

Will there be a 1987 summit meeting?

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The following analysis was released by the presidential candidate on March 10.

Fortunately, there are increasing signs that a "summit" agreement on the proposed "zero option" for European medium-range missiles may not occur during 1987.

During the past several days, high-ranking Soviet officials have indicated that Moscow may be pulling back from its promise of an early Reagan-Gorbachov summit. The public denunciations of the "zero option" by French government officials, have persisted over the weekend. High-ranking British circles seem to share the French estimation that Gorbachov's offer is both a fraud and grand strategic deception. The most recent public statements by Henry A. Kissinger, including his op-ed in the March 8 Sunday *Washington Post*, are most interesting signs of similar thinking within part of the Atlanticist establishment.

Our assessment of the likelihood of a 1987 summit must take into account a pattern of public statements on the state of the economy, including a most notable press conference given in Italy by David Rockefeller and leading Italian banking official Guido Carli. The pair joined in warning of a grave international economic situation. Their observations dovetail with a signal piece by Christopher Dunn, "The Grim Legacy of Reaganomics," in the Business and Finance section of the March 3 *Times* of London. Dunn echoes spreading sentiment among trans-Atlantic influentials, as he begins his article with the simple declarative sentence: "Reaganomics is dead."

The Reagan administration's over-eager drive to reach an "historic arms-control agreement" with Moscow, is being

viewed as an effort to get "Irangate" off the front pages, and to sidestep the growing issue of the economy. Secretary Gorbachov's launching of his grand strategic deception, although mainly directed at Soviet efforts to decouple West Germany strategically from the United States, is seen widely as Moscow's effort to exploit President Reagan's difficult domestic situation by offering the President the chance to go out of office with what some White House wishful thinking might regard as an "historic contribution to peace."

Over the past week, Moscow has become less optimistic about Mr. Reagan's ability to deliver at such a summit. Leading Soviet spokesmen hint at their suspicion that the President's "Irangate" problems may increase rapidly. Soviet leaders are also watching the signs suggesting that Mr. Reagan may soon be hit by the full political force of a perceived failure of "Reaganomics." The signs are, that Moscow is preparing to concentrate on its fall-back option, using the "zero-option" offer as a way of driving a wedge between the Bonn and U.S. governments.

The evidence suggests, that such Soviet estimates of Mr. Reagan's political vulnerabilities may be more or less accurate ones.

Gorbachov's offer to withdraw Soviet medium-range missiles from Eastern Europe to Russia itself, is pure fraud. Were these missiles to be pulled back to the Urals, their warheads would be aimed at targets in Western Europe just as effectively as they are at present. The only difference is, that these missiles would be out of target-range of U.S. medium-range missiles based in West Germany. Since Gorbachov did not propose to include Soviet short-range missiles,

his “zero option” means that an INF agreement of the sort Mr. Reagan appears disposed to accept, has no effect but to obliterate U.S. nuclear defenses in Europe, while increasing the Soviet capabilities in that theater.

The Washington chatter, stating that the United States will demand adequate verification of the Soviet pullback, is less than worthless. All that the U.S. could accomplish, with any amount of verification built into an INF agreement, is to verify that the Soviets have strengthened their attack-position against Western Europe, while the U.S. defense has been rendered virtually nonexistent. Not accidentally, Soviet high-ranking spokesmen have stated publicly their willingness to accede to the demands for verification.

It appears that a significant portion of the trans-Atlantic establishment has understood this curious Soviet logic. The liberal neo-isolationists, such as Senator Sam Nunn, appear willing enough to go along with the Moscow offer, but a sizable section of the Atlanticists, including Kissinger, are opposing the deal.

So far, Kissinger’s arguments, in his *Newsweek* and *Washington Post* pieces, are more pragmatism than principle. Kissinger argues for a tougher bargaining position, suggesting that Mr. Reagan, like West Germany’s Hans-Dietrich Genscher, may have gone too far, much too fast, in concessions to Gorbachov. Although Kissinger appears to have turned much tougher than he had been during recent years, his change in posture remains consistent with his past approaches to pragmatic “crisis management” methods.

Meanwhile, David Rockefeller appears to have adopted the view that the North-South issues popped to the surface by Brazil’s debt moratorium, are more urgent than negotiating new offers with Moscow. Mr. Rockefeller did arrange his meeting with Brazil’s Finance Minister Funaro in Rome, and did issue his statement on the economic situation during the period he was in Italy for that meeting. If the views of Messrs. Rockefeller and Kissinger coincide, as they often tend to do, the line emerging appears to be: Let’s hold the line in Europe for the time being, while concentrating on the worsening economic crisis in the West generally. The echo of Kissinger’s warnings in the influential *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung*’s lead editorial of March 10, and the spread of warnings about the worsening economic crisis, appear to show, at least, that the combined views of Kissinger and Rockefeller may represent a trend of thought within a sizable fraction of the trans-Atlantic liberal establishment.

Parallel estimates of the situation are surfacing among Mr. Kissinger’s traditional, influential opponents. On economic issues, notables among traditionalist Democrats are expressing views not unlike those of Mr. Rockefeller and the *London Times*’ Christopher Dunn. In all sections of the establishment, liberal and conservative, there appears to be a raging fight over the issues of proposed, alternative approaches to an economic situation which all seem to agree is turning disastrous.

If Mr. Reagan persists in defending the myth of a “Re-

aganomics prosperity,” and attempts to use a prospective summit as a way of distracting attention from the issues of Irangate and the economy, his political support within the United States and Western Europe will fall to levels Mr. Nixon suffered during the spring of 1974. In that case, Mr. Reagan’s stubbornness will find him like buckwheat in a windstorm. He can not cling to his present postures and not be broken by the political winds now building up around his administration. It couldn’t happen to a nicer guy, but there you have it.

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At the present rate, a sizable number of the Republicans will soon begin to distance themselves from the administration’s foreign and economic policies, especially those worried about “running on the coattails of Herbert Hoover” in the 1988 elections. On both sides of the aisle, members of Congress are soon to be hit very hard by their constituents on the issues of the economy. The public is less and less sympathetic to the economic miracles of deregulation and budget-cutting; they are demanding that this terrible economic depression be stopped. That, and a growing fear of AIDS, will be the leading popular issues in the fall off-year elections.

The public, and increasing numbers of the politicians, will seek to use various available issues to hit the White House hard, as a reflection of growing popular rage against the President’s futile, but stubborn clinging to “Reaganomics.” In such a political atmosphere, the unresolved issues of Irangate are political dynamite.

The next 90 days are going to be most interesting times. Either the President scraps his present political tactics, and takes the lead both in cleaning out the “Irangate” mess and in showing willingness to face the failure of “Reaganomics,” or he will be unable to reverse the rapid loss in confidence building up around the nation and the world. In this case, he will be politically on the ropes, vulnerable to every political blow thrown against him. By approximately May, or perhaps even earlier, these realities will be coming to a head.

Either way the President chooses to jump, I have a growing suspicion that his 1987 summit with Gorbachov might not take place.