

In a Jan. 13, 1975 interview with *Business Week*, Kissinger commented, "I'm not saying that there's no circumstance where we would use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price. It's another where there's some actual strangulation of the industrialized world." President Ford echoed Kissinger in an interview with NBC's John Chancellor: "I want it made clear . . . that this country, in case of economic strangulation—and the key word is strangulation—we had to be prepared . . . to take the necessary action for our self-preservation."

Saddam Hussein or no Saddam Hussein, what will soon become clear to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and other Arab leaders is that their countries have been militarily occupied. And as one U.S. intelligence analyst commented, "Even with Saddam eliminated, the U.S. cannot pull out overnight. As removed and out-of-the-way as the oil fields are located from Saudi population centers, having U.S. troops with barbed wire surrounding Saudi well-heads will not add to internal Saudi stability, much less regional stability. It can only get worse."

Documentation

The following are excerpts of the commentary by Ambassador James E. Akins that appeared in the Los Angeles Times on Sept. 12 and the Virginia Pilot on Sept. 17.

In January 1975, the neo-conservative publication *Commentary* carried an article proposing invasion of Saudi Arabia as a solution to the eternal Arab problem and to our own economic problems. A flurry of similar articles followed that proposed occupying oil fields on the peninsula from Kuwait to Dubai, pumping them dry, and in 50 years or so returning the properties to their original owners. . . .

I suggested that anyone who would take this proposition seriously was a madman, a criminal or a Soviet agent. Henry Kissinger, then U.S. secretary, had another view, and my career in the Foreign Service did not extend much beyond that point. . . .

There are those in the Bush administration who will point out that conditions are more propitious now than in 1975 for at least a de facto military occupation of the Saudi oil fields. An invasion would not be necessary.

I am not the only knowledgeable observer who is convinced that the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not intend to attack Saudi Arabia early last month. . . . Yet . . . Dick Cheney convinced King Fahd that such an attack was imminent. . . .

If Saddam is not overthrown, he will remain a potential threat to Saudi Arabia and a certain threat to the House of Saud if the Americans were to withdraw. So, it is conceivable that U.S. troops might be welcome to stay indefinitely. Whether that would enjoy the favor of the army and the

Echeverría: End 'cycle of poverty and pillage'

Luis Echeverría Alvarez, the former President of Mexico (1970-76), criticized Anglo-American actions in the Persian Gulf at the annual meeting of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) in Caracas, Venezuela on Sept. 6. Excerpts follow:

This crisis has all the characteristics of a profound crisis between the North and the South. . . . It is beginning to be evident that, in the grave Persian Gulf conflict, there are still-unresolved issues which persist, and which could worsen due to the unilateralism of North-North negotiations.

We understand the circumstances which have generated the tendency toward the globalization of the economy; but, can anyone think that globalization will be acceptable and fruitful [when it] leaves out the Third World countries? The answer is clear; it will not be possible. If there was any doubt of this, the Persian Gulf events are eloquent. In summary, we are going to face one conflict after another in the developing areas. They show us today, and they will demonstrate tomorrow, that it is neither conceivable nor possible to eliminate 76% of the world's population from participation in constructive peace dialogues.

[Latin America must integrate itself.] This cycle of poverty and pillage, of submission to forms of globalization conceived in North-North terms, must be replaced with precise forms of regional integration.

people of Saudi Arabia is another matter.

Those in and out of the U.S. government—including Kissinger—who were serious about taking over the oil fields in 1975 surely will argue that we should not let these extraordinary resources go now that they are in our control.

The scenario can be advanced further. The United States, which has already persuaded the Saudis to increase production by 2 million barrels a day, could order or persuade them to increase production much further. . . . The Saudi-Emirates production could be raised to 20 million barrels a day within three or four years through a crash development program. We could then write off permanently—or at least for a generation—Iraq, Kuwait, and for good measure, Iran.

The oil price would be kept low, ensuring the support of the world's consumers. . . . Or the price could be set somewhat higher, say, \$20 per barrel. . . . Cost of produc-