

them fit for 'indigenous cultural forms,' " reported the Buenos Aires daily *El Cronista* on Jan. 18.

Resistance builds

In Mexico, there is beginning to be resistance to the government's policy of appeasement. Indigenous communities are staging marches demanding that the Army stay and that the self-proclaimed human rights agencies leave, since they are providing cover to the EZLN. One such march was staged in Ocosingo.

The Jan. 13-19 issue of the weekly *Siempre* carried a seven-page spread titled "The EZLN War: Support for Cárdenas and a Pretext for U.S. Intervention," which featured LaRouche's statement that the insurgency was not an indigenous phenomenon, but steered by foreigners. In its Jan. 20-26 issue, the magazine's editorial attacked the "irresponsible and opportunist, even fanatical, attitude that certain partisan politicians and media have adopted, when they accuse the Mexican Army of having acted as assassins in Chiapas, an accusation that rests, more than on evidence, on suppositions and on the discrediting of the Armed Forces." The editorial pointed out that the EZLN leaders armed themselves with modern weapons while they gave the Indians "wooden guns."

Sources in Mexico say that Cárdenas has been stung by the *Siempre* coverage and is readying a major counterattack against LaRouche and *EIR*.

The LaRouche statement also appeared in *La Estrella de Panamá* and Argentina's *El Informador Público*, among other publications.

Columnist Ariel Remos, of the Miami-based daily *Diario Las Américas*, on Jan. 12 reported that the events in Chiapas are "part of what was agreed at the Havana meeting of the São Paulo Forum" last July. Similar reports have been written by columnist Patricio Rickets of the Peruvian daily *Expreso*.

Mexican government assesses EZLN threat

The following is a report issued by Mexico's Department of Interior (Gobernación), with material supplied by the National Defense Department and Attorney General's Office, on Jan. 7, 1994.

Introduction

Beginning in the first hours of Jan. 1, a difficult situation has developed in four municipalities in the state of Chiapas: San Cristóbal de las Casas, Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, and Altamirano.

A violent and armed group attacked the capitals of these municipalities, destroyed offices and archives, assassinated

and physically attacked policemen and civilians, took hostages, stormed businesses, seized the local radio station of Ocosingo, released prisoners from the region's detention and rehabilitation centers, attacked installations of the Federal Electricity Commission, and even fired upon a Red Cross ambulance on its way to assist.

The information available on this violent and aggressive group which is operating in the state of Chiapas has made it possible to determine its principal characteristics and many of those presumed to be responsible for leading it. Thus, we know that its leaders come from different origins, national and foreign; experts in combat, highly trained and educated, they have planned, trained, and now lead the actions of this radical group. It's different with the others; these are locals, Indians, manipulated or pressured, who have taken part in the violent actions. This is not an Indian movement nor a peasant action. This is the work of professionals manipulating those who are disaffected and who have recently suffered adverse economic conditions.

As has been widely reported, several Indian and peasant towns have rejected the aggressors. One angry Indian community in the town of Oxchuc managed to capture six members of the aggressor group, displaying them in the plaza and handing them over to the Mexican Army, which has already placed them at the disposition of civilian authorities. A similar reaction occurred in different parts of Altamirano municipality, which feared that the aggressors would return and called upon the media to request aid from the Mexican Army. The Indian and peasant organizations of Chiapas have turned to the authorities, demanding the Mexican Army provide protection and offering their full participation in suppressing the aggression. This has also been reported by international and national news agencies. For this reason, it is important to reiterate that this is not an Indian or a peasant movement, but rather the actions of a radical group led by professionals who are deceiving, and even impressing, the Indians.

As is explained in this text, throughout the last year there was information on various illegal activities by groups operating in this border zone. Among these were trafficking in weapons and military supplies, isolated attacks against local police and ambushes against members of the Armed Forces, threats against producers to obtain economic or logistical support, extorting money through sale of "safe-conduct passes," violent land invasions, establishment of training camps, and reports of calls for sedition, taking advantage of the impoverishment of the region.

They have adopted a political language which leaves no doubt of their determination to do battle with the Mexican Army and State. They hide behind the name of Emiliano Zapata, who is profoundly respected by our people, to pursue their violent objectives. They show a double face: friendly and courteous to the tourists in San Cristóbal de las Casas, and extremely virulent and bloody against our mixed-race and Indian compatriots in Ocosingo. While the *comandantes*

and their groups of followers have high-powered weapons, the Indians—many of them no more than 15 years old—have small arms, machetes, and wooden rifles used in training, in hope of capturing firearms.

This group, in its training camps and presence of identified foreigners, resembles other violent factions which operate in the Central American countries. They have been encouraged also, and on occasion aided, by those who, perhaps in good faith, confuse tasks of a religious nature with social struggles, without regard to the means employed.

Local and federal authorities have responded from the first moment these illegal activities were detected. During 1993, in May and June, the assassinations of Mexican soldiers and other criminal acts were investigated, resulting in subpoenas being issued—with or without detainees—before the respective judges, and in all cases, the demands of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with defense of human rights were listened to, and answered. The government of the state of Chiapas proceeded to carry out, as is their obligation, the arrest orders issued by the competent judges. Arrests were made, put at the disposition of the judges, and weapons confiscated. Some of these actions produced local reactions from groups of sympathizers, probably without a profound understanding of the cause. The Public Ministry's office intensified its operations against drug-trafficking, and continued to monitor the training camps for illegal activities, and to take action as appropriate.

The particular circumstances of ancestral backwardness in the region, intense and massive illegal migration of citizens from countries south of the border, and a history of abuse of authority in the past made it necessary to act with particular caution during 1993. Many of the actions undertaken were modified, and some arrests were suspended in response to the demands on behalf of respect for human rights made by social and religious groups of Chiapas, many of them ignorant of the growing clandestine activities of the armed group of aggressors.

The authorities showed particular calm and flexibility. Order and the promotion of a new way of acting, and adhering to law, dialogue, and harmony in order to combat long-standing problems, advised special treatment. In many cases this attitude and response by the government allowed for solutions to some demands which otherwise would not have been possible; in other cases, unfortunately, this blocked preventive and justifiable actions which would have permitted more efficient action by the government against the final gestation of this clandestine and extremist group.

It was decided, for this reason, to increase the federal and local government response to social demands and long-standing problems. The programs of the [National] Solidarity [Plan] in the state of Chiapas are the most intensive in the country. In the last five years, federal investment has grown tenfold, going from 70 million new pesos to 750 million new pesos in 1993. This has permitted, as the secretary of social

development has reported, the construction of hospitals and 80 health centers, rehabilitation of more than 4,000 schools and construction of almost 2,000 classrooms, construction of more than 3,000 kilometers of roads and highways, the introduction of electricity to 1,200 communities, and the construction and rehabilitation of 500 potable water systems.

In addition, the 110 municipalities of the state have received municipal funds, and 19 regional funds have been set up for the Indian communities so that they can finance their productive projects; more than 60,000 coffee growers in the state who have seen the international price of coffee collapse in the last years have been helped, and credits have been given without collateral to 90,000 other peasants. Beginning in August 1993, a special program was undertaken to combat backwardness in this area in particular, with an additional investment of 40 million new pesos for highways, a hospital in Altamirano, schools, and productive projects.

In the area of agriculture, the federal government has carried out unprecedented actions in the state, in particular in the area under attack: More than 2,000 legal cases, constituting more than 90% of the cases left over from 1992, were resolved; 90,000 hectares of land were restored or granted, primarily to Indian communities, nearly 6,000 hectares were regularized; and aid given for production increases. Also, resources for social programs in the state of Chiapas increased more than tenfold during the last five years. Finally, in August 1993, a special program for the jungle and border areas was developed to respond more quickly to the demands of this region.

The presence of a broad range of social organizations which have maintained a permanent dialogue with the government has allowed for many social advances. Clearly, an organization of a very different nature hid behind this effort to join social participation and the government's responses, not for the well-being of the citizens of Chiapas, but to prepare the violent blows of the past days.

In conclusion, the path of social action for the benefit of the communities of the area and the state as a whole was adopted. This path had already brought results and those [projects] which take longer, had begun to bear fruit. Thus, direct preventive actions were avoided, in response to demands which, we reiterate, ignored the increase of subversive activities. But social action can not persuade those who already had irrevocably resolved on violence, independently of responses to social demands. This explains why the events of the first days of January were not thwarted earlier.

Ever since Dec. 30, the local and federal governments and the Mexican Army had identified a suspicious movement in the jungle which foretold of an impending important action by groups of aggressors which had retreated into isolated areas of the jungle after several actions carried out in July. This was the third time that year that such reports had been received. Therefore, security measures were reinforced and police and Mexican Army detachments in the area were

strengthened. However, the aggressor movement turned out to be broader and more extended, launching violent actions in places where they had not previously carried out actions, such as San Cristóbal de las Casas. They moved in very small groups, joining together near population centers, which made their detection more difficult.

From the onset of the attacks by the radical group, the response of the authorities was to protect the civilian population and call for peaceful dialogue. On Jan. 1, the governor called in writing for the intervention of the Mexican Army,

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under Article 119 of the Constitution of the United States of Mexico and Clause III of Article 42 of the political constitution of the state of Chiapas. In order to avoid the further loss of civilian lives in these towns, the Army did not counterattack the first day. On the second day, the Mexican Army suffered a direct attack on its barracks, to which it responded efficiently. It also responded to calls for help from other towns in the area, again proceeding with the objective of defending and protecting the population. The Mexican Army has acted, and will continue to act, in accordance with the law and in fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities.

In every case, the Mexican Army has placed the results of its investigations at the disposal of the local or federal public ministry, whichever is the relevant authority, to be acted upon according to the law. The Public Ministry has deployed its personnel to speed up prior investigations and to act according to its legal responsibilities.

At every point, and as in recent years, there has been complete access by the media, which has freely exercised its responsibilities. This, too, has been taken advantage of by this aggressive and radical group to promote its combat objectives. Despite that, the rights of the media to inform the population will not be limited. The places where their personal security cannot be guaranteed will, however, be pointed out to them. An office of official information has been established in the zone to continuously provide reports on the events as they occur.

Therefore, and with a desire to broaden the public's knowledge of the circumstances in Chiapas, this document is presented with extensive information on the events, the identity of the radical group and the various interests which joined in its formation, the actions which the federal and

local governments have taken to respond to this threat, and the most important lines of action which will be followed in the coming days. These are the objectives of this report.

The Mexican Army will continue to act with great respect for human rights and the population until it has clearly and decisively responded to the call for order and security made by the inhabitants of that part of the state, and handed over to the Public Ministry's office the prisoners and evidence in its possession. Subpoenas are being drawn for persons presumably linked to the criminal activities of the recent period. Social organizations, collective farms, and Indian communities will be respected. Excesses or abuse of the law will not be tolerated.

Together with several state and national social and peasant organizations, as well as with various religious and national political organizations which have rejected violence and called for dialogue, a commission has already been set up to immediately aid the neediest sectors of the population. There will be a broader response to the social demands of the inhabitants of the jungle and the border area of the state of Chiapas.

The federal government has responded immediately to guarantee supplies of food, blankets, and medicine. It has also set up public health programs to attend to emergencies, prevent diseases, and reestablish hospital functioning which was sabotaged by the aggressors. Housing has been built or repaired to provide for families. Together with local authorities, soldiers of the Mexican Army are protecting and distributing this federal aid. At the same time, necessary services which had been destroyed by the aggressors, are being repaired and installed. This is particularly true of infrastructure, such as water and electricity, and schools, hospitals, and roads, all so vital for this zone and which had already been built. Thus, new efforts to attend especially to this area of the country will be made in addition to the pacification actions.

1. Background

During the past decade, the structural problems affecting the state of Chiapas have led to the emergence of several social movements for the defense and promotion of the communities' interests. These are legally established organizations. However, extremist and violence-prone ones also emerged. In 1967 and 1970, the People's Armed Commandos and the Mexican Insurgent Army carried out training operations in different parts of the area, but without going beyond these.

Later, in the 1980s, some groups radicalized their activities in the fight for land and promoted illegal takeovers of farms, which led to violence. These conflicts were isolated and in most cases were met with a legal response aimed at conciliation.

In the 1990s, social action intensified with the support of many peasant, popular, and Indian organizations. But despite these advances, for armed and violent groups whose leaders were professionals, and with the support of many civil and religious organizations, this in no way changed their plans.



A Zapatista guerrilla in Chiapas, Mexico. As the Mexican government's report underlines, "This is not an Indian movement nor a peasant action. This is the work of professionals manipulating those who are disaffected and who have recently suffered adverse economic conditions."

They continued isolated acts of violence and radicalized their goals for armed struggle. It was here that the so-called Zapatista National Liberation Army began its operations.

In this document we describe the most important characteristics of this aggressor group, its forms of recruitment and training, its organization, and the bases where it carries out its operations, the weaponry, communications, and equipment it uses, description of its recent actions, and the operations it has carried out since Jan. 1, 1994. Also, we provide information on its leaders, which has been confirmed by direct testimony from individuals in the region.

2. Description and objectives

The so-called Zapatista National Liberation Army is an extremist, violent, professional, and well-trained organization. Its profile is highly ideological and it uses language characteristic of extremism.

Its operational strategy since 1993, and under cover of other organizations in the years prior to that, involved encouraging invasions of rural properties and spreading violence through ambushes of the Army and of public security forces and seizure of their weapons. Its proposals have been radical: attacking strategic public and military installations. It has taken advantage of social problems to recruit members and employs self-described "catechists," some of them identified, to gain access to Indian groups living under precarious

conditions. It has not hesitated to pressure entire families to bring new members into its violent cause. Eyewitness testimony and recent actions confirm this. Its intention has been to expand its cadre base to combat the Mexican state and its government.

It has rules and internal discipline, and various instruction manuals on the use of weapons, attack plans, combat strategies, security and communication systems, and disciplinary measures. Literature from the Clandestine Revolutionary Party People's Union (Procup), which helps distribute its publications, was found in its camps.

The so-called EZLN has been present since 1993 in five Chiapas municipalities: Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Comitán, Altamirano, and Chanal. In these zones, it has an organized network of cells which are in constant communication with each other through civilian radio bands. It has 15 training centers in various areas: 6 are in Margaritas, 5 in Ocosingo, 2 in Sabanilla, 1 in Altamirano, and 1 in Chanal.

3. Recruitment and training

This armed aggressor group has been supported by various ideologues and clerics—of different denominations—all acting individually. They have had the task of training cadre and organizing within communities. This has enabled them to move from convincing groups of rural inhabitants, to recruitment, and later to training in practices of subversion

and terrorism.

These earlier conditions have enabled the activists, when they encounter resistance, to use the threat of confiscation of property or expulsion from the community against those who don't want to participate. According to the testimony of recruited peasants, they have even used children as hostages to force the participation of their parents.

The dynamic of a community group under its control is gradual: Productive activity is almost totally paralyzed, municipal and even educational activities are abandoned. Coopted or pressured groups devote their efforts to building training camps, and the families prepare food to meet the needs of the members of this radical and violent group, who

The Indian and peasant organizations of Chiapas have turned to the authorities, demanding the Mexican Army provide protection and offering their full participation in suppressing the aggression.

come from distant towns to receive paramilitary instruction. They also build refugee centers for those of the population who don't participate.

Later, recruited groups enter into a period of organizational preparation. According to captured manuals and eyewitness testimony, they carry out actions and sometimes sell their animals and belongings to get weapons.

During this phase, instructors are provided in physical training, martial arts, in the operating of civilian radio bands to establish and support a network of radio communications. In parallel, doctors involved in the group train Indian peasants in basic health and first aid procedures.

The instructors, made up of Mexicans and foreigners, make up a nucleus, apparently well-trained in guerrilla warfare and terrorism. It would appear that in the case of the Mexicans, some were activists in guerrilla groups that were dismantled in the seventies, who separated themselves from the many who returned to live a life of productivity under the law. There are clear indications that these groups are closely related to the Clandestine Revolutionary Party People's Union and the National Liberation Forces.

In the case of the foreigners, it is possible that they have had some guerrilla experience in the countries to the south of Mexico. That those arrested are of various nationalities of that region, and their level of training, suggest this. Among those arrested are one Nicaraguan and, it would appear, one Guatemalan.

Recruited groups train one or two times a week, or semi-monthly and, according to the area, the times vary; when part

of the town is in the movement, they train in areas close to the community, from 17:00 to 22:00 hours, and later, from 14:00 to 18:00 hours. They train in small groups so that they are not detected by security forces. Their training is in weapons and explosives handling, personal defense, target practice, and ambush maneuvers.

4. Organization and bases of operation

According to available information, three kinds of bases of operations are presumed. First is an uncovered circular area, where members of the movement train, normally located near the caves closest to the community. The second type are mobile units, regularly occupied by the so-called insurgents, that are comprised by: "study schools," which are only for regional and middle-level leaders, "training areas," "radio station," "armory and kitchen." The last type are the so-called "bases," which are made up of various buildings and a "training area" for irregular combat.

The various kinds of bases of operation are all located in hidden areas topographically difficult to reach. Getting to them requires four hours' travel through semi-open stretches in areas of dense vegetation.

Among the main centers of operation of the UZI [Zapatista insurgent units] are: San Juan, in Las Margaritas; San Marcos, in Ocosingo; Livingstone, between Ocosingo and Altamirano; La Grandeza or La Garrucha, between Ocosingo and Altamirano; Delicias Pacham, Morelia, in Altamirano; Peña Guadalupe, in Ocosingo; Chalam del Carmen; El Carrizal, in Ocosingo; Buena Vista de Flores; and Santa Rosalía in Comitán.

Clandestine installations that have been discovered are linked to each other, since they belong to the clandestine organization Zapatista Union Force—Armed Struggle. They use the same communications system and codes; they are ruled by the same orders; their methods of training, and the places and hours of training are the same, and coordination is invariably through civilian radio band. Strategically, they are distributed for maximum penetration throughout the southern area of Chiapas state.

Information in hand suggests that the structure of the movement in each community is made up of three regional heads who act as political commissars in charge of recruitment and indoctrination of the population. They operate through periodic meetings, including showings of political-revolutionary movies, held in so-called safe-houses. Later they hold meetings of groups from several communities. One of these is called "Assembly Center."

The population is meanwhile organized in two parts: the bases of support and reserve, made up of women and the elderly, and another support group, which are the so-called "Zapatistas" which are made up of minors. From these groups are selected the four- or five-person commissions charged with managing the flow of food and money; they are also in charge of the transfer of weapons and guarding the camps. These commissions are changed every 72 hours.

The so-called "Militia Squads" operate as a paramilitary apparatus. Each squad is made up of a "sergeant," a "corporal," a radio-operator, a health adviser, and 20 militants.

5. Weapons, communications, and individual equipment

The weapons and individual equipment are purchased for the cadre through their so-called "general commands." They have the following kinds of weapons: American-made, 16-round 22-caliber rifles; American-made, 5.56-caliber AR-15 rifles; American-made, 30-caliber M-1 carbines; various other kinds of rifles, pistols, and revolvers, as well as British-made STEN rifles; CK rifles of unknown fabrication which could be, according to informants, Soviet made, 7.62 caliber, 10-round Sks-Simonov carbines, used especially by guerrilla units. The majority of the weapons are new.

With regard to their radiocommunications network, the communities have radio operators with CB equipment which transmit on a class-B band, between 26.965 and 27.552 Mhz, according to the number of channels. The radiocommunications equipment has 23 or more reception-transmission channels, which operate between 24:00 and 06:00 hours.

The kind of equipment generally used are Cobra radio-transmitters, models 19-Plus and 148-GTL, using 5/8 antennas model Alley Cat. So far, part of their code has been broken and some of their transmissions recorded. It is believed that there are 172 radio stations, located in Altamirano and Ocosingo. The key code uses the CB band combined with others, which reveals deployments of Army units and public security forces.

A radio technician with the guerrilla group is the one who supervises the communications network. The base transmission station of the subversive "General Quarters" has the identification code Cicara; it would appear to be the so-called "Center of Instruction El Caracol," located in the same community, in Las Margaritas.

The individual equipment of each cadre consisted of a cartridge belt, material for cleaning weapons, canteen, knife and weapon, and ammunition. Regarding their uniforms, they were produced by the communities with the material purchased locally; they included brown shirt, red bandana for tying at the throat, cap, and khaki-colored pants. The uniforms were marked by ranks, ranging from "activist" to "colonel."

Regarding the combination of colors chosen for their military uniforms, these are very similar to those used by Guatemalan guerrilla units which operate along the border with Mexico; in the case of the latter, their uniform is a khaki shirt and brown pants.

6. Leaders

The various organizations and associations of the region have established among themselves a network which has practically given rise to a confederation of leaders. By combining their leaderships, the result has been a paramilitary

organization which has headed up the armed actions of violence of recent days, and which calls itself "Zapatista National Liberation Army."

It is necessary to distinguish between the Indian groups and their leaders, and those ideologues—clerics and so forth who are involved—who call themselves "catechists" but who carry out subversive activities, and the political activists, the majority of whom have histories from radical organizations, some of Central American origin.

In fact, the coincidence of interests between the religious activists and the political extremists has produced various organizations which in practice have imposed themselves on legitimate community and peasant organizations, and which have used them and changed them. The government has been very careful not to confuse the different kinds of organizations and their leaders, so as to respect the authentic leadership of the communities.

We already have the identifications of many of the leaders of the communities of Altamirano, Ejido Morelia, Delicias Pachán, Guadalupe Victoria, Edén del Carmen (Ocosingo), Chalam de Carmen (Ocosingo), la Grandeza (Ocosingo), Florida (Ocosingo), Nuevo Sacrificio (Ocosingo), La Laguna (Ocosingo), La Arena (Ocosingo), Mendoza (Altamirano), Flor del Río (Margaritas), Nuevo San Marcos (Margaritas), Guadalupe el Tepeyac (Margaritas), El Caracol (Margaritas), Plan de Santo Domingo (Margaritas), Arroyo el Porvenir (Margaritas), San Isidro (Margaritas), San José del Río (Margaritas), San Antonio de las Flores (Margaritas), Ejido Veracruz (Margaritas), El Rosario Río Blanco and the community of Margaritas itself.

Regarding the political organizations subjected to the interest of radicalized leaders, we have detected the following: in Las Margaritas, there is the Union of the Armed Zapatista Revolution of Mexican Liberation. It has the support of the Zapatista Revolution Organization and of "La Radio" Organization, which carries out proselytism and logistics.

In the area between the municipalities of Ocosingo and Chiapas de Corzo, operates the National Independent Peasant Association Emiliano Zapata (Anciez), whose ideology is similarly radical, which split from the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization (OCEZ), considered lacking in sufficient levels of radicalism.

It must be reiterated that, since the launching of the confrontations, the government has offered dialogue. This offer has been answered with more violence. Violence, as the President of the Republic has stated, does not yield greater freedom nor more democracy, only hatred and political obstinancy. Despite this, there is a willingness to deal benevolently and even to consider a pardon for those who abandon hostilities and any form of violence.

The government reiterates its irreversible commitment to defend the state of law, reject violence, appeal to peaceful dialogue, and dedicate itself to solving the social challenges that should be a common objective and the patriotic response of the entire nation.