

Bush arms control sellout will leave Europe disarmed

by Leo F. Scanlon

The weeks leading up to the May 31 summit meeting between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachov have provided the opportunity for the Soviets to wring humiliating diplomatic and strategic concessions out of the Bush administration, in return for which the Soviets have "agreed" to maintain their current military superiority on the European continent. The ludicrous spectacle of Secretary of State James Baker groveling before Gorbachov in Moscow, insulting Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, and then claiming victory in the negotiations, has provoked loud protest against the Bush men from their heretofore docile conservative supporters. News articles and editorials have attacked Baker's performance, and a group of congressmen has written a letter demanding that the White House put an end to the charade.

But outrage alone will not derail the Bush administration's plans for the upcoming summit, since that script is written without consideration for military or strategic matters. The Soviets are well aware that the military policy of the Bush administration is subordinate to budgetary considerations, and the Soviet high command is satisfied to let the ongoing collapse of the U.S. economy do their "negotiating" for them. This circumstance has reduced Bush to begging the Soviets for an arms control agreement which will provide cover for the next ratchet collapse of the U.S. defense infrastructure. In return, Bush has agreed to sabotage the anti-bolshevik resistance movements in East and West which pose the immediate threat to the tyrants in the Kremlin.

The clock is now running on events out of the administration's control. It may be that the upcoming summit sellout will trigger the destruction of the political consensus which has supported Bush's treachery.

Soviets snooker Bush negotiators

Even the most cursory examination of the record of negotiations leading up to the latest summit meeting shows that the Soviets have been using the talks as a means of securing support from the Bush administration for the crackdown and suppression of the resistance movements. In fact, there can hardly be any other purpose for the START talks, since the weapons systems involved (primarily mobile missiles and cruise missiles) are inherently concealable and not easily subjected to any counting or verification regimens cooked up in a treaty agreement. The fact that the administration has agreed to move ahead on negotiations over numbers of warheads, while leaving verification matters to be resolved at a later date, is evidence that everyone knows there never will be verification of the terms of the agreement.

The START treaty proposes to reduce land-based strategic missiles. For the Soviets, this means reducing their SS-18 force from its officially admitted size of 308, to 154. This is a 50% reduction—except that the Soviets intend to modernize the remaining missiles with modifications which will make the smaller fleet more lethal than the original 308. When Baker proposed to limit that modernization, he was told to get lost, and the U.S. has dropped this demand. The pathetic approach of the Bush strategists was to impose limits on flight testing which would prevent the Soviets from determining the reliability of the modified missiles, thus degrading their value as a first-strike weapon. Not surprisingly, the Soviet military has practically laughed out loud at this scheme. At the pre-summit meeting on May 19, Soviet officials told Baker that "the U.S. should be satisfied with the commitment to a 50% reduction" in numbers.

The fiasco further involves the SS-24 and SS-25 mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which the Sovi-

ets have been producing in prodigious numbers. The Soviets have simply refused to entertain any discussion of limitations on these weapons, and Baker has no possibility or intention of changing that fact. For budgetary reasons, the U.S. Congress will not be funding development of comparable rail or road-mobile systems. Finally, the Soviets have made it clear they will not tolerate intrusive verification procedures necessary to monitor such systems, and have announced that they have been violating the INF provisions on this count.

A related matter is the question of non-deployed missiles. The mobile systems in question, and the heavy ICBMs, can be fired and re-loaded from stockpiles which are uncounted. Given the demonstrated Soviet position on intrusive verification, these stockpiles will remain uncounted, and the Soviets have given no indication of including the matter in the treaty on a face-saving pretext.

Baker surrenders cruise missile edge

This entire issue becomes even more problematic when cruise missiles are considered. U.S. strategy relies heavily on the deployment of an array of highly accurate cruise missile systems, especially air- and sea-based, to provide deterrence in the face of Soviet superiority in other systems. The stand-off capability which cruise missiles provide is a critical aspect of the defense of the European theater in the post-INF treaty period. In early May, Bush put a higher premium on these systems when he told the NATO ministerial meeting that the U.S. had decided to abandon plans to modernize the Lance (short range, surface-to-surface) nuclear missile, and would also withdraw nuclear artillery from Europe.

The deployment of the 600-mile-range Air and Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) in the European theater was designed to offset the "no modernization" decision, a range which would allow these missiles to hit massed armor formations on Soviet territory in the event of conflict. But in the recent negotiations, Gorbachov agreed that the Soviets would not demand restrictions on the latest American cruise system, a long-range missile named "Tacit Rainbow" (and would exempt it from counting in the strategic column) if the U.S. would accept a 375-mile limit on cruise missiles ranges. On May 18, Soviet military negotiators announced that Tacit Rainbow would be subject to range limits as well. Desperate to secure the "deal," Baker sent a letter to Shevardnadze describing U.S. intentions with respect to planned modifications of the system, providing assurances which caved in to the range limits demanded by the Soviets. A number of Congressmen have pointed out that the letter sent by Baker was in fact a violation of law.

The Soviets followed up this victory with renewed demands for Naval Arms Control agreements, aimed at further limiting U.S. cruise missile capabilities. Within days of Baker's return, Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev told a U.S. Senate panel that "naval forces cuts negotiations are unavoidable," and identified naval aviation units and cruise

missiles as a top target. As Bush de-nuclearizes the European theater, the elimination of the nuclear warheads on sea-based cruise missile systems is a top priority of Soviet planners. Bush and Baker are moving them into the cross hairs.

The Soviet stunts during the negotiations were a replay of their usual tricks. Every one of the "issues" which Baker touted as resolved at the pre-summit meeting had already been settled in February! At that time, the Soviets began creating the image of a "military bogeyman" threatening peace-loving Gorbachov. As negotiations continued during April, a "previously unknown" military figure, General Omelichov, appeared in the Soviet delegation, and scotched all agreements on the cruise missile issue.

Immediately, U.S. media began a campaign to build support for an embattled Gorbachov, who was now facing a "resurgent" military. The actual purpose of the propaganda campaign is to build support for Gorbachov's bloody suppression of the rebellions breaking out in the Baltic States and elsewhere in the empire.

The same trick was pulled when Soviet negotiator Omelichov's agains intervened on May 19 destabilized Baker such that he left Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene (in Moscow for simultaneous talks with U.S. and Soviet officials), waiting for two hours while he begged Gorbachov to give him a face-saving resolution of the impasse. When Baker finally met the representative of the only force which seriously threatens the Soviet empire, he refused support to her cause, and later had to deny rumors that he had in fact told her that the U.S. would support Gorbachov on the secession issue. Gorbachov met with Prunskiene on schedule, and reaffirmed his demand that the Lithuanian declaration of independence be suspended before Soviet economic warfare measures are lifted. This ukase, delivered virtually in front of the U.S. Secretary of State, supports the rumors of Baker's perfidy.

The upcoming START agreement will produce a larger ratio of Soviet weapons aimed at a smaller number of U.S. targets. The Soviets have over 40,000 tanks and 380,000 troops in Eastern Europe, and from this position of military superiority they are watching the U.S. prepare unilateral disarmament measures in the theater. The ominous reality of the consequences of the U.S. sellout is summed up by a participant in the negotiations who said, "Both Shevardnadze and Gorbachov were very clear that a united Germany could not join NATO. There's no loosening of their position at all."

The Bush administration stands impotent before a Soviet move to gain military mastery of Europe. Bush has secured no concessions removing Soviet military dominance of Eastern Europe, and has left the anti-bolshevik resistance movements to fend for themselves against Soviet thuggery. It is the collapse of the U.S. economy which is paralyzing the government.

Bush has his own "Man In The Iron Mask." The economic recovery program of LaRouche is the basis for a new consensus to replace the discredited Bushmen.