

EIR Feature

The coming bloodbath in the Soviet bloc

by Paul Albert Scherer


West German specialist Gen. Paul Albert Scherer (ret.) offered a series of prognoses and forecasts about the evolution of the Soviet empire and the Communist world in general, at a press briefing on Oct. 18 at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

General Scherer is one of the leading experts in the world on the political and economic affairs of the Soviet empire. He has had a career as a journalist and as a security consultant, and was, for a number of years in the 1970s, the leader of the military intelligence and counterintelligence of the Bundeswehr of the Federal Republic of Germany. During that time General Scherer was a personal and security adviser to then-Federal Chancellor of Germany Helmut Schmidt. He was introduced to the audience by Webster Tarpley, who also translated his remarks:

Let us talk first of all about the situation of blindness which we are in in the Western world. There is a tremendous fascination with Gorbachov in the Western world, and this fascination is so great that the scene is dominated by wishful thinking. In the past two years or so, I have begun to make public appearances, and begun to become a public figure, which is something that the former chief of an intelligence service does not normally do. It is the case that if you know more, you have an obligation, and if you do not carry it out, you are guilty.

The necessity that we have today is for leadership from the United States as the leading power of the Western world. The situation is going to become more and more tragically difficult in the weeks and months ahead. With that, our responsibility to coming generations increases.

When we look at the Eastern bloc, we cannot use the eyes of Western civilization. The power situation in the East bloc has changed in a way that is dangerous. We think that you have heard today that [Erich] Honecker was resigned, and that his successor is now Egon Krenz. I don't want to brag, but I made this prediction to a number of congressmen at the Capitol yesterday. I gave a speech here in this



Stuart Lewis

General Scherer speaks at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. "I gave a speech here in this building on April 29, 1989. At that time, I made a prediction that there would be a raining down of blood in the East bloc, and some people did not want to believe it at that time. Today, I will say that the rain of blood is going to be substantially more severe."

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People who know something about the Russian winter may have some idea of what I am talking about. But before we examine the winter situation, let us examine the power situation in that part of the world.

I will talk about the Gorbachov group. I must note at the beginning that "Gorbachov" is not an individual, not a one-man rule, but the rule of an elite; the Nomenklatura are agreed that they don't want one-man rule. The Gorbachov group is now running the gauntlet through the valley of exhaustion of the Soviet empire. The background to this situation is that the Soviets are exhausted and their resources are insufficient. I think that this changing situation is being judged far too benignly by many observers in the West.

Gorbachov has been brought in; he is the number-one figure of the Soviet Union, the crown prince of Andropov. He was brought in as part of an attempt to overcome this situation of exhaustion. Suslov, now deceased, but who used to be the ideology pope of the Soviet bloc, described Gorbachov as somebody who was an extremely dynamic bundle of energy. He is, at the same time, absolutely a man of the regime, a man of the system. That is our starting point, because that is Gorbachov's starting point.

Gorbachov has now been in power since March 1985, and for the first two years things generally went well for him—they went well in terms of domestic policy, they went well in terms of foreign policy also. The group of modernizers that came into power with him has changed substantially in these four years.

My analysis proceeds from the idea that there are four pillars of power in the Soviet system, and that these four pillars of power are not all favorable to Gorbachov. First, we have the party. The party is publicly criticized by Gorbachov for incompetence. The party is shaken by these attacks, and is also shaken by the loss of power of the party, and by the constant purges that are carried out against the party. Therefore, in the party what we see today are very strong conflicts of loyalty, the kind we saw in the Khrushchov period when Khrushchov attempted to carry out a reform of the party in the period after 1962. Gorbachov is the one who has begun to talk about sabotage on the part of the party.

I make the estimate that in this part of the Soviet elite, the party, in terms of what they are actually thinking among themselves, two-thirds to three-quarters are actually in an anti-Gorbachov position.

Let us now go to the second pillar, which is the government apparatus. What I want to point to is not simply the government apparatus, but also the engineers and technocrats who make up the defense industries. The Gorbachov group has been forced to change its positions in order to meet the demands of the military industrialists and this part of the economic management structure. The government apparatus does not support Gorbachov's actions even though he has succeeded in becoming President and, through various manipulations and tricks, at least formally speaking, has accumulated powers that are similar to those of Stalin.

I will give one example. Recently, for reasons of his own personal security, Gorbachov brought special units of the security forces under his own personal command. This action parallels the SS division that was brought under Hitler's personal command. Therefore, Gorbachov knows what kind of danger he now finds himself in. The government apparatus

is no longer really pulling with him.

Let us now turn to the third pillar, the military apparatus. The flight out of Afghanistan that the Soviets were obliged to undertake has meant a very severe test of the Soviet military establishment. The political administration of the Red Army, the people who are the dictators of education for the troops, have come into danger, and cannot operate the way they want. There are certain conditions of disarmament that the General Staff does not want to accept. The military apparatus for these reasons is now rather strongly divided, and no longer enjoys a strong representation in the Politburo and other top organs.

Let us now turn to the fourth pillar, the internal security apparatus. The internal security apparatus would have special difficulties if the question of the abolition of the police state were to arise. There is now growing concern in the five key areas of the internal security apparatus—the KGB, the GRU, the police, the militia, and special divisions of the Interior Ministry. But I would say that the security apparatus is absolutely behind Gorbachov; they support him and they support his policies. But the concern among these organs is growing about the disintegration, the paralysis, the psychological situation among the masses.

Glasnost is today a razor that is being held at the throat of the entire Soviet regime. The purpose of *glasnost* was to activate the masses and bring them into the field of political activity as a weapon against the Nomenklatura.

So, the one group that is actively supporting Gorbachov in his policies is the intelligentsia. But the intelligentsia simply does not have the same kind of significance that the internal security apparatus, or the Nomenklatura and other forces in Soviet society have.

The masses

The Soviet masses are under the very negative impact of a food supply situation which is already worse than it was in 1953. You have to remember that in quite a number of factories that were deemed insufficient, the wages were cut by 25%. Russians notoriously have a sweet tooth, they like ice cream even in the winter time. But now sugar is being rationed and is very hard to come by. The same goes for soap and other basic commodities.

Now you also have a price explosion. One of the results of that is that about 60% of pensioners are below the poverty line. There is a tremendous loss of trust and confidence in the party, and that has been brought about by the Gorbachov group itself. And that loss of confidence is now compounded by the food crisis.

What you hear very commonly from the Soviet man on the street is something like the following: Gorbachov talks and talks and talks, the party is absolutely no good, and we are going to hell.

In addition to this loss of confidence in the leadership, you also have a loss of belief in the system, which is a central factor for future developments. I won't be telling you

anything new if I say that Stalin was a criminal. Nor will I be telling you anything new if I say that Brezhnev's group and his 18 years of rule are now being described as a dangerous and bad period. If you take a population and you take away their belief in the system in this way, if you tell them their history has all been worthless, then what will their response be? They are going to be extremely depressed.

Then we have the impact of the Afghan situation. This is a very significant part of the experience of the Soviet masses. There were a lot of soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Large numbers have come back as cripples, as paraplegics, and they tell stories of how bad the situation of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan has been.

Then we have the fact that the Soviet leadership has lost its information monopoly, which, in a closed society like theirs, is a small revolution in itself. In the Ukraine, you had the Chernobyl incident, and a lot of the inside information about what actually happened there has begun to spread among the Soviet population. Things have gone so far that a lot of the jamming apparatus for foreign radio transmissions, which had been turned off, is now in action again.

In addition to all of this, we have had the rail strikes in the summer, we have had the strikes of miners in the Donets Basin, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan, and this has brought the morale level of the Soviet population to zero. If we take into account that Gorbachov was obliged to send a telegram of congratulations to his Hungarian comrades, on the fact that they had liquidated their own Communist Party, then we have an idea of the profound shocks to which this apparatus has been exposed.

To summarize, for man as a strategic factor: This is a sinking ship. Everybody who thinks about this would like to get off that ship if they can.

We are dealing not only with Great Russians here, we are dealing with 130 nationalities with their corresponding languages, and their various ethnic conditions. We have to conclude that this entire construct is now entering into a period of a lethal social-psychological disease. It is a terminal, mortal disease that has grasped the entire organism, the nationalities who are able wish that they had left the Soviet Union yesterday, rather than tomorrow.

The other image I might use, without exaggeration, is that this can be compared to the plague in the Middle Ages. And of course, as soon as the plague appeared, everybody wanted to get out of the cities where it appeared.

Lenin said that this Russian empire was the prison house of peoples. This state, this entire political construction, is today an obsolete creation of a colonial type. This construction, this empire, has been held together by the ideology on the one hand, a kind of secular religion, and on the other hand, of course, by the police state apparatus.

Time as a strategic factor

Now that I have discussed man as a strategic factor, let me speak of time as a strategic factor.

We can clearly sketch the importance of the strategic factor of time, using the signals that the Gorbachov group itself has sent us. We have Gorbachov's attempt to get the Supreme Soviet to approve a comprehensive ban on strikes for 18 months, and that request was not honored by the Supreme Soviet, but rather, all he got was a partial strike ban over a shorter period. What this very negative signal for Gorbachov signifies is that he is not going to make it through to February 1991 unless he can prevent all strikes in such key areas as railroads, mines, and so on.

The second signal came from Shevardnadze when he visited the United States on his way to Wyoming. He asked, demanded, wished, requested for Gorbachov, a summit with President Bush before Christmas of this year.

There are other speeches by Gorbachov saying that he needs another two years in order get his operation together. So, we can now rule out any idea that time is working for Gorbachov. There is no way that *perestroika* could reach any sort of success before the year 2010. That is the professional estimate of German bankers who have made inspection tours of the Soviet Union. There are some of them who say there will be no success of *perestroika* in the industrial area until the year 2020. You may know that there are now management courses being given in Germany for Soviet planners and managers.

The Russian winter

Let us now turn to this coming Russian winter. The food supply, the situation of heating, the standard of living—all of that is going to deteriorate even further. We have reached a point very similar to another period of Russian history, 1904-05. It is also similar to 1917, during the Kerensky regime. Japan had been awakened from its own Middle Ages in the 1890s, with aid of the United States, and resurgent Japan had obtained its military victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and that external military defeat led to a revolution throughout the entire Russian Czarist empire. The Trans-Siberian Railroad had been completed in 1896. What happened in 1917 was that there was a series of very large strikes on the Trans-Siberian Railroad which essentially cut off Siberia from the rest of Russia.

I am of the opinion that, without exaggeration, a similar situation of strikes and paralysis is going to hit the Russian rail network before Christmas of this year.

In the spring of next year, 1990, will come the final decision whether the current elite, the Gorbachov group, will be able to stay in power or not. The West naturally wants the success of Gorbachov. That is understandable if we assume that the possible successors are going to be much more brutal than he is. If you read the newspapers, you would assume that Gorbachov is a very serious person, that he and his group have attempted to implement a very serious policy. But if you are in the Soviet Union and you want to save the system, you can't just be serious in your policy. If Gorbachov were

to try to do that he would be ousted immediately.

So, we have to assume that war is going to be waged on two levels. I don't like the term Cold War, the term is disinformation in itself. Speaking soberly, we are living in the Third World War. It has reached a certain kind of truth position in places like Afghanistan. The Third World War actually began in 1948 with the blockade of Berlin. That was a time when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly over the entire world for about four years. The Americans at that time would have been in a position to oblige and force the Soviets to conduct free elections in Eastern Europe. It is an honor to the United States that you did not attempt to use that to obtain worldwide domination. But at the same time the United States exhibits a naiveté that is horrifying, the kind of naiveté that we saw when Carter kissed Brezhnev, and this naiveté has not gone away, it is still with us.

Let me quote a 1983 statement of Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB for 18 years. He was the person who directed the final solution in Budapest in 1956, when he was Soviet ambassador to Hungary. "We are ready to respect the interests of the United States, if the United States is ready to do the same thing for we Soviets in Eurasia." Think about this, and look at the situation today, and you get the idea that what U.S. policy is doing is corresponding to this proposal by Andropov.

There are, therefore, global understandings of the superpowers. And these are not desirable. One example is the Strategic Defense Initiative. Another is the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations. A third example is the likely withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Federal Republic of Germany.

If we look at the European situation, we see that Poland and Hungary say "yes" to the perspective of their integration into the West. The French, British, Italians, and others are somewhat disappointed by the course of events, and are relatively careful. I must confess that I was ashamed of Germany, that there was so much "Gorbymania" during Gorbachov's visit, which was a very inappropriate thing for the Germans to do. But now, that psychological situation has been thoroughly changed by new events.

Right now, we have to face the strategic demands of the Soviets. The Soviets want the denuclearization of Europe. The Soviets want the halving of strategic armament, and they want conventional disarmament. The Russians try to present themselves as the inventors of peace, and they try to paint NATO as the opponent of peace. You know for yourselves that the Soviets are world champions of deception, of manipulation, and of disinformation, especially through the use of agents of influence. I, as former head of a counterespionage service, have concluded that the underground war waged by the Soviets is still being waged in every way.

Above ground, in the visible area, we see disinformation. Underground, there is a war of intelligence agents. At the same time, there is use of liberation forces and the export of revolution. Some of the deception operations, for example,

Soviet workers defy strike ban

Three weeks after his Oct. 2 demand for a nationwide ban on labor strikes was transformed by the Supreme Soviet into a ban on strikes in vital industries (just about everything except for the faltering consumer goods sector), Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov took to *Izvestia's* letters-to-the-editor page, to plead with workers not to strike any more. His request had little effect on the ever more desperate Soviet labor force.

On Oct. 25, it became known that coal miners in all the 12 coal mines of Vorkuta, north of the Arctic Circle, had walked off the job at midnight on Oct. 23-24. In defiance of the strike ban, the Vorkuta strike committee put forward pay and benefit demands, but also political ones: elimination of Article 6 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, which defines the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the "leading force" in society; direct elections to the post of President; direct elections for all People's Deputies; and official recognition of miners' strike committees as trade unions.

Oct. 23 also saw a two-hour warning strike by miners in the Kuzbass coalfields, Siberia, which the Soviet news agency TASS said was motivated by "the non-fulfillment of a series of points agreed with the government commission after the July strike." In the Kuzbass, the miners were joined by other local workers, including from the sector which most threatens to bring the Soviet economy to a full halt—the railroad employees.

Nor was that all. In fact, the Soviet Union is beset by every sort of strike. Coal strikes. Port strikes. Threatened cement strikes. Threatened subway strikes. Warning

strikes. Manipulated strikes. Strikes blending into nationalist protests. And, even personal strikes, so to speak, in the form of surging absenteeism in industry.

Winter strikes

The gravest strike threat looms in the transport and energy sectors. As the strike ban was debated in the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda* came out on Oct. 4 with an assessment of the impact of rail and coal strikes to date. Goods shipments, it said, have been "stuck at border railway stations in Moldavia, seaports in the Baltic, and so forth. The former and the latter have been paralyzed by strikes. The rail minister reported the following overall figure: Because of the disorders, there are 100,000 freight cars 'not working,' that is, standing idle, in the country each day."

Deputy Prime Minister Lev Voronin spelled out the impact of the strikes, the ethnic clashes in the Transcaucasus, and the non-labor-related transportation snarls, as a shortfall of goods delivered that was 50% higher in the third quarter than in the first half-year of 1989. In July and August alone, 4 billion rubles worth of consumer goods and 1 billion rubles worth of food were not delivered. In September, 300,000 tons of produce were not shipped. "Two million tons of imported freight including grain, sugar, and light industry goods, cannot be moved from seaports. . . . The time that ships spend standing idle has to be paid for in convertible currency. The cause of the problems is the shortage of freightcars."

As for fuel and raw materials, *Pravda* said, the coal shortfall for September alone was 3 million tons, including 600,000 tons of coking coal. Metallurgical plants are threatened with "standstill," since they only had three days' coking coal stocks on hand. "Fuel reserves at thermal power stations have been drained to the minimum and coal stocks for the population's needs are only one-half of last year's figure. Let us repeat the point: the frosts

are used to cover up massive Soviet arms exports which are still taking place. That is a demand of the Soviet military production sector, their military engineers and managers, who demand that high levels of military exports be maintained.

With the oil prices on the world market continuing to fall, the Soviets are in no position to renounce arms exports. They bring in approximately 1 billion rubles per day. The same goes for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia can in no way allow itself to go onto a soft line. Czechoslovakia produces a very significant part of this arms export.

There are some developments that look good. These are façades. It looks like certain military positions in Vietnam are being given up. It looks like things are being done to Cuba. It is an advantage for the West that 55,000 Cubans

are now leaving Namibia or Angola. It is important that Mengistu in Ethiopia is no longer being fully supported.

But in Afghanistan, very little has changed. The Pakistanis are being neutralized. The Iranian government is playing the Russian card insofar as Afghanistan is concerned. The arms deliveries to Nicaragua are being continued. And the liberation movements in Latin America are never without Soviet help.

Now, I would like to give you an estimate of the entire course of events. In 1920, the United States abandoned European politics with a great deal of disillusionment because they believed that the Versailles Treaty was going to bring another world war. Over the last 81 years, we have had a tremendous development of civil wars, a kind of worldwide civil war. It is

are approaching and they will spare no one—neither strikers, nor those intending to strike, nor those who work conscientiously.”

The Russian Republic's daily *Sovetskaya Rossiya* reported Sept. 29 from a meeting of the Supreme Soviet's Transportation, Communications and Information Technology Commission, that “the complex of questions connected with the long-term development of transportation . . . is perhaps causing the greatest anxiety” in the country. From January to August, the commission was told, the shortfall in freight shipments, due to work stoppages alone, was 40 million tons of goods.

Other types of transportation were threatened, the article said. In Moscow, “like a bolt from the blue,” a strike committee was formed of Moscow Subway workers, who are discussing a package of demands, including “to almost double the drivers' pay, that is, to raise it to R900 a month.” It was argued that this would close the gap with the pay of regular railway workers. V. Tetenov, chairman of the parliamentary commission, called this yet “another example of group selfishness. Every conflict like this, if it is expressed in a strike, is a heavy blow to the whole country's economy.”

More threats

The threat of a nationwide construction strike was part of the lead-up to the Supreme Soviet's ban on strikes. The official trade union daily, *Trud*, reported Sept. 21 on a “warning of a possible mass strike by the [energy] sector's construction industry workers, caused by the cement shortfall.” The threat came in a telegram from an ad hoc committee of the construction workers' (official) trade union, to state planning and supply officials. It said that “150,000 construction industry workers within the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry system will find themselves unemployed and unpaid in

the next few days.”

At issue was a reduction of the the cement allocation to the centralized construction industry by 153,000 tons, so that that amount could be sold “through the trade network” to the population—e.g., construction cooperatives. *Trud*, which deliberately publicized the strike threat and thereby built up the sense of an emergency, said that the union committee session was “stormy, with passions boiling as they did in the mining towns” last summer.

If the threat relayed by *Trud* seemed to introduce the element of official (or factional) provocation into the strike picture, the news from Ukraine showed the potential for strikes to break out of all controls and merge with nationalist resistance movements in the captive nations. On Oct. 3, Agence France Presse said that miners from 21 pits in the Lvov-Volinsk coalfield, in western Ukraine, stopped work for two hours to protest failure to honor strike agreement commitments by the authorities last summer. This news came from Ukrainian Helsinki Watch sources, at the moment of the Supreme Soviet debate on the strike ban, and just after a huge Ukrainian demonstration in Lvov. The same day, workers at “a number of firms” in Lvov also struck for two hours, to protest the brutality used against that Oct. 1 demonstration. The stoppage was called by a strike committee, founded in Lvov on Monday, Oct. 2.

Just after the strike ban, *Pravda's* Oct. 5 front page editorial called for “discipline” and “dictatorship of conscience,” in order to meet market requirements for all sorts of goods. In the process of describing how bad the crisis has become, *Pravda* revealed that worker absenteeism is idling trains, machines, and entire shops and plants. In the first six months of the year, 12,465,000 man-days were lost due to absenteeism (compared with 2,000,000 man-days lost from strikes in that period), reflecting the widespread disgust among Soviet workers. Every day, 95,000 people fail to show up at work.—*Rachel Douglas*

now 45 years ago that the friendship with Uncle Joe was broken. But all of the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam have remained, without any attention to the fact that there have been no free elections in Eastern Europe.

I stress that the opposite coast of the Atlantic Ocean, the European coast, must be maintained for the free world. Why? This is where we have to look at the third factor in strategic estimates, the overall strategic potential.

The old Roman Empire could only exist so long as it held the entire Mediterranean basin, and held the opposite coast, the African coast, under its control. Western civilization can only remain alive as long as the Atlantic can function as a kind of internal sea of Western civilization. There never will be, in all of history, a repeat of such a large amphibious

operation as the Normandy invasion. The two military technical revolutions that have taken place since 1945, rule that out absolutely.

The key to the door of the future lies in Europe. Why? Look at it the way the Russians do for a moment. They have the idea of the “common European house,” an invention of Brezhnev. What that means in strategic terms is 500 million producers. That is the biggest market in world history, the Russians want to get into it. If the Soviets were able to dominate that market, by getting the U.S. out under the slogan “Yankee go home,” then the lights would go out here in the United States and everywhere else on the Atlantic also.

I have been talking about three strategic factors: man; the development of strategic potentials, and the time factor. All

of these factors are working against the Soviets, provided that the United States be not so blind as to pull its troops out of Europe. What is essential is that through the summer of 1990, the United States armed forces remain in Central Europe, with their full complement, and their full nuclear protection, and that has got to be done even though the financial situation inside the United States creates serious difficulties.

I set that as a strategic timeframe for a number of reasons. In the present strategic situation, Poland is not going to survive. That is tremendously deplorable. The West Slavic population of the Poles has grown up as an integral part of Europe. The fact that no abortive revolution has taken place so far, is obviously to the credit of the Roman Catholic Polish Pope. The Russians, building on their experience after 1980, have decided to bring in Solidarnosc, and oblige them to take a part of the responsibility for what is going on, and as a result of taking that responsibility, Solidarnosc will be wiped out.

If the Poles, as unfortunately seems likely, go into a state of collapse with extreme turbulence, this will mean that the logistical lines of supply for the 20 divisions that the Soviets maintain in East Germany, will come under extreme danger of interruption.

It is possible, and I hope that this is not going to happen. In East Germany, you now have Krenz in power, and he is nothing but a fundamentalist Communist. It is quite possible that the insurrections could appear this spring, and East Germany could go into a state of all-out civil war. I live in the area of Saarbrücken. Egon Krenz made a visit there, and stated on German television, we of the East German leadership would immediately carry out the Beijing solution, if counterrevolution were to rear its head in our country.

Look at the last five to six weeks in the German Democratic Republic. About 100,000 people have fled the country, in the full light of world publicity. This has had the effect of a thunderbolt striking the Kremlin. First, there were 7,000 demonstrators in the streets. The week after that, it's 10,000 in the streets. By this week it is over 100,000 demonstrating. I can only hope that this threat by Krenz will not be carried out. But the loss of power by the regime is quite evident in East Germany, as in Poland. It's anarchistic.

Looking ahead to 1990

I will make a forecast. If Gorbachov and his group are able to survive into the summer of 1990, they will then be ousted in one way or another. One possible way is assassination. There could be a conspiracy followed by a coup d'état. It could come also through insurrection, through a mass upheaval, with paralysis in the transport area, and also the nationalities. If you know the mentality of the Great Russians, and also the Byelorussians and the Ukrainians, you know that a civil war under these conditions would be extraordinarily bloody. Look at the figures. You are talking

about more than 50 million Ukrainians. You are talking about a total of 30 million people in the Transcaucasus. You are talking about 55 million people in the Muslim southern belt. And you are talking about the large masses of people in the core of the empire, in Russia itself.

The situation is going to be about the conflicts of these forces, and the attempts of many of them to get away. I would like to be wrong on this, because this kind of thing brings with it war consequences.

This is not to exaggerate. Here are some of the scenarios which are possible after what I have just described, after Gorbachov. After Gorbachov can come, as a first possibility, a radical Communist, Beijing solution. That means a brutal crackdown designed to destroy what the Russians would call a counterrevolution. That applies to Poland, it applies to Hungary, to East Germany, and it applies to the Soviet Union itself. Because in the broad spaces of the empire, there is no way of avoiding it.

A second scenario: fundamentalist Communists, with a flight forward strategy against the outside world. It is possible that a part of the military forces, in particular a part of the land army, won't go along with this. It could be the case that a psychological paralysis, after the operations in Afghanistan, and after repeated interventions against the Soviet population, will become stronger. But a surprise attack against Western Europe remains a possibility, especially through air attack. That would be with *spetsnaz* troops, and second, nuclear blackmail against the United States.

A third scenario: tougher reformers than Gorbachov. They would be stressing Great Russian nationalism with open fascist overtones. These Great Russian fascists would attempt to get rid of Gorbachov with a putsch. They might open the door to a Finlandization of Poland, Hungary, and other areas of Eastern Europe. They might make an offer of some kind of peaceful coexistence, with a market of 500 million consumers open to the West Europeans. They may attempt to raise the fascination of the common European house. They would attempt to neutralize Germany because of the great psychological danger, and would be able perhaps 20 years after that to actually attain world domination.

There certainly are other scenarios. But I will stick to these essential ones.

Let me summarize briefly. The first group would be radical orthodox Communists, who want to stamp out the sparks of counterrevolution that are now burning in so many places. That will necessarily lead to insurrections, to general strikes, and similar phenomena. That would lead to a decomposition of the empire, starting in the peripheral areas.

Second scenario, the fundamentalist Communists with flight forward aggression to the outside. This means the Fourth World War, if you accept my proposition that the Third World War actually began in 1948, and went under-

ground into proxy wars and similar things after the Korean conflict. The truce in that war has been in place since about 1982, since the end of the Brezhnev era.

This second scenario is the one most dangerous for us, especially dangerous if the American political leadership should be so naive as to refuse to see this danger. If the American politicians are that naive, then it is possible that this rotten empire, economically rotten and psychologically rotten, could still prevail.

The third scenario is also extremely dangerous, because it seems to offer a softer line. The American strategy and American positions really play very little role in this third scenario, because the necessary precondition for the third scenario is that U.S. troops will have already left Western Europe.

You have still this idea of a balance of power, which the British have practiced in the past. You have a certain French nervousness about a united Germany with 85 million people, and that brings this kind of thing back into play. And nobody can deny that a market with 500 million consumers does exercise a certain fascination.

I am convinced that Gorbachov will fall, he will trip, he will stumble, in the same way that I predicted that Honecker would be out. I would add to that the prediction that Poland, for economic reasons, even with Western aid, simply will not make it.

We have ahead of us an extremely dangerous course of events. It is therefore obligatory that we proceed with our eyes open and our judgment sober. Gorbachov came to East Berlin for the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the G.D.R., and he made a very interesting comment: If you come too late, you pay with your life. What he meant was to apply to Honecker. But it applies to Gorbachov as well. If Gorbachov comes too late, and he does, he comes twenty years too late, then Gorbachov will pay with his life.

The Gorbachov group and Gorbachov himself are totally overestimated. It is a consequence of wishful thinking in the West, and of Western complete inability to understand the categories of thought and action that exist in the East.

All of the strategic factors I have indicated speak eloquently against the continued survival of Gorbachov in 1990. I feel that if we wish to save Western civilization in this crisis, it is necessary to examine these conditions I have referred to, and the basic facts are known to think tanks in the West.

We must be tough about drawing the consequences from these facts.

I will conclude with a quote from T.S. Eliot, from *Murder in the Cathedral*. "Man stumbles from unreality to unreality, because he refuses to see."

It is part of our own human evolution that we must fight to be able to see. If we don't want to be the victims of Soviet seers' disinformation, we have got to keep our positions the way they are until the summer of 1990.

A dialogue with General Scherer

On Oct. 19 at a luncheon in Washington sponsored by EIR, Gen. Paul Albert Scherer responded to questions from members of the U.S. military and intelligence community, both active and retired.

Q: Is there any chance that things will get so bad, and maybe Gorbachov if he is tough enough, if not as tough as Stalin, or somebody else, will say, "Let's let the United States have it, and launch their atomic weapons"?"

Scherer: They wouldn't undertake a total thermonuclear assault, because they are not suicidal, in my opinion. The Soviet tactics in the START negotiations, the attempt to cut strategic weapons in half, indicates that the Russians would not attempt a thermonuclear first strike in the classical, full panoply. If there were to be a nuclear attack on the United States, it would probably come in the form of the destruction of a single, large city. They would probably expect that, in retaliation for that, one large Russian city would be destroyed. And I would say that the United States is not strong enough to wage a world war. Whether the Russians are strong enough is unclear. I would have to assume that they are.

Q: Returning to the concept of the idea of civil war, the fundamental problem of the Soviet Union today is economic. If the country falls into civil war, then how is the economic problem going to be solved?

Scherer: There is no solution to the Soviet economic problem. It won't be solved. You have to assume that, first of all, in this coming winter, several hundred thousand people, if not millions, are going to die of hunger. Whatever the West tries to deliver, and the West is talking about delivering wheat and freeing Jews, it won't work. It is a totally anti-human situation of the Russians. But there is no solution but civil war, it is anarchy. One force against another. It will be like China, when warlords took over.

Q: But then, how does the Soviet Union stay a world power?

Scherer: Modern nuclear missile war, which can be waged just by pushing buttons, is always possible.

Q: But they aren't suicidal.