

## Now, the Bush crowd's 'autopilot' has to go

by Mel Klenetsky

Extraordinarily loud transatlantic screams and howls have been heard in certain political circles from London to Washington, D.C. in the aftermath of President Clinton's trip to Europe in early July. The London press snarled and gnashed at the U.S. President the minute he made his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Clinton was declaring a new foreign policy, a new special relationship with Germany and with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Republican National Committee Foreign Policy Forum, held in Washington two weeks later, echoed the concerns expressed in the British press, albeit in a more subdued form.

During his European trip, Clinton endorsed the notion of a strong Europe, with Germany as the economic and political centerpiece. He expressed great hope that Germany and the United States would define a policy for working with Russia and the East. Clinton also expressed support for a strengthened Franco-German relationship. These expressions of good will and hope for Europe's future that Clinton put forward on July 11 and 12 set off the most venomous spate of articles in the British press.

In a recent issue, a British newsweekly, the *Economist*, picked up on these themes with the following commentary: "Early indulgence towards a young President who needs time to learn his job is giving way to a sense that Mr. Clinton may be congenitally feeble on foreign policy and incorrigibly indecisive at home." President Clinton has challenged the British special relationship, therefore the enmity.

That challenge came most strikingly during the President's trip to Europe. On July 11, Clinton held a press conference in Bonn, during which he spoke of a "German-American partnership" and of the "unique" relationship between the two countries. He stressed that his talks with Kohl had involved "Europe's other half," and mentioned central and

eastern Europe, including Poland, the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and other countries. These were areas which Clinton and Kohl are seeking to "integrate" into Europe, especially in economic terms.

On the following day, Clinton met with Jacques Delors, the outgoing president of the European Commission. Clinton praised the Delors plan, which outlined a vast program of European infrastructure, especially high-speed rail links, as the way to reduce joblessness. The Delors plan echoes key features of earlier proposals by Lyndon H. LaRouche. In contrast to British opposition and hatred of Delors, Clinton, at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Kohl and Delors, only had praise, saying, "I want to particularly applaud President Delors for the white paper he issued on jobs and growth in the European Union. . . . We talked quite a bit today about how we can further develop our cooperation."

The British press gave these statements front-page coverage. The headline of the London *Guardian* read: "U.S. Cuts British Special Link, Clinton Turns His Eyes to Germany." The *Guardian's* Bonn correspondent, David Gow, wrote: "President Clinton effectively ended the United States' special relationship with Great Britain, instead offering Germany a unique partnership with the world's leading power in forging a united Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." The British press agency Reuters reported that Clinton had "named Bonn as the main U.S. ally in Europe, pushing Britain's fading 'special relationship' into the background."

At a July 27 policy seminar at the Capitol Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C., 1996 presidential pre-candidate Lyndon LaRouche discussed the potential of Clinton's statements during his trip for upsetting Britain's geopolitical apoplexy.

"I would not suggest that the President has established a new policy," said LaRouche, but, "I would suggest that he has established an impetus toward a new policy, and has taken a number of concrete steps to institutionalize that." LaRouche added this caution: "Throughout this [Clinton] government, there are many parts of the Bush administration still running around on autopilot; and, until those are cleaned out or overwhelmed, it is going to be extremely difficult, and precarious, to establish new policy."

### **Bushmen follow London's lead**

It was hardly accidental that, within two weeks of Clinton's trip, Bush networks in the Republican National Committee convened a high-powered foreign policy seminar—which took place the same day as LaRouche's Washington seminar—to blast the Clinton administration's foreign policy. The speakers were former secretaries of state James Baker and Henry Kissinger, former defense secretary Richard Cheney, and former ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Except for a few indirect allusions, the speakers carefully avoided mention of what was motivating their attacks—namely, their fear that Clinton is threatening to shift from an Anglo-American axis to a new, unique German-American alliance—and instead focused their criticism on the President's handling of crises that in fact were all set into motion during the Bush gang's occupancy of the White House.

Secretary Baker indirectly touched on their true concern when he criticized Clinton for granting a visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, earlier this year. This concession to the Irish Republican faction triggered outrage from British circles who saw the action as the harbinger of the breakup of the Anglo-American special tie.

Cheney, a likely candidate for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination, also obliquely hit at the new dynamic set in motion by Clinton, when he criticized Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's comment that Russia needed "less shock and more therapy." Cheney maintained that Talbott's remarks, made last December after the Russian elections, undermined the efforts of Russia's "economic performers," i.e., Yegor Gaidar and the shock therapy crowd.

Henry Kissinger (who in May 1982 pronounced himself to be a British agent, in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs), also leaped to the defense of his British masters at the Republican seminar. Kissinger substituted the term "Atlantic Alliance" for "Anglo-American alliance," but his meaning was clear enough. Referring to the Clinton administration's foreign policy reorientation, Kissinger whined: "The Atlantic Alliance has been the most permanent feature of the postwar foreign policy. . . . We should not jettison lightly the Atlantic relationships that have been established."

The Republicans' criticisms of Clinton's foreign policy failures in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and North Korea were mere subterfuge—with much hypocrisy thrown in for good

measure. After all, these situations have emerged as crises precisely because of the Bush crowd's commitment to British-style geopolitics, and because Clinton has so far been unwilling to make a total break with the Bush legacy.

The true issue at the Republican seminar was the Atlantic relationship and the nuclear arrangements between the superpowers. Kissinger and his crowd are not happy with the emerging new set of relationships, and would like to return to a revamped form of the old Anglo-American-Russian nuclear condominium—a fact made evident by their attacks on Clinton for defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis.

President Clinton's European visit brought the unresolved issues of foreign policy in the post-Cold War period into the limelight. The failure of Margaret Thatcher and George Bush's shock-therapy asset-stripping program toward Moscow and the East became evident in October 1993, when Yeltsin destroyed the Parliament.

Shock therapy was the post-Cold War version of British geopolitical strategy: Keep the powers of Europe in a divided and weakened state. A strong Russia and a unified Germany working together was not and is not in the British plan. This is why Thatcher, according to her memoirs, tried to stop German unification. If President Clinton moves in the direction of the Delors plan and LaRouche's European Productive Triangle proposal for economic development, it will end not only the U.S.-British special relationship, but also two centuries of British balance of power geopolitics.

At his July 27 seminar, LaRouche discussed the Clinton-Kohl meetings in the following terms: "Russia has the lowest population density of any industrialized nation on this planet. Therefore, it means that the distance between two points in the production network, is greater than any other part of the planet. Therefore, to have production which is competitive technologically, you must have an efficient transport system, and a reliable high-speed transport system.

"The same thing is true throughout eastern Europe; the same thing is true of China. Infrastructure is primary. . . . If we're going to do that, to have growth, where is the greatest amount of labor to produce wealth? I suggest to you about 1.3 billion people in China; I suggest to you over a billion people in South Asia. . . . How do you develop that?

"You develop that, by starting with the ancient center of the most advanced productive potential on the planet, developed, actually, by Charlemagne, which is the Triangle. . . . That center of Europe is the greatest concentration of productive potential on this planet. Develop that, pump in high technology, to build it up. . . . Therefore, the integration of an East-West link, of the type proposed by [French minister] Hanotaux and [Russian minister] Witte, at the end of the last century. . . . is the way in which to do this. Therefore, we must have an integrated Eurasia development program, based on infrastructure."

Should Clinton go in this direction, the Bush-Thatcher crowd would be washed up once and for all.