

# OAS meeting adopts 'Body Count' McNamara's strategic ravings

by Gretchen Small

In a paper presented to the World Bank annual meeting on April 25, Robert McNamara, a leading ideologue of the U.S. Eastern Establishment, outlined a strategy to reduce and/or eliminate national military institutions in developing sector nations, as the next immediate step required to consolidate the new world order—and free up billions of dollars to bail out the bankrupt international financial system in the process. Arms sales and technology transfers to these regions must be centrally controlled by the U.N. Security Council, and all international aid conditioned on cuts in military expenditures, the former director of the World Bank instructed the meeting.

McNamara did not oppose military force per se: only that which is dedicated to defending the nation-state. He argued that the “international system that relies on the national use of military force as the ultimate guarantor of security” must be replaced by a “worldwide system of collective security,” in which the U.N. Security Council, led by the United States, controls all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and deploys “coercive” measures against any country which does not follow international “rules of conduct.”

He also specified that regional bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity, and similar entities he hoped to see created in Asia and the Middle East, must “come to function as regional arms of the Security Council,” if the global collective security system is to work.

The imperial program outlined by McNamara in April won the day at the annual meeting of the OAS, held in Santiago, Chile from June 3-8. Despite nervous objections reportedly raised by some diplomats during closed-door sessions, the meeting concluded by all member states signing a final resolution which mandates the OAS to become precisely the “regional arm” McNamara talked about. The so-called “Commitment of Santiago,” hailed as a momentous step toward the consolidation of “democracy” in the Americas, in fact established the mechanisms for supranational military intervention against any government in the region that dares break from the free trade looting schemes which have made cholera and drug trafficking king in the Western Hemisphere.

Canadian representatives, and a U.S. team headed by former Kissinger Associates president Lawrence Eagleburger (now deputy secretary of state), marched into the OAS

meeting with the McNamara anti-military program as their main agenda item.

U.S. worries over the spreading military unrest in Ibero-America against the new world order plans are warranted. A year ago, groupings within the militaries of several countries were concerned over the collapse of their particular nations caused by the economic austerity programs and narco-terrorist deals promoted by Washington. Today that concern has spread across national borders. Increasingly, the discussion in military forums is over what to do to resist—what *regional* economic and military program could allow a generalized rebellion against the genocide imposed by the “democrats” to succeed. Similarly, military resistance has also begun to rally civilian forces against the bankers’ program in various countries.

## Pérez's treachery

The U.S.-Canadian agenda could not have dominated the OAS meeting as it did, however, without the aid of the Venezuelan government of the Socialist International's Carlos Andrés Pérez. Pérez (who has hired Henry Kissinger as “foreign investment adviser” to his government) is as rabid a one-worlder as can be found. Last month, during trips to Colombia and Europe, he repeatedly argued that “archaic” concepts of sovereignty must give way to “supranational rights.” He advocated the creation of a “regional army” to guarantee “democracy”—a democracy which does not permit protest against economic austerity, as Pérez demonstrated when he ordered Venezuelan troops to massacre hundreds in 1989.

Venezuelan diplomats proposed that the OAS meeting vote up a statement committing all OAS member states to an immediate break in diplomatic relations with any nation where a military coup, or an overturning of the presently existing governments, occurred. Other, tougher, sanctions could then follow against any government declared to be a renegade state.

This mandate for automatic intervention was too egregious for even the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico to swallow, and other governments joined in opposition. In his speech to the assembly, OAS Secretary General Baena Soares attempted to counter the Bush-Pérez ultra-“democratic” agenda, by reminding the foreign ministers that

“the threat against freedom does not exclusively originate in authoritarian temptations,” but also in “the chaos and anarchy that could prevail if our populations continue to suffer from the hunger and diseases that we thought had been eradicated. . . . Extreme poverty is the most acute problem and overcoming it is the most urgent task,” he stated.

But because all the Ibero-American “democracies” remain firmly committed to the Bush economic agenda, the U.S. easily succeeded in winning acceptance for a “compromise” version of the Pérez proposal. So the final “Santiago Commitment” included the two crucial points sought by the U.S. delegation: a ringing endorsement of Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas—in essence, a plan to turn the region into one vast slave-labor *maquiladora* plant in order to ensure debt payments to the banks—and a commitment that an emergency session of the OAS would be called within 10 days to discuss collective sanctions against that country, where a military coup has taken place.

The outcome of the meeting was “better than we expected,” U.S. Ambassador Luigi Einaudi happily told the press. Einaudi, dubbed “Kissinger’s Kissinger” because he ran Policy Planning for Latin America at the State Department straight through the Ford, Carter, and Reagan years, insisted that now the OAS must go further, and find mechanisms to bring the armed forces and police into “the continental democratic process.” In diplomatic language, Einaudi threatened any military that does not join this “process.” The U.S. invasion of Panama, he specified, was directed against “a government without authority,” but it caused tension within the OAS between the concepts of non-intervention and defense of democracy. Not to worry, he added: “At the moment there are no Noriegas in the active governments of America, which permits these things to be reconciled.”

### **Brainchild of the depopulation fanatics**

Robert McNamara’s role in the new world order “democracy” project should be sufficient to raise alarm about its fascist nature. Over the years, McNamara has participated in numerous policy planning outfits of the Eastern Establishment, ranging from the Inter-American Dialogue, where he was a member of the Executive Committee when the Dialogue first came out for drug legalization, to the Lucis Trust-Temple of Understanding, a U.N.-based satanic association, originally named the Lucifer Trust.

Cutting world population, however, has been McNamara’s obsession since at least his days as President Johnson’s defense secretary during the Vietnam War, when the term “body-count” was introduced as the metric to evaluate progress in a war. As head of the World Bank for most of the 1970s, McNamara tailored the bank’s policies to promote depopulation programs since, as he told the *Boston Globe* in March 1982, he believed that “the threat of unmanageable population pressures is very much like the threat of nuclear war.” In a 1982 interview that appeared in *EIR*, McNamara

argued that economic policy must be used to achieve depopulation goals: He suggested that a good way to “keep down population in the cities,” is to “put heavy taxes and regulations against heavy industry in the city and encourage labor-intensive agriculture with higher food prices.”

McNamara’s approach to crushing national military institutions is much the same. In his latest paper to the World Bank, “The Post Cold War World and Its Implications for Military Expenditures in the Developing Countries,” he argued that international lenders can force developing countries to cut out military spending, by simply cutting off international credits to resisters. “It is bad economics and bad policy for the donor nations and the international financial institutions to continue to behave as if the funding of stabilization adjustment and development programs can be separated from the financing of military expenditures,” he stated. “If producing governments sharply reduce the availability of such financing, it will be correspondingly more difficult for a number of the major Third World arms purchasers to continue importing at earlier levels.”

The international community should monitor the percentage of central government expenditures that are devoted to the security sector, as well as the ratio of security expenditures to Gross National Product, he insisted. “I strongly urge the linking of financial assistance, through ‘conditionality’ to movement toward ‘optimal levels’ of military expenditures.”

### **‘A world in conflict’**

Financial conditionality is one of five measures McNamara demands, to force military expenditures as a percent of developing countries GNP by the end of the decade. He lists four others: “Security Council guarantees of territorial integrity; continuing reductions in both conventional and nuclear arms by the Great Powers; tight control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them; and substantial limitations on arms exports from arms producing nations.”

McNamara dismisses arms procurement programs as extras acquired by Third World governments “to protect against perceived potential threats; to bolster their claims to regional-power status; as a symbol of unity and independence; as tangible evidence that they intend to defend their sovereignty; and to reward the armed forces for supporting them against internal opposition.” For McNamara, the most important—and undesirable—feature of military expenditures is that “it strengthens the political influence of the armed forces.”

The Security Council policing role that he envisions is not a peaceful one. The system of collective security requires, says McNamara, “agreement by the Security Council that regional conflicts, endangering territorial integrity, will be dealt with through the application of economic sanctions and, if necessary, military action, imposed by collective decisions and utilizing multinational forces.”

Likewise, the U.N. Security Council must oversee arms use internationally, as fiercely as it does regional conflicts. "The Security Council must be prepared to undertake collective and, if necessary, coercive action," he dictated. "To begin with, the Council should agree to prohibit the development, production, or purchase of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles by nations not now possessing them. Countries in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions would be subject to strict economic sanctions on the part of the international community. If sanctions failed to alter the behavior of the government in question, a U.N. military force would be given a mandate to eliminate the production capability and any stocks that had been produced or otherwise acquired."

By any rational reading, McNamara's vision of the new world order would seem to inspire not arms cuts, but a commitment to the most high-technology arms buildup possible by any developing sector nation capable of such actions—in self-defense, before their nation, too, is subjected to the same genocide meted out to Iraq, foreseen by the "Great Powers."

### **Utopian delusions underlie McNamara's 'new world order'**

*The international "system of collective security" proposed by McNamara is premised on the wild delusion that Western conflict with the Soviet Union has been buried forever, as seen in the following selections from his paper, "The Post Cold War World and Its Implications for Military Expenditures in the Developing Countries."*

Today, for the first time in half a century, we have another opportunity to formulate a statement of world order. That is what I propose to set before you.

The major factor affecting global economic, political, and social trends in the last decade of the 20th and early years of the 21st century, in my opinion, will be the revolutionary changes in Soviet policy introduced by Mikhail Gorbachov. And I say that in full recognition of the fact that his days in power may be numbered.

Gorbachov has emphasized on numerous occasions that war between the Great Powers is no longer an acceptable instrument of political change. He says "today's problems between East and West must be resolved through political means." He has indeed ended the Cold War.

But the West has not yet revised its foreign or defense policies to reflect that proposition. . . .

I believe Gorbachov is presenting the world with the greatest opportunity in 40 years to shift the basis for formulation of relations among nations from "Cold War" thinking to a totally new vision of world order. By such a shift we should be able to enhance global stability, and at the same time produce significant long-term budgetary savings and the resources to support much-needed restructuring of the economies of both the developed and developing countries. . . .

[S]ince 1986, Gorbachov has sought to redefine Soviet perceptions of national security by introducing his so-called "New Thinking." The point that he returns to more than any other when discussing foreign policy is his belief that modern military technologies have rendered war an inadmissible means of advancing a nation's security interests. . . . The Soviets have studied the origin and implications of the confrontations over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East. They have recognized, perhaps more than others, the great danger that through misinformation, misjudgment, and miscalculation, such crisis may escalate. . . . [F]or over 40 years the foreign policy and defense programs of Western nations has been shaped largely by one major force: fear of, and opposition to, the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism. It will require a leap of the imagination to conceive of new national goals, goals appropriate to a world which will not be dominated by the struggle between East and West. . . .

In sum, I believe we should strive to move toward a world in which relations among nations would be based on the rule of law, supported by a system of collective security, with conflict resolution and peace-keeping functions performed by multilateral institutions—the United Nations and Regional Organizations. . . .

. . . Such a world would need a leader.

I see no alternative to the leadership role being fulfilled by the U.S. I want to stress, however, that in such a system of collective security, though the U.S. must play a leadership role, it must accept collective decision-making. Correspondingly, its partners must accept a sharing of the risks and the costs: the political risks, the financial costs, and the risk of casualties and bloodshed. . . . I would favor . . . cuts in conventional [NATO] forces to 50% of NATO's 1989 strength. Such a "short-term" program will greatly improve crisis stability. . . . [B]asic changes in NATO's nuclear strategy are required. Some are going so far as to state that the long-term objective should be to return, insofar as practical, to a non-nuclear world. . . . [R]ecently disclosed, formerly highly classified documents of the Eisenhower administration indicate that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had recognized this problem. In 1954, writing in a top secret assessment of internal strategy, Dulles . . . went so far as to state "atomic power was too vast a power to be left for the military use of one country." Its use, he thought, should be "internationalized for security purposes." He proposed, therefore, to "universalize the capacity of atomic thermonuclear weapons to deter aggression" by transferring control of nuclear forces to a veto-less United Nations Security Council. . . . Policing an arms agreement that restricted the nuclear powers to a small number of warheads is quite feasible with present verification technology. The number of warheads required for a force sufficiently large to deter cheating would be determined by the number any nation could build without detection. . . . [S]urely it would not exceed 100. Very possibly it would be far less, perhaps in the low tens.