

Military strategist refutes Wohlstetter doctrine

by Leo F. Scanlon

The defense budget is virtually assured the center ring position when the congressional circus comes back to town in Washington this month, and previews of the Bush proposal indicate that cuts in weapons programs and closures of domestic military bases will hit the regional economic base of many congressional districts with a vengeance.

The ensuing political brawl is sure to divert attention from the much more insidious strategic premises which underlie the defense strategy of the Bush administration; strategies which were outlined in the January 1988 report, entitled "Discriminate Deterrence," issued by the President's Commission on Long-Term Strategy, otherwise known as the Wohlstetter Report.

To this day, the central thesis of that report has been refuted loudly by the lone voice of Lyndon LaRouche, who issued a 1988 presidential campaign statement pointing out that "The essence of the Wohlstetter Report is, that it proposes the strategic decoupling of the United States from the defense of Western Europe and the Western Pacific." The LaRouche document concentrated on presenting an alternative to the Wohlstetter strategy, in confidence that "patriots situated to do so will tear the Wohlstetter Report apart, shred by shred, in other published locations."

The November and December issues of the magazine *Defense Science* serialize an article by noted defense analyst Sam Cohen, entitled "Competitive Strategies: a Sow's Ear From a Silk Purse?" which tears a devastating hole in the fabric of the Wohlstetter Report.

An insider speaks

Sam Cohen is considered to be one of the fathers of the enhanced radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, which was conceived and developed during his wide-ranging career in nuclear weapons research. The neutron bomb was an early (if not the first) breakthrough in the development of "discriminate" tactical nuclear weapons. This weapon did not fit the strategic prejudices of the Rand Corp. thinkers centered around such as Alain Enthoven, Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and other devotees of the theology of Mutually Assured Destruction, and thus was never employed in a useful manner.

This same group has lately become the advocates of Precision Guided Munitions (smart weapons), which they believe will allow Western technological advances to offset the

immense numerical superiority of Soviet forces in Europe, a concept which has been dubbed "Competitive Strategies." The advantage of this concept, according to Iklé, is that these conventional technologies can be deployed without "crash program" methods, and are a counterweight to SDI-style systems which inherently threaten the MAD order. So-called "smart weapons" provide the "discriminate" deterrence which justifies major force reductions by the United States in the European theater.

Cohen hammers on several fundamental technical points which call the value of this strategy into question. He reports that in all the years of debate, there has never been an official study of the extent to which enemy countermeasures might degrade PGM effectiveness versus the measures required to degrade the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. His own research indicated the obvious fact that nuclear munitions provide a decisive margin over chemical weapons—a conclusion apparently shared by Soviet military planners who developed and fielded an array of such tactical weapons, and NATO commanders who never showed enthusiasm for the so-called conventional PGM deterrent.

Further, Cohen points out, NATO doctrine assumes that the Soviets would never use nuclear weapons preemptively, and thus avoids the fundamental question: "Why would the Soviets dread so much the prospect of having to be the first to use theater nuclear weapons?" Especially since nuclear weapons are the most effective counterthreat to PGMs.

"Soviet declaratory military doctrine," Cohen says, "would dictate that if they wanted to win the war as quickly as possible with the least damage to their own forces, that is precisely what they would do: conduct a disarming first-strike (using discriminate nuclear weapons, which Soviet doctrine clearly calls for) against NATO, followed up by quick occupation of Europe by their ground forces."

'Oxymoronic war games' and Marshal Ogarkov

The self-delusory process which avoids facing this basic reality is bolstered by war games conducted by NATO strategists—war games which are, by Cohen's description, completely rigged. In the "play house" world of war games, the Soviets are never allowed to employ nuclear weapons in a way which would obviate the self-proclaimed advantage of the NATO systems.

Further, the Soviets are never assumed to utilize basic

Further clinical insanity: Scowcroft would ban MX

National security adviser (and former Kissinger Associates partner) Brent Scowcroft wants the United States to eliminate the MX missile. According to the Jan. 14 issue of the *Washington Post*, Scowcroft suggested to President Bush that the U.S. offer a deal to ban future deployment of 50 U.S. MX missiles in exchange for the Soviet Union's agreement to eliminate 20 SS-24 missiles already deployed and agree not to deploy any more.

Scowcroft wanted Secretary of State James Baker III to make the proposal to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze when Baker goes to Moscow Feb. 6-7, but, according to the *Post*, was blocked when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said he opposes elimination of the MX, because it is a more powerful weapon than the single-warhead Midgetman. Scowcroft's plan has the strong backing of Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who has told the White House that it would make it easier for any arms control treaty between the superpowers to be ratified by the Senate.

camouflage, cheap decoys, and other techniques which easily degrade the effectiveness of "smart weapons." (For technical reasons, it is only necessary to move the impact point a few meters in order to protect many of the targets of "smart" weapons.)

According to Cohen, U.S. forces in West Germany recently "fought a mock battle where an enemy tank company had been detected, attacked by aircraft and artillery . . . whereupon it was discovered that only two of the 11 enemy tanks were actually tanks" the rest were decoys. This is only one of many illustrations of the ability to "spoo" the PGMs. The Soviets are recognized masters of this capability.

An even more basic calculation made by Cohen shows that "From a cost effectiveness standpoint, since these . . . weapons systems will probably have costs comparable to those of nuclear delivery systems, the ratio of the cost required for target destruction [with PGMs] to the cost of protecting targets . . . could readily favor the Soviets."

It should be no surprise to learn that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (who previously headed the Soviet Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception), is the leading advocate of these new U.S. conventional capabilities.

Cohen asks the obvious question: "Is it possible that the

Soviets . . . had determined effective countermeasures . . . to the new U.S. technology and were telling the U.S. what it wanted to hear, to encourage it to follow an ineffective strategy?" The answer to this begs the bigger question, what is the real origin of the Wohlstetter Report and its support for decoupling the NATO alliance?

'You can call me Meier'

Cohen finally makes the apt analogy between today's devotees of utopian theories of war and weaponry, and the disaster brought upon Germany by their predecessors among the Nazi elite. Most famous in this regard is boast that British bombers would never reach Berlin, made by Hitler's sidekick, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, head of the German Luftwaffe. He declared: "If that event occurs, you may call me Meier" (a common Jewish name of that time).

Goering had been convinced that the theoretical kill probabilities of new anti-aircraft weapons would make good his boast. Unfortunately, the weapons had been tested under conditions similar to modern NATO war game simulations, and, concludes Cohen, "Goering was taken in by a group of high technologists and analysts who seem to have peddled a line rather similar to that we've been hearing about PGMs. . . . The ghost of Goering could come back to haunt this high-tech (at least on our side) battlefield."

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