

as long as that authority continued to be effective and truly international. . . . Such an authority is, in the final analysis, the only means of maintaining a stable world peace. *The concept of international guidelines which subject all the nations of the world to a single legal international order, under the legitimate control of an international authority, is not only an age-old concept but is the only truly rational solution yet found to achieve this end.* *Perpetual Peace*, by Immanuel Kant, written in 1795, and *The Problem and the Paths to Peace* by Norberto Bobbio, written in 1979, could be mentioned as two references, one old, one modern, on this matter” (emphasis added).

Even more serious is the fact that Helio’s son Roberto Jaguaribe is the chief Brazilian negotiator supporting the capitulation of the country to international inspection. An adviser to Itamaraty, Roberto Jaguaribe works in coordination with Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, SAE secretary general.

In statements published on Jan. 28, 1993 in *Jornal do Brasil*, Roberto Jaguaribe said that “Brazil is at a disadvantage because it hasn’t ratified the accord [with the IAEA], and it will lose immeasurable political advantage. . . .” Roberto Jaguaribe has lied on many occasions that the “challenge inspections” will never be applied to Brazil, while surreptitiously leading a powerful lobby in Congress to push for signing the Modified Tlatelolco Treaty which, in the new text of Article 16, compliantly confirms the full implementation of forced inspections on the signatory countries of Resolution 290, of Aug. 26, 1992: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

The Battle of 1995 approaches

The pressures on Argentina and Brazil are enormous. Recently, the director general of the IAEA stated in Washington that “Brazil, Argentina, and North Korea are, today, the nations that most attract the attention of the international community in the nuclear area,” as reported in *O Globo* last May 24.

In Brazil, the pressure will increase because in 1995 the Brazil-German nuclear agreement comes up for review, and the Siemens company has said that it will not renew it unless and until Brazil accepts the complete IAEA safeguards, including the challenge inspections, which subject virtually every industrial installation, and scientific or technological research facility, to surprise inspections.

However, renegotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 will also create new opportunities to question the entire unjust system of “technological apartheid.” Argentina and Brazil could play a leading role in defeating the designs of the new world order and in reopening dialogue on the concept of Collective Economic Security, which links the problems of international security, including the so-called safeguards, to the issue of economic progress in the developing countries.

The true history of non-proliferation

by Lorenzo Carrasco and Alberto Sábato

In 1995, when the first international meeting to renegotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will convene, one of the most important international confrontations will take place between those nations that still defend the principles of the sovereign nation-state, and those powers and oligarchic groups that want to replace the nation-state with a world government which asserts the right to forcibly intervene anywhere on the planet on the grounds of defending a supposedly “perpetual peace.”

The NPT was imposed in 1970 by the major victorious powers of the Second World War in order to brake and dominate the spreading use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But its authors now perceive the treaty, in its present form, to be insufficient to assure this control.

Although, officially, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) predicts that the treaty will be extended indefinitely, since the end of 1991 many Anglo-American specialists have begun to question the propriety of maintaining the NPT in its present form, charging that in its function of supervising and punishing violations it is too vulnerable to political influence. Unofficially, it is known in many western and eastern diplomatic circles that there is ongoing discussion of the possibility of replacing the NPT, or at least strengthening it by sanctioning the use of force, including military force, to compel compliance with the treaty’s mandated “safeguards.”

In reality, the NPT is utterly bankrupt, due to several factors.

1) The crumbling of the Soviet Union revealed the fragility of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in the face of the emergence of separate republics in the former Soviet Union which possess nuclear weapons. Some of these nations, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, still have ICBM installations, while the rest only have tactical nuclear weapons. One problem is the possibility that these weapons might be used in warfare in the turbulent regions of the defunct Soviet Union.

What most concerns the Anglo-American oligarchy immediately is that Ukraine has declared itself an independent nuclear power and that, with its 1,800 nuclear warheads that make it nominally the third largest nuclear power in the world, it may demand the right—identical to that of Russia—to be seated in the U.N. Security Council. Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma made exactly that proposal to the Ukrainian Parliament in early June, which provoked an immediate reaction from the United States, France, and Britain,

since such a Ukrainian move would smash to pieces the plans to reform the U.N. security system.

2) At the same time, the so-called “non-recognized new nuclear powers” such as Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa will certainly demand a place in the atomic club.

3) The IAEA is being strongly questioned concerning its ability to prevent so-called horizontal proliferation.

For these reasons, it is believed that the “eagles” of the Anglo-American establishment intend to simply extinguish the IAEA by alleging its failure to detect the supposed construction of an Iraqi bomb, and to compel its replacement by some mechanism backed by force and tied directly to the U.N. Security Council.

The strengthening of the IAEA’s “safeguards” began to be discussed shortly after the end of the war against Iraq, a country whose nuclear installations for peaceful purposes were bombarded to carry out, in fact, a radical version of the infamous Baruch Plan proposed at the end of World War II by U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Bernard Baruch. The intention: to create a supranational agency to control all nuclear technologies and minerals everywhere in the world on behalf of the Anglo-American axis.

The aged British nuclear expert Geoffrey Greenhalgh proposed the revival of the Baruch Plan in an April 1992 article in the British journal *Nuclear Engineering International* which concluded: “The danger, now . . . is more limited conflicts from local rivalries, probably involving no more than a few bombs. . . . But the shock of such an event would surely galvanize the world community into enforcing some system of regulation and control. Why not do this now, instead of waiting for the worst to happen?”

Clearly, the Anglo-American establishment, made desperate by the defeat of the non-proliferation system—one of the instruments of world control set up at Yalta—has begun an intensive search for alternatives that may well result in an induced nuclear conflict that will likely involve turbulent regions of the former Soviet empire, as a means to facilitate the irreversible “return of Baruch.”

This conclusion also jumps out from the study carried out by three representatives of the anti-proliferation mafia, David Albright, Franz Berkhout, and William Walker, as reported by the London *Economist* in its first issue in June. According to the article, the day is imminent when a localized ethnic war, such as that now raging in former Yugoslavia, could provoke an atomic explosion in some part of the former Soviet Union.

North Korea, the second test case

At the beginning of this year, these same Anglo-American circles proposed to repeat against North Korea of the same campaign method used against Iraq, in order to definitively set a precedent for the application of the new doctrine. According to diplomatic sources, the possibility of using cruise missiles against various countries accused of violating the global non-proliferation rules has been under consideration.

This new non-proliferation doctrine was presented at the end of February 1993 by the London *Economist*, which demanded that North Korea be treated more harshly. “By refusing to let the inspectors check two suspect nuclear sites, North Korea is not just cocking a snoot at the IAEA; it is threatening the whole international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Which is why, if it cannot be persuaded to keep its promises by diplomatic means, it should expect a bloody nose. . . . Though North Korea is a test case for the newly toughened NPT, it is the NPT itself which is on trial. If North Korea can cheat [with impunity] . . . South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan will be tempted to build their own bombs. The Security Council should stand ready to use whatever it takes to uphold the NPT—economic sanctions, force if need be—or lose the entire treaty.”

The Clinton administration has already adopted this doctrine, as shown in the testimony of CIA head James Woolsey to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee last Feb. 24: “Of the many issues that have emerged in recent years, few have been more serious, have more serious and far-reaching implications for global and regional security and stability than proliferation . . . the strengthening of the IAEA must go hand in hand with renewing and reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. . . . But the recent showdown between IAEA and North Korea shows the fragility of the agency’s mandate. Without strong international sponsorship and support, it cannot succeed. The U.S. can take a lead role in strengthening and supporting the international organization, but we cannot do it alone. Outspoken and forthcoming assistance from other, such as the Russians, the Europeans, and the Japanese is essential in giving the IAEA the credibility and accountability it needs to complete its mission successfully.”

These public statements were preceded by an intense debate in Anglo-American academic circles. For example George William Rathjens, who had been deputy ambassador for President Jimmy Carter for nuclear non-proliferation matters, and who was for many years a leading participant in the Pugwash Conferences, wrote an article published in the August-September 1991 issue of MIT’s official journal *Technology Review*, in which he criticized the extent to which the NPT had become inoperative. According to Rathjens, “Israel, Pakistan, India, Brazil, and Argentina have not acceded to the treaty [NPT] because each wants to retain a nuclear weapons option for security purposes. India, Brazil, and Argentina were influenced by prestige considerations as well. North Korea, another state poised to acquire nuclear weapons, has signed the treaty but will not agree to the IAEA monitoring of facilities required unless the United States removes its nuclear weapons from South Korea. . . . Indeed, concerns that Iraq was using the NPT as cover for acquiring nuclear weapons technology motivated Israel to attack the Osirak reactor in 1981, even though the reactor was subject to IAEA safeguards. Before the Gulf war, Iraq again showed that a state could fulfill the letter of NPT obligations while pursuing a clandestine weapons program at facilities not de-

clared to the IAEA. And so the United States followed the Israeli precedent by bombing suspect nuclear sites.”


Rathjens thinks that “questions have to be raised as to whether the NPT is likely to be extended in 1995, and indeed, whether it should be unless it is strengthened. . . . U.S. non-proliferation policy has traditionally been based on discussion and denial, in particular on support for the NPT regime, IAEA safeguards, and regulating the flow of nuclear technology by a system of domestic and international export controls. To this has now been added the selective use of military action to destroy the emerging nuclear capability of states which threaten U.S. interests. Much can be done to shore up the traditional pillars of the non-proliferation regime. The NPT treaty would be enhanced if it incorporated stiff sanctions for violations and if it extended IAEA safeguards to include all nuclear activities, not just those that states declare. More can be done to minimize the flow of sensitive nuclear technology and weapons-usable materials to would-be proliferators if supplier states, including emerging ones, act in concert to develop and enforce strong export controls.”

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., director of Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, presented a more radical version of the same policy in an article in the May 29 issue of the magazine *Science*. Nye affirms, without reserve, that at issue is giving the U.N., and above all the Security Council, the legal instruments to permit it to exercise strict control over all nuclear activities. “Because the NPT is necessary (although not sufficient) for an effective policy, it is essential to extend the treaty in 1995. Formal amendments to the NPT would open a diplomatic Pandora’s box, but the regime can be strengthened by two practical measures: challenge inspections and sanctions. The IAEA board of governors has agreed to extend special inspections whereby its inspectors could visit suspect rather than only pre-agreed sites. While this is a useful step, it is not enough, because the IAEA bureaucracy has tended to define its role in terms of civilian nuclear power. When permission is refused to IAEA or when NPT violations are alleged, the U.N. secretary general should send a special group of inspectors that would report directly to the Security Council. . . . The Security Council should impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter if the resisting or violating NPT party refuses to allow access or take remedial measures.

“There is no single solution to this complex set of problems, but the beginning of wisdom is to build upon the existing system, add new instruments such as challenge inspections and sanctions, and, above all, increase the priority given to the issue. Otherwise we may be faced with the ironic outcome that the widely welcomed end of the Cold War may increase the prospect of nuclear use.”

McGeorge Bundy enters the scene

The Spring 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the quarterly of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, summarizes a Carnegie Commission report on “Reducing the Nuclear



A foot soldier for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a nuclear freeze rally in New York makes explicit the aims of the designers of this policy: destruction of national sovereignty.

Danger,” written by the decrepit deacon of the Anglo-American oligarchy McGeorge Bundy, and by Adm. William Crowe, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The study backs the policy of strengthening the organizations dealing with non-proliferation by facilitating an increased involvement of U.S. intelligence and military power.

This is highly significant given that the presumed North Korean violation was not ascertained on the basis of the IAEA’s authorized safeguard procedures, including inspections, but rather through a factor outside of the established purview of the IAEA: a satellite photograph that the U.S. delegation maintains reveals a suspicious installation, despite the fact that this very installation was inspected twice by IAEA officials.

In this respect, McGeorge Bundy and his co-author stated in their article that “if agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency are to have wider responsibilities and powers in this field, American reinforcement will be essential and the more so because both habit and interest will produce strong demands from other states. . . . If the IAEA is to get a sufficient flow of information about trade in relevant materials and devices, there must also be reinforcement of the most important single source of information, American intelligence—and indeed such reinforcement has begun. There is a complex question about the possible future role of a separate agency of the Security Council, functioning like the special commission that has been necessary in the case of

Iraq. It is not clear that the IAEA, with its inherited ethos of trust in those it monitors, can do all the hard work alone.”

In other words, the IAEA's established pattern of functioning renders it incapable of carrying out the dirty work necessary to maintain the non-proliferation policy. Said Bundy, “What is clear is that if there is to be timely international action against suspect states, there must be readiness to act in the U.N. Security Council, and here American support will be crucial.”

The most significant part of the Bundy report is an attack on the concept of strategic defense based on new physical principles, including a not-so-veiled reference to the proposal of Lyndon H. LaRouche that the original version of the Strategic Defense Initiative, announced on March 23, 1983 by President Ronald Reagan, should be adopted. To maintain the non-proliferation policy, Bundy openly and hysterically rejects any effort to find a superior strategic solution by means of a technological leap, such as that proposed by the Russians at the Vancouver summit in April.

Bundy wrote: “The case of strategic defense is one of the best examples of the requirement that we respect the realities of nuclear warheads. There is a recurrent tendency to ask technical experts to do more than nature permits—to make us safe, by science and technology, from what science and technology have made possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts contribute to the confusion by advertising more than they can deliver. The case that is currently relevant is that of strategic defense. There really is no present prospect that all-out defense can outrun all-out offense in nuclear warfare, because of one simple reality: the overwhelming destructiveness of every single nuclear warhead. . . . The United States can keep a sharp eye out for some real possibility of a technical revolution between strategic offense and defense; prudence require no less, and the United States should not allow its bad experience with the Strategic Defense Initiative, as originally advertised, to make it imprudently inattentive.”

Challenge inspections

While awaiting the revision of the NPT in 1995, IAEA director Hans Blix has been working with the permanent members of the Security Council to grant the council the power to carry out challenge inspections based on nothing more than public charges from any entity considered “internationally credible.” This IAEA policy is revealed in two secret documents, Gov/2554, of January 1992, entitled “Strengthening the Safeguards: the Providing and Use of Design Information,” and Gov/2657, of May 1993, entitled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Safeguard System: a Reexamination of the Application of Safeguards.”

In both documents, the IAEA board of governors orders all countries to maintain the “complete” safeguard accords, which include challenge inspections, and that all countries participate in a full international effort to gather data; in other words, to sanction a system of mutual espionage exactly as called for by both Bundy and CIA head Woolsey.

Document Gov/2657 even speaks of “a number of measures, including environmental monitoring, which would improve the capability to detect undeclared facilities and activities” and recommends that “these measures be further developed, assessed and implemented by the Secretariat, as matter of urgency.” The document states that environmental monitoring “includes water and air monitoring techniques applicable at different ranges. [The IAEA] noted there is greater certainty at this stage in the use of these techniques for long-range detection of reprocessing compared to front-end fuel

The return of Bernard Baruch

In the April 1992 issue of the British journal *Nuclear Engineering International*, Geoffrey Greenhalgh wrote an article with the suggestive title “The Return of Baruch,” in reference to the infamous Baruch Plan formulated by U.S. ambassador Bernard Baruch at the First International Conference on Nuclear Energy which took place just after the Second World War. Baruch proposed creating a supra-national entity for the forcible world control of all nuclear technology and world reserves of radioactive minerals.

Baruch complained that it was “an injustice of nature” that precisely those countries that developed nuclear technology were the very countries that lacked nuclear mineral reserves. Working from this premise, Baruch proposed that the countries that possessed these reserves must cede control over them to the major powers and accept a policy of forcible nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, since 1991, when the United States and its allies decided to bomb Iraq's nuclear installations because of charged violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which Iraq was a signatory, the world has been subject to the Baruch Plan.

Greenhalgh began his article with a brief review of the various plans for international control of nuclear energy, writing that “one of the more far-sighted and detailed of these was the plan put forward in July 1946 to the United Nations by the U.S. representative Bernard M. Baruch, based on the Acheson-Lilienthal study of the problem. This proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority which would manage, control, or own all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, and have the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.”

Later in the article, to justify his proposal to revive the Baruch Plan, Greenhalgh analyzed the weaknesses of the safeguards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): “Back to Baruch. A key feature of any international control system is that it must be strictly

cycle activities, specifically enrichment. Further development of this long-range capability as regards both is urged.

The foregoing makes clear that the IAEA has gone beyond mere spying from space, to legitimize territorial invasions by special corps of spies utilizing "marvelous new techniques" whose efficacy is very doubtful.

The Four-Party Nuclear Safeguard Accord signed between Brazil, Argentina, and the IAEA, as well as the so-called "modified" Tlatelolco Treaty now in process of ratification, are both tied to the reforms now under discussion to

modify the non-proliferation regulations. The former indirectly approves the new demands of the IAEA for "challenge inspections" of nuclear installations. The latter explicitly replaces the entirety of Article 16 of the original treaty with a new text that sanctions the unrestricted right of the IAEA to carry out challenge inspections in any of the cited countries. This act of capitulation was ratified by the foreign ministries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico at an Aug. 26, 1992 meeting in Mexico City, where they signed Resolution No. 290, that made official the challenge inspections statute.

enforceable. The weakness of the IAEA safeguards system, as shown in Iraq, is that it only applies to 'declared' facilities which the IAEA is empowered to inspect; the IAEA has neither authority or means to search out suspected violations even in countries which adhere to the non-proliferation treaty let alone those countries which have so far refused to sign. Baruch on the other hand saw prevention and penalization going hand in hand.

"We must provide the mechanism to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. . . . The United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nuremberg. . . . When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and corresponding punishment set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that: Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty. . . .

"But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against offenders in the nuclear area but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—and perhaps—why not—against war itself.

"The breakup of the Soviet Union, and the declared wish of the successor republics to renounce nuclear weapons, now offers the world a rare second chance to establish a strict international control over nuclear weapons. . . . While many of the detailed control proposals for Baruch's International Atomic Development Authority have been overtaken by 40 years of growth of the nuclear power industry, the basic principles of the need to prohibit weapons development and to punish violations remains unchanged. This bold proposal was tantamount to the imposition of world control through the authority of the

United Nations.

"This will represent a large step forward in international control by the United Nations, but the world cannot wait until the occasional miscalculation, as by Iraq, occurs to present the U.N. with the opportunity to act on a case-by-case basis. It will necessarily require interference in the affairs of sovereign states, but as Baruch claimed, the time may have come when people are 'not afraid of an internationalism that protects and are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow sovereignty.' "

Greenhalgh's article ends with a somber statement which, more than being just a warning of the possible use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts, could be analyzed as a threat that the Anglo-American oligarchy might consider the possibility of using a manipulated regional conflict for the purpose of imposing its new system of nuclear safeguards:

"The danger, now . . . is more limited conflicts from local rivalries, probably involving no more than a few bombs. . . . But the shock of such an event would surely galvanize the world community into enforcing some system of regulation and control. Why not do this now, instead of waiting for the worst to happen?"

British anti-science

Greenhalgh has a long career as a British intelligence operative since he worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. in the Abadan refinery during the Second World War. In 1948, Greenhalgh joined the just-formed Atomic Energy Research outfit set up in Harwell, England. Nominally an advanced nuclear research center, Harwell has in reality functioned to disseminate discriminatory policies against non-nuclear powers, and to try to maintain indefinitely the 1945 postwar international status quo in the nuclear area.

Later, in 1956 and 1961, Greenhalgh was the British scientific attaché in Estocolmo, and he later moved over to Brussels as the British Atomic Energy Agency's representative to Euratom. In 1964, he returned to Britain as the first director of the British Nuclear Forum. Today he functions as an "independent consultant" on nuclear affairs.—*Lorenzo Carrasco*