippines." It is the personnel at the CSIS, beginning with Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who function as the semi-official State Department back door to the Soviet Union. The scenario called for—following the death of President Marcos—the assassination of selected generals and government officials, after which the New People's Army takes over. Kupperman told a reporter: "Marcos is living in a delusory world. . . . He's going to get deposed. Look, if Marcos were to disappear for whatever reason, constitutionally the successor is the Speaker of the House. If he were assassinated and a few command and control sites taken out, the Philippines government would not exist."

Oct. 18. President Ronald Reagan sent Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)

identical message ever sent to a friend." Laxalt, according to the *Washington Post*, delivered a letter from Reagan to Marcos stating that unless Marcos carried out constitutional, economic, and military reforms, the United States would withdraw support from his government. The content of the letter was based on an alarmist report from the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, backed up by reports from Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz to the effect that the Philippines is headed for "catastrophe" under the Marcos government at the hands of the New People's Army. The report was presented to the House Intelligence Committee and the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Oct. 19. The *New York Times* printed the story that Marcos had rejected the substance of Laxalt's letter. This was exposed as a piece of willful disinformation by both Marcos and Laxalt, the latter stating that "the thrust of the story is inaccurate." Laxalt further stated that "all of the reports about him [Marcos] being a doddering old man were wholly contradicted by my observation of him" during their four-hour meeting.

Oct. 19. President Marcos, appearing on ABC's Nightline, was pressed by Ted Koppel to call for elections, even though the President's term is not up until 1987. Marcos insisted that he already had the mandate of the population and elections would violate the Philippines constitution. Koppel's demand, however, was repeated throughout the U.S. media.

Oct. 20. The *New York Times* persisted with an editorial "What Can Make Marcos Listen?" complaining that Marcos had been able to "sidestep" the "blunt message" from Laxalt. The *Times* demanded that the minimum condition for continued support to Marcos be sweeping electoral reforms—that is, cleaning out his own power base in the military. Implicitly calling for a coup against the Marcos government, the *Times* stated that if Marcos refused to listen, "the many demoralized officers in Manila may have keener ears."

Oct. 28. Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee announced, "We must put Marcos on notice that our interests in Filipino democracy will no longer be held hostage to a rigged election. To ease Marcos's resignation, we should offer him and his family safe passage and sanctuary for his retirement."

Oct. 28. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) announced that they would be holding hearings on cuts in military and economic aid to the Philippines.

Oct. 29. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth held a press conference in Manila where he lashed out at the Marcos government for "human rights violations."

Oct. 31. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "we still face a situation of strategic stalemate in the next three to five years." Wolfowitz said the State Department expects "civil war on a massive scale" in three to five years. "That is the direction we are heading," said Sen. Richard Lugar, who would later head the Reagan observer team for the Feb. 7 elections. Lugar stated that Marcos should understand that U.S. "patience has run out." Wolfowitz stated that the State Department had given the IMF "strong support" in dealing with the Philippines and complained, "We have not yet seen any substantial reform implementation."

Nov. 1. The Senate Intelligence Committee passed out a report calling for a total U.S. withdrawal of support to the Marcos government unless Marcos carries out demanded reforms. The report, however, contained the death sentence for the Marcos government: "We believe such a change of course is very unlikely and there is serious doubt about whether the Marcos regime still has the administrative and political capability to initiate reforms even if it were so inclined." Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn.) told the press, "The Reagan administration should be preparing to adopt a democratic alternative or face having no alternative but the New People's Army."

Phase two: the perception game

"The facts as they emerge become increasingly irrelevant because it's the perception that counts, and the perception prevails both in the Philippines and, I think, internationally, that Mrs. Aquino won the election."

—Former Ambassador William H. Sullivan, Feb. 9

Nov. 3: President Marcos announced that he would hold snap elections within the next three months, in order to prove that he has the mandate of the Filipino people. The elections were scheduled for Jan. 17. Sources reported that Marcos was offered the third tranche on the IMF stand-by loan, if he went ahead with elections.

Nov. 5. Opposition leader Salvador Laurel visited Washington, where he was hosted by Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Rep. Stephen Solarz. Laurel indicated that the opposition was preparing for civil war, not elections, stating: "The Filipino people are prepared to defend their ballots with their lives and it may end up in a violent confrontation."

Nov. 13. Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz told a congressional panel that there will be a "complete collapse of political confidence" in the Philippines government, if the elections are not perceived as fair.

Nov. 14. President Marcos announced that he would delay the elections until Feb. 7. Opposition parliamentarian Homobono Adaza stated the delay "is a significant victory for the opposition, but it's more a result of American pressure than from the opposition."

Nov. 14. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution calling for "free and fair elections" in the Philippines—implying they would not be fair except under U.S. pressure.

Nov. 14. Rep. Stephen Solarz declared in an op ed in the *Wall Street Journal* that fraudulent elections in the Philippines would "have grave consequences for the future relationship with the Marcos government."

Nov. 29. President Marcos endorsed the action taken against the International Monetary Fund by the Peruvian government of Alan García. The *Manila Times-Journal* reported, "President Marcos yesterday suggested to a visiting Peruvian official that Third World, Asian and South American countries should work for it [partial forgiveness of loans]. The President praised Peru for opening the minds of the Western countries to the financial difficulties of the Third World."

Dec. 2. Rep. Stephen Solarz succeeded in ramming through the House of Representatives a resolution for a 75% cut in military aid to the Philippines.

Dec. 3. Philippines Political Affairs Minister Leonardo Perez accused the CIA of interfering in the election and said the U.S. embassy was helping the opposition. Perez said he had "reliable reports on the presence of CIA agents masquerading as media representatives consorting with and giving

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