

EIR Reviews

CFR issues program for a U.N. dictatorship

by Linda de Hoyos

Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts

Edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch
Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York,
1993
403 pages, paperbound, \$17.95

Enforcing Restraint is "must" reading for any patriotic person in a position of policymaking, particularly those in the developing countries. Conceived and published as it is by the New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the sister institution in the United States to the London Royal Institute of International Affairs, the book's audience would appear to be those in the United Nations bureaucracy and in U.S. government and think-tanks who have already discarded notions such as natural law and the sovereign nation-state. In its attempt to muster arguments for "collective intervention in internal conflicts," the book is a preview of the "legal" blandishments that are being fashioned to force others to toss out such principles and accept U.N. Security Council dictatorship over their countries.

The book consists of a series of essays on points of international law that require work in order to fully legitimize armed intervention by the United Nations. The middle section of the book is devoted to case studies of "enforcing restraint" in "Yugoslavia," Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, and Cambodia. Contributors notably include Domingo Acevedo and Tom J. Farer, experts on the Organization of American States and international law at American University. American University's international law and "democracy project"

was the headquarters for the production of the "Bush Manual," also known as *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, by Lewis Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial, which has served as the manual for the dismantlement of the sovereign militaries of the Ibero-American countries.

Enforcing Restraint wastes no time getting to the point. Max Kampelman, author of the Foreword, evokes the image of humanity now plunging into a "new dark age," and implies that collective intervention is required to save civilization. But there's a hitch: "For hundreds of years, international society has been organized on the basis of separate sovereign states whose territorial integrity and political independence are guaranteed by international law. The United Nations charter, in embodying and reflecting the values of the state system, reaffirmed the principles of non-use of force across international boundaries and non-intervention in internal affairs. . . . But do these principles possibly impede a collective response to equally brutal warfare occurring *within* national boundaries?" (emphasis in original).

Thus, the book's purpose is to find ways to circumvent this commitment to the nation. Tom Farer, writing an essay on "Legitimate Intervention," notes that before 1990, such challenges to the nation-state were inconceivable: "The Gulf War seems to have functioned as the inaugural event of a new political age." Now, as Lori Fisler Damrosch concludes in the final essay of the book, "Instead of the view that interventions in internal conflicts must be presumptively illegitimate, the prevailing trend today is to take seriously the claim that the international community ought to intercede to prevent bloodshed with whatever means are available."

If the trend is to abrogate the concept of national sovereignty, then to whom is this authority to be relinquished?

Kampelman supplies the answer: "What is clear is that there is a shifting line [of intervention] and it is evident that it is the U.N. Security Council, which, by its decisions, places the legal imprimatur between what is justifiable and unjustifiable international intervention."

But the "U.N. Security Council" is not a homogeneous body; in reality, the legitimacy once possessed by the nation-state is handed over to the Permanent Members of the Security Council—the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China, with the two former colonial powers of Great Britain and France—all of which are well-armed nuclear-weapon states. In short, power is turned over to the "Big Five" with the implicit threat of both economic and military pressure exerted against any nation which might protest.

Secondly, the Security Council itself has become the target of pressure by the United Nations bureaucracy, now led by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Beginning with Boutros-Ghali himself, whose grandfather signed over Egypt to the British in 1899, the U.N. bureaucracy, as *EIR* has documented in other locations, is composed primarily of either direct representatives of the British-European oligarchies and American offspring, or by Oxford-Cambridge-Sussex University coopted compradors of the British Commonwealth. All of these people are wedded to the notion that the rights of usury, through the instrument of such U.N. organizations as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, retain a higher value than the sanctity of human life.

The Trilateral Commission, along with Boutros-Ghali himself, has recommended that the U.N. maintain its own standing army to operate at the will of the Big Five. This option is not a point of contention with the authors of *Enforcing Restraint*. Their concern is merely to define ways to gain acceptance for such one-world strategems.

Outcome-based diplomacy

The language itself of *Enforcing Restraint* helps explain how the concept of outcome-based education (OBE), in which the goal of the student is to aid in creating and then abiding by a "consensus," was hatched at the U.N.-headquartered Lucis Trust. As knowledge and truth are thrown out the window by the OBE brainwashers, so in the world of *Enforcing Restraint*, natural law, the sanctity of human life, the sovereignty of the nation-state, and truth (not to mention economic development, which bit the dust a long time ago), are shoved to the side. Instead, as Farer asserts, law is treated as "a matter of degree, the degree of consensus and of clarity about what behavior is demanded, permitted, or proscribed."

Debate revolves around such terms as "the normative." "The normative" means what people are currently willing to "take" (at the point of a gun) from the oligarchy. Damrosch, for instance, happily notes in the introduction, "On the normative dimension, our case studies establish that large segments of the international community have been willing to

endorse strong collective action in a wide range of situations . . . genocide; interference with delivery of humanitarian relief; violations of ceasefire agreements; collapse of civil order; and irregular interruption of democratic governance."

In conclusion, Damrosch shows the way in which the U.N. bureaucracy and its backers are hoping to play the same role as the "brainwasher-facilitator" of the OBE classroom: "As the focus shifts from unilateral intervention to collective involvement, the values of conflict containment and autonomy implicit in the non-intervention *norm* should not and need not be abandoned. . . . Among these reasons are the desirability of allowing the institution [the U.N. or subsidiary regional organization] to play the role of 'honest broker' and to hold itself available for good offices or mediation functions. . . . Strengthening of the *norm enforcement function* is ultimately critical for the maturation of international society" (emphasis added).

The overall concept as outlined by Damrosch is to shift the "norms" inch by inch toward the one-world dictatorship that the CFR and like bodies desire. For this reason, Damrosch opposes the creation of new treaties that would "pin down" the norms: "I favor allowing trends to continue to develop and *precedents to accumulate*, without any explicit move in the near term to change existing legal texts. Gradual growth in the Security Council's powers is fully consistent with methodologies of [current] treaty interpretation."

The media also have a significant role to play in the "gradual accretion of precedents" sought by Damrosch. She notes that "televised images of fleeing Kurds and starving Somalis galvanized the international community for action." And Jeffrey Clark of the U.S. Committee on Refugees and the Carter Center notes in his case study of Somalia that "the 'CNN factor' simply did not allow the U.N. and the international community to continue avoiding action as the situation deteriorated." In short, media manipulation of suffering is consciously deployed as a weapon of the one-worlders. As in the OBE classroom, molding perception, not seeking truth, is the objective.

Aristotelian calculus

From the standpoint of their overall goals, the legalists of the U.N. dictatorship then spin off sub-criteria as justification for acts of force against populations. This is most evident in the chapter by Damrosch on the subject of the "civilian impact of economic sanctions." She is forced to admit that "there is the perception, and possibly the reality, that the sanctions, rather than the crises to which they respond, have created humanitarian emergencies."

Ergo, clear criteria must be agreed upon for action. There is the "conflict containment criterion" which must be weighed against the "differentiation criterion," which is then broken down into the "civilian impact criterion (absolute form); wrongdoer impact criterion (absolute form); and wrongdoer/civilian impact criterion (relative form). Once

these parameters have been established, the logic maze to reach the goal—justification for economic sanctions—is not too difficult to reach.

The sticking point is the civilian impact criterion/absolute form, which evidently states that “a program of economic sanctions should not diminish the standard of living of a significant [a word certainly open to “interpretation”] segment of society below the subsistence level” which leads to death. Damrosch is quick to point out that this does not mean that the international community is responsible to ensure a “subsistence standard of living.” Once the criteria are named, then it is just a matter of seeing into which slot a sanctions policy fits. Damrosch emphasizes: “Conceivably, a program with adverse relative effects, or even adverse absolute effects, might have to be tolerated—reluctantly—in deference to the value of containing conflict, which in my view is and should remain hierarchically superior.”

In addition, Damrosch calls for arms embargos against both sides in a conflict. This translates into stated justification for the U.N.-enforced arms embargo against Bosnia, making it impossible for Bosnia to defend itself against Serb aggression. This is but one of many instances in which the abstract legalities of Damrosch can be easily “interpreted” to serve the geopolitical interests of the Big Five—in this case, Great Britain.

And in the case of Iraq, Damrosch says, the embargo has been used for geopolitical ends: “The embargo formally applies to all of Iraq’s territory, but the actual situation is one of de facto autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan, policed by coalition troops operating out of Turkey.”

Another peculiar benefit of arms embargos to the U.N. dictators is that it weakens a potential adversarial force if U.N. multilateral military intervention becomes necessary down the line, as Damrosch points out. This is by no means irrelevant. It must be recalled that colonialist forces took over entire areas in Africa and Asia on invitation from one local force under attack from another. The colonialist possessions were first called “protectorates” before becoming full-fledged colonies. The imposition of U.N. forces introduces the same danger, as Farer is at least honest enough to point out: “Indeed, as it has evolved, the U.N. operation in Somalia has passed far beyond old-fashioned peacekeeping, beyond peace enforcement, to something approaching a de facto trusteeship.”

The Big Lie

Alongside the legal abstractions, the book’s case studies are a picture of candidness. Reading them, one cannot escape the conclusion that in each case, the situation would have been solved more quickly and with less loss of life if the United Nations or its regional surrogates had left the targeted country alone.

In the case of Somalia, the case study, while obfuscating the western backing given to President Siad Barre’s opposi-

tion, does relate how the U.N. pulled up stakes as soon as Barre had been overthrown and declined any intervention until the political and physical situation in the country had completely broken down. Even then, the U.N. intervention was one misadventure after another.

The case of former Yugoslavia is notorious, as the U.N. secretary general, in league with neutral negotiators such as “Dr. Death” Lord Owen, have ensured the prolongation of the war, to the advantage of the Serbs.

In Liberia, Ecomog intervention prolonged a war that was almost over, thus broadening the war to not only encompass more forces in Liberia (the resurgence of forces loyal to the deceased leader Samuel Doe), but ensured that the war spread into Sierra Leone.

In Cambodia, the U.N. forces intervened to protect the genocidal Khmer Rouge when the newly established government forces were at the point of removing the Khmer Rouge from Pailin, the main source of the rebel group’s economic and hence military strength.

And in Haiti, the U.N. has simply been used to impose a “democracy” on the country, in keeping with the Bush Manual project to destroy the military forces of the entire Ibero-American continent, no matter the enormous suffering of the Haitian people.

If anything, the case studies demonstrate the continued inefficacy and immorality of U.N. “legitimate interventions.” Such ineptitude is deliberate and calculating. The reality is that “peacekeeping” is the guise through which any institutional opposition to one-world dictatorship is to be eliminated.

All the authors agree that the current level of multilateral interventions into countries would have been impossible during the Cold War. “The constellation of forces backing the post-colonial status quo rejected any and every justification for secession,” notes Farer. Since 1945, Nigeria, Uganda, and Indonesia have been among the countries that faced massive loss of life in internal wars or unrest. In the case of Bangladesh’s declaration of independence from Pakistan, only a Soviet veto protected India from a Security Council resolution forcing India to withdraw when it went to defend Bangladeshi civilians.

Now, in the post-Cold War era, the U.N. dictators are rushing to build up the precedents and acceptance for their control over world affairs. It should not be surprising, given the utopian presumptions of the authors, that reality is being overlooked. First, the collapse of the biggest speculative bubble in human history is about to bring the U.N.-stamped international monetary system to an abrupt end. Second, the shock therapy policies of the U.N.’s sister agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, can be expected to force a backlash in Russia and possibly in China, throwing the post-Cold War geopolitical chessboard up in the air. But as long as that reality remains obscured, the perception game of the U.N. legalists continues to hold sway.