

being stripped of all their possessions—in some cases, right down to the clothing they wore. The other main targets of the mobs were warehouses and homes of relatively well-to-do party and government figures.

As a leader of the Uzbek movement against the cotton monoculture told Western journalists by telephone from the republic's capital of Tashkent: "People in the villages are living on the edge of poverty and subsisting on bread and water because of the monopoly on cotton. There are 1.5 million unemployed in Uzbekistan. The real reason for this unthinkable slaughter is the economic, political, and cultural frustration of the people."

'Crisis ministry'

Back in Moscow, the Stalin-style crackdown preparations were well-advanced even before Gorbachov's departure for Bonn. Nikolai Ryzhkov, reelected as Soviet prime minister, addressed the Congress of People's Deputies on June 10 to outline a vast purge and reorganization of the Soviet government, to be completed before the end of June. Had the ultra-Stalinist content of that speech alone been honestly covered and commented on in the Western media, "Gorbymania" would already belong to the past. The measures he announced include:

- The creation of a new "crisis ministry" is being created, called the "State Committee for Extraordinary Situations," with extraordinary powers to deal with "unrest, disasters, and accidents."

- The reduction of the currently more than 100 U.S.S.R. ministers and chairmen of state committees, to only 10, with roughly half the changes involving transfers, and the other half outright dismissals.

- The reduction of the number of members of the U.S.S.R. Ministries and State Committee 112 to 57; the number of ministries for branches of the economy goes from 52 down to 32.

- The vast purge will not touch the ministers and ministries concerned with internal security. The ten ministers who will stay on at their posts prominently include Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin.

Huge as it is, what is presented here is merely the known, confirmed dimensions of the huge purge that will be ratified when the Central Committee convenes June 26, for the third extraordinary, formerly unscheduled, plenum within a mere five weeks. This dynamic alone, totally without any precedent, underscores what sort of extraordinary, and nasty, shocks, jolts, and eruptions, one can expect from the Soviet Union very soon.

The purge will go much further, and perhaps even before the month of June ends. Many leading Soviet figures are bound to become casualties, but the biggest casualty of all will be the global condominium, already mortally wounded, and the disease it spawned—"Gorbymania."

Turkey squeezed by external crises

by Thierry Lalevée

Since the May 1 demonstrations which led to riots in Istanbul and elsewhere, there has been no respite on Turkey's internal political scene. But this agitation pales in the face of the international political crises hitting the easternmost NATO nation, reinforcing its sense of isolation and confirming the Turks' fears about European stubbornness in rejecting their application for membership in the European Community.

A case in point is the outcry over the tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees whom Turkey took in last year, after they fled the chemical weapons onslaught of the Iraqi Army. While Iraq was much denounced then, concrete efforts to resettle these refugees by financing the building of new villages have not been forthcoming. Most European countries have blocked Kurdish refugees from their territory; recently Britain required visas for Kurdish refugees and Turkish citizens alike, after some 1,000 Kurds had reached England.

Things came to a head after a visit by Danielle Mitterrand, the French First Lady, to Turkey last month. The fact that the visit was organized by the new French ambassador, Eric Rouleau, should have aroused suspicions in Ankara. Rouleau had to leave his first and last diplomatic posting, Tunis, much earlier than planned, amid reports that he was plotting against the prime minister, Mohammed M'zali. Anyhow, as soon as Mrs. Mitterrand was safely back in Paris from her private and humanitarian visit to Turkey, she held a high-profile press conference denouncing Turkish human rights violations against the Kurds. While a diplomatic crisis was narrowly averted when she stressed in subsequent interviews that these were her private views and not those of the President, the case was made.

When in the first week of June, hundreds of Kurds had to be hospitalized for what looked like systematic food poisoning—of which many died—the finger was pointed at Ankara. Officially, Iraqi intelligence services were blamed for the operation, but, British media and others implied, Ankara was guilty by association and failure to prevent it. The BBC gave heavy publicity to the charges against Turkey aired from Damascus by Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani. Then, the new successor to Khomeini as Iran's spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, made a much publicized defense of the Iraqi Kurds in the fight against Baghdad. All heads turned toward Ankara.

But while the Kurds and Mrs. Mitterrand made it to the

world's front pages, the ongoing crisis between Bulgaria and Turkey received no such fanfare. Not until Prime Minister Turgut Özal lambasted the West on June 13 for ignoring that crisis, did the State Department agree to make a formal denunciation of "Bulgaria's ill treatment of its Muslim community." The crisis had started in early May when Sofia sent paramilitary forces, and then the Army to repress Bulgarian Muslims' protests against the Bulgarianization process set into motion in 1985: Muslim- or Turkish-sounding names were changed into Bulgarian Slavic names, speaking Turkish in public has been banned, and the mosques closed down.

When Ankara moved politically and diplomatically to defend the Muslim community, Sofia decided to play the game of open borders, officially meaning Bulgarian Muslims could leave for Turkey. In reality, the Army was deployed to herd thousands of Bulgarian Muslims, either of Turkish ethnic background or Slavs converted to Islam in the Ottoman era, to the borders. Without any belongings but a bag, with no compensation for houses or properties left behind, they are being summarily dropped at the Turkish frontier. Since early May, more than 10,000 have been expelled that way, forcing Ankara to build emergency refugee camps on its borders. Besides the problem of integrating these refugees into Turkish society, the issue of how many intelligence agents the Bulgarian authorities mixed in among the refugees is no less troubling.

But if this crisis has been lingering since 1985, why did Sofia change policy suddenly in May 1989? The level of internal revolt within Bulgaria, even though it grew larger by the year, is no explanation. Many Turks believe the cause lies in Moscow, and especially the way the Soviet Union has been recently protesting Ankara's decision to modernize its forces and major military bases. Hence, the Bulgarian Muslims are paying the price of a direct crisis between the NATO and Warsaw Pact.

It could thus be expected that would Ankara be the recipient of NATO solidarity. Instead, the U.S. Congress cut some \$50 million in aid to Turkey at the end of May. The pretext? Some days earlier a Soviet pilot defected to Turkey with his MiG-29. While rejecting Soviet pressures to extradite him back to Russia, Ankara agreed to return the plane. This was a normal procedure; moreover, the MiG-29 is no longer Russia's most advanced fighter and is known to Western services. Yet, Washington rebuked the Turks for having kept them from inspecting the plane.

The new U.S. Ambassador Morton Abramowitz arrives in mid-June in Ankara, with the mandate to give Turkey the West Germany treatment: neutralization. And the United States is making it clear that if Turgut Özal does not agree with this agenda, it is grooming an alternative—Suleyman Demirel, a former right-wing premier in the 1970s whose leadership pushed Turkey to the brink, until the Army intervened in 1980. Maybe his longstanding Freemasonic connections make him a better known entity in Washington.

A 'new' Afghanistan same old sauce in a

by Ramtanu Maitra and Susan Maitra

Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's recent visit to the United States was the occasion for a media-hype that a new Afghan policy is on the anvil. Both President Bush and Prime Minister Bhutto stated that the United States and Pakistan are "in full agreement" over the new policy. Afghan President Dr. Najibullah—whose removal, along with the return of 3 million refugees to Afghanistan, was otherwise identified as the solution to the Afghan crisis by Miss Bhutto recently—added to the hype: Najibullah praised the Pakistan government for its "change of Afghan policy."

The political-military equations on the ground in Afghanistan, taken together with recent public discussion of strategy by the Mujahideen guerrilla forces, point to the fact that for the next three to four months any "new policy" is not likely to add up to more than a variation on the old one of attempting to deal a convincing military setback to the Kabul government.

It was the failure of the Mujahideen, despite heavy losses, to capture the Afghan cities of Jalalabad and Khost, that gave rise to the speculation that a "new Afghan policy" was at hand. But considering the limited options open now to the Mujahideen, and to Pakistan, efforts will most likely continue to attain even a partial military victory in the battlefield and thus re-establish the Mujahideen's credibility. Until the Afghanistan plains start receiving ground frost in October, the Mujahideen will widen the battlefield and try to capture at least a few provincial capitals from the Kabul regime. The hope is that such a policy will bear fruit and provide the Mujahideen the necessary leverage to discuss a political solution with the Soviet Union—a suggestion which the Pakistani prime minister has made a number of times in the recent period.

Tactical errors

Backing up this "new" policy is the word from Peshawar, Pakistan, that the Mujahideen have come to realize that they had made a tactical mistake by concentrating their firepower only on Jalalabad, following the Soviet troop withdrawal in