
Interview: Eugene Sujanszky

National problems in Eastern Europe go back to post-World War I treaties

Formerly an Hungarian insurgent in 1956, Mr. Sujanszky is currently president of the Association des Combattants hongrois de la liberté (Association of Hungarian Freedom Fighters). He was interviewed Jan. 23 by Joelle LeConte Rosenberg in Paris, and the interview has been translated from the French by EIR staff.

Q: Could you talk to us about the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, of Clemenceau's role, and of the errors of French policy?

Sujanszky: Incontestably, all the national problems which one sees suddenly arising in Eastern Europe had their origin in the policy errors of the winners of the First World War. Instead of creating a Europe based on peoples' right to self-determination, with the treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Saint Germain, and the Treaty of Trianon, they redrew the borders from inside an office, a negotiating room, without asking the opinion of the people who lived in those territories. And naturally, this artificial cutting-up created the kernels of discord between the neighboring states in central and Eastern Europe. The consequences, above all those of the Treaty of Versailles, with the elements of it that were so negative for the German people, were the development of totalitarian ideology among populations exasperated by this unjust treaty.

The Treaty of Versailles is therefore responsible for the birth of Nazism. (I must remark that the other factor that favored the development of Hitlerism in Germany, was the danger of Marxist-Leninist Bolshevism, which in that era had already shown that it represented neither the working class, nor social justice, nor peace, but was an ideology based on the oppression of peoples by a terrible police terror, and which caused, between 1917 and 1933, a veritable genocide in the Eastern Part of Europe, territory of the Soviet Union.) The countries of Central Europe and of the East, including Germany, were particularly concerned by this Bolshevik

danger which threatened the Weimar Republic.

So, on the one hand, unbearable conditions for the population had been created by the Treaty of Versailles, and, on the other hand, the imminent threat of seizure of power by the Bolsheviks was developing, thus permitting Hitler to develop his totalitarian theory as a self-defense solution. Without the Treaty of Versailles and without Bolshevism, which was manifesting itself in a more and more dynamic imperialism, Nazi totalitarianism would never have been able to develop in the midst of the German population, nor take power on the occasion of an election in 1933.

Of course, the Treaty of Versailles affected the Germans, but at the same time, it created political instability between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and between Germany and Poland. The Treaty of Saint Germain and the Treaty of Trianon dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Empire and created a hotbed of potential flareups in Central Europe and in the Balkans. Hungary suffered the most from the Treaty of Trianon. If you look at a geographic and political map of the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, Hungary appears as a sovereign and independent state with a territory of 300,000 square kilometers, with natural borders to the east and south, formed by the Carpathian Mountains, whereas in that era you don't find a trace of countries like Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. After 1920, with the Treaty of Trianon, this thousand-year-old territory was sliced up unjustly, without a plebiscite, without a referendum. The borders had been redrawn at the negotiating table of Palais Trianon, such that two-thirds of the millennium-old territory of Hungary was detached and attributed to two newly created countries, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and to Romania, which doubled its territory with the acquisition of Transylvania. All this artificial cutting up, without taking popular will into account, nor the principle of self-determination, created in Eastern Europe animosity between neighboring countries, which the Great Powers manipulated for their own interests.

The masterpiece of these unjust treaties was the blind policy, imbibed of sentiments of vengeance vis-à-vis the Germans and Austro-Hungary led by Clemenceau, president of the Council, and by France, a policy which enormously contributed to the development of conditions that allowed Hitlerism to reach power in Germany. France's and Clemenceau's policy are, indirectly, responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War.

Q: What do you expect from the famous perestroika policy of Gorbachov?

Sujanszky: It must be realized, 70 years since this unjust treaty, imposed arbitrarily by the winners in World War I, that many problems remain still as unhealed sores on the body of European society. And these more or less scarred, but still, unhealed sores are very adroitly utilized by Gorbachov in the framework of perestroika. We know very well that the Soviet Union's policy has always been very supple and capable of making unpredictable contradictory turns, which surprise and disorient their enemies. The first perestroika of Marxist-Leninist imperialism was produced in Lenin's day, when he abandoned the principle of Marxism-Leninism which consisted in suppressing all private property and reestablished, on a provisional basis, private property in agriculture, during the NEP [New Economic Policy].

The second perestroika, which took the whole world by surprise, took place in 1939, when Stalin signed a treaty with his mortal enemy, Hitler, the famed German-Soviet treaty. And he even turned over to the Nazis, German Communist militants who had taken refuge in the U.S.S.R. after Hitler took power. It is incontestable that Stalin wanted to provoke the outbreak of the Second World War between the Third Reich and the Western democracies, because he hoped that the belligerents would weaken each other and Europe would be ripe for a Bolshevik revolution. And if revolution did not produce itself in a European country, then the Red Army, intact, would set off to obtain the Bolshevization of all of Europe.

Hitler's clear victory in the West upset the plan of Stalin. That is why he hoped that Germany, to bring England to its knees, would undertake a grand invasion action by the Wehrmacht into the British Isles. Meanwhile, Stalin prepared a formidable military concentration on the western frontiers of his empire, primed to unleash a blitzkrieg attack against Germany when Germany's army was fully engaged in combat with England.

Hitler figured out the ruse of Stalin, who had used the German-Soviet treaty as a trap to spring World War II, and he gave up his invasion plan against England and launched a surprise attack on the Soviet Union: That was "Operation Barbarossa." It is an indisputable historical fact that the aggression of the Hitlerian army against the Soviet Army was a preventive war; otherwise some weeks later, the Soviet Union would have taken Germany by surprise.

For tactical reasons, to deceive Hitler and the Western democracies, the Soviet Union was able to do an about-face, and to ideologically disarm and upset so many sincere and idealistic communists around the world.

The third perestroika of Soviet Union: The regime of Tito, after 1945, was considered by Moscow as the most solid communist regime in Europe, outside of the Soviet Union. In 1948, for strategic reasons, it was denounced by Stalin as a traitor regime, which had become the "lackey of the American imperialists."

With these spectacular changes in Moscow's tactics, Tito, one of the most loyal and authentic communist leaders, turned into an enemy to be beaten. Of course, seven years later, in 1956, for tactical reasons, the same Tito, the "mad dog of American imperialism," became again, in Moscow's official line, a "communist comrade of great and authentic value."

The fourth perestroika, the most important in the history of the Soviet Union, was Khrushchov's decision to launch de-Stalinization in February 1956 during the XXth Congress of the Communist Party. Stalin, considered by communists around the world as the greatest personality of universal history, the "father of the peoples," he who had conquered Hitler, who opened the radiant future of communism for all the "oppressed," was suddenly booted out by the new Kremlin leader and treated like one of the biggest criminals of universal history.

With these perestroika tactics, Moscow wanted to put the vigilance of the free world vis-à-vis Soviet imperialism to sleep and to create an adequate policy for unleashing the era of "peaceful coexistence." In all the satellite countries, the ruling Communist Party immediately lined up on the new orientation of Moscow, retransmitted by the KGB conveyor belt. The liberalization of Khrushchov's regime resulted in a consequence unforeseen in the Soviet plan, the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution of October 1956. The extremely supple and deceptive tactics of Moscow provoked unexpected consequences: Moscow had to utilize the means of Stalinism: the intervention of the Red Army, policy-state terror, to channel events.

In the course of these 30 years of "peaceful coexistence," inaugurated and unleashed by Khrushchov with his de-Stalinization, the Soviet Union has made strategic advances on all the continents (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Cuba, and Nicaragua). We reached, thanks to the sound policy of Reagan, a situation where Moscow felt the need to develop a new tactic so as to put the vigilance of the free world back to sleep, and recover its imperialist dynamism, which had slackened.

It's in this framework that we must view the perestroika of Gorbachov. He is trying to give a new image to the Iron Curtain countries which is very sympathetic, because he promises a democratic transformation based on respect for human rights. In the wings, it's the same all-powerful KGB

pulling the strings—The KGB which, since its founding by Dzerzhinsky under the name of Cheka, has remained the major builder and guardian of the Soviet Union as a world power.

We must not forget that Gorbachov is the protégé of the KGB and that the whole apparatus of this super-political police stand behind perestroika. How can one believe in the sincerity of transformations of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism toward an authentic democracy without the removal and suppression of its major support, the KGB?

The Communist Parties are crumbling to dust in the East bloc. But on the contrary, the secret police, the KGB's subsidiaries—although this is well dissimulated in Western media and public opinion—remain intact. The nationalities problems, an untreated sore since 1920, and even earlier, are very adroitly utilized by perestroika, and hence by the KGB. Certain events are provoked which tear open the tender scars and cause the unhealed, merely disguised, sores to appear.

The KGB is trying to draw on the sympathies of the great Western powers by its policy of perestroika, which is nothing but a ruse to obtain the maximum support from the peoples of the free world, and this support must not be only political and mediating, but also economic and technological, which is what the Soviet Union today needs so badly.

In ripping open the scar tissue of old wounds, Moscow leads people to think that the existence of the central power of Moscow is necessary in order to prevent nationalist discord between the peoples of Eastern Europe and of the center. It's a remarkable, adroit, and deceptive, tactic whose efficacy can be measured by the willingness of Western politicians to get into bed with Gorbachov and the Soviet Empire.

Q: What is going on with Transylvania, the former province of Hungary which was attached to Romania in 1920?

Sujanszky: Being Hungarian, I am of course very sensitive to the problem of Transylvania, unjustly detached by the wrong policy of Clemenceau in 1920—detached from Hungary and stuck onto Romania without a plebiscite, without respecting the principle of self-determination of peoples. Nonetheless, my main concern remains the difference of conception which exists between democratic societies based on the respect for human rights, and the totalitarian Marxism-Leninism embodied by the Soviet Union. In this framework, territorial problems, which do indeed exist, pass for me into the background. I think that in a united, free, and democratic Europe, such thorny problems, which originated from unjust treaties of the past, are going to find their equitable solution, which will have to be founded on reciprocal loyalty between peoples, on respect for the human rights of minorities, and on the principle of self-determination of peoples. But to get to that point, Marxist-Leninist imperialism, which has committed innumerable crimes against humanity in the same way as Nazism, must disappear definitively off the world political chessboard.

Book Review

A journalist's view of the Pacific War

by Dean Andromidas

Pacific Microphone

by William Dunn

Texas A&M University Press, College Station,
Texas, 1989

399 pages, hardbound, \$19.95

If you have read several histories of the Pacific War or biographies of General Douglas MacArthur, then I highly recommend *Pacific Microphone*. This very readable book is the wartime memoir of a CBS correspondent who covered the Pacific beat, starting a few months prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War to the Allied victory in August 1945. Make no mistake, the book does not intend to be a history, but is Mr. Dunn's personal memoir of his experiences in that historic conflict. Its usefulness lies in the ability of the author's anecdotes and personal observations to add a third dimension to so many of the modern two-dimensional histories, dry books that, more often than not, are revisionist tracts that only succeed in distorting history to the purpose of their authors. Although Mr. Dunn is clearly a conservative by political persuasion, his observations are not at all made through ideological spectacles.

Being fairly well read in the Pacific War, this reviewer found that many of Mr. Dunn's personal observations and anecdotes lent greater insight into the events, political developments, and leading personalities that were part of that great war.

Mr. Dunn left for the Far East at the beginning of 1941, on a 90-day assignment that lasted nearly four years, first touring the pre-war U.S. colony the Philippines; the colonies of the British Empire including Singapore, the Malay states, Burma, and India; and the Dutch East Indies and China. He also visited pre-war Japan, observing its war mobilization, which was even apparent to a newscaster's superficial glance.