

via, and Korea-Taiwan will have the following impact:

- *An Indo-Pakistani war could break out, involving nuclear weapons.* India and Pakistan have been on the verge of war for most of 1990, and have exchanged threats of nuclear attack. The Afghan Mujaheddin are allied with the Pakistani regime, and the Afghan government with India. The Anglo-Americans and China will side with Pakistan, while the Soviets will be unable to ignore India, perhaps their last foreign ally. A war on the Indian subcontinent means that almost 1 billion people will be at war.

- *A Balkan war would carry the potential to become a general war in Europe.* The commitment of Anglo-American-NATO forces, including those of Italy, to the Gulf will be seen as a golden opportunity for Serbia to reassert domination over the other component republics of the Yugoslav Federation. Albania will side with Kosovo, while Bulgaria will assert its claim to Macedonia. Croatia and Slovenia will seek to secede. Hungary and other contiguous states could easily be drawn into such a conflagration.

- *In the Far East, the weakening of U.S. support for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China makes these states into possible objects of attack by North Korea and mainland China, respectively.* The 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea could only be defended by the massive use of nuclear weapons. P.R.C. strongman Deng Xiaoping has announced an acceleration of his timetable for the conquest of Taiwan.

Ultimately, each of these regional conflicts—the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, the Balkans, and the Far East—leads toward a U.S.-U.K. thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Since the imposition of the economic blockade against Iraq, the Anglo-Americans have also imposed on the Soviet Union a virtually total grain embargo. President Mikhail Gorbachov has warned outside powers against intervening on the side of component union republics of the Soviet Union. Although weakened in land offensive capabilities, the Soviets have continued to expand their absolute ICBM superiority with SS-24, SS-25, and modernized SS-18 missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and submarines. Soviet support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 for military action against Iraq appears motivated in part by willingness to let the Anglo-Americans be decimated through their offensive operations in the Gulf, weakening them for any subsequent conflict with the Red Army.

The potential for strategic miscalculation in all phases of the looming conflict is magnified by the psychological instability of President Bush and the Anglo-American leadership. Bush is gripped by a war psychosis related to his personal psychological disintegration under the pressure of economic breakdown crisis and military confrontation. Because of this mental impairment, Bush now fulfills the classification of inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office under the terms of the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-

tion. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, Bush's only professional military advice has come from Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an ideologue and political careerist.

A nuclear war?

Discussion by *EIR* researchers with several retired U.S. military officers has turned upon the following startling hypothesis: that a Gulf war may rapidly go nuclear.

The war plan under which Operation Desert Shield is being conducted, these sources contend, goes back to the Carter Doctrine of 1979 and was designed to counter a Soviet thrust into the Persian Gulf through reliance on neutron bombs. Neutron bombs would have been effective against Soviet tank columns in motion, but may be far less effective against Iraqi fortified positions, since a meter of earth or sand greatly reduces the impact of neutron radiation. Therefore, under the logic of this original plan, the Anglo-Americans would have to rely from the opening of hostilities on tactical nuclear weapons in the 1 kiloton range and up, including nuclear shells for 110 millimeter howitzers. Despite the obvious destructive power of these battlefield nuclear weapons, their impact should not be exaggerated. Since nuclear detonations do not generate overpressure outside of ground zero, a simple covered trench in the sand provides substantial protection against everything except a direct hit. In addition, sand does not transmit shock waves as well as the loam or clay

LaRouche: Why we must support Iraq

Lyndon LaRouche issued the following commentary on Dec. 2, in response to an influential figure in Europe who favors military action against Iraq.

To put the matter as briefly as possible, we ought to consider ourselves engaged in a war against Bertrand Russell and his kind for the soul of humanity as a whole. That means that we must combat the New Age current, which desires to establish a modern global version of a paganist *Pax Romana*, whether that be Anglo-American, Muscovite, or other.

To conduct this war successfully, we must define war in the way I have defined it in comments upon Prof. F.A. von der Heydte's *Modern Irregular Warfare*, and in other relevant locations, as essentially cultural warfare. From that standpoint, because Iraq—and precisely because Iraq—is at present adopted as a chief imped-

soils of the temperate zone.

Another reason for the temptation to resort to nuclear weapons, these military analysis assert, is that the Iraqi military represents a powerful defensive force of well-organized, well-equipped, and battle-seasoned troops. Iraq now has approximately 450,000 soldiers in Kuwait and southern Iraq, including a first line of fortifications manned by the Iraqi Army and, behind them, a mobile reserve of the elite Republican Guard. In mid-November, it was announced that an additional 250,000 reservists would be called up and sent into this area. Further reserve call-ups could bring the total Iraqi land forces on all fronts to 700,000 to 1 million troops, many of them combat veterans.

The Iraqi Army fought an eight-year war with Iran and suffered some 800,000 casualties. In the opinion of professional military observers, the Iraqi forces have a limited capacity to conduct deep offensive operations (although their seizure of Kuwait was highly efficient), but are masters of the tactical defensive, and did not break or panic at critical moments in that war. Iraqi line units are battle-hardened, experienced in desert fighting, and familiar with all the climatic and environmental stresses of the region. The Iraqi soldier will be fighting to defend his own country, his family, and his property against an imperialist aggressor from the other side of the world. He will be highly motivated, and any battle plan premised on an Iraqi rout will probably prove to be illusory. Roughly 60% of the Iraqi people are Shi'ite

Muslims. Whereas during the Iran-Iraq War this fact created problems of political motivation which had to be overcome, in any contest against non-Muslim forces, and especially the "Great Satan" United States, it will stiffen resistance.

Iraqi forces possess an array of heavy equipment, with a total of 5,800 tanks, 1,500 armored fighting vehicles, 5,000 armored personnel carriers, 150 attack planes, 150 attack helicopters, and two dozen modern Soviet SU-24 bombers equipped with Exocet missiles of the type that destroyed the *U.S.S. Stark* in the Gulf in 1987.

While the U.S. will possess overall air superiority, the Iraqi forces will retain advantages in certain areas.

The Iraqi main battle tank is the T-72, which has numerous points of superiority over the newer U.S. Army Abrams M-1 when it comes to desert warfare, according to retired military officers consulted by *EIR's* research team. In tank duels, the standard model T-72 fires a shell which will crack the Abrams turret. By contrast, the frontal armor of the T-72 is impervious to the standard M-1 Abrams shell, although this is being redressed through the arrival of M-1A1 tanks from Europe, which are equipped with a 120 mm cannon which does have the capability to destroy the T-72 head on. Otherwise, U.S. Army anti-tank weapons, such as the LAW, the Dragon, the AT-4, and the TOW, will not pierce the frontal armor of the T-72.

Iraq possesses the German-made Roland anti-aircraft system, which is more than the equal of the U.S. Hawk

iment to the establishment of Mr. Bush's Hitlerite, paganist, neo-Roman World Order, it is most undesirable that Iraq be significantly injured in any way.

There is more at stake in this than simply sympathy for the enemy of one's most mortal adversary. It is a *cultural* principle. The virtue of Iraq—and it has many "down" sides—is that Iraq, unlike that miserable collection of oiligarchs, principally oiligarchs of the South, is committed to the idea of transforming the Arab population, and others, but especially the Arab population, by aid of scientific and technological progress.

Such a commitment is not only the enemy of our Bertrand Russellite and kindred adversary, but it is a damned good idea. So therefore, why do we wish to destroy someone who may be an erring fellow, but who is agreed upon a principle which we adopt, to work to the advantage of an absolute lunatic who wishes to set up upon this planet a utopia which the planet and the human race alike would probably not survive?

That must be our overriding consideration.

I realize that under the press of political circumstances, narrower considerations—playing-field types of considerations, such as "how to play the game" as handed

to us—seem to override our perceptions of larger realities. We are so concerned with making a principle of the proper way of playing the game, that we degrade politics to a mere game, and then wonder sometimes why, after winning many battles, we seem to have lost the war. We played the battles each according to the rules of the game, but lost the war. And we did so, because there was a fallacy inherent in playing history according to the childish conception of an infantile game.

What we ought to be concerned about, is *to ruin* that which is about to ruin this planet, i.e., the establishment of some neo-paganist order which destroys the means by which the nuclear family is maintained, for the sake of playing the game according to our self-image, the self-image that we would like to put upon ourselves, from the standpoint of playing according to the rules of the perceived game.

It is not the defeat of an enemy, or the advantage of the enemy of our adversary that concerns us; it is the defeat of that adversary by making sure that we take no steps, if we could do otherwise, which might weaken the standpoint of our practice and strengthen the standpoint of the adversary's practice.