

## Brzezinski proposes tactful surrender to Moscow

by Criton Zoakos

Zbigniew Brzezinski's latest book, addressing the strategic problems of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, is a policy implementation document, with considerable following inside the Reagan administration. The policies advocated are not Brzezinski's mere personal preferences, but are shared by a spectrum of foreign-policy and national-security-policy administrators and bureaucrats, many of them associated with Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In short, the views in Brzezinski's book are those of present U.S. Ambassador to NATO David Abshire, of chief U.S. Arms Control negotiator Max Kampelman, of special Arms Control Adviser Paul Nitze, and that other occupant of the seventh floor of the State Department, George Shultz; they are also the views of the CIA's entire National Intelligence Estimates Board, and those of Jack Matlock in the National Security Council.

This particular power combination in the Reagan administration, increasingly since the end of 1984, has not only shared the "geostrategic" opinions of Mr. Brzezinski, but, more significantly, it has staked out a clear, and publicly identifiable, factional "turf" inside the government, committed to implementing the strategic program outlined in Brzezinski's book.

In short, the program described in Brzezinski's book, has been in existence since, at least, the end of 1984, as an action/implementation program of that coalition inside the Reagan administration which prefers to identify itself as "those who disagree with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger." The question is, why has this faction commissioned Brzezinski to popularize their strategic perspectives in the form of a book?

Simple: Brzezinski's

influence of another book, which, for one year now, has functioned as a catalyst, galvanizing a growing resistance, among military and national security professionals, to the current Soviet strategic offensive. The book against which Brzezinski's *Game Plan* was written, is *Executive Intelligence Review's* bestselling *Global Showdown: The Soviet Imperial Warplan for 1988*.

If the reader takes the trouble to compare the respective organization of arguments in the two books, he will convince himself that *Game Plan* was written for the purpose of challenging the influence of *Global Showdown*. If the reader, further, were to visualize the intensity with which policies were debated and arguments exchanged in virtually every nook and cranny of our defense and national security establishment over the past 12 months of intensifying challenges, he will readily understand why the partisans of Brzezinski's ideas would have to commission a public airing of their views.

Unacknowledged by the media of mass information, the view of a growing number of senior officers of the uniformed services is that the United States and the Soviet Union are now in a state of undeclared war. Since the Wackersdorf riots in West Germany and the new wave of assassinations in Western Europe beginning with the killing of Karl-Heinz Beckurts, perhaps the majority of active general and flag-rank officers share this conclusion. Brzezinski's hastily published book firmly rejects this evaluation. Brzezinski does not even characterize the state of relations as "conflict," but prefers the description "contest," and more specifically, "imperial contest," between "two imperial powers." From this, seemingly innocuous semantic difference, eventually emerge

the catastrophic policy proposals of Brzezinski and his patrons, which, if implemented, will spell the end of the United States as a nation.

### The policy recommendations

To begin from the end of the book, its policy recommendations: Brzezinski's strategic proposals, specifically, are:

**1) Prohibit the adoption of a war-winning doctrine by the United States** or, in his own language: "Mutual strategic security—a mix of forces that makes a first strike militarily futile and societally suicidal—should be both the American and the Soviet objective. . . . U.S. strategic offensive forces should be deployed in numbers deliberately contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first strike to Soviet strategic forces."

**2) Undercut and whittle down President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative** or, in his own words: "The United States should move toward deploying a *limited* strategic defense, composed of a space-based screen to destroy missiles in their boost phase and a land-based terminal defense to intercept incoming warheads. This would inject a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a first-strike nuclear attack. In order to pursue mutual strategic security bilaterally, the United States should propose a renegotiation of the outdated ABM treaty of 1972, to permit *some limited* deployment of space-based defenses" (page 261).

These two policy elements are the highest priority objectives of the group of policy makers represented by Brzezinski. Additional, spelled-out components include:

**3) Decoupling of the United States from the defenses of Western Europe.** "The United States should undertake a gradual—and certainly only partial—reduction in the level of American forces in Europe" (page 262), and,

"The United States should encourage the development of a politically and militarily integrated Western Europe, less dependent on the United States but still tied to it by a strategic alliance" (page 263), and,

"In the long term, the United States should welcome closer West European ties with Eastern Europe which could eventually lead both America and Russia to disengage from their present confrontation in the heart of Europe" (page 263).

**4) The adoption, by the United States, of the role of a hostile, repressive imperial/colonialist military power in Central and South America.** "Manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged Rapid Deployment Force through the creation of additional light divisions for use on the third front or in Central America" (page 262).

"Washington should advance regional economic development in Central America and work to create a more solid base for political democratization in Central America. The United States must exert every effort—including the use of force if necessary—to obtain the external neutralization and internal self-determination of Nicaragua and must be pre-

pared to apply force at an early sign of Soviet or Cuban military involvement in the suppression of opposition to the current regime in Managua" (page 267).

These are the four most important and irreducible strategic policy objectives of the grouping behind Brzezinski's book. The remainder of the purported "recommendations," is simply sauce to make them palatable.

In reality, the Brzezinski recommendations amount to complete withdrawal of the United States from the entire Eurasian landmass, coupled with a futile military preoccupation in Ibero-America, in terms identical with those proposed by the late Yuri Andropov in an April 1983 interview with the Hamburg weekly *Der Spiegel*. Andropov then proposed that if the United States abandoned all claims of interest in the "Eurasian landmass," Moscow in return would scuttle Nicaragua and thus "spare" the United States of the purported strategic threat that Mexico, we are told, poses to the United States.

Brzezinski will deny that he is advancing Andropov's proposals. He will vehemently point out that his book advocates that the United States "compete" with the Soviet Union on no fewer than three "fronts" on the "Eurasian landmass." The First Front, in his terminology, is Europe; the Second Front, in ranking of importance, is in the Far East, and the Third Front is the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan tier.

What form Brzezinski's legendary "contest" between the U.S.A. and Moscow is to take on these three fronts, coheres with admirable precision with Soviet strategic objectives: For the all-important First Front, Europe, Brzezinski recommends, as we saw, "partial" withdrawal of U.S. forces for the purpose of effecting an integration of Eastern and Western Europe, an integration of unarmed, defanged, and decorticated states which, Brzezinski tells us, will put the fear of God into Marshal Ogarkov's armored and nuclearized divisions.

For the "Second Front in the Eurasian landmass," Brzezinski proposes some disingenuous generalities without any military content. From the man who, as national security adviser guided the embarrassing "President Jimmy" to start economic warfare against Japan, we receive the following strategic advice: "The United States should promote an informal geopolitical triangle in the Far East through wider economic and political cooperation among the United States, Japan, and China." After this "informal economic cooperation," known as "Jap-bashing," is effected, Brzezinski recommends that the United States leave Japan out on a limb to take care of stopping the Soviet march to the Pacific: "Rather than simply increase its defense spending, Japan should be encouraged also to make an indirect but still important contribution to common security by increasing its strategic economic aid to those developing countries in which the Western democracies have a vital stake. This effort should involve about 4 percent of the Japanese GNP. . . . Japan and the United States should actively promote China's economic

modernization. . . ." (page 264) etc., etc.

Brzezinski's recommendations for the "Third Front" are: "Improve relations with Iran," "Keep the Afghan issue alive," and "Provide more aid to Pakistan." Period. Not a word about how he personally toppled the Shah of Iran, put Khomeini at the helm, and opened the gates for a Russian march to the Gulf while he was national security adviser. Today, Brzezinski is playing a similar game in Pakistan, assisting the fundamentalist Jamati Islami to undermine the traditional institutions of civilian and military stability in Pakistan.

This summarizes Georgetown CSIS's and Brzezinski's strategic recommendations: 1) Limit the Strategic Defense Initiative. 2) Do not provoke Moscow with any serious improvement of American strategic offensive forces. 3) Decouple the United States from Europe. 3) Let the Japanese defend the far East. 5) Let the Mujahedeen teach the Red Army a lesson in the Middle East.

This is the substantive content of the strategy which Brzezinski was commissioned to author and popularize with this little book. Everything else contained between the covers is an agonized effort in classical Jesuit casuistry, attempting to present these policies in the coloring of a contrived "anti-Sovietism," and an even more fake militant "pro-West," i.e., pro-"conservative" posturing. If any honest conservative, or if any person with sincere concern for the fortunes of Western civilization, were drawn into believing what Brzezinski says his allegiances are, such a person must be the archetype of the "sucker."

## Why we are not an Empire

What does Brzezinski consider to be "our side"?

Consider: In Brzezinski's scheme of things, the United States and the Soviet Union each leads an Empire. It may come as a surprise to many Americans, civilian and military, veteran and not, that the good Mr. Brzezinski characterizes the United States as an empire no different in principle than the Soviet Empire. Why are we supposed to be an "empire"? Simply because political power, in the United States, flows from top to bottom. In his own words: "*I use the term "empire" as morally neutral to describe a hierarchical system of political relationships, radiating from a center.*" Just like this.

A political system is called "empire" because of the way it determines the flow of "power." When two rival empires are on a collision course, the reasons for the collision are reasons of pure "power." These are the axiomatic foundations of "geopolitics" and "geostrategy."

The idea is older than Mackinder or Haushofer. In fact, it goes back to the Most Serene Republic of Venice, and before it to Isocrates, Gorgias, and before them, to the infernally ingenious geopolitician of antiquity, the Persian Satrap Pharnabazus, the Metternich of the fifth century B.C. Old though Brzezinski's axiomatic assumptions may be, they are both wrong and inadequate for understanding what is actually

the underlying cause of the war between the "United States" and the "Soviet Union," in fact, more precisely, the war between "East" and "West."

The popular theme of the 1950s, naive though it was, reflected more accurately than Brzezinski the substance of the conflict: "democracy against totalitarianism." Most ordinary citizens of the 1950s, by "democracy," understood a process of give-and-take of ideas in which the persuasive power of reason was allowed to shape policy; by "totalitarianism," they understood a situation in which, only the persuasive power of arbitrary, repressive force shaped policy. By extension, popular sentiment of those days assigned to totalitarian societies a weakness of rational powers. When persuasive power is absent from reason, then reason is flawed. Thus, only societies with a deficit of reason fall into the misfortune of the totalitarianism or arbitrary, coercive power.

The implications of these earlier popular observations, and not geopolitical power calculations, are the driving causes of the irrepressible conflict between East and West. Western political culture is, hereditarily, riveted, more or less consciously at different periods, on the conviction that reason, even if arrived at through heated argument, is the best ruler. Fools may believe that liberty has been bequeathed to us so that we may "do as we please." The reality is that each time liberty was gained in the history of the West, it was the liberty to search, attain, argue on behalf of reason. Our political system of today is based on the calculated risk that the benefits of liberty to reason outweigh the disadvantages of hedonistic libertinism.

The Eastern political tradition, today embodied by Moscow, is based on the exercise of arbitrary coercive power. It is there to coerce only one thing: reasoned argument. It is an ancient, unbroken tradition of "might makes right."

Our Western world is still, at least officially, one in which "right makes might." We therefore, unlike the Soviet Union, are not an "empire," because, to borrow from the geopoliticians' lexicon, the "flow of power" follows the reverse direction. Those readers will be susceptible to Brzezinski's casuistry who have lost the moral power to understand that we are not, or, more precisely, we are not supposed to be an "Empire." We are supposed to be a Republic, leading a world community of republics against Russian despotism. When we become an empire, we lose.

### **Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest**

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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