

Further clinical insanity: Scowcroft would ban MX

National security adviser (and former Kissinger Associates partner) Brent Scowcroft wants the United States to eliminate the MX missile. According to the Jan. 14 issue of the *Washington Post*, Scowcroft suggested to President Bush that the U.S. offer a deal to ban future deployment of 50 U.S. MX missiles in exchange for the Soviet Union's agreement to eliminate 20 SS-24 missiles already deployed and agree not to deploy any more.

Scowcroft wanted Secretary of State James Baker III to make the proposal to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze when Baker goes to Moscow Feb. 6-7, but, according to the *Post*, was blocked when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said he opposes elimination of the MX, because it is a more powerful weapon than the single-warhead Midgetman. Scowcroft's plan has the strong backing of Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who has told the White House that it would make it easier for any arms control treaty between the superpowers to be ratified by the Senate.

camouflage, cheap decoys, and other techniques which easily degrade the effectiveness of "smart weapons." (For technical reasons, it is only necessary to move the impact point a few meters in order to protect many of the targets of "smart" weapons.)

According to Cohen, U.S. forces in West Germany recently "fought a mock battle where an enemy tank company had been detected, attacked by aircraft and artillery . . . whereupon it was discovered that only two of the 11 enemy tanks were actually tanks" the rest were decoys. This is only one of many illustrations of the ability to "spoo" the PGMs. The Soviets are recognized masters of this capability.

An even more basic calculation made by Cohen shows that "From a cost effectiveness standpoint, since these . . . weapons systems will probably have costs comparable to those of nuclear delivery systems, the ratio of the cost required for target destruction [with PGMs] to the cost of protecting targets . . . could readily favor the Soviets."

It should be no surprise to learn that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (who previously headed the Soviet Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception), is the leading advocate of these new U.S. conventional capabilities.

Cohen asks the obvious question: "Is it possible that the

Soviets . . . had determined effective countermeasures . . . to the new U.S. technology and were telling the U.S. what it wanted to hear, to encourage it to follow an ineffective strategy?" The answer to this begs the bigger question, what is the real origin of the Wohlstetter Report and its support for decoupling the NATO alliance?

'You can call me Meier'

Cohen finally makes the apt analogy between today's devotees of utopian theories of war and weaponry, and the disaster brought upon Germany by their predecessors among the Nazi elite. Most famous in this regard is boast that British bombers would never reach Berlin, made by Hitler's sidekick, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, head of the German Luftwaffe. He declared: "If that event occurs, you may call me Meier" (a common Jewish name of that time).

Goering had been convinced that the theoretical kill probabilities of new anti-aircraft weapons would make good his boast. Unfortunately, the weapons had been tested under conditions similar to modern NATO war game simulations, and, concludes Cohen, "Goering was taken in by a group of high technologists and analysts who seem to have peddled a line rather similar to that we've been hearing about PGMs. . . . The ghost of Goering could come back to haunt this high-tech (at least on our side) battlefield."

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