

Interview: Gen. T'eng Chieh



How we can overthrow the mainland China dictatorship

This interview—Part III in a series—was conducted by C.M. Lao, publisher of the Chinese Flag Monthly, in Taipei, June 14, 1989. General T'eng is an elder statesman of the Kuomintang party (KMT) in the Republic of China on Taiwan. He was a close adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and is today Taiwan's leading military strategist.

Lao: You have said that if the Communists kill all the student leaders, their regime can hold onto power for quite a long time. But you also said that if there were intervention by an outside power, this could help accelerate the doom of the Communists. Can you give us a more specific explanation?

General T'eng: At the present moment the Communists cannot cut all their ties with the outside world. We have to use all sorts of relations and channels to help the mainland Chinese to hasten the doom of the Communists as much as possible. For this purpose, our party and government should assume very important responsibilities. It is much easier for us to do so now, since the mainland Chinese have been trained by the Communists. Everybody knows how to organize. They know how to fight as well. It is true that they are poor, and have no modern facilities, and they even have trouble printing a single leaflet—we saw on the television screen how the students at Tiananmen [Square] were duplicating leaflets using a primitive wax matrix and a roller. If they got photocopy machines, it would be much easier. So money and high-technology equipment is all they need. We should support them fully.

We offer support instead of seeking to impose leadership. We should support them in every way, and link up with them to merge together into one single unit. This support can spread the student movement everywhere on the mainland, and this is also our political plan of attack. This kind of participation and support require the organization of the whole Chinese people everywhere in the world to foster these developments. How should we proceed to organize them? There are two important ways. First, we should create an invisible leadership cell to take full responsibility for everything. Sec-

only, we should develop the right spirit, a spirit that can be trusted reliably to strengthen the dynamic of revolution, and to bring the people into the revolutionary camp.

In addition to these two points, we have to develop a practical plan to carry out this project. From now on, there will be a power struggle in mainland China. Who will take part in this power struggle? As I have already said, the participants will be the soldiers in the Communist army and the secret intelligence services. In their hearts many are actually anti-Communists; but those people are relatively few. How can we free them from Communist control, and when the right time comes, how can we use them to inflict the most deadly blow against the Communists? For this we require a highly competent secret plan.

Today our enemy seems to be going downhill. If we know how to use the strength of the people efficiently, we will soon be marching on the path to early success. Now we already have good pre-conditions to implement our plan against the enemy. We already are superior in manpower, financial power, logistics, and high technology. If we can efficiently exploit this superiority in practical warfare, we will have the guarantee of victory. Effectiveness in warfare is a question of wartime leadership. In the last analysis, wartime leadership must be correct. Therefore, we may say that we have prepared everything and we are merely waiting for the correct wartime leadership.

Who will assume this burden of responsibility? It must be the ruling party, the Kuomintang. But our party members in Taiwan have lived a prosperous life for a long time. So nobody has paid attention to military studies. Not only do they not understand military affairs, but, except for our soldiers, they also lack the will to resist. Therefore the people in Taiwan are better at development and weak in fighting. You don't find "total war" or "people's war" in any book in the countries of the free world. Total war is a new military theory which developed from Lenin through Mao Zedong by actual fighting experience. Just like the other democratic countries, Taiwan has only a few people who read the writings of the Communists. They don't study the Communist

methods of warfare. If we talk about war, we only talk about conventional war or nuclear war. So we are completely ignorant of the Communist methods of warfare.

If you want to defend yourself against Communist people's war, if you think in terms of conventional warfare, that is a very backward idea. To defeat the Communist people's war, we have to wage total war, primarily with political means, backed up secondarily by military means. Using this kind of total war, we can prevent bloodshed and easily solve the problem that the Communists pose for us. This is the right time to carry out this total war, so the entire chain of command, especially the chain of command in the party, have to study total war—then we can create optimal conditions among our leadership.

In the present situation, if we want to form this kind of centralized leadership, we have to depend on the knowledge and experience of the older generation. They can provide the expertise required for our military preparations. The second and third generations should carry out the task. In this way we will have a visible, tangible cooperation among the older people, the middle-aged people, and the younger people who will be welded into a single unit. If we can establish a correct and efficient leadership of this type, then we can fully exploit this opportunity to recover mainland China, and we can avoid wasting any more time. But to create this kind of organized political force including all strata of society is not easy.

Lao: In regard to the democracy movement on the mainland, many people have proposed using the military forces of the R.O.C. to help the students, but our government officials have assumed a very cautious attitude. Even in the middle of May, the government here forbade the KMT members of the Legislative Yuan to bring up this question in the parliament. Numerous scholars, especially professors at the International Relations Institute of the Chungchi National University, had warned us in newspaper articles and television interviews not to give the Communists a pretext for attacking Taiwan and in so doing to transform their internal crisis into a foreign aggression.

Even though the professors gave special emphasis to this, they could not prevent a few people from insisting on a military intervention on the mainland. Therefore, President Lee and General Hau made separate speeches on June 8 and 9 to press and television journalists. President Lee spoke of "counter-motion by no motion," and General Hau stated that the armed forces are strictly concerned with the defense of Taiwan. After this, some people still had divergent opinions, including particularly the reaction of the overseas Chinese. They thought that the profile of the R.O.C. government was too low.

Frankly speaking, those who insisted on a military attack have raised three questions that we need to discuss and clarify. The first question is, that the massacre at Tiananmen proved that the Communists depend in the last analysis on

military power, since they used their military forces to deal with all their problems. If we want to overthrow the Communist regime, can we hope for success if we refrain from using our own military forces to destroy theirs?

Secondly, our late President Chiang Kai-shek pointed out that the recovery of mainland China is based on an effort that is 70% political and 30% military. This did not mean that we renounced the use of military power. Does what we are doing now come down to abandoning the use of military power in order to recover mainland China?

Thirdly, some people stressed that we should not provide the Communists with any excuse to attack Taiwan and transform their internal crisis into a foreign aggression. How real is the threat of Communist attack? Communist China has so many internal problems; would they ever be able to attack Taiwan? If the Communists intend to attack Taiwan, the majority in mainland China will not support them. How can they solve their internal conflicts by attacking us? The Communists already have a very bad international image. If the Communists really started an invasion, would that not mean complete suicide for them? Since we have been hoping for this kind of situation on the mainland, why are we so timid now? The decision to go to war is a ponderous decision for the whole nation. Since people have these questions, how can we avoid giving them a clear answer? But these matters are very sensitive, and it is difficult for government officials to give any further explanation. Therefore, I hope that you as a scholar can give us elucidation.

General T'eng: Your questions are very important, because without military power there can be no war. Therefore, how can we use military power directly or indirectly to exert decisive influence on the outcome of war? First we have to note that this is a total war. Military power, even though it is the central resource in warfare, represents only one visible part of total warfare. What percentage of total war is accounted for by military forces themselves? The principles laid down by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek show that 70% is political and 30% is military. According to this, total war is based primarily on political factors, with military forces as an auxiliary.

This does not mean that we give up military action. Let us look at the invisible side. Military forces must be ready to attack at all times. Back in 1949, when the government withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan, our late President Chiang Kai-shek had already set up a defensive policy that improved our strength from inferior to superior, so that we can turn defeat into victory. The withdrawal from Hainan and Chou Shan islands was necessary because of this defensive policy. The victory at Quemoy [Kinmen] and the victory in the artillery battles starting Aug. 23, 1958 show the superiority of this defensive strategy in action. The result was that our enemy did not dare to take any further military actions. This has allowed Taiwan, Penghu [the Pescadores islands], Quemoy, and Matsu to enjoy 40 years of stable development

on the basis of the Three Principles of the People.

We have created a miracle of economic construction, so that our manpower, our financial power, and our high technology have gone from relative inferiority to a superior level. This kind of change is a product of our superior military defense. Without this superior military defense, we could not have attained our achievements of today—that much is clear.

This kind of change also creates the preconditions for taking the offensive. That means that today our military defense is not strictly military in character. Actually it has already developed a successful political offensive. This function is invisible, but those who study this question must see it clearly, for otherwise their study will be insufficient. To maintain our superior level of defense, we must accept a certain limitation in our use of our armed forces.

Today we have to pay more attention to continuing the development of our political counterattack, so that we need not be overly concerned about being attacked ourselves, and can devote our attention to directly mounting the political counterattack on mainland China. If we follow this principle, then military power will become the central factor in our waging of total war, and this will guarantee our march to final victory. Of course, this does not mean that we will not use military power to attack mainland China. If it is necessary, we will consider using military action. But the military forces we intend to use on the mainland should not come from Taiwan.

We should use the military forces that are already on the mainland. How can we make use of the military forces within the mainland? This is a task that must be achieved by political warfare. This is exactly like the Revolution of 1911. To overthrow the Ching Empire, since we did not have any military forces, we transformed the imperial army into the revolutionary army. I have repeated this many times that the army cannot exist without the support of the people. Since the entire population of mainland China are opposed to the Communists, it is certain that the Communist soldiers are in their hearts also hostile to the Communists. Because the Communist army is totally blindfolded, or kept in line by the threat of attack by pro-Communist units, they dare not show their opposition to the regime in public. If we can figure out an effective method of acquainting the army with the true situation and eliminate the blackmail coming from the other units, then we will be able to turn the Communist army into an anti-Communist revolutionary army. If we can do this, then the powerful impact of these troops will doom the Communist Party.

Our goal is not completely to eliminate our enemy, but rather to force him to surrender and to build a new life under the Three Principles of the People. This is the result we are seeking in revolutionary warfare. Using a direct military assault to attack the mainland will stimulate the inhuman reaction of our enemies, and the result will be beyond anyone's control. As we know, our enemy has no superior power

to overcome us, but they have a nuclear deterrent force. We have to take this into careful consideration.

Don't forget that we are fighting against Communists—we are not fighting against any normal enemy. Since the Communists dared to carry out the massacre at Tiananmen, how could we ever be sure that they would not dare to use their nuclear weapons? What we have to do is to maintain our superior defensive capacity, and determine the best method of consolidating the anti-Communist commitment of the mainland Chinese. We should form leadership cells within

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the entire mainland population, and concentrate our efforts on splitting their army and dissolving their secret police, and winning them over to work for us, thus bringing success within our grasp.

Lao: You have already given us a very clear analysis and prognosis about the mainland situation. There are many questions about the overseas Chinese we would like to have answered. After the massacre, all the overseas Chinese, whether they had been pro-Communist, extreme right wing, or neutral, all turned into anti-Communists. This was also the case in every nation in the world. This is the first time in 40 years that our enemy has been compelled to retreat, thereby giving us the advantage. If the situation continues to develop in this way, what will the result be? And what methods ought we to use?

General T'eng: In the early morning of June 4, the news of the Tiananmen massacre was broadcast to the world, and evoked a reaction of rage everywhere. All national governments, overseas Chinese, and even part of the diplomatic corps of the Communist regime itself strongly condemned the massacre. Especially the mainland students studying abroad organized anti-Communist demonstrations. That is exactly what the Chinese proverb says: "He who errs from the true path [*dao*] will receive less assistance from his fellow men." Even his relatives will avert their faces from him. So

the Communist regime has been totally isolated among the nations.

Any disadvantage for our enemy is bound to be an advantage for us. How much advantage we can receive depends solely on how we respond. The most influential country in determining the degree of our advantage and of the enemy's losses is the United States, followed by Japan, and then the other countries. Therefore we should pay special attention to the motives of the United States government and of the Japanese government.

In this, we must consider that a disagreement in principle is involved. Our cultural tradition is concerned with justice and not with profits. This is a founding principle of our nation, and we will not give it up. But other nations may not agree with this principle of ours. Many countries are concerned with profits and are indifferent to injustice. Therefore, we cannot judge the motives of others according to our own feelings, nor can we expect other people to treat us according to our own principles.

This means that we should clearly understand what the principles of other nations are, so that our diplomatic work can be conducted smoothly. The reaction of the American people to the Tiananmen massacre seemed to me to be the strongest. In the House of Representatives and the Senate there was total agreement that the United States should mete out the most serious condemnation and censure to Beijing. This represents the truthful voice of all Americans. The attitude of President Bush did not satisfy the wishes of the Congress. Even though Bush canceled arms sales and asked American citizens to leave the mainland, James Lilley, the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing, made a series of conciliatory statements, and also announced that the United States would not impose any further economic sanctions. None of this had any serious effect on the Communist regime. None of this stopped the Communist regime from launching a manhunt against the leaders of the democracy movement.

Why did Bush refuse to take more decisive anti-Communist attitude? Because he was more concerned about the triangular relationship with Communist China and with the Soviet Union, and about trade relations, personal friendships, and avoiding the loss of all the effort invested in relations with Beijing. The massacre created a conflict between justice and profit. What should Bush have done? I hope that he will be able to unify justice and profit. As for us, we should aggressively increase our essential relationship with the United States, according to our plan.

We will do the same thing in regard to Japan. We must help them to understand the advantages and disadvantages that emerge from the conflict between justice and profit. Since Japan has invested large amounts of money in mainland China, with the United States in second place, they are concerned about the possible total loss of their investments. Therefore, their condemnation and sanctions against the Communist regime were so weak and cautious.

Castro seeking deal with Bush

by Gretchen Small

Under a cloud of confetti about a drug war, Cuba and the Bush administration have entered a new phase of negotiations toward reestablishing relations. With Moscow the silent partner in this elaborate dance of back-channel negotiations, acrimonious public attacks and diplomatic "signals," there is no doubt that the big push toward a deal is on. What is in doubt, is who in Cuba shall be the beneficiary of the deal.

Engaged in open battle with Gorbachov, and well aware of Washington's efforts to also curry favor with potential successors, Fidel Castro proved in July that he is willing to sacrifice whatever and whomever he can to ensure that it is he who keeps the franchise on power.

On July 11, Castro took to Cuba's airwaves to announce that his government now wishes to open "communications" with Washington on fighting drugs. Two days later, Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, a once-close friend deemed potential opponent, and three others were executed by firing squad, on charges of "carrying out hostile actions against foreign states, trafficking in toxic drugs, and abuse of authority."

"There are two kinds of Communists," Castro explained in his annual July 26 anniversary of the Revolution address: "Those who let themselves be killed easily and those of us who won't let ourselves be killed at all."

Havana Trials, 1989

The cover for both operations—the executions of opponents and negotiations with Washington—is a suddenly discovered "intolerance" for drug trafficking in Cuba.

The Castro regime, which has used narcotics trafficking as both a source of funds and the cutting edge of warfare against the other nations in the Americas for two decades, launched its anti-drug charade on June 14, with the announcement by Armed Forces Commander Raúl Castro that the popular army general, Arnaldo Ochoa, several aides, and top officials of the Interior Ministry had been arrested. The Cuban nation was told that Fidel and Raúl Castro had discovered with horror that this small group had cut drug-running deals with the Medellín, Colombia drug cartel in the last three years.

What followed next was a spectacle not seen since Sta-