

## Is Moscow's new diplomacy really puzzling?

by Criton Zoakos

Following the June 25-26 Plenary meeting of the Soviet Central Committee, we have had numerous fine examples of Moscow's "New foreign policy philosophy," two of which are of striking, but characteristic barbarity. One is the brutal treatment of West German President Richard von Weizsäcker while on official state visit to Moscow; the second is the treatment of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at the hands of Soviet Ambassador to Washington Yuri Dubinin. Both Shultz and von Weizsäcker, the latest victims of Soviet brutality, are devout proponents of policies of appeasement and capitulation to Moscow.

What Moscow does to its appeasers should be instructive—both to them and to the rest of us. President von Weizsäcker, from July 6 to 10, was on an official visit to the Soviet Union, attempting to proclaim the new era of friendship and cooperation between the German and the Russian people. He foolishly praised Gorbachov and his "new leadership," and made other embarrassing statements of propitiation. In return, he was treated with the worst contempt any satrap has ever suffered in the hands of his sovereign. General Secretary Gorbachov lectured him on the evils of speaking about German unity; Soviet President Andrei Gromyko, at the state banquet, handed von Weizsäcker a list of names which, Gromyko said, was of persons who were war criminals that Germany should extradite to the Soviet Union; the Russian newspapers incessantly lectured von Weizsäcker on the importance of upholding treaty obligations—perhaps an allusion to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. The question arose: Since, according to law, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot

extradite its nationals for real or alleged war crimes, but must try them at home, since Gromyko knew that such extraditions would be illegal, why did he make his demand? And since most of the names on his list were names of persons either dead or already tried in German courts, why, then, the request? And, why, indeed, the sonorous publicity given it by the Russian newspapers?

Very simply, Moscow wanted to humiliate in public, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The second noticeable case of Russia's brutality toward its friends: On July 10, after weeks of absence, Soviet Ambassador to Washington Yuri Dubinin returned to Washington to meet with George Shultz. This was the ambassador's first meeting with the Secretary since the conclusion of the so-called historical Central Committee Plenum, in which, if the *New York Times* is to be believed, capitalist restoration was virtually imposed on Russia by the "Gorbachov revolution."

According to press spokesman Charles Redman, the State Department was very disappointed with the July 10 Shultz-Dubinin meeting. The disappointment stems from the fact that Dubinin "repeated unacceptable parts of the Soviet positions in the Geneva talks," and, also, that he failed to respond to the State Department's invitation for Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to come to Washington in order to arrange for an actual summit meeting this year, in which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachov are to sign a Euromissile arms treaty. The State Department, following the Shultz-Dubinin meeting, has found the Rus-

sians "noticeably less willing to make progress in detailed discussions of the Euromissile treaty."

Widely discussed among increasingly nervous State Department bureaucrats is the question of "why" the Russians are moving to brutalize such public figures as Shultz and von Weizsäcker, who have been so useful in promoting Soviet-sponsored, supported, or authored policies. A more discussed question is: Why are the Soviets moving away from arms control, and away from the prospect of a Reagan-Gorbachov summit? These questions, of course, hold fascination only among those in the foreign policy officialdom who have believed the great propaganda myth of Gorbachov's "restructuring" policies. Secretary Shultz was one of the few cabinet members who, speaking on the record, welcomed Gorbachov's *perestroika* as a harbinger of peace and greater East-West cooperation. Those who, like the *EIR*, have seen in *perestroika* nothing but the continuing aggressive war drive of the Soviet economy under Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's plan, saw nothing strange in Moscow's treatment of Weizsäcker and Shultz, and therefore did not ask the question "why." Those who are asking why the Soviets are behaving so brutally, are simply reflecting Shultz's mistaken perceptions of *perestroika*. If one rejects the Secretary's rose-colored glasses and sees the Soviet war mobilization as what it is, one would not be surprised by Moscow's brutal actions.

### **Will there be a Reagan-Gorbachov summit?**

Despite the fact that Moscow kicking its friends in the teeth should not be viewed, as a matter of principle, as a departure from policy, there has been a certain shift of emphasis in Soviet tactics, which merits a certain attention. Until recently, Moscow's tactical attitude toward the West was to try and produce a U.S. withdrawal from Western Europe by means of an arms-control agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Russians were counting on what they privately call their "Reagan card," President Reagan's obsessive desire to reach an arms-control agreement with Gorbachov during this year. From the October 1986 summit at Reykjavik to recently, Soviet diplomacy was to a large degree shaped to facilitate the efforts of officials such as Shultz, Charles Wick, and others who, against all sound military advice, have been pressuring Reagan to sign an arms-control agreement this year. Beginning in the spring of 1987, George Shultz and the State Department, with help from like-minded friends among Western Europe's foreign ministries, have been urging that an arms-control agreement, at least on Euromissiles, be signed this year, on the theory that during next year, a presidential election year in the U.S.A., it will be impossible to produce an arms agreement.

Progressively, the more Shultz argued in favor of haste, the more cautious the Soviets became. The question began to be discussed in Moscow, whether it is worth making an

agreement with a political faction which might not be able to honor it the following year. The Soviet leadership, with increasing interest, has been concerning itself with the question of who and what will be the next American and Western leadership that will replace the Reagan administration. So far, their analysts appear to be out of luck.

Perhaps more perplexing in the eyes of Soviet intelligence analysts, than all other phenomena of America's erratic political life, is the spectacular extravaganza of the Iran and Contra-gate hearings in Congress, and the dramatic political warfare surrounding the candidacy of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. for the presidency of the United States. These two processes of American political life, LaRouche and Irangate, are now the central concern of the Russian leadership. These two matters will define what kind of competition Moscow will have in 1988-89, and that, in turn, defines what the Kremlin command must do to reach its objective of world domination. It appears that, at present, Moscow sees George Shultz's and the liberals' faction in the United States, as seeming to be on the losing side. There are certainly questions in Moscow over the usefulness of signing an arms-control treaty in 1987, with a political faction of the United States which will be out of power, and therefore unable to implement it, during 1988.

At best, Soviet readings of the present American power struggle, are very uncertain. Moscow's treatment of Weizsäcker and their attitude toward Shultz's cherished dream of an agreement this year, suggest that certain bottom-line guidelines have been issued at the latest June 25-26 Central Committee Plenum. These guidelines, in summary, appear to be: When in doubt about the political factional refinements in targeted nations, apply pressure on those nations without regard to factional considerations.

So, Western public figures, such as Weizsäcker, Shultz, and others who act as Russia's ambassadors of good will, to the extent that they continue to be members of target governments, will receive the hostility which Moscow reserves for those governments without any special consideration for its useful fools. The treatment of Weizsäcker and Shultz should serve as a warning to others: The so-called East-West relationship is rapidly being taken away from the realm of ideologies, political preferences and politics, to the realm of raw, naked, interests of state. For the Kremlin, the takeover of West Germany's technologically sophisticated economy, is a matter of irrepressible state interests. Whether that takeover is accomplished by guile, betrayal, threat, or by violence, makes no difference. This seems to be what Moscow is signing with its increasingly provocative posture.

So, the question comes up, can the United States afford George Shultz and his policies of appeasement at a time in which each concession to Moscow brings forth a new, more brazen demand from Moscow? Perhaps it is time for Shultz to resign, as the Soviets suspect he will.